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Abstract 
This thesis illuminates two underexplored facets of Plato’s notion of right measure in 
the Statesman: the cognitive role of imagery and the correct leadership of minds for 
individuals and political communities. 
The central chapters of this thesis argue that the cognitive function of images is 
grounded on their well-articulated combination. The first and last chapters serve to 
frame this study of imagery within the main subject of the dialogue, namely the correct 
guidance of human minds. This study is thus divided in five chapters that explore the 
different facets of right measure in different contexts. 
The first chapter examines the structure of the Statesman as representing a disrupted 
dialectical process aimed at discovering the right measure of philosophical judgments. 
The second chapter studies the notions of paradeigmata and eikones as images to be 
artfully combined in a cohesive, measured whole. The third chapter accounts for the 
value of mythical paidia as productive of a clash of images that corrects excesses and 
invites to seek for measured judgments. The fourth chapter examines Plato’s usage of 
contrasting images of divine steering and cosmic balance to represent an expert 
communication of inner harmony. Finally, the last chapter returns to the Statesman as a 
whole, examining how Plato represents education and educational leadership as 
communication of a well-composed balance to the mind and to the political community.  
This project illuminates a frequently overlooked of Plato’s philosophy: its nuanced and 
flexible attention to the guidance of human minds in need of psychological and political 
equilibrium. 
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At the still point of the turning world. Neither flesh nor fleshless; 
Neither from nor towards; at the still point, there the dance is, 
But neither arrest nor movement. And do not call it fixity, 
Where past and future are gathered. Neither movement from nor towards, 
Neither ascent nor decline. Except for the point, the still point, 
There would be no dance, and there is only the dance. 
(T. S. Eliot, Burnt Norton)  
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General Introduction 
This project illuminates two underexplored aspects of Plato’s notion of right measure 
(τὸ μέτριον) in the Statesman: the cognitive role of imagery and the correct leadership 
of minds for individuals and political communities. My focus on the Statesman has 
revealed that, in this dialogue, the notion of right measure is inseparable from images as 
much as from psychological guidance. Plato furnishes an account of right measure in 
the very central section of this dialogue (277a3-287b3), presenting it as the criterion for 
judging (among other things) whether images and models are correct and enlightening 
or excessive and misleading instruments. Nonetheless, he offers no conclusive 
definition of right measure, either in the Statesman or elsewhere.1 No grasp of this 
concept is possible without interpreting Plato’s meandering writing style, which 
includes dialogical interchanges, critical reflections, images, examples, and frequent 
errors and corrections. The nuances of his stance on right measure are best clarified by 
exploring its different facets in different contexts, seeking to tease out their contextual 
relevance rather than universal definitions. This thesis is thus an effort of textual 
interpretation that focuses on two different but interwoven issues. I have chosen to 
explore right measure in the two concrete instances of cognitive imagery and leadership 
of minds, offering a detailed examination of the various ways in which Plato represents 
right measure as the underlying principle of correct guidance of the human mind. 
In order to support this reading, I will articulate my thesis along two lines: (a) a 
study of the educational leadership of minds presented in the Statesman; and (b) a study 
of the cognitive role of imagery in this dialogue. These two aspects are inextricably 
interwoven, insofar as Plato has constantly represented through images and models how 
a correct leadership works, but also presented imagery as an instrument to educate and 
lead the mind towards knowledge. While imagery constitutes the central subject of this 
thesis, the most enlightening way of interpreting it is, I propose, to present it within the 
broader context of the dialogue. Therefore, I shall frame the main object of my 
dissertation, namely imagery, within the broader concern with measured psychological 
leadership. The first and last chapters of my thesis will provide this conceptual frame, 
showing how Plato has explored the right measure of individual and collective 
guidance, either as a criterion of correct philosophical and political judgments (Chapter 
1) or as a criterion of psychological and political equilibrium (Chapter 5). In both cases, 
Plato’s concern is how to produce a correct psychological condition, which underlies 
                                                             
1 Bontempi, 2009, pp.23-26; Brumbaugh, 1962, p.167. 
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both successful philosophical inquiries and good political orders. In the central chapters 
(2, 3, and 4) I will show that in the Statesman (277a3-278e11) Plato has presented 
images and models as cognitive instruments useful to lead the mind closer to the truth, 
insofar as they are part of the human ‘experience about knowledge’ (τὸ περὶ τῆς 
ἐπιστήμης πάθος, 277d7). I will argue that this cognitive function does not consist in 
providing a unique or direct access to truth, but rather in creating a measured middle 
ground between the extremes of definitive knowledge and complete confusion, 
correcting excesses in thought and language, and opening novel perspectives without 
triggering disorientation. Ultimately, my thesis will show that Plato’s main concern in 
this dialogue is with good leadership: a correct guidance that seeks to counteract 
excesses and promote the achievement of balance between detrimental extremes, 
namely a measured condition, within individuals and communities alike. 
 In the following sections, I will illustrate the methodological stance of my thesis 
in relation to right measure (section 1) and to my two lines of study: leadership of minds 
(section 2) and imagery (section 3). In addition, I will present a review of the most 
recent scholarly contributions to these fields of inquiry (4). 
 
0.1. The Underlying Philosophical Principle of the Statesman – Right Measure 
The notions of a right measure (μέτριον) and of a normative measure (μέτρον)2 of every 
good and fine reality pervade Plato’s entire corpus, and they are present in any aspect of 
his philosophy.3 In general, Plato presents right measure as a normative principle of 
wise, reasonable, and intelligent actions, and to well-composed, harmonious or balanced 
realities (artefacts, physical phenomena, discourses, good psychological states and 
political communities) as the results of such actions. Throughout his dialogues, he 
explores the possibility of finding an objective philosophical criterion for correct, good, 
and beautiful activities and of determining its range of validity. In the Statesman, he 
                                                             
2 For the distinction between right measure and measure in itself, cf. Sayre, 2006, pp.142-3 and 171-190; 
Migliori, 1996, pp.340-342. Plato uses the adjective μέτριον to indicate indifferently ‘what is in due 
measure’ or the principle of right measure conceived more abstractly. ‘Measure’ (μέτρον) itself denotes 
rational exactness and an absolute principle of cosmic and ethical order; however, it is only mentioned 
twice in the Statesman (269c6; 284b1) and never accounted for independently from right measure. 
Therefore, its definition lies beyond the scope of this study. 
3 Bontempi (2009) has shown the pervasiveness of the language of measure in Plato’s corpus (see her 
Appendix, pp.329-368, for a complete terminological list). In her introduction to this study, Linda 
Napolitano Valditara has remarked that the ‘centrality’ of right measure in all of Plato’s dialogues is 
typical of ancient Greek culture in general, which was broadly characterised by polar notions such as 
limit-excess, norm-hubris, harmony-disharmony (p.5, tr. mine). On the notions related to measure in 
ancient Greek culture, cf. Tredé-Boulmer, 1992; Senzasono, 1983; Schaefer, 1981; Prier, 1976; Kurz, 
1970; Koyré, 1967; Pohlenz, 1965. 
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presents right measure as the criterion of every expert practical activity, namely every 
art that succeeds in producing something good; this principle is a measure not in the 
mathematical sense of quantitative determinations as such (like numbers, lengths or 
velocities), but in the sense of a normative but flexible standard for the generation of 
good and fine realities (283e-284e). The notion of right measure thus contrasts moral 
and epistemological relativism, of the kind promoted by rhetoricians or sophists such as 
Gorgias and Protagoras, whereby no independent norm of behaviour and truth exists or 
can be found. Indeed, Plato’s philosophy can be seen as an ongoing effort to contrast the 
relativistic idea that ‘man is the measure of all things’ (πάντων χρημάτων ἄνθρωπον 
μέτρον εἶναι, Theaet. 160d9),4 as Protagoras argued, in ethical, aesthetical and 
epistemological terms. By contrast, Plato seeks to identify – as far as possible – a 
normative principle of truth, goodness, and beauty, rejecting absolute arbitrariness but 
also embracing the uncertainties of genuine inquiry. 
Given the broad range of philosophical concerns related to right measure, this 
notion has been examined, even in the Statesman alone, under different respects: 
metaphysics,5 dialectic,6 philosophical education,7 rhetoric,8 moral psychology and 
politics.9 To my knowledge, only Milena Bontempi (2009) has completed a synoptic 
study of this concept in Plato’s philosophy, outlining it as a flexible standard of correct 
organisation of discourses, psychological states and, in particular, political constitutions 
(pp.178-196). According to current scholarly agreement, outlined in Section 0.4.1., the 
Statesman presents it as a normative principle of contextual correctness (opportunity, 
adequacy) and avoidance/correction of excesses and deficiencies in practical and 
theoretical contexts. The question of how its various aspects are related is nonetheless 
far from settled, and it is even doubtful whether it can be settled once and for all. 
In the Statesman, indeed, right measure appears as inherently multifaceted and 
difficult to define univocally. Plato here juxtaposes various synonyms for the same 
principle: ‘right measure, the fitting, the opportune, the needful, and everything that 
                                                             
4 That Plato’s philosophy constitutes a challenge to sophistic relativism is undoubted, but the precise 
scope of this challenge is more problematic. For instance, Guthrie (1971) considers Plato’s idealism as 
radically hostile to sophistic scepticism (pp.50-52). Gomperz (1901) considers the same hostility as 
grounded on Plato’s preference for the Socratic method of inquiry (v.1, pp.418-422). Differently, Capizzi 
(1955) argues that Plato’s response to sophistry is an act of mediation between scepticism and dogmatism 
(pp.404-6). On the nuances of the sophistic notion of opportune measure, see also Untersteiner (1996); 
Neumann (1938), and cf. Bontempi (2009), p.373, n.34. 
5 Sayre, 2006; Migliori, 1996. 
6 Lafrance, 1995. 
7 Santa-Cruz, 1995. 
8 Tordesillas, 1995. 
9 Lane, 1998 and 1995. 
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removes itself from the extremes to the middle’ (284e6-8; tr. Rowe, adapted).10 This 
terminological variety testifies Plato’s awareness that this principle cannot be naïvely 
reduced to a single account. Accordingly, Bontempi (2009) has observed that it 
possesses an ‘essentially prismatic character’ (p.140, tr. mine): right measure is 
irreducible to any single definition but needs – by its very nature – to be investigated in 
distinct contexts, under different respects.11 This approach does not necessarily contrast 
unitary definitions of right measure. It restrains us, however, from drawing univocal 
conclusions that might obscure the inherent variety of this principle. Acknowledging the 
prismatic character of right measure is not only a matter of interpretive prudence, but 
also a method for illuminating and articulating its complexity. 
In agreement with this view, I will contribute to the current debate on right 
measure by teasing out its various instances in the Statesman, in order to show that it 
constitutes the underlying philosophical principle of this dialogue. I will analyse it 
under different respects: as a criterion of philosophical and political judgment (Chapter 
1); as the middle-point between radical confusion and complete knowledge provided by 
imagery (Chapter 2); as the playful yet troubling convergence of opposite images in the 
myth (Chapter 3); as the delicate condition of cosmic balance (Chapter 4); and as the 
correct composition of both the individual mind and the social order (Chapter 5). My 
programme will be to avoid conflating all of these instances under a univocal and 
conclusive definition. This stance respects the explicit methodological indication of the 
leading character in the Statesman, the Eleatic Stranger:  
[I mean] that at some time we shall need what has now been said with regard to 
the demonstration about what is itself precisely exact. But as for what is being 
shown beautifully and sufficiently with regard to our present concerns, this 
account seems to me to assist us in a magnificent fashion: that we must equally 
consider that all the arts exist and, at the same time, that greater and less are 
measured not only in relation to each other but also in relation to the generation 
of what is in due measure.  
ὥς ποτε δεήσει τοῦ νῦν λεχθέντος πρὸς τὴν περὶ αὐτὸ τἀκριβὲς ἀπόδειξιν. ὅτι 
δὲ πρὸς τὰ νῦν καλῶς καὶ ἱκανῶς δείκνυται, δοκεῖ μοι βοηθεῖν μεγαλοπρεπῶς 
ἡμῖν οὗτος ὁ λόγος, ὡς ἄρα ἡγητέον ὁμοίως τὰς τέχνας πάσας εἶναι, μεῖζόν τε 
                                                             
10 Cf. Bontempi, 2009, p.140. 
11 See also: Sayre, 2006, pp.147-148 and 171-173; Lane, 1998, p.186; Migliori, 1996, pp.120-121; 
Lafrance, 1995, pp.93-94; Santa Cruz, 1995, pp.193-194. 
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ἅμα καὶ ἔλαττον μετρεῖσθαι μὴ πρὸς ἄλληλα μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς τὴν τοῦ 
μετρίου γένεσιν (284d1-6, tr. Rowe, adapted). 
The Stranger here posits that every art is based on the normative criterion of right 
measure and on the objective of producing well-measured objects. He presents this 
account as a helpful one, capable to assist (βοηθεῖν) the inquirers in their search for the 
political art. Therefore, he is admittedly not concerned with absolute exactness. In fact, 
he clearly distinguishes complete demonstration (ἀπόδειξιν) of what is exact from the 
act of having shown sufficiently (ἱκανῶς δείκνυται) that right measure is a helpful 
criterion to give account of any kind of expertise. The approach that Plato takes in the 
Statesman is not dogmatic, but exploratory and reliant on sufficient and instrumental 
accounts, without claims to complete knowledge. Right measure fully belongs to the 
field of sufficiency, adequacy, and approximation to truth, rather then to complete 
exactness.12 Again, this does not mean that we cannot reach cohesive conclusions about 
it. It means, rather, that our understanding of it cannot rest on the surface-level of 
conclusive definitions and doctrines, but benefits from constantly problematizing every 
single account. When I speak of ‘underlying philosophical principle’, thus, I do not 
refer to esoteric or unwritten doctrines hidden behind Plato’s exoteric writing, but to a 
notion that must be shown, case by case, to operate in particular contexts without claims 
to absolute closure. 
 
0.2. Line of Study (a): Leadership of Minds 
The Statesman tackles two interwoven concerns: (1) the definition of correct political 
leadership, as its subject-matter; and (2) the educational methods of philosophical 
inquiry, represented in its dialogue-scene. The dialogue scene represents an Eleatic 
Stranger who didactically leads the character of Young Socrates (namesake of the older 
philosopher) in the effort of ‘discovering the path to statecraft’ (τὴν οὖν πολιτικὴν 
ἀτραπὸν […] ἀνευρήσει, 258c3, tr. Rowe, adapted). He resorts to different methods of 
inquiry and frequent digressions, while the youth is mostly (but not always) a quiet 
recipient of his discourses. The main methods on which the Stranger relies are diairesis 
(division in couples of mutually exclusive ideas)13 and paradeigmata (models used to 
                                                             
12 For the distinct notions of exactness and right measure in ancient Greece, cf. Kurz, 1970 and Koyré, 
1967. 
13 Sayre, 2006, pp.11-15; Pender, 2000, pp.47-48. 
13 
 
represent a certain common feature between two distinct objects).14 Elizabeth Pender 
(2000), accordingly, has observed that the ‘art of recognising likenesses and differences 
underpins much of the discussion’ in the Statesman (p.47). The process of collection 
and division constitutes the methodological focus of this dialogue. 
Scholars often consider this process as the central doctrine of the Statesman.15 
Plato’s attention to methods in this dialogue, however, is as undeniable as it is 
problematic: the complexities of political life, to which Plato dedicates various books in 
the Republic and the Laws, become here mainly the object of formal categorisations, 
they are seldom explored in extensive detail, and never truly debated. Accordingly, 
Lane (1998) has observed that the ‘discourse on political theory’ in the Statesman seems 
‘pallid beside the poignancy of the Apology or the Crito, the vitriol of the Gorgias, the 
grandeur of the Republic, and the monumentality of the Laws’ (pp.1-2).16 While other 
dialogues leave extensive room for debate about political doctrines and for exploring the 
nuances of political leadership, the Statesman may appear unduly austere in its didactic 
approach to its subject matter. Lane has responded to this problem by observing that the 
political art addressed in this dialogue is, like philosophy, the ability to discover the 
various differences between those who live in the city and to combine them in the best 
possible way. This similarity, Lane observes, grants the unity between philosophical 
methods and political practices in the Statesman (pp.201-202).17 Albeit certainly austere 
and somewhat didactic, the Statesman constitutes a consistent exploration of both 
philosophical methods and political actions. 
While philosophical methods in the Statesman have been extensively studied, a 
further philosophical concern of Plato’s has not received extensive attention: the correct 
and expert guidance of the human mind. I aim to show that the educational scene and 
political argument of this dialogue are connected not only by Plato’s concern with 
collection and division, but also by his attention to the condition of the human mind, 
both at the individual and at the social level. In the Statesman, Plato presents the correct 
guidance of minds either from the individual angle of philosophical education or from 
the political angle of correct leadership. He explicitly presents the usage of images and 
models as a tool to manage what happens in ‘our soul’ (ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχὴ, 278c8)18 when it 
                                                             
14 Sayre, 2006, pp.28-35; Pender, 2000, pp.48-49. 
15 E.g.: Sayre, 2006, pp.28-35; Lane, 1998, pp.201-202; Migliori, 1996, pp.198-199; Rowe, 1995a, pp.8-
11; Santa Cruz, 1995, pp.191-193, Taylor, 1961, p.9. Contra Stefanini, 1949, pp.216-218. 
16 Cf. Rowe, 2000, pp.171-178; Santa Cruz, 1995, pp.190-193. 
17 Cf. Pender, 2000, p.48. 
18 Cf. 258c7; 286a2. 
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seeks for knowledge, and politics as, first and foremost, an art of leading the 
dispositions ‘in the souls’ (ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς, 307c6)19 of the citizens towards harmonious 
coexistence. This connection has gone hitherto unremarked despite the extensive 
scholarship on this dialogue. The widespread focus on formal methods, rather, has 
obscured Plato’s pervasive concern with ‘the right measure internal to the soul’ 
(Bontempi, 2009, p.188, tr. mine) as much as to political orders. Nonetheless, it can be 
shown that Plato’s interest in moral psychology, in the mind’s need for correct 
orientation and thus for expert guidance, is a fundamental element in the composition 
and doctrine of Statesman. 
 The first and last chapters of my thesis are designed to outline this element of 
psychological (cognitive and emotional) guidance. Chapter 1 will focus on the 
articulation of the Statesman as a whole, demonstrating how Plato has presented this 
philosophical inquiry as a series of organised disruptions that coincide with moments of 
critical reflection. I will show that this organisation is philosophically significant, 
insofar as each moment of reflection, constitutes an instance in which philosophical and 
political problems need to refer to right measure as a criterion of judgment. I will thus 
show that Plato has artfully represented the activity of the inquiring mind as inherently 
open to disruption, and in need of right measure whenever it stands ‘in the middle’ of 
divergent alternatives. Chapter 5 will focus, instead, on the parallel between the 
portrayal of cognitive processes and political dynamics. I will demonstrate that Plato 
has represented them both as in need of balance: on the one hand, the inquiring mind, 
dragged around by apparently digressive discourses, needs to attain a stable, well-
composed movement; on the other hand, the minds of the citizens inclining to courage 
and moderation need to work as mutual counterweights in order to achieve a stable self-
regulation. Right measure will thus appear as the dynamic middle point between 
complete confusion and definitive stability. 
 
0.3. Line of Study (b): Cognitive Imagery 
The Statesman presents imagery as a cognitive instrument suitable to leading the mind 
towards knowledge and truth. This dialogue relies on various images and models for the 
political art, and on an elaborate myth composed of various traditional images. The 
character of the Stranger indeed variously assimilates the statesman to producers of 
                                                             
19 Cf. 309c2; 309c7; 309d10; 310d10. 
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goods, herdsmen, weavers, trainers of gymnastic, doctors and helmsmen, and he uses 
some of these images in the construction of his myth.  The Stranger explains at 277a3-
287b3 that the usage of ‘models’ (παραδείγμασι, 277d1) is integral to ‘the experience 
about knowledge’ (τὸ περὶ τῆς ἐπιστήμης πάθος, 277d7) entailed by this philosophical 
inquiry. Moreover, he claims that his myth is as effective as conceptual divisions in 
making an individual ‘more capable to discover’ (εὑρετικώτερον, 286e2)20 some truth 
about philosophical problems. My purpose will be to account for these claims, 
expanding the most recent scholarly contributions (outlined below) through close 
textual analyses of his theories about imagery and of the inherent articulation of the 
various images he uses. 
The fundamental problem to tackle when addressing Plato’s imagery is its 
definition. To study imagery, indeed, means to address a flexible object with no clear-
cut boundaries. In addition, in the philosopher’s corpus we find no univocal definition 
of what an image is. Plato in fact uses different terms related to visual representations 
and appearances to describe his usage of imagery: εἰκών (‘likeness’, ‘image’), εἴδωλα 
λεγόμενα (‘spoken images’, either deceitful or credible), παράδειγμα (‘model’), σχῆμα 
(‘figure’ or ‘pattern’), and παιδιά (playful account, imitative art or representational 
performance). Moreover, he blurs the boundaries between these terms, never identifying 
categories such as analogy, simile, or metaphor. Accordingly, in her encompassing 
study of Plato’s imagery, Elizabeth Pender (2000) has observed that the term εἰκών 
describes, without differentiation, comparisons, similes, metaphors, artistic 
representations, reflections or shadows, and copies or imitations (p.42). Melissa Lane 
(1998) has noted that Plato constantly relies on ‘images, analogies, similarities, 
comparisons of all kinds’ (p.18), without ever distinguishing precisely one from the 
other but evaluating all as they provide comparative arguments. More radically, Linda 
Napolitano Valditara (2007) has remarked that modern distinctions among myths, 
metaphors, analogies, and allegories do not capture the fundamental philosophical 
significance of Plato’s imagery, which is always bent to contextual usages and not 
susceptible of universal categorisations (pp.VII-VIII). Accordingly, I will not seek to 
crystallise the fluidity of Plato’s language but I will privilege the textual datum as 
irreducible to complete terminological consistency. 
Nonetheless, it is possible to establish some instrumental parameters that will be 
relevant for my study of the Statesman. 1) Plato uses the term εἰκών (‘image’) in order 
                                                             
20 Cf. 287a4. 
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to assimilate language, especially but not exclusively figurative language, to pictorial 
and artistic representations and mark the difference between imitation and reality.21 2) 
He uses the term παράδειγμα (‘model’) when referring to an object that is compared to 
another in order to recognise their mutual similarities and differences, or to furnish an 
ideal exemplar, as opposed to providing its definition through conceptual divisions.22 3) 
He resorts to the term σχῆμα (‘figure’) either as a general term for illustrations or, more 
specifically, for geometrical patterns (especially the circle).23 4) Finally, he uses the 
term παιδιά (‘game’) to describe myths, provisional accounts, and joking remarks with 
no claim to definitive truthfulness, as much as visual arts, children’s mimicry and 
musical or theatrical performances that imitate certain aspects of reality.24 These 
parameters are purely instrumental, insofar as the boundaries between them shift and 
overlap in the Statesman. The Stranger introduces weaving as a model (παράδειγμά, 
279a7) of statecraft, but then speaks of the threads of the social fabric, on which 
statecraft acts, as an image (εἰκόνα, 309b5). He introduces a cosmic myth about 
pastoral, pre-political ages as a game (παιδιὰν, 268d8) but he also claims that it belongs 
to the field of ‘greatest models’ (μεγάλα παραδείγματα, 277b4), because it is an 
excessive representation of statecraft qua akin to herding. He uses the ‘images’ 
(εἰκόνας, 297a8) of physicians and helmsmen, ‘to which, by necessity, we must always 
compare our kingly rulers’ (αἷς ἀναγκαῖον ἀπεικάζειν ἀεὶ τοὺς βασιλικοὺς ἄρχοντας, 
297e8-9) in the same way as his other political models, namely to allow a comparative 
evaluation of statecraft. And he speaks indifferently of a figure (σχῆμα) when he 
describes the image of the divine herdsman (275c1),25 the image of statecraft, akin to a 
painting (277a4-6),26 the circular pattern of heavenly motions (269a5),27 and the images 
of immoral doctors and helmsmen (297e12-13).28 We can avoid formalising Plato’s 
fluid language while acknowledging that imagery, however named, is an object that he 
clearly identifies as distinct from logical argumentations and completely truthful 
                                                             
21 E.g. Crat. 432d: ‘Do you not perceive that images are very far from having qualities which are the 
exact counterparts of the realities which they represent?’ Cf. Crat. 439a7-b3; Resp. 533a1-4; Pender, 
2000, p.41. 
22 E.g. Soph. 233d; Resp. 592b. 
23 E.g. Pol. 269a5; Tim. 33b1. But the circular pattern is also named ‘image’ (εἰκόνα) at Leg. X.897e1. 
24 E.g. Tim. 59d; Euthyd. 277d; cf. Resp. X.602b; Pol. 288c; Leg. I.642b-643d; VII.793d-794d. 
25 ‘This figure of the divine herdsman’ (τὸ σχῆμα τὸ τοῦ θείου νομέως). 
26 ‘And now, according to my view, the king does not yet seem to have a complete figure for us’ (νῦν δὲ 
κατά γε τὴν ἐμὴν οὔπω φαίνεται τέλεον ὁ βασιλεὺς ἡμῖν σχῆμα ἔχειν). 
27 ‘The present figure’ (τὸ νῦν σχῆμα). 
28 ‘Let us look at the matter by fashioning a kind of figure, using these as material’ (κατίδωμεν γὰρ δή τι 
σχῆμα ἐν τούτοις αὐτοῖς πλασάμενοι). 
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accounts. Like a visual representation, imagery is distinct from the object it represents 
but has the capacity to evoke it.29 
Thus, my study of imagery in the Statesman distances itself from influential 
scholarly approaches that deny any cognitive value to Plato’s imagery, beyond its 
decorative status or, at best, emotional influence. Such a position is endorsed in 
particular by Luc Brisson (2004), who claims that the images of myth (gods, heroes, 
souls, the otherworld and the distant past) are employed by Plato mainly because of 
their communicative and persuasive power (p.16-19), without intrinsic relation to 
philosophical truth, because they are unverifiable (pp.20-23) and purely narrative 
(pp.25-26).30 However, abundant textual evidence contradicts similar views. As 
Napolitano Valditara (2013) observes, in the Symposium the character of Alcibiades 
says that he is going to praise Socrates ‘through images’ (δι᾽ εἰκόνων, 215a5) and 
compares him to Silenus-figures, claiming that ‘the image will be said for the sake of 
truth, not laughter’ (ἔσται δ᾽ ἡ εἰκὼν τοῦ ἀληθοῦς ἕνεκα, οὐ τοῦ γελοίου, 215a6). In the 
Gorgias Socrates addresses the rhetorician Callicles with a myth of the otherworld and 
claims: ‘Perhaps, though, you will consider this a myth, of the sort that old wives tell, 
and despise it; and there would be no wonder in despising it if, as we search, we could 
somehow find anything better and truer than this’ (τάχα δ᾽ οὖν ταῦτα μῦθός σοι δοκεῖ 
λέγεσθαι ὥσπερ γραὸς καὶ καταφρονεῖς αὐτῶν, καὶ οὐδέν γ᾽ ἂν ἦν θαυμαστὸν 
καταφρονεῖν τούτων, εἴ πῃ ζητοῦντες εἴχομεν αὐτῶν βελτίω καὶ ἀληθέστερα εὑρεῖν, 
523a5-8).31 Indeed, Socrates had formerly claimed that, while Callicles might consider 
his account a myth, he considers it an ‘argument’ (λόγον, 523a2), presenting it ‘as if it 
were in fact true’ (ὡς ἀληθῆ γὰρ ὄντα, 523a2-3).32  And again, in the Republic Socrates 
distinguishes the false images of his myths from the ‘true falsehood’ (ἀληθῶς ψεῦδος, 
382b8) of deceitful words, which bring about ‘ignorance in the soul of the deceived’ (ἡ 
ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἄγνοια ἡ τοῦ ἐψευσμένου, 382b8-9). By contrast, he claims that ‘the 
falsehood that lies in words is but an imitation of the deceit that affects the soul and a 
second-born image, not an altogether unmixed falsehood (τό γε ἐν τοῖς λόγοις μίμημά τι 
τοῦ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἐστὶν παθήματος καὶ ὕστερον γεγονὸς εἴδωλον, οὐ πάνυ ἄκρατον 
ψεῦδος, 382b9-c1). Socrates posits that there is a form of ‘false’ language, namely the 
language of myths, whose falsity lies on the mere level of literal expression, but which 
can nonetheless produce some truth ‘in the soul’ of the receivers, namely provide a 
                                                             
29 Cf. Pender, 2000, pp.59-60. 
30 Cf. Schofield, 2009; Rowe, 2010, pp.308-312. 
31 Napolitano Valditara, 2013, p.X. 
32 Cf. Morgan, 2000, pp.156-157. 
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relative cognitive gain. Myths and images alike are often used by Plato as arguments for 
the sake of truth or at least mingled strictly with arguments, and any rigid distinction 
between muthos or eikon and logos fails to account for their problematic relation. 
Therefore, it is necessary to acknowledge that Plato credits imagery, mythological or 
not, with at least some relation to truth and knowledge, some specific cognitive force, 
even when it appears playful, inadequate, or even (if taken as a literal account) outright 
false. 
My study aligns with the most recent attempts to evaluate Plato’s figurative 
language as a properly theoretical instrument, capable of providing a cognitive gain. 
Such studies include, in particular, Napolitano Valditara (2007), Pender (2000), and 
Lane (1998). Napolitano’s work, focused on Soph. and Resp., explains the heuristic role 
of ‘spoken images’ (εἴδωλα λεγόμενα, Soph. 234c6) by identifying a contrast between a 
delusionary ‘apparition’ (φάντασμα, 236c3) and genuine representative ‘images’ 
(εἰκόνα, 236c3).33 According to Napolitano, Plato’s evaluation of imagery as cognitive 
instrument depends on a binary judgment. Certain images conceal elements of the truth 
they claim to represent and are deceitfully presented as fully exhaustive accounts, 
identical – as it were – to the object they represent; but others are attempts to represent 
their object faithfully, as far as possible without distortions, and they reveal their 
partiality. The mark of their truthfulness does not lie in the direct correspondence with 
the object they serve partially to reveal, but rather in the informative intentions of the 
speaker and in their cognitive effect on the mind of the receiver.34 Pender and Lane have 
studied the cognitive effect of images in the Statesman, where they are named models 
(παραδείγματα). According to their interpretation, models point out, comparatively, 
objective features of an object of inquiry, reveal its similarities with another object and 
thus clarify the unknown and prevent errors of judgment. Pender and Lane agree that 
models are heuristic, not because they can provide a demonstration or lead to novel 
propositions and perspectives, but because they serve to impose a novel and clear 
structure on an unclear object with which they share objectively acknowledgeable 
features.35 Ultimately, the most recent acquisitions about the cognitive value of Plato’s 
imagery identify it as a partial representation of an obscure object of inquiry, which 
counteracts either deceit or confusion. 
                                                             
33 Thereby distinguishing between a ‘fantastic’, delusionary art (φανταστικήν, 236c7), and an ‘iconic’, 
representative one (εἰκαστικήν, 236c7). 
34 Napolitano Valditara, 2007, pp.12-19. 
35 Pender, 2000, pp. 56-57. Lane, 1998, pp.69-70. 
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I will expand our current understanding of the heuristic and cognitive role of 
imagery in Plato, and examine an overlooked aspect of the Statesman: the dynamic 
interaction of different images. I will present it as either their combination, when they 
are irreducibly different, or their clash, when they are conceptually opposite. The theory 
whereby images and metaphors perform a cognitive role by establishing a convergence 
of divergent or clashing concepts has attracted increasing interest in recent years in the 
study of semantics and rhetoric, based on I. A. Richards’s seminal work The Philosophy 
of Rhetoric (1936).36 In particular, Max Black’s (1962) interactionist theory states that 
metaphorical accounts can provide novel insights by restructuring the assumed 
relationships between two designated subjects (p.33). Paul Ricoeur (1978) interprets 
this phenomenon as a ‘semantic clash’ that produces a ‘new predicative meaning which 
emerges from the collapse of the literal meaning’. (p.146). More moderately, Eva Kittay 
(1987) argues that the cognitive role of metaphor consists in providing novel 
perspectives on familiar ideas, namely not ‘new information about the world’ but a 
‘(re)conceptualisation of information that is already available for us’ (p.39). Pender 
(2000) remarks that, according to this interpretation, ‘metaphor plays a unique role in 
cognition, as its distinctive expressive and cognitive capacities provide a special kind of 
epistemic access which other forms of discourse cannot provide’, because it does not 
merely point out a similarity between two different subjects, but it restructures ‘one 
concept in terms of another’ (p.19). While my study does not engage directly with 
modern semantics and rhetorical studies, it shows that the Stranger’s theory and usage 
of images as cognitive tools is comparably grounded on their combination and clash. 
Concerning models, I will show how current studies have failed to articulate in its 
entirety the dynamic process that makes imagery heuristic: recognition, variation and 
combination of different images. Concerning the mythical game (παιδιὰν, 268d8), I will 
show how current studies err in considering it an ‘excessive’, inarticulate accumulation 
of images, and display its carefully constructed structure. In both cases, my 
methodological stance will privilege the difference (and even the contrast) among 
images as the prime reason for their cognitive efficacy. 
 
 
                                                             
36 Cf. Pender, 2000, pp.18-23. My overview of the modern developments in the study of images and 
metaphors is based on Pender’s account of the ‘epistemic thesis’, whereby imagery provides a unique or 
irreducible cognitive access to knowledge. 
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0.4. Scholarship on the Statesman 
The scholarship on the Statesman is differentiated according to various interpretive 
angles. Scholarly approaches to this dialogue range from analytical readings such as 
Lane’s (1998) and Sayre’s (2006), focused on dialectical methods and metaphysics, to 
the studies of imagery and myth, such as Pender’s (2000) and Morgan’s (2000). 
Regardless of interpretive angle, the Statesman has received increasing attention in 
recent years, in particular due to its extensive exploration of imagery and the notion of 
right measure. Its focus on ethical psychology, instead, has received less attention. For 
the sake of clarity, I will privilege here the most recent monographic studies about 
either the Statesman as a whole or about my main objects of study. Concerning 
imagery, itself widely studied, my attention will be limited to studies that sought to 
explain its cognitive and heuristic role. 
 0.4.1. Scholarship on Right Measure and its Prismatic Character  
In the last two decades, four monographic studies have accounted for right measure in 
the Statesman: Migliori (1996); Lane (1998); Sayre (2006); and Bontempi (2009).37 All 
of them present it as the underpinning philosophical concern of this dialogue. Migliori’s 
and Sayre’s studies are focused on metaphysics and present right measure as a 
theoretical object of knowledge, while Lane’s and Bontempi’s are focused on politics 
and explain right measure in terms of practical actions and ethical psychology. 
 Maurizio Migliori’s and Kenneth Sayre’s interpretations address the 
metaphysics of the Statesman. Migliori outlines five essential features of right measure. 
(1) It is a criterion of avoidance of excesses and defects both in philosophical discourses 
and other practical activities, including politics (pp.118-119). (2) It refers not to a 
mathematical or geometrical measurement of ‘the more and the less’, namely of abstract 
quantitative determinations, but to what is fitting, opportune, adequate to concrete 
circumstances, subjects, and purposes (pp.123-124). (3) As a consequence, it functions 
as a criterion of judgment, through which the extremes of excess and defect are 
condemned and the mean is accepted (ibid.). (4) It depends in the last instance not on 
practical or empirical determinations, but on metaphysical principles: the twofold 
Principle of ‘Great and Small’ and the univocal Principle of ‘Measure’ in itself (pp.340-
343). (5) It is inherently polyvalent, because it applies to a wide range of practical 
concerns, from the correctness of philosophical discourses to political activities and 
                                                             
37 See also: Lafrance (1995) on right measure and dialectic; Tordesillias (1995) on the rhetorical kairos; 
Santa Cruz (1995) on the contextual opportunity of didactic methods. 
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every form of craftsmanship (pp.343-345). Similarly, Sayre’s interpretation focuses on 
the metaphysics of Excess and Deficiency, (pp.149-150), and considers them aspects of 
‘the Great and the Small’ as metaphysical objects (pp.154-170). His metaphysical 
reading (Sayre, pp.171-190) is consistent with Migliori’s, but he also remarks that 
diairesis, the art of finding ‘the middle’ between opposite conceptual fields, constitutes 
a method that relies on right measure (pp.235-240). 
 Melissa Lane and Milena Bontempi are concerned with the political, and thus 
practical, aspects of right measure. They agree with the view that right measure serves 
as criterion of judgment irreducible to quantitative determinations (e.g. Lane, pp.186-
187; Bontempi, pp.139-141), but they do not seek to provide metaphysical accounts. 
Rather, they observe that every practical effort of avoiding excesses and deficiencies is 
necessarily contextual; right measure is always partial and comprehensible only in 
specific circumstances. Lane observes how right measure, albeit presented as an object 
of purely ‘objective knowledge’, is nonetheless always ‘obliquely’ applied to particular 
situations and different temporal moments (p.186). Lane emphasises one aspect of right 
measure, its temporal nature as kairos (right moment, correct timing, the eternal Good 
in time; p.164). Bontempi, similarly, remarks that right measure is a criterion that needs 
to be ‘acquired through a praxis and a judgment’ and thus depends on an ‘intrinsic and 
decisive nexus with particularity, punctual and irreducible’ (p.141, tr. mine).38 In 
addition, she emphasises how the intrinsic obliquity and blurriness of right measure 
makes it necessarily prismatic and impossible to understand fully without reference to 
partial angles of inquiry (p.140). Her account is incompatible with Lane’s reduction of 
right measure to the temporal kairos, but affirms the necessity to explore its further 
nuances. Nevertheless, both scholars agree on the fundamental feature of right measure, 
namely its multifaceted character. 
 In agreement with these latter contributions, I will disentangle two specific 
facets of right measure: the correct guidance of human minds and the usage of imagery 
as cognitive tool. Despite widespread scholarly attention to right measure as a 
metaphysical and political concept, its relation to imagery and psychological guidance 
has gone unremarked and deserves further exploration. My study thus offers a broader 
account of right measure and illuminates some of its yet unexplored aspects. 
 
                                                             
38 Cf. Santa Cruz 1995, p.193. 
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 0.4.2. Scholarship on Leadership of Minds 
To my knowledge, no studies have attempted to identify the measured guidance of 
human minds, common to both philosophical education and political leadership, 
theorised in the Statesman. The idea that Plato’s political thought reflects educational 
concerns with the harmony of the mind was supported by Lodge (1947), who provided 
extensive evidence from the Republic and the Laws, but his insight has not been hitherto 
applied to the Statesman. Recently, nonetheless, three scholars have highlighted Plato’s 
the bond between politics and education of the mind: Melissa Lane (1995), Christopher 
Bobonich (1995), and Milena Bontempi (2009). I shall focus my review on these studies 
because they directly evaluate statecraft as guidance of the citizens’ psychological 
dispositions.39 
Lane claims that the Statesman presents an original account of ‘moral 
psychology’ as a mode of conflict management (p.281). This dialogue focuses on the 
potential conflict between moderate and courageous citizens, whose emotionally-driven 
and one-sided preferences for mild or aggressive policies can be equally detrimental for 
the city’s survival and stability. Thus, Lane claims, correct statecraft consists in an 
effort to ‘moderate conflict’ and to allow a timely ‘dynamic alternation’ between these 
two factions in the command of the city, in order to allow them to exert power correctly 
(p.282). To Lane, the Statesman is concerned with human psychology, fundamental for 
the correct order of the city, and this correctness is a matter of right measure qua 
timeliness of actions and policies. Bobonich notices that the Statesman addresses the 
‘education of non-philosophers’ (p.328) from the standpoint of ‘ethical psychology’ 
(p.329). Like Lane, he remarks that the role of the statesman is to counteract the 
distortions of judgment (excesses or deficiencies) caused by the emotionally-driven and 
conflicting attitudes of the citizens. However, he reads it as an effort to ‘inculcate’ or 
implant a correct opinion in the citizens’ distorted ‘psychological mechanism’, so that 
they may achieve individual virtue and happiness (p.328). Unlike Lane, Bobonich fails 
to grasp the role of right measure in the Statesman, as a principle not merely of 
individual goodness but also of collective harmony. Finally, Bontempi claims that 
statecraft aims to harmonise ‘the different components of the citizens’ souls [with each 
other], in order to interweave their opposite characters’ (p.145, tr. mine). In her reading, 
                                                             
39 Other studies have marginally acknowledged this political function. For instance Accattino (1995) and 
Weiss (1995) both account for it, but their focus rests respectively on political authority and political 
knowledge. Hobbs (2000) briefly addresses the problematic status of aggressiveness as difficult to guide 
in the Statesman, but her concern is reconstructing Plato’s notion of heroism in diverse dialogues. 
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the Statesman focuses on the political management of moral psychology, because the 
purpose of statecraft is to generate ‘unitary cohesiveness’ among different citizens 
(p.146, tr. mine). Like in Lane’s reading, statecraft aims to generate right measure in the 
political community. However, Bontempi interprets it not only as a matter of timely 
alternation and moderation of conflicts, but as the positive construction of ‘a composite 
reality’ made of heterogeneous elements, a ‘correct koinonia’ (community, fellowship) 
whereby opposite groups of citizens contribute at once to the cohesiveness of the city 
(ibid., tr. mine). 
These recent developments in Platonic scholarship highlight the fundamental 
element of political activity as Plato presents it in the Statesman, namely the guidance 
of the citizens’ psychological dispositions in view of a harmonious political order. 
However, no scholar has yet observed that Plato’s focus on correct psychological 
dispositions is not limited, here, to political order, but encompasses philosophical 
practices as well. My aim will be to show that, in both cases, Plato’s underlying concern 
is the need for the mind to eschew detrimental confusion and achieve harmonious 
equilibrium. Without this common element of philosophical and political praxes, the 
Statesman cannot but appear an unfocused philosophical text, divided between 
theoretical concerns and political interests, while in fact Plato’s attention rests on a 
single educational concern: the beneficial leadership of human minds. My thesis will 
thus expand our current understanding of Plato’s moral psychology and of its guiding 
criterion: right measure as balance. 
 0.4.3. Scholarship on Models and their Cognitive Function 
The most complete accounts of the cognitive role of imagery in Plato’s Statesman are 
limited to three studies: Goldschmidt (1947, ed. 2003); Lane (1998), and Pender 
(2000).40 All these studies focus on the Stranger’s account of models (paradeigmata) in 
the central section of the dialogue (277a3-278e11). I include Goldschmidt’s more dated 
study due to its still influential status, albeit now superseded by closer textual readings. 
None of these studies, it must be noticed, accounts for the broader terminology used by 
Plato to refer to images in the Statesman, and all focus on his example of the 
comparative juxtaposition of simple and complex syllables in order to recognise 
individual letters. 
                                                             
40 See also: Lloyd (1966) on analogy; Owen (1973) on the ‘undepictable’. Their arguments about, 
respectively, analogical reasoning and representation of concepts credit a limited cognitive role to 
imagery. However, their theoretical focus on similarity (as either analogy or representation) does not 
allow us to tackle the combination of differences theorised in the Statesman. Cf. Pender, 2000, pp.12-14; 
Lane 1998, pp.70-75. Additional minor studies: Kato (1995); Palumbo (1995); Hirsch (1995). 
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 Victor Goldschmidt’s study focuses on Plato’s Sophist (218c-d) and Statesman 
(277d-279b; 285c-286b). He considers the account of models in the Statesman as a 
theoretical refinement of the one in the Sophist; therefore, I shall focus solely on his 
interpretation of the former. Goldschmidt suggests that models are didactic exercises 
directed at achieving a synoptic understanding of a particular object of inquiry (p.18). 
He considers them as discursive tools that serve to illustrate similarities between 
different objects, such as weaving and statecraft qua combinatory arts (pp.66-72). To 
him models are not heuristic in the sense that they provide a demonstration, which must 
always rely on independent logical or empirical verification (pp.53-58). However, he 
argues that, insofar as they highlight an intelligible shared element between two objects, 
they provide a distinct cognitive gain according to Plato’s philosophy: by establishing a 
useful conceptual detour from one object of inquiry to a comparable one, they train the 
mind in seeking for the intelligible Forms of every reality (pp.58-86). Goldschmidt 
relies heavily on inter-textual reconstruction of Plato’s doctrines, rather than 
contextualising the Stranger’s account of imagery within one single dialogue, and thus 
fails to explore the autonomous cognitive efficacy of this conceptual ‘detour’ (p.74).41 
 Differently, Lane (1998) and Pender (2000) account for the heuristic role of 
models within the context of the Statesman alone. They both consider models as 
instruments that project a conceptual structure from a familiar conceptual field to a 
different and more obscure one. Lane considers them a ‘remedy’ against conceptual 
confusion, counteracted by a ‘dynamic method of comparison’ (p.63). By comparing 
two heterogeneous objects such as statecraft and shepherding or weaving, models are 
useful correctives against unreflective assumptions, and thus grant a distinctive 
‘epistemic gain’: the very reflection on constitutive elements of an object of inquiry that 
conceptual divisions alone do not allow (p.68). This comparative process does not 
consist in ‘merely transmitting knowledge’ which someone has ‘discovered by a 
(necessarily) different route’, but in actively reflecting in comparative terms (ibid.).  In 
simpler terms, conceptual distinctions alone do not allow us to compare the elements of 
an object with another one and may obscure implicit (and unwarranted) assumptions; 
models, instead, allow further awareness about such assumptions. However, they do not 
guarantee, per se, the objective validity of the similarity they reveal. Therefore, they do 
                                                             
41 This process itself is debatable. Recently, Kato (1995) has argued against the relevance of the doctrine 
of Forms in the Statesman. However, Sayre (2006) and Migliori (1996) have independently demonstrated 
that there is a distinct account of Forms in this dialogue. The problem of Plato’s doctrine of Forms and of 
its variation through different dialogues is not object of this study. Cf. Gonzalez (2003) and Sayre (1993) 
on the inexistence of a single and definitive theory of Forms in Plato’s corpus. 
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not directly provide access to knowledge but must remain open to discussion and re-
examination (pp.76-97). Similarly, Pender argues that models are used as instruments to 
recognise, comparatively, ‘the same thing in something different and distinct’ (p.49). 
They are part of a process of collection and division of ideas based on their objective 
similarities and differences, and thus constitute an integral part of dialectic (pp.47-48). 
Finally, they are ‘heuristic and not just didactic [i.e. illustrative]’ devices, insofar as 
they serve ‘to impose a [novel] structure on an object’ with which they have objectively 
‘common features’ in order to advance an inquiry (p.56). Their heuristic role is 
moderate and limited: not a direct or unique access to truth, let alone a demonstration, 
but an indirect access to it (‘if used in the correct way’, in combination with accurate 
diairesis), a ‘second-best’ account that helps in ‘furthering exploration and discovery’ 
(p.58). Ultimately, Lane and Pender agree that, by restructuring and revising given 
opinions as correctly as possible (in given dialectical contexts), but without claims to 
definitive closure, models serve as important cognitive stimuli. 
 While Goldschmidt reduces models to didactic exercises that rely on 
metaphysical knowledge, Lane and Pender credit them with an intrinsic cognitive role 
and heuristic potential. Their reading is sounder because it accounts for the strong 
textual evidence that models contribute to cognitive experiences, without postulating an 
extra-textual level of doctrinal contents. However, as I will show, this interpretation 
does not account for the variety of different terms that Plato uses to describe imagery, 
and its exclusive focus on comparison unduly reduces the Stranger’s more complex 
account. In my study, therefore, I shall rely on these contributions but expand them to a 
more complex account of images and of their correct, measured combination, in order 
to show that their cognitive role is ultimately an instance of right measure. 
 0.4.4. Scholarship on Imagery in the Myth and its Cognitive Function 
Studying the images that Plato embeds in his myths causes additional difficulties, since  
his narrations are often extremely elaborate accounts that reinvent a wide variety of 
images. This is particularly evident in the Statesman, in which the Stranger elaborates a 
novel myth of origins drawing from three traditional myths: the birth of humans from 
the earth, the primordial rule of Cronus, and the miraculous inversion of heavenly 
movements. The articulation of different images within a single myth requires accurate 
study, which few scholars have attempted. Most interpretations, in fact, simply point out 
how the myth provides a utopian frame for politics against which the characters 
examine statecraft in the real world. Here, I will address the most recent accounts of the 
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cognitive role credited to this myth by Lane (1998), Morgan (2000), and Pender (2000), 
with particular attention to the interaction of different images within it.42 
 Lane and Morgan espouse the widespread reading of the myth of the Statesman 
as a corrective tool. They agree that: (1) the myth is a particular heuristic device akin to 
a paradeigma (Pol. 277b4), albeit more ambiguous;43 and (2) it is presented as 
excessive (277a6-c6), insofar as it includes a great variety of images, creatively 
combined to represent a utopian age of human life. Lane argues that the narration about 
imaginary primordial ages is introduced, at least apparently, as a ‘grand, childish, and 
inconclusive paradeigma’ (p.101) and a ‘pivotal’ moment of inquiry used to correct 
theoretical errors (p.120). She claims that this myth, precisely because it is grand and 
over-elaborate, serves to present as excessive the identification of statecraft as a form of 
human herding (pp.99-101) and to reject traditional images of pastoral authority 
(pp.111-114). To her, its ultimate function is to establish, narratively rather than 
logically, a ‘distinction between possible and actual’ conditions of human life and 
politics (p.116). She thus considers the presence of numerous ‘trappings of divinity and 
cosmology’ in this narration (p.122) as a ‘structural weakness’ (p.123), intentionally 
included by Plato as a method of highlighting an excess. Similarly, Morgan argues that 
the Stranger here ‘elaborates a theory of myth as paradigm’, a ‘heuristic device’ used to 
correct the earlier definition of the statesman as ‘shepherd of the human flock’ (pp.253-
254). However, like Lane, she observes that mythical narration displays a ‘tendency to 
move beyond the confines of simple illustrative paradigm’ (p.253) and it becomes even 
the ‘opposite to the method of paradigms’ because it describes a grand and complex 
object rather than proceeding from simple examples to more difficult subjects (p.255). 
Lane’s and Morgan’s interpretations reflect the predominant reading of the cognitive 
role of this myth: a utopian or idealised story meant to correct an excessive certain 
perspective on statecraft,44 and whose elaborate imagery is an instance of creative and 
potentially confusing exaggeration.45 
                                                             
42 My focus on imagery excludes two other related fields of inquiry: (1) cosmology and (2) utopian 
readings of the golden age. On (1): Carone, 2005; Mohr, 1985; Vlastos, 1975; Skemp, 1952. On (2): 
Horn, 2012; El Murr, 2010; Kahn, 2009; Brisson, 1995; Ferrari, 1995. Both fields are undoubtedly linked 
to imagery, but they do not account for how it is used within a single narration.  Rather, cosmological 
reconstruction aims to decipher imagery in terms of Plato’s theoretical doctrines, while utopian readings 
are concerned with the immediate impact of narrations about imaginary ages on political arguments. 
Neither concern is directly addressed in my thesis. 
43 See also: Goldschmidt, 1947 (ed. 2003), p.29; Kato, 1995, pp.165-166. 
44 Cf. Kahn, 2009, p.162. 
45 Lane, 1998, p.111: ‘imperative of invention’; Morgan, 2000, p.259: ‘narrative compulsion’ and ‘desire 
for narrative magnificence’. On the image of reversed aging, cf. Kahn, 2009 pp.150 and 152: ‘comic 
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 By contrast, Pender (2000) argues that the complex articulation of images within 
this myth (and others) serves the specific purpose of presenting effectively Plato’s 
philosophical positions.46 Her focus rests on Plato’s different images for the supreme 
god and his activity in this myth: the ruler of a community, a helmsman, the father of a 
living being, and a craftsman who creates a fine artefact (p.139). To Pender, the fact that 
‘different images are closely interwoven’ in the myth testifies the complexity of Plato’s 
philosophical account (p.139). She observes that Plato, by representing the god in a 
multifaceted way, effectively displays different aspects of what he conceives as the 
directive power of the universe, which would be incompatible if taken literally: supreme 
command over a complex community, beneficial guidance that prevents calamities at 
sea, benevolent care of a child to be left independent at the right moment, and expert 
construction of a fine object (pp.138-139). To her, this combination of incompatible 
aspects allows Plato ‘to create extended pictures of divine activity and to achieve 
particular rhetorical effects’, namely to articulate effectively ‘all the threads of his 
thought’ (p. 139). Precisely the variety of images he uses is ‘an invaluable guide’ for 
understanding his philosophical positions (ibid.). Pender’s conclusion can be formally 
extended to any instance in which Plato avails himself of different images to represent 
one and the same subject. 
 The predominant readings of the myth of the Statesman present it as a corrective 
tool and deny any positive cognitive role to the various images that compose it. Only 
Pender credits them with the cognitive function of presenting multifaceted accounts 
about philosophical subjects. However, she does not identify any coherent theory of 
Plato’s in regard to the combination of images in the Statesman.47 A persistent gap 
remains between Plato’s usage of images in his myths and his theories about them. My 
study of imagery in the myth of the Statesman aims to demonstrate not only that it 
performs a positive cognitive role not reducible to mere correction, but also that Plato 
coherently presents it as a cognitive stimulus. To this end, I will offer a novel account of 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
elements’ of ‘Plato’s comic imagination’, and a ‘picturesque story’; Migliori, 1996, p.219: ‘extraordinary 
elements’ given ‘an intentionally excessive development’ but devoid of inherent philosophical meaning 
(tr. mine); Dillon, 1992, p.29: ‘a delightful piece of whimsy’ and a ‘piece of foolery’. 
46 Kahn (2009) also acknowledges the variety of images in this myth: traditional stories of remote ages, 
but also the Empedoclean image of opposite cosmic ages, references to reincarnation, cosmological 
figures akin to the Timaeus, the birth of culture thanks to divine gifts, and Plato’s original invention of 
counter-aging humans (pp.149-152). However, he does not credit it with any specific function beyond 
creative portrayal of utopian ages.  
47 Notice that Pender (2003) grants that not only similarities but also differences between object and 
image or among various images contribute to the cognitive role of imagery. What Pender does not 
textually identify is exclusively Plato’s notion of combination—a notion, however, of fundamental 
significance in the Statesman. 
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the myth as a playful image (paidia) that relies on clashing notions, and I will examine 
the opposite images of divine guidance and cosmic balance that Plato combines in this 
myth. I will show that Plato construes imagery as a cognitive tool that is only apparently 
excessive, but actually capable of opening novel conceptual spaces in a measured, not 
disorienting way. Indeed, it can be shown that the cosmic images in the Statesman serve 
to illuminate the notion of right measure itself, envisaged as delicate balance. 
 
0.5. Project Outline 
This dissertation is structured in five chapters. The first chapter analyses the Statesman 
as a whole, with particular focus on its structure, in order to illuminate how right 
measure works as a criterion of judgment, always ‘in the middle’ of divergent 
alternatives. The central chapters articulate the heuristic and cognitive force of imagery 
as theorised and used by Plato, focusing respectively on the measured combination of 
models and images (Chapter 2), the myth as a playful image composed of clashing 
notions (Chapter 3), and the images of the divine helmsman and cosmic balance 
(Chapter 4). The last chapter returns to the Statesman as a whole, analysing the notion 
of leadership of minds, namely the production of right measure as balance in the mind 
and in the political community. 
 Chapter 1 demonstrates that the Statesman is organised according to a specific 
structure of pairs of contraposed dialectical paths, each divided by a moment of critical 
reflection. Expanding the studies of its structure undertaken by Diés (1935), Brumbaugh 
(1962), and Migliori (1996), this chapter demonstrates that the structure of the 
Statesman reflects its underlying philosophical principle of right measure. It shows that, 
on the macroscopic level, this dialogue is divided between the inquiry on statecraft as 
akin first to herding and second to weaving, with these contraposed paths disrupted by a 
reflection on right measure as evaluative criterion. In addition, it shows that analogous 
disruptions operate on a more detailed level, always reflecting a philosophical need for 
measured judgments, e.g. to distinguish ideas correctly, to discern the happiness of the 
human condition in the ages of Cronus and Zeus, or to evaluate the relation between a 
flexible political authority and fixed norms. This chapter thus demonstrates that the 
inquiry of the Statesman is not structured only according to methodological distinctions, 
as commonly assumed by scholars. In fact, it demonstrates that the Statesman embeds, 
in a structure of organised disruptions, its underlying philosophical principle: right 
measure as criterion of judgment to be employed at critical moments of reflection. 
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 Chapter 2 demonstrates that the heuristic function of images and models in the 
Statesman depends on a complex process of recognition, variation, and ultimate 
combination of different aspects of an object of inquiry (in this context, statecraft) 
theorised in the central section of the dialogue. This chapter thus challenges the limits of 
contemporary scholarship, whereby models are comparative tools whose function is 
essentially to illustrate or at best to restructure given opinions. It interprets the role of 
many different images of the statesman (producer of goods, herdsman, weaver, trainer 
of gymnastic, doctor and helmsman) as the best way to present a single subject from 
various angles, without either flattening it upon a single account or renouncing the 
possibility of understanding it. It thus demonstrates that images and models are heuristic 
because they are dynamically combined in a measured way, avoiding at once reduction 
to one-sided accounts and cognitive disorientation among different perspectives. 
 Chapter 3 demonstrates that the myth of the Statesman, in its formal 
characteristics, is not only used as an excessive model, as commonly assumed by 
scholars, but as a specific tool with an inherent cognitive power: a discursive game or a 
form of playfulness (paidia) that puzzlingly combines opposite images and makes them 
clash. By contrast with the interpretation of myths and games as childish tools, directed 
at immature individuals, this chapter supports Kathryn Morgan’s (2000) reading of 
discursive games as philosophical instrument, used to address complex objects of 
inquiry, acknowledging and challenging cognitive limits. Moreover, it expands 
Morgan’s account by analysing the specific formal features of paidia as presented by 
the Stranger in the Sophist and the Statesman. It shows that playfulness is presented by 
the Stranger as an ambivalent instrument, capable of creating either a deceptive 
conflation of opposite ideas, conceptual determinations or perspectives (cf. Napolitano 
Valditara, 2007), or a cognitively stimulating clash of opposites that puzzles the mind 
and invites it to seek for correct, measured judgments. It shows that the account of a 
playful use of images in the Statesman is positive: a beneficial emotional enchantment, 
the pleasure of works of art, the non-conflictive opposition of courageous and moderate 
citizens, and an instrument to test an individual’s virtue. It ultimately demonstrates that 
playfulness in the Statesman performs, in a marked cognitive sense, all these positive 
functions and thus subverts the sophistic conflation of opposites into a positive tool of 
intellectual challenge and stimulation. In the Statesman, paidia constitutes not an 
exaggerated and confusing myth, as frequently assumed by scholars, but a precisely 
organised articulation of images that serves as cognitive stimulus. Thus, the playful 
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usage of imagery is itself measured, not excessive or deceitful, whenever it is used to 
tease out an implicit ambivalence and to stimulate critical thought. 
 Once the features of imagery have been established and evidence of their 
interaction provided, Chapter 4 will offer an original reading of imagery in the myth of 
the Statesman.  This chapter demonstrates that, in his playful myth, Plato has presented 
two opposite metaphorical accounts of the cosmic movement, in order to create a clash 
of opposite perspectives on control and measured self-regulation. My study highlights 
the interaction of two opposite images to describe the same figure of cosmic motion, 
namely circularity: on the one hand, the steering of a helm by a divine figure, and on the 
other hand the delicate balance of a revolving body. It analyses how they express ideas 
of benevolent control and measured autonomy, with reference to pre-Socratic sources 
and inter-textual evidence from Plato’s corpus. It thus shows that an inherent 
ambivalence is at work in the myth, whereby the notion of self-control is envisaged as 
both depending on and contrasting with previous external control. It demonstrates that 
the coexistence, in a single narration, of opposite images of power and control 
determines a positive cognitive gain. Thus, it shows the cognitive power of images in 
triggering an autonomous intellectual response in the receivers and in creating novel 
conceptual spaces through their clash. 
 Chapter 5 returns to the Statesman as a whole and analyses its focus on the 
leadership of minds both in its scene and in its argument. Eschewing the predominant 
scholarly focus on methods and didactic concerns, it analyses the images that Plato used 
to describe the movement of the mind, both at the individual and at the political level. 
With regard to the individual soul, it shows how Plato has represented it as being 
carried around in circles (ἐν κύκλῳ, 283b3; 286b5) by complex philosophical 
discourses, and thus as in need to compose itself (συνίσταται, 278d2) maintaining a 
correct inner order and stability. With regard to politics, it shows how he has 
represented the citizens’ minds as being carried in opposite directions (ἐπὶ τὰ ἐναντία 
φερομένων, 310a5) by divergent emotional drives, and thus in need of a well-balanced 
composition (σύγκρασιν, 308e7). Ultimately, this chapter highlights the common trait of 
philosophical and political leadership as represented in the Statesman: the challenge of 
detrimental drives to confusion and conflict, and the establishment of a condition of 
inner order of mind and society by creating a cohesive, balanced whole. 
 Overall, I will offer a radically novel reading of the Statesman and elucidate 
three fundamental aspects of Plato’s philosophy. I will show that the notion of right 
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measure is the underlying philosophical principle of this dialogue and will articulate its 
multifaceted complexity. I will analyse Plato’s focus on the correct guidance of the 
human mind, both on the individual and on the social level. Finally, I will analyse the 
cognitive function of imagery as directed at representing an object from different angles 
and opening novel perspectives. My interpretation will thus suggest a new line of 
Platonic interpretation, by showing the importance of reading his works with a first and 
foremost attention to right measure, ethical psychology, and imagery as strictly 
interwoven. All these aspects challenge the still pervasive image of Plato’s philosophy 
as a dogmatic (and dead) metaphysical system. They demonstrate, in fact, his nuanced 
(and still challenging) attention to human psychology and society, with their irreducible 
and fertile complexities. 
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Chapter 1 – Right Measure in the Structure of the Statesman 
Every discourse must be composed, like a living being, 
with a body of its own, so as not to be, as it were, 
headless or footless, but to have middle parts [mesa] and 
members, written in fitting relation [preponta] to each 
other and to the whole (Phaedr. 264c2-5). 
 
Introduction 
This chapter analyses the structure of the Statesman, both as a hermeneutic tool to 
locate the different stages and sections of argument, and as a compositional technique 
that reflects the philosophical criterion of right measure. I will argue that, as different 
scholars have partially shown, there is a consistent articulation of the dialogue both on a 
macroscopic level and on a more detailed one; and I will show that this articulation 
reflects on the one hand a distinction of different philosophical methods, and on the 
other a unifying philosophical principle that recurs throughout the Statesman, i.e. right 
measure. I will therefore analyse first the structure as a whole (1.1), and then evaluate 
the unifying principle on the two levels of dialogic articulation (1.2 and 1.3). 
 A methodological premise is opportune: analysing the articulation of Plato’s 
dialogues is not an arbitrary subdivision of sections (which are, in fact, absent due to the 
dialogical form); it is rather an attempt to identify consistent parts of the dialogue based 
on textual philosophical criteria. Plato has repeatedly been shown to be aware of criteria 
of composition and of their philosophical value: we can recall the Symposium with its 
succession of different eulogies of Eros up to the wonderful synthesis of Diotima and 
the following disruption caused by Alcibiades; the Phaedrus and the ironical interplay 
of Socrates’s two discourses on love, separated by a divine inspiration; the Republic and 
the three shocking ‘waves’ of argument on sexual equality, shared marriages and 
philosophical rule; or finally the Timaeus, with its three sections on the creation of the 
universe, the material principle, and the nature of humans. The most evident proof of 
Plato’s compositional awareness are the words that his Socrates pronounces in the 
Phaedrus: ‘every discourse must be organized, like a living being, with a body of its 
own, so as not to be, as it were, headless or footless, but to have a middle and members 
[μέσα τε ἔχειν καὶ ἄκρα], composed in fitting relation to each other and to the whole 
[πρέποντα ἀλλήλοις καὶ τῷ ὅλῳ]’ (264c2-5). Whatever we may think of Plato’s distance 
from his characters’ voices, his awareness of compositional criteria is undeniable; and 
the strong claim that a fitting (prepon) organisation depends on the philosophical 
adherence to the truth (262c1-3), combined with Plato’s evident mastery of composition 
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in so many dialogues, leaves little room to doubt of his attention to the structure of his 
works. Friedländer (1969b), accordingly, claimed that in the Statesman ‘a coherent 
structure is visible behind what looks, if viewed from the outside, like an incoherent 
juxtaposition of parts’ (p.294). My interpretation rests on the persuasion that it is 
possible to trace a structure that reflects Plato’s philosophical conception of right 
measure, in strict textual consistency with the very same dialogue analysed. The 
following study is an attempt to validate this methodological hypothesis in relation to a 
particular dialogue not yet extensively studied through this lens. 
 
1.1. The Structure of the Statesman and Its Philosophical Principle 
Various scholars have analysed this dialogue as a whole, remarking the different stages 
that structure the discussion. The main studies that offer an encompassing view of the 
Statesman and its structure are by Diés (1935), Brumbaugh (1962), and Migliori (1996). 
As usual with Plato’s dialogical form, there is no definitive agreement on the structure 
of this dialogue. Indeed, Plato never follows a fully systematic account, explicitly 
divided in chapters or thematic units. Sometimes it is possible to identify thematic 
sections through textual evidence, for instance, whenever a character highlights the 
introduction of a new problem or a shift of perspective;48 but more often the distinctions 
are not that sharp, because Plato tends to ‘trail’ future discussion topics before they 
begin more formally, having his characters anticipate problems that will be scrutinised 
(or even posed as problems) only later. This is most evidently the case with the 
Statesman, which indeed begins with an error, by defining the statesman as a kind of 
‘herdsman’ of human beings, and only much later discards this definition as a 
misleading model (268b8-c10). However, the attempt to distinguish different stages is 
valuable, not only as an instrument for the reader, but also as a way to understand 
Plato’s composition and the reasons that underlie his non-systematic approach. 
 Diés has presented a clear-cut structure of the Statesman, which he divides in 
three great stages of inquiry (p.8). The first stage (258d-277d) presents statecraft as an 
art akin to the herdsman’s; the central section (277d-287b) consists in a theorisation of 
the role of models (paradeigmata) as instruments for philosophical inquiry, and of the 
                                                             
48 E.g. ‘Then we must travel some other route, starting from another point’ (268d5); ‘Let’s take the 
following point in turn’ (309b10). 
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criterion of right measure;49 the last section (287b-311c) identifies the specific features 
of correct statecraft by assimilating it to the weaver’s art, and defining it as a unification 
of the citizens’ opposite dispositions. Diés’s structure is effective because it provides an 
account of the difference between the first and the last stages of discussion: while at 
first the interlocutors assume the model of a herdsman as valid, after the central 
theorisation of paradeigmata they follow a different model. Diés does not, in fact, 
express this difference in terms of models, but of definitions; nonetheless, the character 
of the Stranger explicitly points out that the change of perspective between the first and 
the last stages of discussion is a change of models: ‘this figure of the divine herdsman is 
still greater than that of a king’ (274b-c), comments the Stranger, because the 
interlocutors believed that the king deserved ‘great models’ (μεγάλα παραδείγματα, 
277b); but given that the great model was excessive, the Stranger asks: ‘So what very 
small model […] could be compared [to statecraft] in order to discover adequately the 
object of research? By Zeus, Socrates, if we don’t have anything else to hand, well, 
there is weaving’ (279a-b). Ultimately, Diés’s classification shows that the dialogue is a 
cohesive unity, because it is a succession of two different models, divided by a 
theoretical reflection on the role of models for knowledge. The Statesman is a consistent 
process through different stages, from an erroneous (or rather inadequate) definition to a 
precise conclusion on the object at hand. 
Brumbaugh’s overview of the Statesman pays more attention to smaller stages 
of discussion, and in particular to the divide between the initial, argumentative method, 
and the introduction of a myth. He presents the dialogue as divided in four stages. ‘The 
discussion begins by a straightforward definition by subclassification of the statesman 
as the custodian of a human herd’ (p.164); but since this classification is problematic, 
insofar as such a custodian should master an impossible variety of arts, ‘the Stranger 
tells a long myth to show why the definition failed’ (ibid.), i.e. presenting the 
custodians’ art as divine, above human possibilities. Afterwards, the Stranger ‘proceeds 
to try to describe the ruler by a further set of formal classifications’, taking the weaver’s 
art as a model for political activity and distinguishing the activities of ‘various citizens’ 
                                                             
49 Significantly, this procedure is the exact opposite of the one adopted by Socrates in the Republic (368d-
369a; 592a-b), where the greater paradeigma of the best city is employed to understand the smaller 
subject of the individual soul. Both Socrates and the Stranger justify their opposite choices as 
educationally sound, through a comparison to letters: in the Republic, a larger model is said to be clearer, 
just as big letters are more easily discerned than small ones; in the Statesman (277a-287b), a smaller 
model is preferred, because it does not confuse the intellect as the greater ones do, just like complex 
syllables confuse young students more than short, simple ones. The contradiction is remarkable, because 
it suggests that Plato does not put forward theories on paradeigmata primarily in view of theoretical 
consistency, but of contextual educational efficacy. 
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(p.165) from that of the ruler. Brumbaugh claims that the limit, here, is excessive 
formality and inclusiveness (pp.166 and 168), which cannot directly account for the 
concrete and specific art of the statesman. Beyond these ‘three techniques of definition’ 
(p.165), Brumbaugh identifies one last stage of discussion, which presents statecraft as 
an art that aims at a concrete production: ‘the true statesman will be guided by his 
vision of the product of his art’, so that the definition requires to account for the 
‘concrete facts’ of political life (laws, constitutions, personalities). Plato’s ideal 
statecraft is a knowledgeable activity that aims at ‘the public good’ always through ‘the 
medium of a particular situation’ (p.166), and thus relates problematically to the fixed 
stability of laws, the doubtful knowledge of existing constitutions, and the potentially 
conflicting personalities and virtues of the citizens. Eventually, ‘neither logic nor myth 
alone is adequate’ (p.166), but a more complex account is necessary. To this scholar, the 
succession of the four methods of discussion (‘too ideal, too empirical,50 too formal, and 
finally just right’, p.168) makes this dialogue ‘an example of the “art of normative 
measure”, for which Plato never seems to have written out a set of formal rules’ (p.167). 
Brumbaugh’s reading is valuable because it points out its consistence with Plato’s idea 
of the right measure, which is to be acquired through a discontinuous discussion, slowly 
correcting inadequacies and achieving more precise understanding. Compared to Diés, 
Brumbaugh explicates the development from ‘inadequate’ to ‘correct’ definitions that 
the French scholar leaves implicit. Moreover, it highlights the function of Plato’s 
dialogical writing style as expressive of philosophical concepts that Plato himself has 
not exhibited through literal language or linear definitions. Unfortunately, Brumbaugh 
does not offer textual indications of the passages that correspond to the different stages, 
but assumes the reader’s familiarity with the dialogue. Thus, although his point is 
reasonable and consistent, his study has a limited value for textual analysis; in 
particular, after the first two stages of classification (i.e. diairesis) and myth, it is 
difficult to understand exactly51 to which parts of the dialogue Brumbaugh is referring. 
The most succinct classification is offered by Migliori, who distinguishes two 
stages: the first stage (257a-287b) ‘is committed to searching, through the diairetic 
                                                             
50 Brumbaugh uses the term ‘empirical’ in relation to the myth, because it establishes the conditions of 
actual political life as opposed to the mythical framework of the Age of Cronus. 
51 This might even be intentional on Brumbaugh’s part, given the inherent lack of complete exactness 
(akribeia) of right measure. It may be reasonably argued that too close an analysis of Plato’s text, an 
excessive demand for mathematical exactness in his composition, misconstrues the flexibility of the 
dialectical process that he has represented and imposes rigid textual boundaries where there are none. 
Nonetheless, I hold that the attempt to identify as exactly as possible different sections and moments of 
dialectical inquiry, however flexible, provides further insights in Plato’s compositional technique and 
philosophy alike. 
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procedure, a correct definition of the statesman’ (p.32), whose limit is shown through a 
myth, and which gives way to the new model of the weaver; the second stage (287b-
311c) ‘takes on a development more adequate to the topic’ (p.33), analysing laws, 
constitutions and the actions of a good statesman. Migliori presents his division as an 
instrumental tool of clarification, merely distinguishing a more abstract philosophical 
analysis (made of definitions, corrections and theoretical reflections) from a ‘political 
disquisition in the strict sense’ (p.32, n.1).52 In this sense, Migliori’s study (just like 
Brumbaugh’s) remarks an evolution from a less concrete, appropriate discussion of a 
political theme, to a more ‘strict’ and adequate outcome. Diés’s division, however, is 
more valuable if we aim to understand the reasons of Plato’s composition, since it is 
true that the dialogue includes a theoretical section (277d-287b), which deals with 
problems of correct knowledge, distinguished from the political stages that precede and 
follow it. 
Diés’s classification of three different stages is preferable for two reasons. First, 
it provides a useful instrument to distinguish the initial, inadequate definition of the 
statesman from the final definition accepted by the characters. Second, and more 
important, it distinguishes these two political stages from the central stage, which is 
more markedly philosophical, insofar as it deals with theoretical issues of correct 
acquisition of knowledge. The essential merit of this observation is its textual 
consistence: the difference between the first stage of political discussion and the 
following theoretical digression is confirmed by the characters themselves. Once the 
Stranger defines statecraft as an art of ‘herd-keeping’ that is voluntary and relates to 
willing human subjects (276e10-13), Young Socrates believes the inquiry is concluded 
(‘and it’s likely that in this way our demonstration concerning the statesman is 
complete’, 277a1-2). Yet the Stranger, at 277a3-d6, remarks that ‘our discussion does 
not yet seem to have given a complete shape to the king’, and that this incompleteness 
has ‘very strangely stirred up the problem of what happens to us when we have 
knowledge’. The Stranger thus characterises the discussion starting at 277d9 as a 
philosophical digression from the main argument (the political art). Indeed, it concerns 
a specifically philosophical problem, i.e. what the conditions of knowledge are and how 
models should be used to acquire it without error; and it digresses even further 
explaining the criterion of right measure as foundational of philosophy as much as of 
politics. The entire digression ends at 287b3, with the Stranger’s invite to ‘go back 
                                                             
52 Cf. Rowe, 1995, p.14. 
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again to the statesman, applying to him the model of weaving’, and Young Socrates’s 
agreement. This observation is important because Plato himself, through his characters, 
remarks that the central stage of the dialogue is different from the rest of the political 
inquiry, both the preceding (and less correct) discussion, and the subsequent one. Diés’s 
structure is not a mere instrument for the reader, but it reflects Plato’s criteria of 
composition and his awareness of the different stages of the dialogue. Bearing on his 
study, the three stages can then be summarised as follows: 
1. Initial definition of statecraft: the model of the herdsman 258a7-277a2 
2. Theoretical digression: models and right measure 277a3-287b3 
3. Final definition of statecraft: the model of the weaver 287b4-311c8 
 
Notice that, in my reading, I mark the beginning of the digression at 277a2, when the 
Stranger criticises the definition of the statesman as an incomplete picture. Differently, 
Diés marks it when the Stranger’s theoretical argument in fact begins (277d9), 
excluding his introductory critique. This is one of the cases where Plato’s style of 
blurring formal distinctions is more evident; but it seems to me that Young Socrates’s 
strong conclusive remark justifies my reading, and that the Stranger’s remark on the 
incompletion of the research is an important part of his overall theoretical argument 
about the cognitive role of images.53 
The further textual distinctions highlighted by Brumbaugh complicate Diés’s 
overview. In particular, the strong distinction of diairesis and myth in the first stage of 
discussion cannot be ignored: the Stranger forcefully insists on it by introducing the 
myth as ‘some other route, starting from another point’ (268d5). Diés’s structure is not 
more superficial than Brumbaugh’s, but it simply encompasses minor differences from 
a broader perspective, dealing with the overall alternation of political and theoretical 
discussions. It is, in fact, possible to integrate a more general reading of the dialogue 
and a more detailed one. If we pay attention to the smaller stages of discussion, we can 
see that they are nonetheless organised in a way that is compatible with Diés’s reading. 
In fact, we can take Brumbaugh’s reading one step further and see how, on a 
more detailed level, the dialogue is divided in five sections. The first stage, dealing with 
the model of the herdsman, utilises the two different instruments of inquiry of diairesis 
and myth. At 257a7-268d4 the discussion proceeds on purely argumentative grounds: 
                                                             
53 See Chapter 2. 
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statecraft is defined through diairesis as a rearing of human beings (anthroponomikon, 
267c1), and criticised as excessive and imprecise (267c5-268d4). Conversely, at 268d5-
277a2, the Stranger avails himself of a myth of the golden age to show that the current 
condition of humanity (‘the statesmen in our present age are much more similar to their 
subjects in their natures’, 275c1-3) does not allow any human ruler to act like a 
herdsman to human subjects. Thus, the first stage of discussion is divided in two by a 
radical change of method: 
 
1. The model of the herdsman 
(258a7-277a2) 
1.1. Diairesis 
(258a7-268d4) 
1.2. Myth 
(268d5-277a2) 
 
 Once the myth is concluded, and the relevant philosophical considerations 
drawn from it, the Stranger introduces a long theoretical digression on the role of 
models and the criterion of right measure (277a3-287b3), which corresponds to Diés’s 
second stage. This stage consistently maintains an argumentative style and, despite the 
different topics explored,54 it is not sharply divided into different modes of inquiry. The 
last stage of the dialogue, instead, includes two essentially different sections. Here the 
difference is not between argument and myth, but between separation and unification. In 
the section dealing with arts, laws and constitutions, i.e. the political ‘concrete facts’ of 
Brumbaugh’s account, the Stranger is in fact ‘separating’ every aspect of the polis that 
does not coincide with statecraft as such. He remarks this repeatedly, starting at 287b4-
8: ‘the king has been separated off from the many kinds of arts that share his field – or 
rather from all of them concerned with herds; there remain […] those in the city itself 
that are contributory causes and those that are causes [of the political order]’. With this 
sentence, the Stranger begins his distinction of all the various arts that are necessary for 
the existence of a polis (from architecture to art and nurture). At 291b6-c7, the process 
of separation moves on to the ‘chorus of those concerned with the affairs of cities […] 
[who] we must be separated from all those who are really statesmanlike and kingly 
men’, i.e. the group of all those who take part in the various constitutions of Plato’s time 
(democracy, aristocracy and oligarchy, monarchy and tyranny). Finally, at 303e7 the 
Stranger recapitulates the various distinctions so far, and introduces the last one: ‘it 
seems that […] we have now separated off those things that are different from the 
knowledge of statecraft, and those that are alien and hostile to it, and that there remain 
                                                             
54 The cognitive role of paradeigmata and the concept of metrion. 
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those that are precious and related to it’, i.e. the arts of the general, the judge and the 
rhetorician. Only when all these separations are completed, that is, when the inquiry has 
taken into account every concrete aspect of political life, it is possible to ‘describe […] 
the kingly art of weaving, its nature, the way in which it combines the threads, and the 
kind of fabric it produces’ (306a1-3). Thus the Stranger introduces the last section of the 
dialogue, focused on the specific object of inquiry alone, and he presents the true 
political art as an intertwining of the citizens’ different virtues into a cohesive social 
fabric. We can, thus, accept Brumbaugh’s insight of a textual progress in the Statesman, 
which moves from an abstract definition of statecraft to a concrete account of all the 
factors related to it; but we must also pay closer attention to the text, observing that this 
concrete account is twofold: on the one hand, the distinction of all elements that do not 
coincide with statecraft per se; on the other hand, the description of the unifying 
procedure of the ‘kingly art’. This twofold account coincides with Diés’s third stage: 
 
3. The model of the weaver 
(287b4-311c8) 
3.1. Separation of political arts 
(287b4-305e7) 
3.2. Statecraft as unification of virtues 
(305e8-311c8) 
 
Overall, the structure of the dialogue seems to be organised according to an 
explicit criterion, which depends on the different methodological steps used by the 
Stranger to reach a final definition. On the macroscopic level, Diés’s study is correct in 
outlining three stages: the discussion on the model of the herdsman; the theoretical 
digression; the discussion on the model of the weaver. On a more detailed level, 
however, we must distinguish five different methodological sections: the initial 
argument, led mainly through diairesis; the myth; the central digression; the separation 
of political arts; and finally the description of statecraft. The two levels are related as 
follows: 
 
1. The model of the herdsman 
(258a7-277a2) 
1.1. Argument 
(258a7-268d4) 
1.2. Myth 
(268d5-277a2) 
 
2. Theoretical digression 
(277a3-287b3) 
 
 
2. Theoretical digression 
(277a3-287b3) 
 
3. The model of the weaver 
(287b4-311c8) 
3.1. Separation of political arts 
(287b4-305e7) 
3.2. Statecraft as unification of virtues 
(305e8-311c8) 
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This clear-cut outline of three dialogical stages and five sections describes how different 
methods of inquiry succeed one another, without many disruptions typical of Socratic 
dialogues. However, it should not be taken as an explicit division of the text in thematic 
chapters. In fact, it is possible to raise many objections against an excessive 
systematisation of the Statesman. Above all, the various methods here outlined, despite 
being based on the explicit remarks of the Stranger, are not universally applied: the 
argumentative section on the art of the statesman as herdsman-like consists both of 
(purely theoretical) diairesis and of a critique of its results based on a concrete problem 
(which of the many arts that claim to ‘tend’ human beings is truly political, i.e. directed 
at producing a good society?); the myth itself includes and is followed by theoretical 
arguments and problems; the separation of various political arts is interrupted by a 
reflection on laws and their limits in respect to the statesman’s knowledge. Moreover, 
some disruptions are caused by the interlocutors’ subjective uncertainties: the diairesis 
of human beings as political subjects is interrupted by the Stranger when Young 
Socrates hastily distinguishes humans from all other beings (262a3-4), without 
reflecting on the reasons for this distinction, and gives way to a digression on the 
criteria for a correct diairesis; and again, the separation of political arts gives way to the 
reflection on laws because of Young Socrates’s resistance to the idea that political 
knowledge be independent from laws (293e6-7). The former disruption is justified by 
the educational scene of the dialogue (a philosopher training a young man in the 
philosophical art), rather than by a purely logical necessity; and the latter is not only 
based on a character’s reaction, but it ignores other logical problems such as the 
independence of knowledge from consensus and wealth, which will receive attention 
only in the Laws.55 These objections are significant, insofar as they point out that, 
despite the explicit declarations of Plato’s characters, other factors intervene in the 
organisation of the dialogue; and, most important, they prevent us from interpreting the 
dialogue’s stages as purely logical sections, while they are in fact justified by the 
dramatic scene. 
Nonetheless, the stages and sections remarked by the Stranger follow a 
consistent plan of composition. They are not only effective ways of summarising the 
contents of the dialogue and to follow its arguments, nor do they merely respect textual 
indications about methods and digressions. They also reflect an intrinsic principle of 
organisation, which is valid despite the disruptions of the dialogical form. More 
                                                             
55 Leg. 857b-864a; 724a-745e. 
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precisely, we can conceive it as a way of organising the various dialogical disruptions, 
which are possible only within the different stages: Young Socrates’s error of division is 
possible only within the first, mostly diairetic, section;56 and his reaction to the radical 
independence of knowledge from laws fits perfectly the context of radically separating 
the political knowledge from any element external to it. We may speak, then, of 
organised disruptions, which do not contradict the overall organisation of the dialogue. 
This organisation has one evident philosophical implication: it points out 
distinctions of method that are philosophically grounded. As the characters’ inquiring 
minds face different theoretical problems, different methods of exposition and inquiry 
become opportune. On the broader level, one conception (the statesman as herdsman) is 
abandoned in favour of a different one (the statesman as weaver), as a consequence of 
the philosophical digression, which posits the error of the first definition in terms of 
models, and radically reorients the inquiry. On the more detailed level, the first 
argument gives way to a myth, raising the problem of the interaction between the two 
forms and the necessity to justify the role of mythical images in a philosophical inquiry. 
In this case, the myth allows a correction of the former, excessive definition: ‘Let us end 
our myth, then, and we will use it to see how great our mistake was’ (274e1-3). There 
is, thus, a philosophical use of myth, represented by the dialogue’s second section. 
Similarly, the identification of correct statecraft through the previous separation of 
different, but related, elements, is coherent with the Stranger’s reflection on the 
procedure of any art (281d8-e5): 
[There are] two arts that exist in relation to everything that is done […] One 
which is a contributory cause to production, and one which is itself a cause 
[…] Those which do not craft the thing itself, but which provide tools for those 
that do, […] are what I mean by contributory causes, while those that produce 
the thing itself are causes. 
δύο τέχνας οὔσας περὶ πάντα τὰ δρώμενα θεασώμεθα […] τὴν μὲν γενέσεως 
οὖσαν συναίτιον, τὴν δ᾽ αὐτὴν αἰτίαν […] ὅσαι μὲν τὸ πρᾶγμα αὐτὸ μὴ 
δημιουργοῦσι, ταῖς δὲ δημιουργούσαις ὄργανα παρασκευάζουσιν […] ταύτας 
μὲν συναιτίους, τὰς δὲ αὐτὸ τὸ πρᾶγμα ἀπεργαζομένας αἰτίας (tr. Rowe, 
adapted). 
                                                             
56 The fact that he does not commit any more errors of division in the following stages of the dialogue 
supports its reading as a didactic scene: Socrates is slowly learning throughout the various sections (and 
errors). 
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The Stranger acknowledges, at 287c7-d3, that the philosophical procedure through 
separation replicates that method: 
Just as before: all the arts that provided tools to weaving, we put down as 
contributory causes […] We must do the same thing now too […] for we must 
put down all those arts that produce any tool in the city, whether small or large, 
as being contributory causes. 
ὥσπερ ἔμπροσθεν, ὁπόσαι παρείχοντο ὄργανα περὶ τὴν ὑφαντικήν, πάσας 
δήπου τότε ἐτίθεμεν ὡς συναιτίους […] καὶ νῦν δὴ ταὐτὸν μὲν τοῦτο […] ὅσαι 
γὰρ σμικρὸν ἢ μέγα τι δημιουργοῦσι κατὰ πόλιν ὄργανον, θετέον ἁπάσας 
ταύτας ὡς οὔσας συναιτίους (tr. Rowe, adapted). 
Similarly, the separation of jurisdiction, the general’s art and rhetoric is compared to the 
purification of gold at 303d6-e5: ‘we seem to me to be in a situation similar to that of 
those who refine gold’, because ‘the removal of [other metals] through repeated 
smelting and testing leaves the ‘unalloyed’ gold […] there for us to see, itself alone by 
itself’, just like the distinction of the most important political arts will finally let the 
interlocutors see clearly the statesman by itself. Distinguishing the different procedures 
utilised by the characters, then, is not a mere hermeneutic tool; it rather means to 
understand an explicit stance on the methods of inquiry and their order. The first, 
misguided argument is corrected through a myth, then the whole perspective is 
corrected through a shift of models, and finally an adequate definition is reached 
indirectly, through a long process of separation-purification. We must take seriously the 
Stranger’s shifts of method, because they reflect distinct philosophical procedures; they 
provide the contextual reasons for the usage of various kinds of argumentation and their 
interaction. 
 Beyond the methodological distinction, there is a deeper philosophical 
implication, which becomes evident when we pay attention to digressions and 
disruptions. I will show in the following sections that, both on the macroscopic and on 
the detailed levels of inquiry, the methodological shifts of the dialogue are organised 
around the central concept of right measure. Brumbaugh’s insight that this dialogue 
constitutes an example of right measure in act holds indeed not only for the overall 
succession of arguments, refining methods and perspectives, but also for the critical 
moments of each section, whenever the inquiry requires the interlocutors to judge 
(krinein) correctly how to proceed. 
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1.2. Right Measure in the Central Stage as Organising Principle 
The concept of right measure is presented in the central stage of the dialogue (277a3-
287b3), which is central not only in a positional sense, but also qualitatively: it serves as 
an organising principle of the inquiry represented in the Statesman. As we have seen, on 
the macroscopic level the dialogue is divided in two alternative stages of inquiry, which 
coincide with the different models of the statesman as a herdsman and as a weaver, by a 
great digression on the role of models and the criterion of metrion. The central stage 
does not start immediately with the problem of right measure; it rather starts with a 
reflection on the error committed in conceiving the statesman as a herdsman, thus 
originating an essential reflection on the cognitive role of models. This is the 
philosophical ‘problem of the experience about knowledge within ourselves’ (τὸ περὶ 
τῆς ἐπιστήμης πάθος ἐν ἡμῖν) (277d6-7). The Stranger remarks that this theoretical issue 
has been introduced ‘in a very perplexing way’ (μάλ᾽ ἀτόπως) in the political inquiry, 
because it is a digression from the task of defining statecraft. This stage will digress 
even further with a long reflection on the role of right measure in any art. However, at 
the end of the central section, the Stranger claims that this digression, no matter how 
long and apparently ‘overwrought’ (περίεργα, 286c1) is necessary for a good 
dialectician and has been rightly introduced in the dialogue. We should not let us be 
troubled by the ‘going round in circles’ of discourses (τὰς ἐν κύκλῳ περιόδους, 286e5), 
as if they were literally out of place (a-topoi), but try to understand the common reason 
of their presence in the dialogue. 
The recurring element of this philosophical digression, from the very beginning, 
is the reference to right measure. The passage on models anticipates it indirectly, by 
introducing the ideas of excess and appropriateness in philosophical discourses (277a3-
c6). The Stranger claims that ‘the king does not yet have a complete figure’ (τέλεον […] 
σχῆμα) because the inquiry so far has led the interlocutors to utilise ‘great models’ 
(μεγάλα παραδείγματα) for the statesman, using ‘a greater part than the appropriate’ 
(μείζονι τοῦ δέοντος).  He remarks that ‘in order to […] show the error in our former 
route [i.e. in the dialectical analysis of arts], we have made our demonstration longer 
[μακροτέραν], and have not brought our myth to an end [τέλος], and our account, just 
like a portrait, seems to have an adequate [ἱκανῶς] outline, but not yet to have received 
its proper clarity’. The Stranger claims they have acted like painters or sculptors who 
wished, ‘beyond measure’ (παρὰ καιρὸν), to add ‘more and bigger [embellishments] 
than needed’ (πλείω καὶ μείζω τοῦ δέοντος). The language here is noticeably consistent: 
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the figure of the king is not complete (teleon) because the myth has not been brought to 
an end (telos); and this happened because the discussion so far, i.e. the conjunction of 
dialectical divisions and mythical account,57 has made necessary for them 
(ēnankasthēmen, 277b5) to exceed the appropriate (kairos, deon) and be only 
superficially accurate (ikanos). The reason why the first model is not appropriate to a 
king has already been exposed by the Stranger: ‘this figure [σχῆμα] of the divine 
herdsman is still greater [μεῖζον] than that of a king, and the statesmen who belong to 
our present era are much more like their subjects in their natures and have shared in an 
education and nurture closer to theirs’ (275b8-c4). What is new here is not the 
acknowledgment that a human cannot act a like a herdsman to other humans, but the 
inscription of this difference within the field of the right measure of models. Indeed, the 
terms kairos and deon anticipate later results of the digression on right measure, a 
criterion for ‘all those arts which measure in relation to what is measured, fitting, 
opportune, appropriate’ [τὸ μέτριον καὶ τὸ πρέπον καὶ τὸν καιρὸν καὶ τὸ δέον], and 
everything that removes itself from the extremes to the middle [τὸ μέσον]’ (284e2-8). A 
safer way to acquire knowledge, the Stranger suggests, is to move from smaller 
(helattonon) models to the greatest (megiston) one of political art (278e4-10). 
By introducing the notion of greater and smaller models, the Stranger establishes 
a new perspective on the former (misguided) inquiry. Not only does he declare the 
former divisions and myth insufficient to reach a satisfactory definition, but he also 
explains the reason of their inadequacy, by reframing the dialectical process within the 
field of models and the requirements of right measure: the former inquiry took for 
granted that statecraft had features identical to the art of herding, but that was not the 
case. Rather, the art of a herdsman requires him to be superior in nature and abilities in 
respect to his subjects, because he needs to take care of every single need of his herd, a 
condition which no real-life human being could ever meet, and which is rather satisfied 
by a community of different people who master different arts. The former definition, 
hence, was not appropriate to a human statesman, measured against the needs of a real-
life society and abilities of real-life humans; it was rather more appropriate to mythical 
beings like gods and daemons, and to a condition of life which would exist only in a 
Golden Age devoid of toil and contrasts. The error committed by Young Socrates, thus, 
                                                             
57 Notice that, insofar as the myth serves to ‘indicate’ (ἐνδείξαιτο) and see more clearly (ἐναργέστερον 
ἴδοιμεν) (275b1-4) elements ignored in the dialectical divisions, and to ‘show the error’ (δηλώσαιμεν τὸ 
[…] ἁμάρτημα) (277b2-3) thus committed, it is part of a single process which includes both moments. 
The excess does not depend on myth alone, but on the greater model of the herdsman. 
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was to consider statecraft as a straightforward subclass of herding, thereby hindering the 
possibility to evaluate it from a more adequate perspective. 
All these errors had already been remarked by the Stranger, and contrasted to the 
mythical figure; but now they are subsumed into a theory of models, thus requiring that 
the analysis proceed through an opposite sort of model: 
What model, then, occupied in the same activities as statecraft, and very small, 
should be set before us in order to find adequately the object of our research? 
τί δῆτα παράδειγμά τις ἄν, ἔχον τὴν αὐτὴν πολιτικῇ πραγματείαν, 
σμικρότατον παραθέμενος ἱκανῶς ἂν εὕροι τὸ ζητούμενον; (279a7-b1, tr. 
Rowe, adapted). 
The new model, as anticipated, is that of a weaver, which will lead the Stranger to offer 
an articulate analysis of this artisan’s skills, finally identifying it as the process of 
interlacing warp and woof. Once again, the concern is with a measure that will prove 
adequate (ikanos) to the research.  Coherently, the Stranger introduces then a reflection 
on excess and deficiency, as an antidote against the ‘malady’ of considering lengthy 
discussions as useless, excessive discourses (283b7-c1). As I have explained in the 
General Introduction, right measure constitutes a normative criterion of judgment and 
evaluation of excesses and deficiencies, postulated in alternative to any measuring that 
simply compares greatness and smallness. This means that the Stranger contrasts any 
kind of ‘mathematical’ measuring of what is big or small, long or short, quick or slow, 
and any other couple of ‘relative’ determinations, to a kind of measuring that (a) aims at 
a concrete practical result, like a fine garment or a good state, and (b) determines the 
quality of such a product, namely whether it is truly good and fine, or rather excessive 
or defective in some ways. The Stranger knows how provocative it is to consider such a 
criterion as a kind of ‘measuring’, and indeed at 284b7-c3 he presents his opinion as a 
postulate, a necessary discourse through which he is ‘forcing’ (προσαναγκαστέον) his 
language to describe not calculations but also the existence of a principle of ‘opportune 
measure’ for every art (just as, in the Sophist, he was forced to admit the existence of 
Non-being). He thus admits a general object of knowledge that all practical arts need to 
share, in different ways, an expertise that allows any craftsman to produce good and fine 
realities. Dialectic itself falls within this categorisation of arts, because the length of a 
discourse should not be judged, according to the Stranger, in itself, appearing as an 
excessive digression; rather: 
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you and I must be careful to remember what we have now said, and rebuke or 
praise both brevity and length of anything we ever discuss, judging lengths not 
in relation to each other, but according to the part of the art of measuring 
which we said we must remember, in relation to what is fitting. 
χρὴ δὴ μεμνημένους ἐμὲ καὶ σὲ τῶν νῦν εἰρημένων τόν τε ψόγον ἑκάστοτε καὶ 
ἔπαινον ποιεῖσθαι βραχύτητος ἅμα καὶ μήκους ὧν ἂν ἀεὶ πέρι λέγωμεν, μὴ 
πρὸς ἄλληλα τὰ μήκη κρίνοντες ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸ τῆς μετρητικῆς μέρος ὃ τότε 
ἔφαμεν δεῖν μεμνῆσθαι, πρὸς τὸ πρέπον (286c5-d2, tr. Rowe, adapted). 
It is particularly relevant to notice that metrion applies to philosophy as a production of 
correct discourses, thus locating it in the same conceptual field as any other productive 
activity (if on a higher level of importance). Dialectic is an exercise (meletē) in giving 
and receiving account (logon) of realities, especially those of the highest value 
(including, but not limited to, the art of statecraft);58 not a purely theoretical activity, but 
also a practical one whose value must be judged on the results it produces, i.e. on its 
ability to communicate effectively and understand correctly discourses on philosophical 
topics. The Stranger’s theory of models, then, is part of his concerns with the correct 
guidance of mind, which needs to exercise its capacity for measured judgment of 
discourses. The length of philosophical discourses should not be judged in itself, but 
related to what is appropriate. This claim cannot be reduced to the somewhat banal idea 
that the search for truth necessarily requires long discussions, in order to determine as 
precisely as possible what is true about the object at hand. In fact, there is more: the 
appropriateness of a philosophical discourse can be rightly judged only by bearing in 
mind the principle of right measure and the contextual effects of discourses on the mind. 
In other words, on a superficial level the Stranger means that philosophers need 
to be patient both in giving or receiving account of realities, distinguishing differences 
and similarities (285a1-b6) in the long process of collection and division that 
characterises diairesis.59 A philosophical account will be judged adequate 
(independently from its length), if it produces correct distinctions and conjunctions of 
                                                             
58 ‘We need to exercise at being able to give and receive account of each thing’ (δεῖ μελετᾶν λόγον 
ἑκάστου δυνατὸν εἶναι δοῦναι καὶ δέξασθαι, 286a4-5). 
59 Both division and collection are parts of diairesis, since they are the two sides of a single process: 
dividing correctly means locating differences in two opposite forms, for instance distinguishing natural 
numbers into even and odd ones; but the division at the same time is a collection, based on similarity, 
because even numbers are unified by their common divisibility by two. Correct diairesis identifies 
through division classes of objects that share a common feature. It collects at the same time as it divides. 
Cf. Pender, 2000, p.47; Sayre, 2006, p.235. 
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ideas. But the criterion of metrion cannot be conceived as limited to diairesis; in fact, 
the Stranger justifies his reflection on metrion also in reference to mythical discourse: 
Let’s remind ourselves of the reasons why we have said all these things on 
these subjects […] Not least because of the nauseated revulsion we felt there 
was in our lengthy talk about weaving, and of that about the reversal of the 
universe, and that of the sophist about the essence of non-being. 
ὧν τοίνυν χάριν ἅπανθ᾽ ἡμῖν ταῦτ᾽ ἐρρήθη περὶ τούτων, μνησθῶμεν […] 
ταύτης τε οὐχ ἥκιστα αὐτῆς ἕνεκα τῆς δυσχερείας ἣν περὶ τὴν μακρολογίαν 
τὴν περὶ τὴν ὑφαντικὴν ἀπεδεξάμεθα δυσχερῶς, καὶ τὴν περὶ τὴν τοῦ παντὸς 
ἀνείλιξιν καὶ τὴν τοῦ σοφιστοῦ πέρι τῆς τοῦ μὴ ὄντος οὐσίας (286b4-10, tr. 
Rowe, adapted). 
The Stranger then goes on to say what I have already introduced, i.e. that length must be 
judged based on its appropriateness to the subject. The fact that he includes his myth on 
the cosmic reversal is then surprising: long discourses do not include only strenuous 
divisions, but also a myth. Both kinds of discourse have the same emotional effect, i.e. a 
kind of nauseated ‘revulsion’ (δυσχερείας),60 and both should be sustained by 
remembering the reason of their presence in the inquiry, i.e. right measure. Again, we 
see the Stranger insisting on the necessity to train the mind in evaluating correctly the 
right measure of discourses, even when they may trigger unpleasant emotional 
responses. This is surprising not only because a myth is put on the same level of 
dialectical diairesis, but also because this very myth was earlier judged as excessive, 
insofar as it represented a model too great for human statecraft. Is the myth a ‘puzzling 
bulk’ (277b4) of material which was not even brought to an end, or is it a makrologia 
whose length is nonetheless appropriate? 
I argue that the antinomy can be resolved by understanding the different fields of 
inquiry: as long as the model of the herdsman, fully actualised through the myth, was 
used to represent statecraft, it was inadequate, excessive, lacking of measure; but when 
we consider philosophical inquiry as such, it is not. On a deeper level of analysis, then, 
the appropriateness of a lengthy discourse does not depend only on its necessity for a 
correct, detailed and toilsome dialectical process; it also depends on understanding its 
                                                             
60 Lane (1998) and Schofield (1971) translate duschereia as ‘disagreeableness’ or ‘squeamishness’, 
namely the sensation caused by something hard to stomach. I choose ‘revulsion’ better to highlight its 
visceral force as ‘rejectionist impulse’ directed against either toxic substances, reminders of mortality, or 
shameful behaviours (Lateiner 2017; Lateiner and Spatharas 2016). Cf. Resp. IV.439e-44a. 
48 
 
philosophical significance in the acquisition of truth, a significance which is not limited 
to diairesis. Politically, the myth represents an impossible condition where a god 
governs over humans and humans have no need of arts because they live in a toil-less 
world, where ultimately ‘there were no political constitutions’ (πολιτεῖαί τε οὐκ ἦσαν, 
271e8); it is then radically inadequate to a political perspective. But philosophically, it 
is as appropriate a tool as diairesis, and indeed it is used to ‘show the error of the former 
exposition (δηλώσαιμεν τὸ τῆς ἔμπροσθεν ἁμάρτημα διεξόδου, 277b2-3); it can be 
accepted, then, for its philosophical contribution to the research. The evaluation of 
discourses in terms of right measure, thus, cannot be simply reduced to a matter of 
methodological correctness, but consists in the ability to judge them for their value 
relative to different problems and to consider them from different angles. 
Ultimately, on the macroscopic level the central digression on measure divides 
the dialogue in two, not only composition-wise but also theoretically; it opposes a 
former, ‘excessive’ model to a more adequate one; it reframes the error committed in 
the first part as a lack of measure, i.e. not simply an error of definition, as if ‘herdsman’ 
were inherently contradictory to ‘statesman’, but a problem of adequacy, insofar as the 
requirements of the art of a herdsman are inadequate to the art of the statesman. The 
central stage constitutes a reflection on philosophical inquiry itself, which will reorient 
it through a new movement from what is ‘smaller’, easier to describe and understand, 
towards what is more complex. It is thus a moment of cognitive reorientation based on 
right measure as evaluative criterion, a necessary training of the mind in finding the 
correct way to judge and restructure given opinions. 
 
1.3. Right measure in the Different Sections of the Dialogue 
The centrality of metrion works not only on the macroscopic level, but also within each 
section of the dialogue. Different scholars have acknowledged different moments in 
which an explicit reflection on right measure emerges in the dialogue, in particular 
regarding diairesis and the contrast of true statecraft and laws; 61 but it can be shown 
that this concept recurs in essential moments throughout the entire dialogue and 
constitutes the underlying philosophical concern of this work. I will explore here the 
five sections of the dialogue in detail, showing how each includes a moment of 
reflection that ultimately depends on metrion. 
                                                             
61 Sayre, 2006, pp.139-240; Lane, 1998, pp.146-155. 
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The first section consists mainly of divisions of arts in search for a definition of 
statecraft, with a final critique of the inadequacy of this first definition. We can 
summarise the various parts of the inquiry as follows: 
 Initial definition of politics: the art of rearing living beings (258a7-262a4) 
 Methodological reflection: the criteria for a correct diairesis (262a5-263e5) 
 Final definition of politics: the art of rearing human communities (263e6-267c4) 
 Critique of the research so far: inadequacy of the definition (267c5-268d1) 
At 261e the statesman is said to be concerned with ‘herd-rearing’ (agelaiotrophia) or 
‘collective-rearing’ (koinotrophikē), indifferently. When Young Socrates tries to 
distinguish the rearing (trophē) of humans from that of animals, the Stranger criticises 
this division as too hasty, because it took too small a part (smikron morion), discarding 
many large ones (megala): 
‘It’s a most beautiful thing to separate off immediately what one is searching 
for from all the rest – as you thought you had the right division, just before, and 
hurried the argument on, seeing it leading to human beings; but in fact, my 
friend, it’s not safe to make thin cuts; it’s safer to go along cutting through 
the middle of things, and that way one will be more likely to encounter 
forms62 
κάλλιστον μὲν γὰρ ἀπὸ τῶν ἄλλων εὐθὺς διαχωρίζειν τὸ ζητούμενον, ἂν ὀρθῶς 
ἔχῃ, καθάπερ ὀλίγον σὺ πρότερον οἰηθεὶς ἔχειν τὴν διαίρεσιν ἐπέσπευσας τὸν 
λόγον, ἰδὼν ἐπ᾽ ἀνθρώπους πορευόμενον: ἀλλὰ γάρ, ὦ φίλε, λεπτουργεῖν οὐκ 
ἀσφαλές, διὰ μέσων δὲ ἀσφαλέστερον ἰέναι τέμνοντας, καὶ μᾶλλον ἰδέαις ἄν 
τις προστυγχάνοι (262b2-7, tr. Rowe, adapted). 
Thus the Stranger introduces a reflection on the correct method of diairesis. He does 
not provide a fully-fledged definition of it (‘it is impossible to show now what I mean 
with absolute completeness’, 262c4-5), but offers two examples: first, within the human 
species it is meaningless to distinguish Greeks and barbarians, while for instance it is 
possible to distinguish the masculine and feminine sex as possessing, naturally, diverse 
and mutually exclusive characteristics; second, within the set of natural numbers, it is 
                                                             
62 I translate ideais as ‘Forms’, with Sayre (2006), rather than ‘classes’, with Rowe (1995a). The issue of 
the doctrine of Forms and its variations throughout the corpus is a complex one, that cannot be examined 
here. But I hold that, with an author like Plato who pays constant attention to his terminology, it is safer 
to maintain a consistent translation of the term idea. Relations of similarity or difference between the 
various acceptations of the term can be explored much more clearly without imposing artificially different 
terminologies to different texts. 
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meaningless to distinguish (for instance), ’10,000’ from all the rest, because this 
division does not qualify either 10,000 or the remaining set of numbers; while dividing, 
for instance, even and odd numbers does qualify the two sets, as the members of the two 
sets all share common, mutually exclusive properties (divisibility by two, or not).63 
As Sayre remarks in his study of dialectical method in the Statesman, these 
divisions in two do not depend on quantitative considerations, since there is no reason to 
think that men and women are in the exact same number; or to divide the set of natural 
numbers into different, quantitatively equal groups that share no essential common 
feature.64 They are rather qualitative in nature.65 This qualitative division in two is what 
the Stranger refers to when he suggests that ‘cutting through the middle of things’ (διὰ 
μέσων […] τέμνοντας, 262b6) is the safest way to reach ‘Forms’ (ἰδέαις).66 Therefore 
diairesis, a qualitative, non-mathematical understanding of ‘the middle’, can be 
interpreted as part of ‘everything that removes itself from the extremes to the middle [τὸ 
μέσον]’ (284e7), namely as an enactment of right measure. Sayre shows that the 
qualitative division operated by diairesis is consistent with the non-quantitative measure 
of practical arts: the distinction of male and female human beings, for instance, 
identifies classes of objects which can be defined independently from each other, while 
Greeks and barbarians have meaning only in opposition to each other (Greek is 
everything that is not barbarian, and vice-versa).67 The difference is the same as that 
between the art of measuring that makes ‘the more and the less […] measurable […] in 
relation to each other’ and that which measures them ‘in relation to the generation of 
what is in due measure’ (284b9-c1). Thus, the methodological reflection at 262a5-263e5 
is consistent with the central notion of metrion, and operates according to the same 
criteria: finding the ‘middle’ as a qualitative, non-mathematical point; and 
understanding terms not purely in a relation of opposition to each other, but 
independently and in relation to some other element (the middle, the measured) that 
qualifies them. 
                                                             
63 Sayre 2006, pp.214-219. 
64 For instance [1-2; 5-6; …] and [3-4; 7-8; …]. 
65 For instances of non-mathematical, quantitative divisions, and ‘middle-points’, see Sayre 2006, pp.230-
232. 
66 For the metaphysical implications of this passage, see Sayre, 2006, pp.223-240. What kind of 
metaphysics is presupposed by this passage and to what extent Plato supported it needs not concern us 
here. My concern is purely methodological: the Stranger’s reliance on qualitative right measure even for 
conceptual divisions (regardless of whether these lead to metaphysical entities or mere conceptual 
classes). 
67 Sayre, 2006, pp.219-222. 
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It is through this more accurate diairesis that the inquiry proceeds again, 
reorienting the successive divisions. While earlier the subject was the knowledge of the 
statesman, now the focus shifts to human nature (from a purely physical perspective); 
and the conclusion, perhaps with a hint of irony, defines human beings as either 
hornless mammals or featherless bipeds.68 Indeed, this set of divisions is immediately 
criticised because, by assimilating the statesman to a herdsman and the subjects to a 
herd, it enters in conflict with many different arts that can be said to ‘rear’ humans. 
The second section of the dialogue includes another decisive moment of 
reflection, which interrupts the mythical narration at a critical point: 
 First section of the myth: the Age of Cronus (268d2-272b3) 
 Ethical reflection: happiness in the Ages of Cronus and Zeus (272b3-d6) 
 Final section of the myth: the Age of Zeus (272d6-274e4) 
 Correction of the error: the initial definition was excessive (274e5-275b7) 
 Redefinition of politics in light of the myth (275b8-277a3) 
Firstly, the Stranger describes the universe as periodically moving backwards, 
originating a different age in which all living beings grow younger, the earth is 
bountiful, the climate mild and the gods watch over humans and animals. Such 
hypothetical human condition is pre-political, devoid both of conflicts and of 
possibilities for self-determination. ‘What you are hearing, Socrates, is the life of those 
who lived in the time of Cronus’ (272b3), remarks the Stranger to conclude the first part 
of his narration, and immediately invites Young Socrates (and the reader) to a 
reflection: 
As for this one, which they say is in the time of Zeus, the current one, you 
experience it because you are present here. Would you be able and willing to 
judge which one of the two is happier? 
τόνδε δ᾽ ὃν λόγος ἐπὶ Διὸς εἶναι, τὸν νυνί, παρὼν αὐτὸς ᾔσθησαι: κρῖναι δ᾽ 
αὐτοῖν τὸν εὐδαιμονέστερον ἆρ᾽ ἂν δύναιό τε καὶ ἐθελήσειας; (272b3-4, tr. 
Rowe, adapted). 
This reflection is an act of critical judgment, krisis, between two alternatives. One of the 
alternatives, though, is not described: it is experienced by Young Socrates as his present 
                                                             
68 A definition so provocative that it originated an ironical anecdote: Diogenes the Cynic was said to have 
plucked a chicken and declared: ‘Here is Plato’s man’ (οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ Πλάτωνος ἄνθρωπος). D.L. 6.2.40. 
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(nun) and it is to be judged in comparison to the mythical image. While Young Socrates 
admits he cannot answer, and the Stranger offers to judge (diakrinō) in his stead, the 
judgment remains quite ambiguous. ‘If the nurslings of Cronus used all these 
advantages to philosophise’, i.e. to dialogue with each other and even with the animals 
in order to discern the best kind of life, then ‘the judgment is easy [εὔκριτον]: those who 
lived then were far, far more happy than those who live now’ (272b8-c5). But if they 
did not philosophise, and rather spent their time eating and telling myths, ‘this too is 
very easily judged [καὶ μάλ᾽ εὔκριτον]’ (272d2), by which the Stranger implies that, in 
contrast to the happiness of a philosophical age of Cronus, a non-philosophical one 
would be inferior to our own despite all its eases. Overall, the conditional judgments of 
the Stranger depend on a critical factor which is left intentionally unexplored: 
let us set aside these matters, until such time as someone appears to witness 
adequately whether or not the people of that time had desire for knowledge 
and the use of discourse. 
ὅμως δ᾽ οὖν ταῦτα μὲν ἀφῶμεν, ἕως ἂν ἡμῖν μηνυτής τις ἱκανὸς φανῇ, ποτέρως 
οἱ τότε τὰς ἐπιθυμίας εἶχον περί τε ἐπιστημῶν καὶ τῆς τῶν λόγων χρείας 
(272d2-4, tr. Rowe, adapted). 
The Stranger then abandons this moment of krisis, and narrates the origins of our 
present age. Now the universe governs itself, and we humans must imitate it and govern 
ourselves, deprived of the direct supervision of the gods but gifted with various arts that 
help us survive (272d6-274e4). The inquiry will proceed on this basis, eliminate the 
excess of conceiving the statesman as a superior being and redefine politics as a 
voluntary act of care (epimeleia) of voluntary subjects. But why does Plato have the 
Stranger raise a critical question, of fundamental importance, without concluding the 
judgment? Is it simply because the mythical form does not allow ‘rational’ reflection on 
its contents? This seems unlikely, since it is Plato himself who, through the Stranger, 
invites to reflect upon the myth. And who could be an adequate ‘witness’ (μηνυτής) of 
the mythical age of Cronus? The question does not receive an explicit answer, but we 
can see that the problem is once again one of an adequate account. The possibility to 
judge correctly is the same evoked in the central stage on metrion, when the Stranger 
argues for ‘judging [κρίνοντες] lengths not in relation to each other, but […] in relation 
to what is appropriate [τὸ πρέπον]’ (286c8-d2). The problem of judging the two ages in 
relation to each other (which one is happier?), similarly, finds a partial answer not in 
their opposed features (easy life and divine governance against complex life and 
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autonomy), but in relation to philosophical dialogue itself. It is particularly significant 
that Plato has the Stranger refer to an external criterion of judgment about human 
happiness not as an absolute metaphysical norm, but rather as the practice of dialogue: 
the key to a good and happy life, to him, is the (uncertain) capability of mutual 
discussion69 and of questioning the value of one’s life—a skill that blissful creatures 
governed by a totalising authority might even not possess. 
As we have seen, the entire third section, i.e. the central stage that separates the 
model of the herdsman from that of the weaver, is entirely dependent on the concept of 
right measure: a correct model must not be excessively ‘large’, and the dialectician 
needs to be aware of the distinction between the two ways of judging just recalled. The 
section is then concluded with the remark that, as weaving is a model to politics, so 
politics is a model to philosophy. The entire section can be outlined as follows: 
 Explanation of the role of paradeigmata: adequate models from small to great 
(277a3-278e11) 
 Analysis of the weaver’s art: interlacing warp and woof (279a1-283b5) 
 Theoretical reflection on excess and defect: the criterion of right measure
 (283b6-285c3) 
 Function of the models: from weaving to politics, from politics to philosophy 
(285c4-287b3) 
There is no need to linger again on this section, but to stress that, once again, the 
problem which opens the section (the adequacy of models) leads to a reflection on right 
measure and correct judgment, and only afterwards moves back on the problem of 
models, now conceived in function of philosophy (‘for the sake of becoming more able 
dialecticians’, 285d5-6). In addition, we may observe that bearing in mind the principle 
of metrion is, to the Stranger, an antidote ‘against such a malady’ (nosēma, 283b7) as 
that which leads to judge long discourses as digressions and feel ‘revulsion’ at their 
superfluity (duschereia, 286b7). This judgment and this revulsion both stem from the 
ignorance of right measure, and are corrected by orienting the mind towards it as 
evaluative criterion. 
The fourth section of the Statesman is a long process of separation of different 
arts, but it also presents an application of the concept of right measure in contrast with 
the rigidity of written laws: 
                                                             
69 Cf. Chapter 5, Section 5.3.2. 
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 Research through separation: various arts necessary to a polis (287b4-290e9) 
 Research through separation: various constitutions (291a1-293e5) 
 Political reflection: the relation between political knowledge and laws (293e6-
300c4) 
 Reprise of separation: constitutions in relation to political knowledge (300c5-
303d3) 
 Final separation: four arts akin to politics (303d4-305e7) 
Again, we find a moment of reflection triggered by a hesitation of Young Socrates. 
When the Stranger remarks that the true art of statecraft should be independent from 
laws (as well as from wealth and even consensus), the young contests: 
The rest of it, Stranger, seems to have been said in due measure; but that 
ruling must be carried on even without laws, is too hard a notion to hear.  
τὰ μὲν ἄλλα, ὦ ξένε, μετρίως ἔοικεν εἰρῆσθαι: τὸ δὲ καὶ ἄνευ νόμων δεῖν 
ἄρχειν χαλεπώτερον ἀκούειν ἐρρήθη (293e6-7, tr. Rowe, adapted). 
The Stranger welcomes Young Socrates’s doubt, with these words: 
You have preceded me just a little with your question, Socrates. For I was 
about to ask whether you accept all of this, or whether in fact you feel 
revulsion at any of the things we have said; but now it’s clear that we will 
prefer to discuss the correctness of those who rule without laws. 
μικρόν γε ἔφθης με ἐρόμενος, ὦ Σώκρατες. ἔμελλον γάρ σε διερωτήσειν ταῦτα 
πότερον ἀποδέχῃ πάντα, ἤ τι καὶ δυσχεραίνεις τῶν λεχθέντων: νῦν δ᾽ ἤδη 
φανερὸν ὅτι τοῦτο βουλησόμεθα τὸ περὶ τῆς τῶν ἄνευ νόμων ἀρχόντων 
ὀρθότητος διελθεῖν ἡμᾶς (293e7-294a4, tr. Rowe, adapted). 
Notice that Young Socrates questions the correctness of the Stranger’s claim in terms of 
metrion and deon; and the Stranger names his reaction one of revulsion (duschereia), 
the same ‘malady’ of those who cannot take long philosophical discourses because they 
fail to understand their correct measure. The Stranger’s fundamental concern, again, is 
not just with formal methods, but with his interlocutor’s cognitive ability to guide his 
own mind in the correct way, being aware of the psychological effects of discourses and 
orienting philosophical discussions accordingly. The Stranger then dismisses the 
potential contrast of the true statecraft with issues of wealth and popular consensus. As 
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Lane observed, he presses here ‘the rivalry between law and knowledge’ (1998, p.149) 
in terms of the precision of right measure; if law should not prevail, it is because: 
law could never accurately embrace what is excellent and most just for all at 
the same time, and so prescribe what is best; for the dissimilarities between 
human beings and their actions, and the fact that, as the saying goes, nothing in 
human affairs ever is at peace, prevent any kind of art whatsoever from making 
any simple decision in any sphere that covers all cases and will last for all 
time. 
νόμος οὐκ ἄν ποτε δύναιτο τό τε ἄριστον καὶ τὸ δικαιότατον ἀκριβῶς πᾶσιν 
ἅμα περιλαβὼν τὸ βέλτιστον ἐπιτάττειν: αἱ γὰρ ἀνομοιότητες τῶν τε 
ἀνθρώπων καὶ τῶν πράξεων καὶ τὸ μηδέποτε μηδὲν ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν ἡσυχίαν 
ἄγειν τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων οὐδὲν ἐῶσιν ἁπλοῦν ἐν οὐδενὶ περὶ ἁπάντων καὶ ἐπὶ 
πάντα τὸν χρόνον ἀποφαίνεσθαι τέχνην οὐδ᾽ ἡντινοῦν (294a10-b6, tr. Rowe, 
adapted). 
The Stranger is talking here about an absolutely stable kind of law, which requires 
constant obeisance to traditional dispensations, and denies any possible alteration.70 A 
good political art, performed ‘with wisdom’ (μετὰ φρονήσεως, 294a8), should rather be 
able to accommodate two different conditions: the dissimilarities among human beings, 
and the change that their ‘affairs’ (πράξεων) undergo through time. Lane focuses on the 
latter temporal aspect, claiming that ‘it is these dissimilarities in action over time […] 
which resist comprehensive and unchanging dispensations’ (p.150). But there is more: 
not only the change through time, but also the variety among individuals poses 
problems to any attempt at giving accurate dispositions: ‘it is impossible for what is 
always simple [τὸ διὰ παντὸς γιγνόμενον ἁπλοῦν] to be useful in relation to what is 
never simple [τὰ μηδέποτε ἁπλᾶ]’ (294c7-8). 
The discussion here, clearly, tries to reach, through a negative movement, the 
positive characters of an effective political action:71 such an action, ideally, should be 
able to embrace with complete accuracy (akribeia) the shifting and various necessities 
of a multitude of human beings throughout time. The ideal knowledge of a good 
statesman should achieve this result, but law, insofar as it is simple, cannot. No law-
                                                             
70 This description of law stands in sharp contrast with documented Athenian practices (Lane, 1998, 
pp.150-152). It is not justified by the historical context, but rather by the premises of the reasoning: any 
action that alters the law is itself taken independently from the law, either with knowledge or in ignorance 
of what is best for human beings (300c8-e6). 
71 Gill (1995) analyses this process in terms of ‘defamiliarization and theorized reconstitution’ (p.304). 
56 
 
giver could ever ‘be capable [ἱκανὸς] […] of sitting beside each individual perpetually 
throughout their life and prescribing with accuracy [δι᾽ ἀκριβείας] what is appropriate to 
them [τὸ προσῆκον]’ (295a9-b2). This passage describes a specific sort of 
appropriateness which, even if not described through the language of the central part of 
the dialogue, still depends on a knowledge and a capacity of action that adapts the 
precise simplicity of a stable norm to a more complex reality; so complex that, in fact, a 
single individual cannot be adequate (ikanos) to the task of giving absolutely precise 
norms to each subject. This is the political aspect of right measure, which emerges here 
only negatively, by contrast with the rigidity of laws. Lane calls this aspect kairos, as 
the ability to ‘discern correctly’ all the dissimilarities and changes of human actions 
over time (p.150); however, as we have seen, the preoccupation of the Stranger is not 
only with temporal changes, but also with the individual particularities or dissimilarities 
which, according to the myth, are constantly increasing through time, as the universe 
moves away from the Age of Cronus towards the ‘boundless sea of dissimilarity’ 
(273d6-e1). It is the knowledge of right measure that can manage not only the necessary 
changes in human activities, but also the multiplicity of human conditions, and adapts 
(or should adapt) accordingly. The contrast of political knowledge and laws, then, is not 
a radical opposition between an unrestrained freedom and the coercion of laws, but the 
problematic interplay of an independent action that aims at what is better (300c9-d2) 
and the unchanging, generic stability of fixed rules. 
 The last section of the dialogue abandons all considerations of laws and 
constitutions, and focuses on social virtues. Again, we find distinct moments of inquiry: 
 Description of the true political art: opposition of aggressiveness and mildness 
(305e8-308b9) 
 Conclusive reflection: the criterion of political art (308b10-308e3) 
 Description of the true political art: conjunction of courage and moderation 
(308e4-311c8) 
Firstly the Stranger contrasts courage and animosity with moderation and mildness, 
arguing that their inherent rivalry can be harmful for a state; and then he suggests that 
the statesman’s action should aim at producing a harmony of those two virtues. The two 
moments are again separated by a methodological reflection, in which the Stranger 
again compares statecraft to productive arts: 
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Then let’s take the following point in turn […] Whether somewhere any of the 
kinds of knowledge that involve composition, voluntarily puts together any of 
the thing it produces, even the least important, out of bad and good things, or 
whether every kind of knowledge everywhere throws away the bad so far as it 
can, and takes what is suitable and good, and from these, both similar and 
dissimilar, bringing them all together into one, crafts a single form with a 
single capacity. 
τόδε τοίνυν αὖ λάβωμεν […]  εἴ τίς που τῶν συνθετικῶν ἐπιστημῶν πρᾶγμα 
ὁτιοῦν τῶν αὑτῆς ἔργων, κἂν εἰ τὸ φαυλότατον, ἑκοῦσα ἐκ μοχθηρῶν καὶ 
χρηστῶν τινων συνίστησιν, ἢ πᾶσα ἐπιστήμη πανταχοῦ τὰ μὲν μοχθηρὰ εἰς 
δύναμιν ἀποβάλλει, τὰ δὲ ἐπιτήδεια καὶ τὰ χρηστὰ ἔλαβεν, ἐκ τούτων δὲ καὶ 
ὁμοίων καὶ ἀνομοίων ὄντων, πάντα εἰς ἓν αὐτὰ συνάγουσα, μίαν τινὰ δύναμιν 
καὶ ἰδέαν δημιουργεῖ (308b10-c7, tr. Rowe, adapted). 
This art that rejects what is bad and unifies what is good is then specifically assimilated 
to weaving (308d6), and the central model finally operates directly in the definition. The 
model of weaving provides a criterion for political action, determining what kind of 
activity it should perform and what aim it should pursue. The Stranger thus argues 
(308d6-309a3) that correct political action should first entrust the citizens to educators 
who can test and develop their virtues, based on their own inner disposition (while 
excluding, even violently, from political participation anyone who inherently tends to 
unrestrained behaviours and opinions). The final aim is to ‘bind together and intertwine’ 
natures ‘with opposite tendencies’ towards animosity or mildness (309b6), in 
accordance with the image of the weaver introduced in the central part of the dialogue. 
The presence of right measure here is evident, and its object of action is clearly defined: 
not laws or constitutions, but the harmonisation of virtues and dispositions determine, 
above all, a good society. 
 Examining in detail the different sections of the dialogue, we can see not only 
that they are successive methodological moments, but also that they are structured in a 
consistent way, parallel to the macroscopic structure. In each of them, indeed, we can 
find ‘units of meaning’ structured around a central moment of reflection on right 
measure (in its different acceptations). The initial diairesis is divided in two by a 
reflection on how to ‘cut through the middle’ the objects of inquiry, and this moment 
marks a shift from a diairesis of statecraft per se to one of human nature. The myth 
opposes the age of Cronus, when the universe moved backwards and the gods were in 
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charge of every reality, to the so-called age of Zeus, when all realities are autonomous; 
and again, the two narrations are separated by a critical reflection that calls for a way to 
judge between two alternatives. The central section moves from the theory of models, in 
search for an adequate one, to a general theory of right measure itself, which grounds 
the acceptance (and endurance) of long philosophical discourses. The fourth section, 
consistently, interrupts the separation of arts and constitutions with a reflection on the 
relation between laws and the knowledge of metrion (here conceived as accuracy and 
appropriateness through time and dissimilarities). Finally, the last section opposes a 
moment of inquiry where courage and moderation are said to be inherently conflictive, 
to a moment where political art is defined as the harmonious interlacing of those 
opposite realities; and it is the model of weaving, recalled in the central reflection, that 
serves as a criterion for this action. There seems to be a recurrent pattern of ‘units of 
meaning’ throughout the dialogue, which can be generalised as: 
Alternative A Critical Reflection Alternative B 
 
This pattern is stunningly consistent with the more generic opposition of the models of 
the herdsman and the weaver, as well as with the general Eleatic Stranger’s dialectical 
practice. Such a precise articulation of arguments cannot be considered a simple chance, 
but must in my view be attributed to Plato’s writing technique; albeit certainly this 
articulation is not rigid, as it includes other elements that do not depend directly on the 
‘critical reflection’,72 it can be considered a compositional application of the very 
concept of right measure. I therefore agree with Brumbaugh’s claim that this dialogue is 
itself a model of right measure in action; I also add that it is not such only for its 
progression from incorrect to correct methods, but also for its structural coherence. This 
structural coherence serves to portray the characters’ (evolving) capability to evaluate 
philosophical discourses at pivotal moments of krisis, and thus stresses the foundational 
importance of right measure as criterion for a correct cognitive orientation. The 
structure of the Statesman perfectly exemplifies a doctrine that Plato never fully 
exhibited, but whose significance is evident throughout its many different applications – 
one of which is this dialogue itself. 
 
 
                                                             
72 Such as the critique that follow the first diairesis (267c5-268d1) or the corrections entailed by the myth 
(274e5-277a3). 
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Conclusion 
Looking at this dialogue’s structure provides insight into Plato’s compositional 
technique and its underlying philosophical principle. While we can agree with Diés’s 
articulation of three dialogical stages, it is also evident that the dialogue has many 
smaller sections which pose problems to a universally acknowledgeable structure. These 
problems can be solved if we observe that the dialogue is divided on the macroscopic 
level in three stages and on a more detailed scale in five methodological sections. This 
articulation is not merely a hermeneutic tool, but it reflects two philosophical 
preoccupations: first, the distinction of different methods of inquiry; second, and more 
important, the enactment of the principle of right measure. 
 This principle acts on both levels: on the surface, the shift from the model of the 
herdsman to that of the weaver is explained as a movement from excessive greatness to 
adequate smallness; more deeply, the centrality of metrion constantly divides ‘units of 
meaning’ in two alternative moments of inquiry. Sometimes we can also see that the 
reflections on metrion re-orientate the following inquiry: beyond the evident shift of 
models, also the first diairesis shifts its object from political art to human nature, and 
the final definition from the contrast to the unification of virtues. As I observed, these 
shifts, far from being pure disruptions (or worse, interrupted by disruptions), are 
actually organised around a common criterion. The matter is more complex for the 
sections of myth and separation, and it would require a more detailed account that was 
impossible to complete here; the task of determining whether and how a shift occurs is 
open to future research, but at present we can observe the presence of a consistent 
division through a moment of critical reflection. Overall, the coherence of the structure 
is also a coherence of philosophical criteria: the Statesman is organised according to the 
principles it exposes. This dialogue artfully represents the difficulties faced by inquiring 
minds, the necessity for critical disruptions, and the need to refer to right measure 
whenever correct cognitive orientation becomes problematic. Structure and content are 
thus unified through the underlying principle of right measure. It does not seem unlikely 
(and is rather a mark of philosophical consistency) that Plato has composed the 
Statesman just like the Divine Artificer of the Timaeus composed the cosmos, holding 
that ‘the most beautiful of bonds is that which most perfectly makes one out of itself 
and what is bound’ (31c2-3).73  
                                                             
73 Plato’s concern with right measure and with ‘the middle’ are interwoven in the Timaeus as well. Here, the 
Artificer binds the material elements in mathematical proportion, because ‘it is not possible that two things 
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Chapter 2 – Cognitive Imagery in the Statesman: Measured 
Combination of Images 
Every combination (sunkrasis), of any kind, which does 
not happen to attain its measure (metrou) and its 
proportionate (summetrou) nature destroys by necessity 
its components and itself in the first place; for in this 
case there would be no mixture (krasis) at all but a 
disconnected (akratos) jumble, on each occasion the 
ruin of what it contains (Phil. 64d9-14). 
 
Introduction 
In this chapter, I will study the cognitive role of images and models in the Statesman. 
This dialogue presents the most explicit theorisation, in Plato’s corpus, of the value of 
imagery in contributing to knowledge and the acquisition of truth. At 277c7-d7, indeed, 
the character of the Stranger introduces them as an extremely useful, albeit not always 
necessary, part of ‘the experience about knowledge within ourselves’ (τὸ περὶ τῆς 
ἐπιστήμης πάθος ἐν ἡμῖν, 277d7) and explains how they positively contribute to it. 
While Plato certainly does not credit imagery with any demonstrative power,74 the fact 
that he presents it as a positive cognitive instrument has drawn increasing scholarly 
attention. The Statesman is indeed paradigmatic of Plato’s appreciation of imagery as a 
cognitive tool, and arguably fundamental for understanding how he uses it in different 
dialogues.75 All scholars that have examined this topic in detail conceive models as 
instruments to highlight similarities between two different objects of knowledge. This 
interpretation, however, ultimately reduces imagery to an illustrative or didactic tool, or 
at best an instrument of revision of ideas but incapable of offering novel insights into a 
radically unknown object. 
The aim of this chapter is to show that this interpretation is too limited, and to 
offer a more complete and textually sound account of the cognitive role of models as 
threefold process: variation, recognition, and combination of different images of the 
same complex object of inquiry. It will show that this process serves to achieve a 
cognitive ‘right measure’ between complete knowledge and radical ignorance of the 
object of inquiry as a whole. The Stranger’s account of knowledge and ignorance, as I 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
alone should be conjoined without a third; for there must needs be a bond in the middle to bring both together 
[δεσμὸν γὰρ ἐν μέσῳ δεῖ τινα ἀμφοῖν συναγωγὸν γίγνεσθαι]’ (31c1). Proportion unifies all terms in the middle: 
a:b=b:c; thereby b:c=a:b. Extremes can become middle points, and vice-versa: ‘the middle term [τὸ μέσον] 
becomes in turn the first and the last, while the first and last become in turn middle terms [μέσα], and by 
necessity it follows that all terms are the same, and having become the same to each other, all are one [ἓν πάντα 
ἔσται]’ (32a3-7). 
74 Pender, 2000, p.58; Goldschmidt, 1947 (ed. 2003), pp.53-58. Cf. Lane, 1998, pp.38-39. 
75 Lane, 1998, pp.18-20. 
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will show, is inherently related to a concern not just with single elements of knowledge 
(e.g. particular opinions or sensual impressions), but with the whole object of 
knowledge, conceived as a holistic plexus of different elements, which dialectic seeks 
not only to clarify independently but also to articulate correctly. As Migliori (1996) has 
remarked: ‘The dialectic under consideration [in the Statesman] must not be conceived 
as a technical ability, but as the philosophical activity itself, attentive not to single 
aspects detached from their context, but to the whole. This “whole”, dialectically 
grasped, does not exclude its parts, but gives them value, because only within this frame 
the parts are what they are: parts of a whole’ (p.195, tr. mine). Plato indeed often 
extends his attention to the harmony of ‘whole’, composite realities, whereby different 
elements constitute a cohesive (non-contradictory and proportionate) plexus.76 In 
particular, in the Philebus (64d9-14) the character of Socrates argues that every artful 
combination (σύγκρασις) needs to attain measure (μέτρου) and a proportionate 
(συμμέτρου) nature, if it is to survive and preserve the very existence of its parts. In 
absence of measure and internal harmony, he claims, we do not have a mixture (κρᾶσις) 
of parts, but a disconnected or unmixed (ἄκρατος) heap of unrelated elements.77 As I 
will show, the same idea applies to the Statesman. This notion is not only 
epistemological, but aesthetical and ethical; it applies not only to the diairetical and 
more strictly logical aspects of dialectic, but to images themselves and to their effect on 
the human mind. My study will thus show that Plato, in the Statesman, has presented 
imagery as cognitively productive, insofar as it produces not only a recognition of 
similarities but also a measured (and elegant)78 combination of different points of view 
on the same subject, which effectively expands knowledge. 
 
2.1. Cognitive Models: The Canonical Interpretation and Its Limit 
As I have shown in my General Introduction (0.3 and 0.4.3.), the three major studies of 
images and models in the Statesman tend to reduce their cognitive role to an illustration 
                                                             
76 Mereology, the study of the relations between parts and wholes as epistemological and ontological 
objects, is fundamental for a correct understanding of Plato’s theoretical and ethical philosophy. For the 
theoretical implications of mereology (reality as a composite structure), cf. Harte (2002); for its ethical 
and psychological meaning (the self as a plexus of faculties and relations with others), cf. Napolitano 
Valditara (2010). 
77 I cannot tackle here the problem of the strict relation between the Statesman and the Philebus. Their 
main common concerns are epistemology (collection as measured unity of multiple elements; Sayre 2006, 
pp.48-51) and ethics/politics (good direction of life as production of intersubjective harmony, Bontempi 
2009, pp.160-170). 
78 Accordingly, Hobbs (2000) observes that, in the Republic (486d), Socrates grounds the cognitive 
acquition of truth on the inquiring subjects’ possession of ‘proportion and grace’ in their minds (p.227). 
The same idea recurs at Soph. 227e-228d. 
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of objective similarities between a familiar object and a more obscure object of inquiry, 
and this interpretation has not been challenged so far. Therefore, I shall refer to the 
following studies as the ‘canonical interpretation’ of the cognitive role of models in the 
Statesman. Goldschmidt (1947, ed.2003) considers models a didactic exercise in the 
‘discovery of resemblances’ (p.22, tr. mine) between a minor (simpler) and a major 
(more complex) object of inquiry. To him, their cognitive value consists in the fact that 
they train the mind in seeking for the objective self-identical essences that underpin 
different realities, namely the metaphysical Forms (pp.22-29 and 72-86). Similarly, 
Lane (1998) argues that models serve to allow ‘a process of active comparison’ (p.66) 
between simple and complex object of inquiry. To her, their cognitive role is ‘to fix 
certain similarities as salient’ for the inquiry, and allow their further exploration, 
distinction, and refinement through conceptual divisions (p.76). In the same vein, 
Pender (2000) presents models as an essential part of the dialectical process of 
collection and division, ‘the art of recognising likenesses and differences’ that 
underpins the whole dialogue (p.47). Models are tools that illustrate clearly an objective 
similarity between two objects, in order to ‘impose a structure on a concept’ that would 
be otherwise obscure (p.56). To Pender, therefore, they are ‘extremely useful cognitive 
tools’ (p.59) insofar as they elucidate and restructure complex concepts, but they cannot 
provide direct access to knowledge or even open novel perspectives. As Pender 
summarises: 
Plato’s assessment of the power of models [in the Statesman] is cautious and 
conservative, claiming only that models help to provide understanding through 
the recognition of common elements. Plato makes no claims that models can 
offer insight into objects that are radically unknown (p.47). 
Pender’s claim teases out the limit of the canonical interpretation: not only models are 
not instrument of demonstration of the truth, but their cognitive power is also limited to 
illustration, clarification, and revision of existing opinions. In the canonical 
interpretation models not only do not guarantee the objective truth of the similarities 
they highlight (and Plato never claims that they do),79 but they also fail to open novel 
perspectives upon objects on which one is radically ignorant. 
                                                             
79 Pender, 2000, p.57: ‘It is notable that in the discussion of the nature and function of models in the 
Politicus there is no discussion of their truth status’. Pender observes that, rather, the Statesman refers to 
opinion, judgment, discovery, as well as ‘showing’ and ‘revealing’, all terms that do not entail proof. 
Lane (1998) also observes that Plato, in other dialogues and particularly in the Protagoras, raises 
‘perplexities about similarity’ and addresses the limits of analogical reasoning: similarities do not 
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 While this canonical reading is logically consistent, my research has revealed 
that its textual focus is too limited, because the cognitive role of models in the 
Statesman is broader than currently granted. This interpretation, in fact, is grounded 
solely on the Stranger’s account of models as comparative tools, exemplified by the 
activity of students that learn how to read correctly complex, unfamiliar syllables by 
comparing them to simpler, familiar ones (277c7-278e10).80 But the Stranger’s account 
is in fact more articulate, as it exemplifies the usage of models through three different 
comparisons: (1) the completion of a work of visual art; (2) the confusing experience of 
awakening; (3) the juxtaposition of simple and complex syllables. I will show that these 
examples serve to propose a more complex theory of cognitive imagery than usually 
accepted, insofar as they outline a threefold process of (1) composition, (2) variation, 
and (3) recognition of different facets of an object of inquiry (in our context, statecraft). 
Thus, I will show that the canonical focus on similarities alone does not exhaust the 
whole range of cognitive effects that Plato attributes to imagery, because he also grants 
a cognitive role to the interaction of differences among various images, which can grant 
(if correctly managed) novel insights. Thus, I will not seek to reject the canonical 
interpretation of models, but to expand it towards an evaluation of perspectival 
difference as cognitively valuable.  
 The idea that imagery allows to restructure existing ideas and open new 
perspectives is in fact common in modern studies of rhetorical figures, and constitutes 
what Pender (2000) has named the ‘epistemic thesis’ regarding models and metaphors.81 
For instance, Eva Kittay’s perspectival theory (1987) attributes this epistemic force to 
metaphor, qua conflation of different linguistic and conceptual domains: 
To call our theory perspectival is to name it for the function metaphor serves: 
to provide a perspective from which to gain an understanding of that which is 
metaphorically portrayed. This is a distinctively cognitive role […] the speaker 
makes use of one linguistically articulated domain to gain an understanding of 
another experiential or conceptual domain and similarly, it is the means by 
which a hearer grasps such an understanding (p.14).82 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
constitute proofs, and arguments by analogy can be rejected simply by positing a different analogy 
(pp.76-83). 
80 Pender, 2000, p.48; Lane, 1998, p.61; Goldschmidt, 1947 (ed. 2003), pp.10-13. 
81 See Pender, 2000, pp.18-23 
82 Also quoted in Pender, 2000, p.20. However, she does not identify any coherence between Kittay’s 
perspectival theory and the theory of models in the Statesman. 
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To Kittay, metaphors are cognitive tools not only because they transpose a structure 
from one field of experience to another, e.g., in Plato, by assimilating intellectual 
knowledge to sight or education to midwifery (pp.275-287). Rather, she argues, the very 
difference between the two assimilated fields forces a re-structuring of familiar ideas, a 
‘reconceptualisation’ or ‘perspectival shift’ that produces new meanings (p.301). Notice 
that this cognitive gain does not consist in the objective discovery of a completely new 
object, but more moderately in presenting new aspects of what is already, to some 
extent, known or familiar to a reader or interlocutor.83 
Pender (2000) observes that Plato relies on this cognitive power of images at 
least when speaking about the gods in different ways and using the metaphors of 
craftsmen, fathers, governors, owners, and helmsmen (pp.100-114): 
By interweaving his different metaphors Plato is able to achieve cognitive and 
rhetorical effects which he could not achieve by each metaphor alone […] 
Once he has established a multiplicity of images for the gods, Plato can move 
freely between them, using one particular metaphor to achieve a certain effect 
and then switching easily to another to make a further point in his argument 
(pp.118-119).84 
The focus here rests on the irreducible multiplicity of images, each of which represents 
(albeit obviously not demonstrating it) a different aspect of the same object of 
discussion. Pender embraces a perspectival interpretation, observing that the 
employment of different metaphors, which are incompatible if taken literally, allows 
Plato the rhetorical and philosophical freedom to explore different facets of the same 
subject, to ‘flesh out and to enlarge upon’ his theological beliefs (p.148). According to 
Kittay and Pender, the role of images is not to demonstrate the validity of a specific 
opinion (such as the existence of benevolent gods, the possibility of objective 
metaphysical knowledge, or the maieutic nature of education), but to expand ideas and 
create broader semantic fields. 
While neither Kittay nor Pender argue that Plato ever proposed an explicit 
perspectival theory, I hold that his account of images and models in the Statesman is 
coherent with a perspectival understanding of imagery. This dialogue certainly does not 
address metaphor as such, and conflates similes, analogies, and metaphors under 
                                                             
83 Kittay, 1987, p.313; Pender, 2000, p.21. 
84 Interactionist interpretations are offered also by Lloyd, 1966 and de Marignac, 1951. 
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various terms, such as ‘model’ (παράδειγμα) and ‘image’ (εἰκών), but it nonetheless 
presents imagery as a tool that restructures given ideas in different ways, in order to 
show the same subject from a variety of new angles. 
 
2.2. A Theory of Models: Composition, Variation and Recognition 
As I have anticipated, the canonical interpretation makes Plato’s account of models 
coincide with the example of children learning how to read by comparing syllables, 
starting at 277c. However, in the dialogue scene, the Stranger introduces the theory of 
models some lines earlier (277a), through a different example: the attempted completion 
of a sculpture and of a painting, through the adequate combination of materials and 
colours. As I have shown in Chapter 1, this happens because Plato writes in a 
fragmented, discontinuous way and trails discussions before articulating them more 
formally. His account of models cannot be fully reconstructed without disentangling it 
precisely from its dialogical context.  
Therefore, a brief recapitulation of the dialogue is necessary to understand the 
meaning of that example. The characters initially tackle the problem of defining the 
knowledge of the statesman through conceptual divisions (258a7-277a2). From the very 
beginning, the characters agree to ‘search for the political man’ (πολιτικὸν τὸν ἄνδρα 
διαζητεῖν, 258b4) among ‘those who possess knowledge’ (τῶν ἐπιστημόνων, 258b4) 
about their specific activity, and never question this hypothetical assumption throughout 
the whole inquiry.85 Having defined statecraft as the art of herding human communities 
(267a7-c3), they face the difficulty of identifying precisely what kind of art it is, since in 
the city different experts tend to human nourishment and education (267c5-268d4). As a 
consequence, the Stranger changes method of inquiry: he narrates and interprets the 
myth of a golden age, in which both statecraft and all other arts did not exist, because 
gods took charge of all living beings as their herdsmen and nature was so bountiful that 
no human expertise was needed (268d5-277a2). This myth serves to show that the 
initial definition was misleading in two respects: (a) it credited too much power and 
knowledge to the statesman and made him identical to a god; and (b) it failed to 
                                                             
85 As Gill (1995) observes, this assumption is maintained at Pol. 293d8-e2, 296e3-4, 297a6-b3; cf. also 
311b-c (p.293, n.7). The idea that there is such a thing as a political science capable to determine the 
objective good of a community (like a doctor would determine the health of a body) is contentious and 
heavy with presuppositions. Plato takes it for granted in the Statesman, but he problematizes it, for 
instance, at Meno (95a-100c). 
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pinpoint the exact mode of his rule (274e5-275a).86 One point must be stressed here: 
this correction does not mean that the initial definition was objectively wrong, as the 
characters do maintain that statecraft is a form of collective rule throughout the whole 
dialogue. Rather, it means that it was in one respect excessive, and in another respect 
defective, because it construed statecraft as too encompassing a control over human 
groups, while also failing to be precise about its activities. Finally, the Stranger revises 
the initial definition of statecraft, naming it, more generically, as the art of voluntarily 
taking charge (ἐπιμέλειαν, 276d1) of groups of human beings with their consent, and 
Young Socrates holds the inquiry to be concluded (275c9-277a2). 
It is at this point that the Stranger introduces his theory of models. He 
contradicts Young Socrates and claims that the political inquiry is yet incomplete, 
because it has furnished an inadequate image of statecraft: 
And now, according to my view, the king does not yet seem to have a complete 
figure for us, but just as sculptors sometimes hurry at the wrong moment and 
actually slow down by making additions and increasing the size of the various 
elements of the work beyond what is appropriate, so too in our case now, I 
suppose in order to show quickly and magnificently  the mistake in the route 
we previously took, we thought it was fitting to the king to give great models, 
and took upon ourselves a puzzling bulk of material in the figure of our myth, 
so forcing ourselves to use a greater part than necessary. Thus we have made 
our demonstration longer, and have in every way failed to bring our myth to an 
end; and our account, simply like the portrait of an animal, seems adequate in 
terms of its superficial outline, but not yet to have received its proper clarity, as 
it were with paints and the mixture of colours. 
νῦν δὲ κατά γε τὴν ἐμὴν οὔπω φαίνεται τέλεον ὁ βασιλεὺς ἡμῖν σχῆμα ἔχειν, 
ἀλλὰ καθάπερ ἀνδριαντοποιοὶ παρὰ καιρὸν ἐνίοτε σπεύδοντες πλείω καὶ μείζω 
τοῦ δέοντος ἕκαστα τῶν ἔργων ἐπεμβαλλόμενοι βραδύνουσι, καὶ νῦν ἡμεῖς, ἵνα 
δὴ πρὸς τῷ ταχὺ καὶ μεγαλοπρεπῶς δηλώσαιμεν τὸ τῆς ἔμπροσθεν ἁμάρτημα 
διεξόδου, τῷ βασιλεῖ νομίσαντες πρέπειν μεγάλα παραδείγματα ποιεῖσθαι, 
θαυμαστὸν ὄγκον ἀράμενοι τοῦ μύθου, μείζονι τοῦ δέοντος ἠναγκάσθημεν 
αὐτοῦ μέρει προσχρήσασθαι· διὸ μακροτέραν τὴν ἀπόδειξιν πεποιήκαμεν καὶ 
πάντως τῷ μύθῳ τέλος οὐκ ἐπέθεμεν, ἀλλ᾽ ἀτεχνῶς ὁ λόγος ἡμῖν ὥσπερ ζῷον 
                                                             
86 Cf. Kahn, 2009, p.149. 
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τὴν ἔξωθεν μὲν περιγραφὴν ἔοικεν ἱκανῶς ἔχειν, τὴν δὲ οἷον τοῖς φαρμάκοις 
καὶ τῇ συγκράσει τῶν χρωμάτων ἐνάργειαν οὐκ ἀπειληφέναι πω’ (277a4-c3, tr. 
Rowe, adapted). 
This passage has often been interpreted as a comment on the myth alone,87 but it is 
actually a comment on the whole ‘previous course’ (τῆς ἔμπροσθεν […] διεξόδου) of 
inquiry, the error (ἁμάρτημα) just committed, and the final objective of the dialogue, the 
demonstration (ἀπόδειξιν) of the nature of statecraft. It does not refer to conceptual 
divisions and definitions, but it presents the former error as a mistake in presenting great 
and inadequate ‘models’ (παραδείγματα), and the purpose of the inquiry as the 
construction of a ‘figure’ (σχῆμα) of the statesman. This passage thus serves to 
introduce an extensive methodological reflection on this whole philosophical inquiry 
and to reframe it in terms of images. The Stranger makes three claims about the whole 
inquiry so far: (a) it is not complete; (b) it has included excessive claims about 
statecraft, which have diverted, at length, the inquiry from its original path; and (c) it 
has not detailed sufficiently the pertinent elements of statecraft. Thus, the Stranger’s 
judgment is not just a condemnation of an objective error (statecraft has been 
misrepresented), but also an evaluation of the relevance or irrelevance of the theoretical 
efforts undergone so far by himself and Young Socrates. His judgment refers to the very 
specific context of this inquiry, and does not constitute a claim about knowledge or 
dialectic in general. His purpose is to refine the methods of inquiry in order to avoid 
repeating the previous errors and to achieve sufficient ‘clarity’ (ἐνάργειαν). Crucially, 
his concern with models as a method of inquiry begins when this inquiry is at an 
impasse: imagery constitutes a response to cognitive disorientation and a necessary 
supplement to mere conceptual divisions. 
 We find here important methodological remarks about the function of models, 
which foreground the following discussion. The aspects of models on which this 
passage insists are two: (a) their excess and deficiency;88 (b) the variety of their 
elements. On the one hand, the Stranger reflects on the ‘measure’ and the ‘opportunity’ 
of images: the characters have added a large number of details ‘at the wrong moment’ 
(παρὰ καιρὸν) and ‘beyond what is appropriate’ (μείζω τοῦ δέοντος; μείζονι τοῦ 
δέοντος); they have represented statecraft  ‘magnificently’ (μεγαλοπρεπῶς), because 
                                                             
87 Morgan, 2000, pp.255-261; Lane, 1998, pp.125-132; Rowe, 1995a, p.200 (comment to 277b1). 
88 Morgan (2000) emphasises the twofold nature of this example: ‘The analogy with the statue-makers 
implies that the myth was, in some sections, too elaborate. The analogy with the painters suggests that 
their discussion has been too sketchy’ (p.256). 
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they thought ‘it was fitting to produce great models’ (πρέπειν μεγάλα παραδείγματα 
ποιεῖσθαι) for the king; and finally they furnished an outline of statecraft that is only 
superficially ‘sufficient’ (ἱκανῶς), but not a complete figure (τέλεον […] σχῆμα). On 
the other hand, the Stranger illustrates the necessity to deal correctly with the variety of 
elements that contribute to the inquiry: the ‘various elements of the work’ (ἕκαστα τῶν 
ἔργων) need to be carefully selected, its ‘parts’ (μέρει) evaluated, and ultimately 
composed as accurately as possible, ‘as it were with paints and the mixture of colours’ 
(τοῖς φαρμάκοις καὶ τῇ συγκράσει τῶν χρωμάτων). This passage, thus, furnishes the 
first methodological criterion for evaluating images and models: aiming at a measured 
combination of elements by eschewing excess (irrelevance, over-elaboration) and 
deficiency (superficiality, lack of clarity). Again, we find not a comment on objective 
knowledge of reality or universal features of language, but rather on contextual usages 
and cognitive effects of images. Instead of a definition of knowledge, that is, we find a 
concrete description of the opportune ways to avoid errors and confusions. I therefore 
take the Stranger’s comments about error in a very moderate, contextual, and non-
prescriptive sense. To him, erroneous and lacking measure is what the interlocutors 
determine as irrelevant or superficial through former inquiries, not what fails to meet 
objective standards such as reference to criteria of truth formally defined once and for 
all. Moreover, we can see that the Stranger’s first and foremost methodological 
observation is about diversity and variety within a single ‘figure’, not immediately (as 
in the canonical interpretation) on objective similarities or factual truth. The Stranger’s 
example of sculpture and painting allows him to avoid the thorny problem of defining 
truth, and to present instead a criterion of ‘right measure’ to judge the validity of an 
image. 
 The Stranger’s second methodological remark focuses, similarly, on variation. 
When Young Socrates asks him to clarify in what sense the account was incomplete, he 
introduces the example of awakening: 
It’s a hard thing, my fine friend, to sufficiently indicate any of the greater 
subjects without using models. There’s the risk that each of us, knowing 
everything as in a dream, then again is ignorant of everything like in waking 
vision.  
χαλεπόν, ὦ δαιμόνιε, μὴ παραδείγμασι χρώμενον ἱκανῶς ἐνδείκνυσθαί τι τῶν 
μειζόνων. κινδυνεύει γὰρ ἡμῶν ἕκαστος οἷον ὄναρ εἰδὼς ἅπαντα πάντ᾽ αὖ 
πάλιν ὥσπερ ὕπαρ ἀγνοεῖν’ (277d1-4, tr. Rowe, adapted). 
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The first line of this passage is clear: models are instrumental methods of inquiry that 
can ‘sufficiently indicate’ (ἱκανῶς ἐνδείκνυσθαί)89 complex subjects, not demonstrative 
instruments. The second line, instead, has triggered frequent confusion, because the 
example of awakening is usually interpreted as describing the attainment of clarity or as 
a progress from true opinions to knowledge.90 But the text is clearly referring to a 
negative experience: the immediate result of awakening from the apparent knowledge of 
dreams is to ‘be ignorant of everything’ (πάντ᾽ […] ἀγνοεῖν). By contrast with Pender’s 
reading (2000), the Stranger does in fact present models as adequate responses to a state 
of radical ignorance (p.47). Pender only grants that the Stranger’s ‘move from the 
statement about models to that of our general poor state of knowledge suggests that 
models can form part of our [i.e. generically human]91 attempts to gain knowledge’ 
(p.51). However, the Stranger refers explicitly to complete ignorance, not to a generic 
poor state of human knowledge. The complexity of this passage is the root of Pender’s 
misunderstanding: when the Stranger speaks of ‘being ignorant’, here, he does not mean 
‘knowing absolutely nothing’ about an object; rather he refers to the articulation of its 
‘totality’ (πάντ᾽). Yet this remark remains mostly obscure, and only the Stranger’s third 
and last methodological example fully clarifies it. 
 This last example describes a comparative process between simple and complex 
objects, directed at illustrating their similar elements and making them clearly 
recognisable. To describe this cognitive experience, the Stranger relies on the example 
of pupils who train in reading. Pupils, he posits, understand adequately the letters of 
shorter and simpler syllables, but commit errors when trying to read and write correctly 
more complex ones (277e2-8). His concern, once again, is not how to define 
knowledge, but the ‘easiest and most beautiful way of leading them on to the things 
they are not yet recognizing’ (ῥᾷστον καὶ κάλλιστον ἐπάγειν αὐτοὺς ἐπὶ τὰ μήπω 
γιγνωσκόμενα, 278a5-6): 
To lead them first back to those cases in which they held correct opinions, and 
having led them back, to put these cases beside the ones that have not been 
recognised, and by comparing them demonstrate that there is the same kind of 
                                                             
89 I translate ‘ἐνδείκνυσθαί’ as ‘indicate’ to mark its difference from the complete ‘demonstration’ 
(ἀπόδειξιν) posited as the purpose of inquiry at 269c2 and 277a4-c3. 
90 E.g. White, 2007, p.65; Sayre, 2006, pp.85-86; Pender, 2000, p.51 and n.115; Kato, 1995, pp.156-167. 
91 It seems more accurate to interpret the phrase ‘each of us’ (ἡμῶν ἕκαστος) as referring exclusively to 
Young Socrates’s and the Stranger’s attempt to gain knowledge. The validity of the Stranger’s 
observation remains nonetheless paradigmatic of other comparable cognitive experiences, and thus 
Pender’s generalisation remains valid as long as it is not taken as a universal theory of discoursive 
images. 
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thing with similar features in both combinations, until the things on which they 
have true opinions have been shown set beside all the ones that they don’t 
know, and once they have been shown like this, and so become models, they 
bring it about that each of all the letters is called always in the same way as 
itself, in all the syllables, on the one hand the different as it is different from 
the others, on the other the identical as it is identical. 
ἀνάγειν πρῶτον ἐπ᾽ ἐκεῖνα ἐν οἷς ταὐτὰ ταῦτα ὀρθῶς ἐδόξαζον, ἀναγαγόντας 
δὲ τιθέναι παρὰ τὰ μήπω γιγνωσκόμενα, καὶ παραβάλλοντας ἐνδεικνύναι τὴν 
αὐτὴν ὁμοιότητα καὶ φύσιν ἐν ἀμφοτέραις οὖσαν ταῖς συμπλοκαῖς, μέχριπερ ἂν 
πᾶσι τοῖς ἀγνοουμένοις τὰ δοξαζόμενα ἀληθῶς παρατιθέμενα δειχθῇ, 
δειχθέντα δέ, παραδείγματα οὕτω γιγνόμενα, ποιήσῃ τῶν στοιχείων ἕκαστον 
πάντων ἐν πάσαις ταῖς συλλαβαῖς τὸ μὲν ἕτερον ὡς τῶν ἄλλων ἕτερον ὄν, τὸ δὲ 
ταὐτὸν ὡς ταὐτὸν ἀεὶ κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἑαυτῷ προσαγορεύεσθαι (278a8-c1, tr. 
Rowe, adapted). 
It is evident that this passage does not address cognition in general, but specifically 
recognition. The Stranger describes here a very specific moment of the cognitive 
experience: the ability to discern clearly the objective ‘similarities’ (ὁμοιότητα) between 
two different objects of learning, one of which is already known. This ability requires 
learners, whenever confusions emerge, to return to cases in which they ‘held correct 
opinions’ (ὀρθῶς ἐδόξαζον) and try to clarify more complex subjects by identifying 
their similar elements. As the canonical interpretation correctly shows, his concern here 
in indeed the possibility to overcome confusion by ‘juxtaposing’ (παρατιθέμενα) what is 
yet (partially) unknown to clearer objects, which thus serve as ‘models’ 
(παραδείγματα). Notice that even in the case of the objects taken as models, the 
Stranger speaks only of correct opinion. He does not demand firm knowledge in any 
step of this process, not even in the selection of sufficiently clear models. As the 
canonical interpretation highlights, he describes a comparative process that relies on 
similarities and correct opinions in order to prevent or correct errors and confusions. 
Yet his focus is not on similarity alone. Rather, it rests on ‘each of all the letters’ 
(τῶν στοιχείων ἕκαστον πάντων), namely on all the single and distinct elements of a 
composite object of knowledge. Again, the Stranger’s main preoccupation is the 
practical way of leading the mind as far as possible towards complete knowledge, by 
managing correctly a variety of elements. He remarks that the purpose of learning 
consists in calling each element ‘always by the same name’ (ἀεὶ […] ἑαυτῷ), discerning 
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it either by differentiation or by assimilation: ‘on the one hand the different as it is 
different from the others, on the other the same as it is the same’ (τὸ μὲν ἕτερον ὡς τῶν 
ἄλλων ἕτερον ὄν, τὸ δὲ ταὐτὸν ὡς ταὐτὸν).92 Once again, the Stranger does not claim 
that models produce knowledge, but only a ‘single true opinion’ (μίαν ἀληθῆ δόξαν, 
278c6) about each of the compared subjects and both together. This is why he did not 
introduce this method as providing the truest possible account of a subject, but more 
moderately as the ‘most beautiful’ (κάλλιστον) instrument of human understanding. Yet 
he does claim that comparisons counteract ignorance, now presented as failed 
recognition: the complex syllables that are ‘not recognised’ (μήπω γιγνωσκόμενα) by 
the pupils are also ‘the ones that they don’t know’ (τοῖς ἀγνοουμένοις). This passage 
clarifies what the aforementioned radical ignorance is. It is the misapprehension of a 
composite whole (like a syllable) due to confusion about its partial elements (like 
letters). ‘Ignoring everything’ does not mean, therefore, ignoring each and every 
element of an object, but rather not knowing the composite object as a whole. It means 
radically ignoring what the combinations (συμπλοκαῖς) of partial elements are, just like 
in the example of visual arts erring meant failing to achieve the correct mixture 
(συγκράσει) of elements within a complex picture. The Stranger, thus, does not 
establish a polar contrast between knowing everything with absolute certainty and 
knowing nothing at all, but between the cognitive experiences of ignoring composite 
realities in their entirety and of recognising correctly only some of their various 
elements. 
I wish further to clarify this point about ignorance of the whole, by relying on a 
non-Platonic but coherent example of the whole-parts relation. The Buddhist scripture 
Udāna (6:4)93 addresses the problem of sectarian disputes about the nature of the 
universe and of the soul; in order to illustrate the underlying reason for these disputes, 
the Buddha narrates of a king who asked several blind men to describe an elephant. 
Each of them, we are told, touched a part of the elephant, and thus offered different 
descriptions of the animal. They variously claimed that it was like a pot (the head), a 
winnowing basket (the ear), a plow (the trunk), a post (the leg), and so on. The point of 
                                                             
92 The abstract language of this passage is difficult to interpret. Nonetheless, expanding the example of 
letters can clarify it: the letter ‘o’ can be recognised as identical in ‘ode’ and ‘exodus’. Thus, the 
similarity of the two words indicates the identity of the single letter. However, similarity can also be 
deceptive, and difference illuminating: consider the word ‘Question’ and the misspelled ‘Ouestion’. In 
this case, the letters ‘Q’ and ‘O’ could easily be confused if observed superficially, or by someone who 
had never seen the former symbol. Only their mutual difference allows to discern their individual identity 
correctly. 
93 I refer to the free-distribution edition and translation by Bhikkhu (2012). 
72 
 
this tale is that ‘people seeing only one side’94 of a more complex whole (here, cosmic 
and spiritual truth) are radically ignorant (metaphorically blind) in relation to it. I hold 
that the Stranger’s theoretical95 point about ignorance is exactly the same: a complex 
object of inquiry such as statecraft is inherently multifaceted, similar to different 
realities under different respects, so that in order to overcome ignorance it is necessary 
to conceive its parts as aspects of a larger whole. One crucial difference distinguishes 
the Stranger’s account from the Buddhist tale: he makes no claim that the attempt to 
reconstruct a whole out of different parts will ever reveal the nature of the object of 
inquiry itself (the statesman), but only its ‘complete figure’ (τέλεον […] σχῆμα), aptly 
compared to ‘the painting of an animal’ (ζῷον τὴν […] περιγραφὴν). The Stranger, 
thus, carefully avoids any claim that discourse, however correct, can ever attain full 
knowledge of any reality in itself, and maintains language on the level of 
representations of reality.96 The fundamental coherence of these two examples remains 
nonetheless enlightening, because both construe ignorance not as absolute lack of 
knowledge or familiarity with an object, but rather as the failure to understand its nature 
as a complex whole. The Buddhist example shows more vividly in what sense failing to 
see the ‘combinations’ (συμπλοκαῖς) of partial aspects of a multifaceted object can be 
reasonably considered as a form of radical ignorance.97 
 Finally, the Stranger concludes his methodological account by returning to the 
example of awakening, but this time with a positive turn: 
Well, if that’s the nature of things, you and I will not at all be in the wrong, 
having first attempted to see the nature of the model as a whole according to 
the part of a different small model, if we are going to transfer, from 
somewhere, the form that is the same as that of the king, a very great one, 
                                                             
94 Bhikkhu, 2012, p.97. 
95 Notice however that the implications of this example are also political: dissent emerges as a 
consequence of the multifaceted nature of truth combined with human cognitive limitations. Cf. Pol. 
301a-303d on political dissent as result of ignorance. It is worth noticing that, while the Buddhist text 
refers to a political figure, a king, as he who knows (but does not communicate) the objective truth, the 
Statesman problematizes the very nature of political knowledge. 
96 Cf. Crat. 439a-b. 
97 The Seventh Letter (342b-343e) furnishes a comparable but more elaborate theoretical account of 
cognitive ‘obscurity and complete ignorance’ (ἀπορίας τε καὶ ἀσαφείας […] πάσης, 343c4-5). Here, 
ignorance is said to depend on the human reliance on language and visual images to attain knowledge of 
any reality, because each word, definition, image or cognitive act can only capture the contingent 
qualities (τοῦ ποιοῦ, ibid.) of an object, and not its objective essence (τοῦ ὄντος, 343b8) in itself. While 
the authorship of the Seventh Letter is controversial, the affinity between these two accounts is 
undeniable. It is possible that the Statesman reflects the extremely demanding criteria for knowledge 
postulated in the Seventh Letter, whereby every form of partial understanding is limited and easy to 
refute, in a Socratic spirit, by demanding a complete objective definition. 
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starting from smaller ones, in an attempt once more to recognize through a 
model what the artful care of those in the city is, so that it may be present to us 
in waking vision rather than in a dream. 
οὐκοῦν ταῦτα εἰ ταύτῃ πέφυκεν, οὐδὲν δὴ πλημμελοῖμεν ἂν ἐγώ τε καὶ σὺ 
πρῶτον μὲν ἐπιχειρήσαντες ὅλου παραδείγματος ἰδεῖν τὴν φύσιν ἐν σμικρῷ 
κατὰ μέρος ἄλλῳ παραδείγματι, μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα μέλλοντες, ἐπὶ τὸ τοῦ βασιλέως 
μέγιστον ὂν ταὐτὸν εἶδος ἀπ᾽ ἐλαττόνων φέροντές ποθεν, διὰ παραδείγματος 
ἐπιχειρεῖν αὖ τὴν τῶν κατὰ πόλιν θεραπείαν τέχνῃ γνωρίζειν, ἵνα ὕπαρ ἀντ᾽ 
ὀνείρατος ἡμῖν γίγνηται; (278e4-10, tr. Rowe, adapted). 
The Stranger ultimately recommends the usage of models as properly heuristic tools, 
which lead to grasp the complex, ‘greatest’ nature of the statesman by starting from 
small models and transferring the same ‘form’ (εἶδος)98 to it. ‘Awakening’ here assumes 
the more familiar meaning of clarification or enlightenment, but only as the result of a 
measured process of discernment. The cognitive process here described is threefold: 
from a state of radical ignorance, caused by the complexity of a composite object, 
through moments of accurate recognition of similarities and differences, towards a final 
clarification of the whole object of inquiry. Notice, again, the Stranger’s insistence on 
the variety of elements within this process, and on how it requires a measured attention 
to their relative complexity: the transference of similarities moves ‘from smaller’ (ἀπ᾽ 
ἐλαττόνων), simpler and partial subjects (plural) towards a single greater one, complex 
and complete. Notice how the Stranger refers both to his current attempt to show the 
cognitive role of models and to his purpose to use other models in the same way in 
relation to statecraft. His language confirms my interpretation: he speaks of the ‘model 
[of cognition] as a whole’ (ὅλου παραδείγματος) as displayed, partially, through a ‘part’ 
(μέρος) of a ‘different model’ (ἄλλῳ παραδείγματι). Again, his concern is with 
attempting to attain knowledge of a well-structured whole composed of the parts 
sufficient to broaden its understanding. The cognitive process allowed by models is thus 
not a mere comparison, but an act of composition of different parts within a complex 
whole. Pender (2000) also highlights the non-prescriptive nature of this process: the 
Stranger speaks of ‘attempting’ (ἐπιχειρεῖν) to reach the knowledge of a cohesive 
whole, not of a rigid method that guarantees success (p.52). Therefore the cognitive 
                                                             
98 It is not my purpose to determine whether the Stranger’s account of models depends on or illuminates 
Plato’s doctrine of Forms. On this doctrine (or a version of it), cf. Sayre (2006), Migliori (1996), and 
Goldschmidt (1947, ed. 2003). Kato (1995) unsatisfactorily discards the problem because the doctrine is 
not fully articulated in the Statesman, but this fact does not suffice to prove that its characters do not 
implicitly assume it as valid. 
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process of combining images is an approximative instrument to attain knowledge as 
completely as possible, not a certain path to truth. 
 It must be highlighted that the Stranger’s focus rests constantly on education and 
psychology, concerned as he is with the cognitive experience of seeking lucid 
awareness and challenging ignorance: 
Then would we be puzzled if our soul by its nature experienced this same thing 
in relation to the individual letters of everything, now composing itself in some 
cases with the aid of truth in relation to each single thing, now, in others, being 
carried around everything, and somehow or other having correct opinions 
about the constituents of the combinations themselves, but once again not 
knowing the same things when they are transferred into the long syllables of 
things and the ones that are not easy? 
θαυμάζοιμεν ἂν οὖν εἰ ταὐτὸν τοῦτο ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχὴ φύσει περὶ τὰ τῶν πάντων 
στοιχεῖα πεπονθυῖα τοτὲ μὲν ὑπ᾽ ἀληθείας περὶ ἓν ἕκαστον ἔν τισι συνίσταται, 
τοτὲ δὲ περὶ ἅπαντα ἐν ἑτέροις αὖ φέρεται, καὶ τὰ μὲν αὐτῶν ἁμῇ γέ πῃ τῶν 
συγκράσεων ὀρθῶς δοξάζει, μετατιθέμενα δ᾽ εἰς τὰς τῶν πραγμάτων μακρὰς 
καὶ μὴ ῥᾳδίους συλλαβὰς ταὐτὰ ταῦτα πάλιν ἀγνοεῖ; (278c8-d6, tr. Rowe, 
adapted). 
The Stranger relates his threefold example of composition (συγκράσεων), variation, and 
recognition of different images to the universal cognitive experience in relation to 
‘everything’ (τῶν πάντων). His purpose is not to define what knowledge is in itself, but 
to articulate the specific condition of the mind (‘our soul’ ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχὴ) in facing 
cognitive disorientation, ‘being carried around everything’ (περὶ ἅπαντα […] φέρεται) 
in certain circumstances, and ‘composing itself’ (συνίσταται)99 in others. He claims that 
this is the natural psychological condition that arises when inquiring into a complex 
totality of elements. Notice the parallel between the combination of different images 
and the composition of the soul: as the different facets of the object of inquiry require 
accurate combination, so the mind that explores them requires correct composition. The 
Stranger’s fundamental concern is for the human mind to acquire the ability to face 
disorienting intricacies without losing sight of the truth (ἀληθείας) it is looking for, and 
                                                             
99 This verb refers consistently to artful compositions of parts in the Statesman. It appears at 271b6, where 
men in the Age of Cronus are said to be ‘composed again and brought back to life’ (πάλιν ἐκεῖ 
συνισταμένους καὶ ἀναβιωσκομένους) thanks to the divinely-guided order of reality. At 274a5 the same 
phenomenon (συνιστάντων) is said to be absent from the Age of Zeus. Finally, at 308c3 ‘composition’ 
(συνίστησιν) denotes the purpose of all productive arts, including statecraft and philosophical discourses. 
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to maintain itself as lucid and orderly as possible. He does not account for the 
characteristics of truth in itself. Instead, he insists on the nature (φύσει) of 
psychological phenomena: the radically confusing effect of all the multiple elements 
that the mind needs to understand, even when inquiring into a single topic, and the 
stabilizing effect of seeking for composition and combination. To him, the mind ‘is 
ignorant’ (ἀγνοεῖ) of an object of inquiry not because this is intrinsically obscure, but 
because its complexity has not been articulated clearly enough, so that it entails radical 
ignorance. The cognitive effect of models, thus, is neither to attain absolute truth nor to 
illustrate, didactically, a specific similarity, but to allow the mind to stand composed 
between radical ignorance and complete knowledge of the truth. 
This is an aspect of his theory that current studies such as Lane’s (1998) and 
Pender’s (2000) have overlooked, focused as they are on determining the linguistic 
features of images and models as comparative tools. Certainly, the Stranger’s argument 
is also about the power of language to show abstract concepts or incorporeal realities. 
At 285d10-286b1 he argues that ‘the things that are without body, which are the most 
beautiful and greatest, are shown clearly only by verbal means and by nothing else’ (τὰ 
γὰρ ἀσώματα, κάλλιστα ὄντα καὶ μέγιστα, λόγῳ μόνον ἄλλῳ δὲ οὐδενὶ σαφῶς 
δείκνυται, 286a5). He thus credits language with a privileged status for philosophical 
inquiries on conceptual (and perhaps divine or spiritual) realities, superior for instance 
to visual illustrations and concrete models.100 But while the linguistic aspect is 
inescapable, I hold that the Stranger’s (and Plato’s) ultimate interest is the psychological 
effect of certain forms of discourse. His account of models is not a general linguistic or 
epistemological theory, but an evaluation of the contextual efficacy of images and 
models in orienting the mind in specific circumstances. Verbal models remain, as I have 
observed, on the level of instrumental tools that represent reality as clearly as possible. 
They constitute the best possible instrument for representing a complex subject, they 
constitute the ‘easiest and most beautiful’ (ῥᾷστον καὶ κάλλιστον) method of inquiry, 
they counteract inarticulate confusion with elegant simplicity, but nothing more. Only 
the Stranger’s psychological claim is in fact universal: models are heuristic tools insofar 
as they orient the mind towards the truth, by leading it to seek a correct composition of 
images (not a straightforward identification of truth), and by preventing the radical 
disorientation (‘ignorance’) brought about by an inarticulate totality of elements. 
                                                             
100 See Pender (2000) for a more extensive account of language and conceptual realities in the Statesman 
(pp.52-55). 
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I argue that this cognitive process grounds the pervasiveness of images and 
models in the Statesman. As Luigi Stefanini (1949) has observed, this dialogue 
constantly relies on images as instruments of conceptual acquisition, not just as didactic 
tools of illustration: ‘[the Statesman] extracts from paradigms every concept about the 
constitution of the State and the function of laws’ (p.217, tr. mine). The image101 of the 
producers of goods, distinct from retailers, illustrates the art of the statesman in giving 
orders by himself, without relying on commands received from others (260e). The 
image102 of the herdsman who tends expertly to his herd represents the art of the 
statesman in ‘taking care [of living beings] not as individuals but as a community’ (οὐ 
μὴν ἰδίᾳ γε ἀλλὰ κοινῇ τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν ἔχουσαν, 275c10-d2). This image is not criticised 
as objectively incorrect by the Stranger, but rather as excessive and insufficiently clear. 
The more adequate model103 of weaving represents an expertise that requires the 
cooperation of other preparatory arts in order to realise a fine product, just like the 
statesman needs to cooperate with all the arts in his community to realise a good city 
(281d-e and 287c). The same model also represents an art that combines the opposite 
elements of rigid warp and flexible woof, like statecraft aims to create a bond between 
citizens of opposite inclinations towards courage and moderation (282b-283a), and thus 
a cohesive social ‘fabric’ (ὕφασμα, 310e11). It thus fleshes out the specific modes of 
political activity that the model of the herdsman had left superficially untouched: 
cooperation with equal humans, not rule over inferior beasts, and combination of 
psychological traits within the community.104 The analogy with the trainer of gymnastic, 
who gives uniform and generic instructions to groups rather than individual 
prescriptions, represents the inescapable imprecision of the statesman’s legislative 
function (294d-e).105 Finally, the images106 of the doctor and the helmsman, whose 
expertise and authority can be used to heal and save their subjects but also to harm and 
kill them, represent the independence of knowledge from fixed norms but also the need 
to resort to legislation as a second-best solution in absence of worthy rulers (297e-
298a).107 While I cannot address, here, the specific implications of all these images in 
their contexts, their variety and pervasiveness in the Statesman testifies the necessity, 
                                                             
101 ‘According to what we have represented in an image just now’ (καθάπερ ᾐκάζομεν νυνδή, 260e3). 
102 ‘Great models’ (μεγάλα παραδείγματα, 277b4); ‘this figure of the divine herdsman’ (τὸ σχῆμα τὸ τοῦ 
θείου νομέως, 275c1). 
103 ‘Smallest model’ (παράδειγμά [...] σμικρότατον, 279a7-8). 
104 Lane, 1998, pp.60-61. 
105 In this case, the Stranger does not speak in terms of images, figures, or models, but his practice 
remains the same. Cf. Lane, 1998, pp.152-153. 
106 ‘Let’s go back to the images to which we must always compare our kingly rulers’ (εἰς δὴ τὰς εἰκόνας 
ἐπανίωμεν πάλιν, αἷς ἀναγκαῖον ἀπεικάζειν ἀεὶ τοὺς βασιλικοὺς ἄρχοντας, 297e8-9). 
107 Cf. Lane, 1998, pp.156-163; Gill, 1995. 
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theorised by the Stranger, to represent the same concept in a multifaceted fashion, 
without ever flattening it upon a single account or claiming definitive truthfulness.108 
 The Statesman articulates the subject of statecraft according to a ‘one-many-
whole’ dynamic: one single subject needs to be represented under many respects, in 
many images that require cohesive combination.109 All these images, certainly, are 
examples of ‘those who possess knowledge’ (τῶν ἐπιστημόνων, 258b4), and thus they 
illustrate the single underlying assumption of the Statesman: politics is an expertise with 
inherent criteria, functions, and objectives.110 But they illustrate it from different angles. 
The Statesman never reduces statecraft to a single image or model, let alone to literal 
accounts, precisely in order to illustrate various aspects of statecraft as they become 
relevant at different moments of inquiry. These aspects may be characterised by simple 
difference, such as between the autonomous production of goods (producers) and the 
command of a group of living beings (herdsman). But they may also be characterised by 
direct incompatibility, such as between the potential harmfulness of prescriptions 
(medicine) and the inherent benefit of producing a fine fabric for the benefit of the 
community, thanks to the bond between carefully selected components (weaving). Even 
if individual images are merely illustrative, taken together they serve to provide further 
depth and complexity to the broader figure of statecraft. Precisely their differences force 
the intellect to seek for a broader conceptual field that may encompass them all, without 
reducing them to literal accounts or enumerations of similarities. The Statesman thus 
invites us to consider its subject as a multifaceted one, best represented through images 
rather than direct accounts. 
The conclusion of the Statesman confirms this reading. In response to the 
Stranger’s description of statecraft as the art of producing a social fabric of courageous 
and moderate people, Young Socrates comments: 
‘In the most beautiful way, Stranger, you have completed for us the kingly and 
political man. 
                                                             
108 Stefanini, 1949, pp.217-218. 
109 Napolitano Valditara (2010) suggests that Plato’s notion of ‘wholeness’ is distinct from his notion of 
‘totality’, the former being a combination of different parts according to ‘a unitary and dynamic rule that 
can bind them to one another’ and the latter the mere ‘paratactic description or quantitative enumeration’ 
(p.150, tr. mine). This distinction seems to be reflected, in the Statesman, by the Stranger’s account of 
‘everything’ (pan) as a potentially confusing accumulation of elements and of ‘combination’ (sunkrasis, 
sumplokē) as the object of correct opinion or representation of reality. Cf. Migliori (2014). 
110 Lane, 1998, pp.50-51; Weiss, 1995. 
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κάλλιστα αὖ τὸν βασιλικὸν ἀπετέλεσας ἄνδρα ἡμῖν, ὦ ξένε, καὶ τὸν πολιτικόν’ 
(311c7, tr. Rowe, adapted). 
Notice how Young Socrates’s language reflects the Stranger’s account of models and 
his theoretical cautions. It does not refer to a definitive demonstration but to an 
exposition that is ‘most beautiful’ like accounts that rely on models, and ‘complete’ like 
the figure that was sought for. Young Socrates also avoids universal judgments about 
the validity of this account, claiming only that it is complete ‘for us’, and thus not 
necessarily for everyone else or in every circumstance. This caution had been suggested 
by the Stranger at 260b7-8: ‘But if people are doing something together, it is enough if 
they agree with one another […] So for as long as we are sharing in the present task, we 
should set aside the opinions of others’ (ἀλλὰ μὴν τοῖς γε κοινῇ τι πράττουσιν ἀγαπητὸν 
ὁμονοεῖν […] τούτου τοίνυν μέχριπερ ἂν αὐτοὶ κοινωνῶμεν, ἐατέον τά γε τῶν ἄλλων 
δοξάσματα χαίρειν). The characters conceive the figure of statecraft here presented as 
still partial and provisional, but in the positive sense of a correct cognitive acquisition 
characterised by awareness of its own limitations. Lane (1998) argues that the 
characters’ ‘goal is a portrait of a single art, sufficiently clear and detailed for these 
purposes, not a panorama of them all’ (p.37). But while she takes this merely as a 
‘teleological framework’ for the inquiry (ibid.), namely a goal used to select what is 
relevant and what is not, the significance of this procedure is broader. In fact, it qualifies 
the whole inquiry as the construction of a conceptual figure for the interlocutors 
alone—and nobody else. Therefore, the Statesman as a whole cannot be taken as 
representing the conclusive attainment of a definition or of knowledge, not even in 
Lane’s moderate sense. Rather, it leaves open the possibility that the figure of the 
statesman be altered, perfected once again in different contexts, from different angles, 
and for different people.111 The whole Statesman constitutes an effort to achieve a 
conceptual figure of its subject-matter that appears complete and satisfactory to both the 
interlocutors and them alone, through the combination of its different facets, and with 
constant awareness of its provisional status. 
 The bearing of visual language on this provisional and partial attempt to achieve 
a beautiful image seems to reflect a widespread concern, in Classical Greece, with 
representation and beauty, with the difficulty of finding ideal perfection and the need for 
                                                             
111 Wallach (2001) accordingly presents Plato’s politics as a multifaceted subject that he explores from 
different angles in different dialogues. Contra Kahn (2009), who supports a linear evolution of Plato’s 
thought throughout his political dialogues. 
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creative combinations.112 Xenophon documents this concern and attributes it to the 
painter Parrhasius, as interrogated by Socrates: 
‘Thus, on entering the house of Parrhasius the painter one day, he [Socrates] 
asked in the course of a conversation with him: “Is painting a representation of 
things seen, Parrhasius? Anyhow, you painters with your colours represent and 
reproduce figures high and low, in light and in shadow, hard and soft, rough 
and smooth, young and old. – True. – And further, when you copy beautiful 
forms, since it is not easy to stumble upon a single person that possesses all the 
perfections, you combine the most beautiful details of several, and thus 
contrive to make the whole bodies look beautiful. – Yes, we do. 
 εἰσελθὼν μὲν γάρ ποτε πρὸς Παρράσιον τὸν ζωγράφον καὶ διαλεγόμενος 
αὐτῷ, ἆρα, ἔφη, ὦ Παρράσιε, γραφική ἐστιν εἰκασία τῶν ὁρωμένων; τὰ γοῦν 
κοῖλα καὶ τὰ ὑψηλὰ καὶ τὰ σκοτεινὰ καὶ τὰ φωτεινὰ καὶ τὰ σκληρὰ καὶ τὰ 
μαλακὰ καὶ τὰ τραχέα καὶ τὰ λεῖα καὶ τὰ νέα καὶ τὰ παλαιὰ σώματα διὰ τῶν 
χρωμάτων ἀπεικάζοντες ἐκμιμεῖσθε. ἀληθῆ λέγεις, ἔφη. καὶ μὴν τά γε καλὰ 
εἴδη ἀφομοιοῦντες, ἐπειδὴ οὐ ῥᾴδιον ἑνὶ ἀνθρώπῳ περιτυχεῖν ἄμεμπτα πάντα 
ἔχοντι, ἐκ πολλῶν συνάγοντες τὰ ἐξ ἑκάστου κάλλιστα οὕτως ὅλα τὰ σώματα 
καλὰ ποιεῖτε φαίνεσθαι. ποιοῦμεν γάρ, ἔφη, οὕτως’ (Xen. Mem. 3.10.1-3, tr. 
Marchant, adapted). 
This ‘combinatory’ method in reproducing perfect beauty came to be attributed by 
different Hellenistic and Latin sources to Zeuxis’s representation of Helen of Troy; 113 
therefore, it does not seem to constitute exclusively a Socratic interest, but probably a 
historical phase of ancient aesthetics. Notice the closeness between Socrates’s questions 
and Plato’s language in the Statesman: the totality (πάντα) of a perfect representation, 
when a single adequate model is absent, can be obtained through an act of combination 
(συνάγοντες) of the various opportune elements (ἑκάστου), the most beautiful 
(κάλλιστα) available from a multitude of sources (πολλῶν). Significantly, Xenophon’s 
account goes on to document Socrates’s concern with the possibility to express, 
visually, the invisible motions of the soul like joys and sorrows, virtues and vices (3.10-
3.8),114 so that we find a partial overlapping between Socrates’s and Plato’s interests 
                                                             
112 Matelli, 2015; Siebert, 2009. 
113 Dionysius of Halicarnassus, On Imitation, 1.4; Cicero, On Invention, 2.1-3; Plinius, Natural History, 
35.6. Cf. Matelli, 2015, p.43.  
114 Cf. Pol. 306c10-d4 on visual expressionism of beauty and virtue (see Section 3.3.1.). 
80 
 
with invisible, incorporeal realities.115 Notice also the implicit reference to right 
measure: painters have the skill to represent, arbitrarily, any kind of opposite features of 
their subjects, but this skill is bent to a selection and evaluation of what is opportune for 
the sake of the most beautiful result.  Plato’s manipulation of visual language, however, 
is more poignant and theoretically developed than in Xenophon’s account. Plato indeed 
assumes terms related to visual arts and turns them into a metaphorical account of the 
cognitive role of images, here in relation to the concept of statecraft. His awareness of 
the creative power of images in presenting more elaborate ideal realities, thus, is not 
only documented theoretically by the Statesman, but also consistent with the cultural 
environment of Athenian high culture and possibly an elaboration of Socratic 
reflections. This parallelism is fundamental fully to understand Plato’s notion of verbal 
images, as not limited to linguistic considerations but also contaminated by notions of 
perfection, beauty, and harmonious composition, which he draws directly from the field 
of visual art and credits, through a metaphorical shift, to the field of linguistic and 
psychological phenomena. The Stranger’s account of paradeigmata, indeed, is itself a 
paradeigma and as such it must be understood. His account is not purely linguistic, in 
the sense that the purity of a linguistic account is contaminated by different images that 
serve to articulate the complexity of a cognitive (not just discoursive) phenomenon. 
When the Stranger speaks of completeness and beauty, then, he does not refer to full 
theoretical closure or to the conclusion of an argument. Rather, he refers to the creative 
attainment of a harmonious combination of different elements and of a stable clarity of 
intellectual vision. 
Accordingly, I have kept my account of imagery in the Statesman intentionally 
on the broader level of its theoretical examination, and presented the pervasiveness of 
images in the Statesman as an instance of a cognitive dynamic that articulates one 
subject from many angles. I have thus left open three possible routes of further analysis: 
(a) examining in detail each and every image that the Stranger introduces in the political 
discussion;116 (b) distinguishing between analogies, metaphors, and narrations in their 
specific features; and (c) pinpointing the (always different) relations between images, 
conceptual divisions, and various theoretical arguments. In fact, I agree with Lane 
                                                             
115 Owen (1973) interprets the account of models in the Statesman as concerned with the contrast between 
depictable and undepictable realities. Notice however that the Stranger does not posit all invisible realities 
as inherently undepictable; in fact, at Pol. 306c10-d4 he argues that virtues can be represented in 
paintings, just like Socrates does in Xenophon’s account. On pictorial expressionism in ancient Greece, 
cf. Schuhl, 1933; Havelock, C. M. 1978. 
116 Lane (1998) provides an exhaustive account of these various images (with the exception of the image 
of producers and sellers), but without examining the cognitive role of combination. 
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(1998) that, if we were to examine any single image, we would come across illustrative 
examples that didactically highlight a specific aspect of statecraft as the Stranger 
conceives it, merely fixing relevant similarities as structural contributions to the inquiry 
(pp.56-61), occasionally correcting errors (pp.45-46), and complementing conceptual 
divisions (pp. 44 and 53-56). Certainly, the role that images perform in every context 
and the cultural nuances of the activities they describe deserve further exploration. Too 
close an analysis, however, would risk to obscure the ‘whole’ broader figure that 
individual images compose. Most importantly, from this broader level alone is it evident 
that there is no rigidly prescriptive norm behind the Stranger’s usage of images, because 
he introduces them at different moments, with or without explicit qualification of their 
status, at the beginning, in the middle or at the end of an inquiry. He simply insists on 
introducing them in different places because he considers them the most elegant and 
accessible way to explore a single subject from different perspectives. The criterion of 
his practice is not a definitive set of rules, but the possibility of combining images in the 
most harmonious way, always responding to implicit theoretical problems and 
contextual doubts or hesitations. 
On the more general level, indeed, we can see clearly that the variety of images 
is consistent with the Stranger’s account of knowledge-acquisition, as a composition of 
different elements, facets, or images of a single complex concept. Better, this variety 
testifies his theoretical commitment to a ‘perspectival’ understanding of human 
cognition and philosophical discourses. To him, a philosophical inquiry must, by 
necessity, explore the different facets of its subject separately, but without losing track 
of the ‘whole’ they compose. His language of images, models, and figures underscores 
such perspectival understanding. On the one hand, each facet, precisely because it is 
merely an image of the truth, wards off any claim to definitive knowledge; on the other, 
each contributes to the creation of a broader conceptual figure that cannot be reduced to 
any of its single aspects. Even if the Stranger does not claim that only images and 
models allow this process, he does nonetheless consider them the best possible way to 
inquire into statecraft from different angles and solve different problems as they 
progressively emerge. Images are the best instruments to achieve a cognitive right 
measure between the extremes of radical ignorance and complete knowledge. This 
conclusion contradicts the canonical interpretation in two respects. On the one hand, it 
means that images are not didactic tools, which can only illustrate the truth or at best 
restructure given opinions, but which can be superseded once complete knowledge has 
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been attained. On the other hand, it means that images are not instruments that can ever 
lead to definitive knowledge, by revising existing opinions in such a way as to lead to 
definitive truth, but they do not need to in order to lead closer to the truth. 
Pender’s (2000) account, focused on similarities (likenesses) alone, correctly 
points out how they can be used in order to structure familiar concepts in novel ways. 
However, this focus is narrower than the Stranger grants, and does not allow to grasp 
why he credits images with more than a preliminary function on the path towards 
knowledge and truth. As Pender claims: 
Throughout [the account of models in the Statesman], Plato is careful to 
distinguish direct accounts of reality from accounts involving images or 
likenesses of it, and images are at best for him a heuristic device, able to offer 
an indirect access to the truth if used in the correct way – namely, as 
preliminary steps in an inquiry (p.59). 
Notice that the term ‘heuristic’, to Pender, refers to the purely instrumental function of 
models in restructuring, through similarity, complex ideas.117 She thus argues that, once 
a model has exhausted its restructuring and clarifying function, the necessity to rely on 
comparison presumably disappears (p.58). But if, as I suggest, their function is to allow 
a stable cognitive movement among different facets of a more complex whole, and to 
respond to necessarily different angles of inquiry, they could not be disposed of even if 
complete knowledge were achieved (an event that, in any case, does not occur in the 
Statesman). In fact, articulating this complexity even from a position of knowledge 
would still require a recourse to partial images. Pender’s interpretation is correct insofar 
as she acknowledges the inescapable discrepancy between image and truth, together 
with the cognitive power of likenesses in rearranging concepts. But her claim that an 
image is correct only as preliminary step of inquiry is limitative. In fact, images pervade 
every step of inquiry in the Statesman. The image of producers and retailers appears in 
the course of conceptual divisions (260c-261a), the mythical figure of the divine 
herdsman serves to correct inadequate conclusions (275b-c), and the very end of the 
dialogue is not a definition but a metaphorical description of the political fabric that 
binds courageous and moderate citizens and holds the rest safely together (311b-c). The 
                                                             
117 Cf. Pender (2000): ‘Therefore when it is claimed that Plato in the Politicus sees models as heuristic 
and not just didactic, it must be clarified that the model in question (weaving) is heuristic in a limited 
sense. The model does not cast up pro-positions and perspectives out of the blue but serves to impose a 
structure on a concept with which – it is implied – it has common elements’ (p.56). Pender construes this 
limit in a positive sense: models lead the mind as close as possible to knowledge, albeit without attaining 
it completely and forever. 
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Stranger’s theoretical distinction between images and truth, accordingly, does not posit 
images as preliminary steps that can be ‘dispensed with’ (p.59) once knowledge has 
been fully achieved, as Pender claims, but rather as limited parts of a more complex 
conceptual figure. 
‘Limited’ does not mean ‘provisional’, ‘partial’ does not mean ‘preliminary’. 
The materials of a statue, the colours of a painting, and the letters of a syllable, once 
correctly identified and combined, do not cease to be elements of the whole, and the 
perception of their diversified combination remains cognitively necessary to their 
correct contextual understanding. Analogously, images in the Statesman are never 
superseded by the broader conceptual figure they form, and the Stranger never claims 
that they should. It is true that he does not present models as unique tools of conceptual 
acquisition and that he allows for a more difficult and direct cognitive access to truth, 
but he offers not positive suggestion about whether images would really become 
disposable once truth is fully acquired. It may still be appropriate to speak of images as 
provisional, but only in the sense of a positive provisionality, one which is necessary to 
cognition and which constantly recurs in any intellectual and dialectical effort, rather 
than one which should ideally wane once truth has been acquired. It is undeniable that 
truth and complete knowledge remain the Stranger’s ideal objectives, on which the 
usage of images (like the practice of dialectical inquiry in general) must depend if it is 
to be meaningful. However, the fact that human cognition needs to be understood as 
perspectival, and thus always to some extent bound to images of the truth, seems to be 
his irreducible pragmatical (if not theoretical) stance.118 
Differently from Pender, Lane (1998) interprets models as capable of leading 
towards definitive knowledge, and thus exceeds in the opposite direction: 
Example [i.e. the usage of models] is presented as the path from true belief [i.e. 
opinion] to knowledge, a path which clarifies and extends those beliefs rather 
than rejecting them; example also interacts with division, which effects 
revisions of common sense and expectations in the service of gaining a genuine 
understanding of the character or activity being investigated. Together the two 
                                                             
118 Migliori (2014) argues for an even stronger theoretical claim: reality itself is, to Plato, a whole that 
combines unity and multiplicity, so that the same object can, by its nature, appear in different and even 
opposite ways when seen from different angles (pp.197-199). Cf. Phil. 14c8-10, 15d4-8. The Statesman 
does not offer any direct metaphysical indication in this regard, but the Stranger’s insistence that the best 
cognitive experience takes into account different perspectives is consistent with Migliori’s stance and can 
be said to support it. 
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constitute a method which retains true beliefs but achieves knowledge by 
drastically revising them (p.65). 
Lane correctly acknowledges that the similarities illustrated through models provide 
true opinions that the characters never discard; however, the Stranger makes no claim 
that models ever allow to overcome true opinion. He claims that they contribute 
positively to cognitive experiences and that they elucidate ideas, but this does not mean 
that they factually lead to knowledge itself (however defined). The Stranger in fact 
never speaks of ‘drastically revising’ any opinion, but rather of combining and 
recognising different images of the truth, in order to achieve as synoptic an 
understanding of it as possible. Precisely by using three different models of the 
cognitive function of models, he prevents any straightforward reduction of his account 
to a linear cognitive movement from opinion to knowledge, of the kind envisaged in the 
Republic through the image of the line and the allegory of the cave. Lane in fact 
interprets models as tools to revise opinions and attain definitve knowledge because the 
Stranger uses the model of weaving to correct and reframe the definition of statecraft as 
akin to herding (pp.56-61). However, his usage of images is much more general and it 
does not necessarily coincide with the correction and restructuring of opinions. He does 
claim that using images counteracts radical ignorance, namely the ignorance of a whole 
composed by different elements, but not that this process leads all the way through on 
the path towards truth. In fact, the explicit result of his and Young Socrates’s inquiry is 
the attainment of a correct figure of statecraft, not the absolute and definitive truth about 
it. Lane thus misconstrues the cognitive acquisitions that images and models in fact 
allow: not the drastic revision of existing opinions, but the factual opening of novel 
perspectives, novel angles of inquiry about the same subject, as long as an inquiry 
requires it. 
 These two opposite errors depend on the failure of the canonical interpretation to 
address the threefold cognitive process described by the Stranger. Since images and 
models are not only illustrations of similarities, but different facets of a composite 
whole, they function neither as preliminary accounts nor as paths to revise opinion and 
reach definitive knowledge. Rather, they function as ‘measured’ instruments of 
cognitive orientation and exploration of one conceptual object under different respects. 
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Conclusion 
The Statesman presents images and models as the most simple and elegant (albeit not 
always necessary) heuristic instruments, which provide a cognitive gain through a 
threefold process of combination, variation, and recognition. In agreement with the 
canonical interpretation, it is evident that Plato presents them neither as instruments of 
demonstration and direct acquisition of truth, nor as irreplaceable forms of discourse. 
Their function is rather the attainment of sufficient clarity and cognitive stability. 
Contrary to the canonical interpretation, however, models do not serve exclusively to 
recognise similarities between two objects, but also to combine correctly the variety of 
aspects of a multifaceted subject. The Stranger’s account is indeed more articulated than 
scholars usually acknowledge: it insists on the multiplicity of facets that require 
accurate, ‘measured’ combination in order to improve our knowledge, on the initially 
confusing effect of shifting from one facet to another, and on recognising the identity of 
a facet both by assimilation and by differentiation of ideas. This account thus describes 
the contribution of images and models to a complex cognitive process: the accurate 
recognition of the diverse aspects of a multifaceted object of inquiry, directed at 
grasping it as a composite whole. Their cognitive role, ultimately, consists in countering 
the human ‘radical ignorance’ in relation to ‘the whole’ of which we see, case by case, 
only single facets. 
Therefore, the Stranger’s theory is consistent with modern perspectival (or 
interactionist) theories such as Kittay’s (1998) and Pender’s (2000), whereby the 
interaction of different images and models provides cognitive gains by opening broader 
conceptual spaces for thought and language. However, the Stranger’s appreciation of 
images remains cautious, for three reasons. First, images do not provide any 
demonstration of the truth about their object but only, at best, correct opinions. Second, 
they do not allow complete freedom in manipulating similarities and providing novel 
perspectives, because they depend on strict hypothetical assumptions about the nature of 
the subject represented (statecraft is knowledge). Third, they also depend on the 
assumption that inquiries are directed, at least tentatively, to the attainment of an 
objectively complete conceptual figure of their object. Perspectivism, to the Stranger, 
does not mean relativism of opinions, but acknowledgement of the partiality of points of 
view about a single objective reality. The Stranger does not appreciate images as 
rhetorical tools that restructure ideas in general, but only as long as they are correctly 
used within a dialectical process that aims (ideally) at complete knowledge. Thus, 
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images are not tools of completely free ‘reconceptualisation’, but instruments that allow 
to counteract radical ignorance about the totality of an object of inquiry, while 
preventing unduly claims to definitive knowledge. They are what allows an inquiring 
mind to preserve the right measure between knowledge and ignorance and thus to 
maintain what Plato arguably considered a genuinely philosophical disposition. 
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Chapter 3 – The Importance of Being Playful: Paidia as Ambivalent 
Image 
Every man and woman must [dein] live his or her life 
playing the finest possible games [paizonta hoti 
kallistas paidia], as opposed to what people think 
nowadays (Leg. VII.803c6-8). 
 
 
 
Introduction 
This chapter will explore the instrument of paidia (game, playfulness), in relation to the 
educational usage of imagery in the myth of the Statesman.119 A crucial fact widely 
overlooked by current scholarship is that the Stranger does not immediately introduce 
this narration either as a myth or as a model of political activity, but as a playful account 
radically distinct from other dialectical procedures such as diairesis and logical 
argumentation. As soon as the attempt at formally defining statecraft fails, he states: 
Then we must travel some other route, starting from some other point […] By 
mixing in, as it were, a game: we must bring in a large part of a great myth, and 
as for the rest, we must then – as in what went before – take away part from 
part in each case and so arrive at the summit of what we are looking for. 
πάλιν τοίνυν ἐξ ἄλλης ἀρχῆς δεῖ καθ᾽ ἑτέραν ὁδὸν πορευθῆναί τινα […] 
σχεδὸν παιδιὰν ἐγκερασαμένους: συχνῷ γὰρ μέρει δεῖ μεγάλου μύθου 
προσχρήσασθαι, καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν δή, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν, μέρος ἀεὶ μέρους 
ἀφαιρουμένους ἐπ᾽ ἄκρον ἀφικνεῖσθαι τὸ ζητούμενον (268d5-e2, tr. Rowe, 
adapted). 
Three aspects of this introduction are noticeable. First, the playful usage of a myth is 
methodologically distinct from the previous usage of diaresis and argument. Second, 
there is no direct identification between game and myth; rather, the myth is the form of 
game chosen by the Stranger to allow the inquiry to continue; better, by using it as a 
game he can metaphorically concoct a mixture of playfulness and philosophy (‘σχεδὸν 
                                                             
119 My focus rests exclusively on occurrences of paidia as discursive practice. Plato presents several other 
instances of educational playfulness, including dramatic ‘plays’ and music (Resp. X.602b6-10; Pol. 
288c1-4), convivial gatherings and rituals (Euthyd. 277d4-e2; Leg. I.646d8-648e4), and children’s games 
(Leg. I.642b2-643d4; VII.793d7-794d3). The notion of ‘playing’, as imitative or representational 
performance that provides recreation, featured in Plato roughly the same polyvalence that it has 
maintained in English, French (jouer), and German (spielen). Plato’s broad notion of paidia thus 
encompasses not only its recreational aspect, but also its representational and performative features. 
Jaeger (1945) remains to date the best study on the connection between game (paidia) and education 
(paideia), not limited to children but pervasive of ancient Greek culture. 
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παιδιὰν ἐγκερασαμένους’).120 He does not posit, therefore, a radical separation between 
muthos and logos, but rather a combination of distinct paths of argumentation and 
discourse, with their different levels of seriousness. Third, the Stranger explicitly invites 
an analytical approach to his narration, a focus on the constitutive parts of the myth in 
order for the political inquiry to achieve, as far as possible, its objective. Among the 
prevalent methodological concerns of this dialogue, the presence of a playful narration 
is nonetheless surprising and demands explanation. I will therefore introduce here the 
prevalent interpretations of mythological paidia, as a tool that responds to a variety of 
intellectual limits, before moving on to illustrate the inherent features of paidia as either 
a deceitful instrument or an educational one. I will not address the widespread and often 
misleading concern about the specific objects of mythological paidia. It has been 
observed that Plato generically presents ‘myth’ (μῦθος) as a narrative (not logical) 
account about objects that escape direct investigation, such as the otherworld, the gods 
and the mythical origins of humankind or of the cosmos.121 Nonetheless, the presence of 
none of these objects justifies the conception of myth as a playful (not only narrative or 
unverifiable) discourse. In fact, Plato uses playful forms of discourse, throughout his 
corpus, to address all sorts of different objects (logical, epistemological, cosmological, 
and metaphysical). The meaning of paidia in Plato’s corpus is extremely nuanced, as a 
description of a playful usage of language that does not coincide immediately with 
myths or childish fables.122 The presence of paidia within a philosophical inquiry, by 
consequence, must be explained not as dependent on inherently ‘mythical’ objects 
(however defined), but as related to the interlocutors’ intellectual abilities and 
psychological dispositions. This chapter thus addresses the formal and educational 
features of playful discourses, as opposed to focusing in details on their various 
contents. 
 Plato held the educational value of playfulness in the highest esteem, as testified 
by the Laws (VII.803c6-8) where ‘playing the finest possible games’ (παίζοντα ὅτι 
καλλίστας παιδιὰς) is the mark of a good life, the condition of education (paideia), and 
                                                             
120 Traditionally, the verb enkerannumi refers to the mixing of wine and water (e.g. Hom. Il. 8.189). It is 
etimologically related to krasis/sunkrasis (correct mixture) and akratos (unmixed, in the sense of either 
pure element or disjointed plexus). It thus echoes the combination of images addressed in Chapter 2, but 
refers more broadly to the interrelation of playful images and philosophy. 
121 Brisson (2004), pp.15-16. Plato, however, often blurs the distinction between μῦθος and λόγος (e.g. 
Gorg. 523a1-3; Tim. 29c4-d2). The category of myth, like that of image, is always fluid and polyvalent, 
and determinations of its meaning vary in different contexts. Cf. Morgan, 2000, pp.156-161. 
122 On the historical trend of regarding myths as children’s fables and old wives tales in Classical Athens, 
see Friedländer (1969a), pp.171-173; Brisson (2004), pp.16-17 and 19; cf. Phaedr. 229b-230a, Lysis 
205b-d. 
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thus the duty (δεῖν) of ideal citizens. Throughout his corpus, Plato associates paidia in 
particular with images and imitations, with constant concern about their educational 
role. Just like dramatic plays consist in the imitation of certain aspects of real life on the 
stage,123 and children’s games often replicate, in an enjoyable way, the more serious 
activities of adult life,124 so all imitative and performative arts belong to the realm of 
playfulness. In the Republic (X.600e), for instance, Socrates compares the poets to 
painters, presenting them as ‘imitators of images of virtue’ (μιμητὰς εἰδώλων ἀρετῆς)125 
and arguing that ‘imitation is a kind of play, not a serious effort’ (εἶναι παιδιάν τινα καὶ 
οὐ σπουδὴν τὴν μίμησιν), both because it does not necessarily entail adequate and 
effortful knowledge of the object it imitates and because it is pleasant and charming. 
Similarly, in the Sophist (234b), the Stranger presents the ‘imitative’ art (τὸ μιμητικόν), 
such as that of painters or of capable sophists, as the most skilful and enjoyable form of 
‘play’ (παιδιᾶς). In the Statesman (288c), moreover, he includes all sorts of arts that 
produce ‘imitations’ (μιμήματα), like ‘painting’ (γραφικὴν) and ‘music’ (μουσικῇ), 
under the category of ‘game’ (παίγνιον). In general terms, the notion of game entails the 
idea that a more serious or real object is being imitated or presented in images, for the 
sake of pleasure and artistic charm, without effort and complete seriousness, as well as 
without a rational guarantee that the playful image is a faithful or exact replica of 
reality. 
This notion applies as much to the literal creation of images and representations, 
as to the production of discourses that try to replicate, through language, a particular 
object of serious discussion and to persuade about its truth. Friedländer (1969a) 
observed that, if we accept that any production of written discourses is akin to a playful 
creation of images, without serious claims to complete theoretical closure, then Plato’s 
entire written production can be read as a paidia.126 The writing of dialogues, to 
Friedländer, is distinct from the serious efforts of a philosophical life, ‘and yet serious 
play – precisely because it is related, under the aspect of imitation, to genuine 
seriousness’ and thus constitutes ‘in some way, a form of education’ (p.123). Recent 
Platonic research, accordingly, is increasingly acknowledging that Plato’s notions of 
imitation and playful image-making are not inherently negative, but are positive when 
                                                             
123 Resp. X.602b6-10; cf. Ion 535d-536d. 
124 Leg. I.642b2-643d4. 
125 Poets as the traditional educators and teachers of virtue: Detienne (2006). 
126 Cf. Phaedr. 276b-277a. 
90 
 
the imitation is adequately performed and its object itself is good.127 Plato’s reliance on 
rhetorical and poetical forms of expression, despite his recurring criticism of rhetoric 
and traditional poetry, becomes theoretically consistent insofar as it constitutes a playful 
attempt to imitate more serious objects of knowledge and to represent his philosophical 
ideals of a good life. However, the specific definition of an imitation or a discourse as a 
paidia is inherently problematic, because it emphasises the idea that the imitator or the 
speaker is not acting purely for the sake of truth and may be attempting to charm or, as I 
will show, even deceive his addressees. I will thus show that paidia is an inherently 
ambivalent instrument, which can serve both as a delusionary tool and as a cognitive 
stimulus. 
A brief methodological note is opportune. My interpretation of paidia in the 
Statesman will be focused on its function as educational instrument, whose foremost 
characteristic is puzzling ambivalence. I will thus emphasise the relation of paidia to the 
presence of contradictory elements within a single account and outline the cognitive 
effects that Plato credits to them. Nonetheless, the object of this study is specifically a 
narration, not a sequence of logical arguments; therefore, I am not directly concerned 
with broader theoretical issues about Plato’s understanding of contradiction and logical 
consistency. Various passages from Plato’s corpus testify his awareness of the principle 
of non-contradiction and of its logical and rhetorical efficacy in evaluating the 
soundness of an argument. In particular, in the Republic this principle grounds the 
distinction of different parts within the human soul, because this is subjected to 
contradictory impulses (IV.436b-c); and in the Sophist it constitutes the main tool of the 
art of refutation, namely the capacity to reveal implicit contradictions in an 
interlocutor’s statement (230b). Besides these major examples, many other passages 
rely on the principle of non-contradiction as a logical, and even demonstrative, tool, 
such as for the contradiction between life and death in the Phaedo (102e-105e) or the 
opposition of pains and pleasures, as well as illness and health, in the Gorgias (496e).128 
                                                             
127 E.g. Notomi (2011); Normandeau (2008); Napolitano Valditara (2007); Lodge (1947). I cannot explore 
here the full range of ‘positive’ imitations or clarify this notion in detail. Suffice it to notice that while to 
Plato imitations are ontologically inferior to the reality they represent (e.g. Resp. X.596d-598d; Symp. 
211e-212a; Tim. 28e-29d) they are also valuable when they succeed in replicating positive objects such as 
the Forms, the harmonious cosmic order, the gods, or the life of the wise. E.g.: sensible universe as 
imitation of intelligible reality: Tim. 28c-31a; 39e; 48e-49a. Cosmic time as the moving image of eternity: 
38a. Human body as partial imitation of the cosmic body: 44d. Minor gods imitating the Divine Artificer: 
41c; 42e; 69c. Moral and intellectual excellence as imitation of the gods or of the Forms: Phaedr. 253b-c; 
Resp. 500c; Tim. 47a-c. Best constitutions as imitation of the rule of the gods or of the wise: Leg. 713b; 
817b; Pol. 293e. 
128 Cf. Napolitano Valditara, 2010, pp.123-132. Napolitano Valditara speaks of a ‘heuristic usage of 
contradiction’ (p.126) insofar as, given a pair of contradictory statements (A and -A) and in absence of a 
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However, Plato never formulated this principle in a rigorous and explicit fashion. 
Moreover, different modes of contradiction and conceptual oppositions appear in 
different dialogues (and are assessed differently by different characters).129 It is 
certainly possible to reconstruct Plato’s broader stance on contradiction as a logical and 
rhetorical tool, but my focus in this chapter (as in my whole thesis) is purely contextual, 
and directed at one educational usage of ambivalence. Contextual evaluation is always 
fundamental further to enlighten Plato’s writing. Plato’s interests, at least in this 
dialogue, are indeed not only focused on the logical soundness of arguments but also on 
the psychological (cognitive and emotional) effects of discourses. The purpose of this 
chapter, thus, is to reconstruct these effects in the context of the Statesman alone and in 
relation to the narrative ambivalence of its myth. 
 
3.1. Paidia as Response to Intellectual Limits: Recent Scholarly Contributions 
A large number of scholars interpret the myth of the Statesman as either a concession to 
Young Socrates’s intellectual immaturity, an acknowledgment of cognitive limits in the 
large majority of people, or a hypothetical and moderate discourse whereby 
philosophers themselves acknowledge their own limitations. In this sense, it is called a 
paidia because it addresses individuals whose intellectual limits, or unruly emotional 
dispositions, can be compared to those of immature children (παῖδες). It is also an 
appropriate description of myth, if we interpret it as the telling of fables and stories of 
the kind that are addressed to children, in strict contrast with the argumentative rigour of 
dialectic. As anticipated, Brisson is the major supporter of this interpretation, as he 
identifies Plato’s myths exclusively as rhetorical instruments to persuade irrational 
individuals and multitudes and lead them, through an non rational influence, towards 
rational behaviours and opinions.130 Other interpreters read the role of myth and paidia 
as a response to universal cognitive limits that affect philosophers as well, whenever the 
object of philosophical discourse lies beyond the reach of discursive reason. This 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
third alternative, demonstrating that one (A) is self-contradictory means demonstrating ad absurdum the 
truth of the other (-A). 
129 Napolitano Valditara (2010) observes, for instance, that in Plato’s corpus some polar opposites are 
presented as contradictory and without middle-ground (e.g. health and illness, good and evil, or life and 
death) and others as extremes of a fluctuation band (e.g. pain and pleasure, whose middle-ground is 
quietness, or black and white, whose middle-ground is grey; pp.124-126). Precise contextual evaluation is 
always necessary to establish what kind of opposition or contradiction is addressed in any dialogue. Cf. 
Lloyd (1966) on the ancient Greek notion of polarity as foundational of, but also distinct from, a scientific 
understanding of contradiction. 
130 Brisson, 1998, p.75; 2004, p.19. 
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interpretation is supported, for instance, by Morgan (2000) and Lane (1998).131 All 
these approaches find solid textual evidence in the Statesman. The Eleatic Stranger 
explicitly refers to his interlocutor’s youth as a reason for him to accept ‘childish 
games’ (παιδιὰς, 268e5). Immediately afterwards, he claims that myths about human 
origins are apt to largest ‘multitudes’ (πολλῶν, 271b3), who nonetheless tend to 
‘wrongly mistrust’ them (οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἀπιστοῦνται, ibid.). He thus recommends myths as 
valid ways to produce in the multitudes, if not philosophical knowledge (ἐπιστήμη), at 
least a level of trust (πίστις) in correct opinions.132 However, he also considers his myth 
as a valid contribution to dialectic, capable of saving his political argument (λόγον, 
268d3) from failing, and of allowing himself and Young Socrates ‘to see how great our 
mistake was’ (πρὸς τὸ κατιδεῖν ὅσον ἡμάρτομεν, 274e1-3). While the first two 
interpretations may be seen as compatible, insofar as youths and unphilosophical 
multitudes may be conceived as equally ‘immature’, the third instance is certainly more 
problematic. In fact, it requires us to accept that philosophical inquiry, i.e. a search for 
knowledge, benefits from the playful telling of myths. 
As Morgan (2000) demonstrates, this is not a unique case in Plato’s corpus, 
because Plato has frequently represented mature philosophers as relying on playful 
discourses as they inquire into extremely weighty matters (pp.164-184). For instance, 
the effortful succession of opposite metaphysical arguments about Being and Non-
Being, in the Parmenides, is considered by the leading character, an aged and venerable 
philosopher, a ‘laborious game’ (πραγματειώδη παιδιὰν, 137b2). Similarly, the 
cosmological account of the Timaeus is called by the eponymous character, himself 
aged and knowledgeable, a ‘measured and wise game’ (μέτριον […] παιδιὰν καὶ 
φρόνιμον, 59d1-2) as well as a myth.133 In both cases, the term paidia is employed by 
mature philosophers in order to acknowledge their own cognitive limits, in relation to 
complex objects of inquiry. The Parmenides deals, through logical tools, with the 
metaphysical problem and contradictory ideas about Being and Non-Being, and is 
ultimately aporetic. The Timaeus, instead, describes the ethical order of the empirical 
universe, an ever-changing object that lacks the clarity and stability of eternal 
intellectual realities such as mathematical and geometrical objects (29b5-d2). In both 
cases, the characters do not claim complete knowledge of the object of inquiry, and they 
rely on tentative forms of discourse without excessively serious claims to definitive 
                                                             
131 Morgan 2000, pp.164-184; Lane 1998, pp.115-117. 
132 Cf. Pol. 304c10-d3. 
133 E.g. Tim. 29c4-d2. 
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truth. Similarly, in the Philebus (28c1-4 and 30e6-7), Socrates judges the role of 
playfulness in describing the cosmic order as ‘a relief from the seriousness’ (ἀνάπαυλα 
[…] τῆς σπουδῆς, 30e6) of weighty inquiries, because it does not entail claims of 
complete knowledge. It does not matter whether a discourse is addressed to logical, 
metaphysical, or cosmological issues, for Plato to call it playful. The essential feature of 
paidia, rather, is the interlocutors’ disavowal of a direct attempt to attain complete 
knowledge. This is the fundamental reason why, in Plato, paidia can assume the 
different nuances of ‘play’, ‘wordplay’, or ‘jest’: such forms of language do not express 
definitive knowledge, but constitute indirect discursive attempts to achieve some 
cognitive gain. In this sense, the status of paidia as a philosophical instrument can be 
assimilated to forms of paidia addressed to immature individuals, because certain 
objects hinder even the intellectual reach of expert philosophers. It is, thus, a measured 
and moderate discoursive practice, appropriate to complex objects of which no complete 
knowledge is (for different reasons) available. 
I thus agree with Morgan (2000) that paidia is a discursive response to different 
intellectual limits, be they subjective and provisional or part of human nature. Morgan 
observes that paidia can be either addressed by skilled philosophers to immature 
subjects, in order to encourage them to persist in an effortful inquiry (e.g. Euthyd. 
277d4-e2; 278b2-c7), or consciously adopted by philosophers themselves, in 
acknowledgment that their own knowledge is limited and fallible. In particular, she has 
remarked that the intellectual status of philosophers is child-like, to Plato, when 
compared to realities such as the immortal soul and the divine order of the cosmos, with 
their immense time scales and metaphysical complexity (pp.176-179; cf. Resp. 498d3-6; 
Leg. 803b3-804b4). For this notion, I add, Plato seems to have expanded an idea already 
present in Greek culture and expressed most vividly by Heraclitus (DK B79): ‘Man is 
called an infant by god, just as a child is by man’ (ἀνὴρ νήπιος ἤκουσε πρὸς δαίμονος 
ὅκωσπερ παῖς πρὸς ἀνδρός).134 In either case, Morgan remarks, paidia and myth serve 
to ‘ward off certainty and keep the philosophical quest alive in terms that acknowledge 
its fragility’ (p.184). While an abundance of dialogues can show how widespread this 
                                                             
134 Plato frequently insists on the association between quasi-religious accounts and the child-like status of 
human beings. In the Timaeus (22b), for instance, an Egyptian priest claims that the Greeks are ‘always 
children’ (ἀεὶ παῖδές) and ‘young in soul’ (νέοι […] τὰς ψυχὰς) because they lack memory of their heroic 
past and periodically lose their cultural memory due to recurring catastrophes. In the Statesman (270e), 
similarly, the direct intervention of the supreme god in the cosmic order causes animals and humans 
literally to grow ‘younger and more tender’ (νεώτερον καὶ ἁπαλώτερον), slowly reverting to the state of 
newborns ‘both in relation to the soul and to the body’ (κατά τε τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ κατὰ τὸ σῶμα), and losing 
all memory of their past (272a). 
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conception is in Plato’s corpus,135 it is sufficient to observe here that this definition 
applies perfectly to the myth of the Statesman, as philosophical tool. Its role, indeed, is 
to save the argument from failure and to allow the inquiry to continue, while at the same 
time acknowledging that the myth is addressing a problematic object without any 
pretence of complete knowledge. The object of this myth is exactly the same as that of 
the Timaeus: the condition of the universe in relation to both the divinity and 
humankind. I stress the fact that such object is not only cosmological, treated as a 
tentative hypothesis, but also ethical, treated as an emotionally and intellectually 
straining account of the human position in the universe. Both in the Timaeus and in the 
Statesman, indeed, humanity stands in an ‘imitative’ relation to the cosmic order (Tim. 
44d; Pol. 274d-e), whereby the human micro-cosmos reflects the structure of the macro-
cosmos, and depends on it for both its material sustenance and ethical happiness. It is a 
mark of Plato’s theoretical consistency, then, that the Stranger choose to disavow 
knowledge about this ethical object, while at the same time considering his account a 
fundamental contribution to his inquiry. 
However, it is not enough for a discourse to be tentative for it to be a serious 
game, as if its playfulness consisted purely in its hypothetical status; rather, it is 
necessary to identify the precise features that make it playful. Indeed, there is no 
compelling reason to consider a speech playful simply because it addresses objects 
beyond one’s cognitive limits, except for the fact that the speakers may be signalling 
their lack of serious commitment to their own words. In fact it would have been 
perfectly possible, for Plato, to describe such discourses as merely hypothetical,136 
without claiming that they are games, or tricks, or jokes. Their introduction as playful, 
instead, does not merely demarcate a hypothetical account from a certain one, an image 
from what it represents, or a narration from a demonstration, but is significant in itself. I 
agree with Morgan that it is not enough to ‘regard myth or play as the mask behind 
which serious wisdom lies, or as the face we put on to make philosophy palatable’ 
(ibid.). It is necessary, instead, to consider paidia itself as a valuable vehicle of 
philosophical wisdom, endowed with specific formal characteristics and capable of 
                                                             
135 E.g. Resp. X.621b8-c2; Tim. 29c4-d2; Gorg. 527a5-7. 
136 Cf. in particular Resp. VI.510c6. In a technical sense, hypotheses (hypotheseis) are the undemonstrated 
axioms of arithmetical and geometrical knowledge, used as instruments to obtain rational conclusions, but 
not dialectically examined. The term however does not apply exclusively to mathematical axioms, but to 
any tentative account that requires dialectical probing. Cf. Phaed. 92d6, 101d2-3 on the value and limits 
of hypothetical premises; Parm. 136a1 on the philosophical praxis of testing the soundness of all 
hypothetical premises, including contradictory ones (namely, the ‘laborious game’ introduced by 
Parmenides). 
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triggering determinate cognitive effects. In the following sections, therefore, I will 
analyse discursive paidia, in close relation to the Statesman, in order to determine what 
formal characteristics make it playful in Plato’s terms, and why they are philosophically 
relevant. The importance of playfulness is testified by the fact that, in certain contexts, 
Plato treats it as a dangerous tool of deception and hindrance of intellectual 
development, while in others he elevates it to the role of an educational instrument, 
capable of challenging the intellect and provoking critical thought. I will thus integrate 
the current scholarly agreement on the serious contributions of paidia to Plato’s 
philosophy, with a coherent account of its formal features; I will show that discursive 
paidia often consists in either conflation or clash of divergent ideas, which can be used, 
respectively, either to hinder or to stimulate the intellect. 
 
3.2. Paidia as Cognitive Hindrance: The Conflation of Opposites 
To Plato, one way of responding to intellectual limitations, either one’s own or others’, 
is to indulge in tricks and illusions, creating distorted images of reality. Plato often uses 
the term paidia to describe similar discoursive practices, as pertaining in particular to 
sophistry. For instance, in the Euthydemus, two debaters are engaging in a series of 
sophistic refutations against a young man, Clinias. Socrates here describes their 
refutations as a playfully agonistic effort of making the interlocutor ‘stumble’ upon 
words and contradictions, thus creating the delusionary impression of being more 
knowledgeable than him (277d4-e2; 278b2-c7). He calls this practice a game or trick 
(παιδιά, 277d9) in order to argue that it lacks any claim to serious knowledge, because it 
is merely wordplay performed in an agonistic (and even antagonistic) spirit. In this 
context, the description of an account as playful does not merely entail an 
acknowledgment of an interlocutor’s intellectual limits, but also their exploitation for 
antagonistic purposes. The same acceptation of sophistry as a delusionary and 
antagonistic trick appears in the Sophist, where we also find an extensive illustration of 
its formal features. The Sophist is particularly relevant in relation to the Statesman, 
insofar as they both share the same leading character and narrative scene. In both 
dialogues, the Stranger is educating young men through attempts at philosophical 
definition, and in both he introduces them to critical reflections on the cognitive value 
and limits of language. His definition of paidia as a sophistic practice in the Sophist, 
narratively prior to his usage of paidia itself in the Statesman, can therefore illuminate 
the features of paidia as a discursive practice. I will argue here that paidia is qualified 
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by the Stranger as deceitful, because it conflates opposite ideas, thus potentially 
hindering the intellect of the recipients. 
 Throughout the Sophist, the Stranger offers various definitions of sophistry. At 
232b1-236c8, he defines it as the art of controversy (ἀντιλογικῆς τέχνης, 232e3) and 
disputation (ἀμφισβήτησιν, 232e4) about every possible subject (περὶ πάντων, ibid.). It 
is crucial to notice that he defines sophistry as a technique that can allow one to speak 
and appear knowledgeable about everything, insofar as the expertise in disputation can, 
formally, address any subject by highlighting its inherent contradictions. The Stranger 
holds that a claim to such totalising ability is a game, joke, or trick (παιδιὰν, 234a8), 
because it creates a deceitful impression of universal knowledge by refuting everyone 
else’s pretensions to knowledge. In the former definition, he had agreed with his young 
interlocutor, Theaetetus, that sophistry is an art through which people collect and 
compare opinions, and: 
by setting them [besides one another] they show that they contradict one 
another about the same things, in relation to the same things and in respect to 
the same things 
τιθέντες δὲ ἐπιδεικνύουσιν αὐτὰς αὑταῖς ἅμα περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν πρὸς τὰ αὐτὰ 
κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἐναντίας (230b7-8, tr. Burnet, adapted). 
According to this definition, sophistry is an art of comparison that can show the logical 
inconsistency of opposite opinions, by pointing out implicit contradictions.137 It is in 
fact similar to the skilful usage of paradeigmata in the Statesman, but opposite in 
purpose: while paradeigmata aim, by comparison, at showing similarities between 
concepts, sophistry compares them in order to display contradictions. In this sense, 
sophistry reacts to intellectual limitations, whereby contradictions are not evident, by 
exhibiting them (ἐπιδεικνύουσιν). The Stranger therefore considers it an art of 
purification (καθάρσεών, 230d7-8) from misguided opinions, in a way that aligns with 
the Socratic method of refutation. 
But in the following definition sophistry is reframed as an art of illusion, 
because refutation can be applied to any opinion, thus creating an appearance of 
                                                             
137 This passage constitutes one of the first formulations of the non-contradiction principle, which will be 
later formalised by Aristotle as a logical axiom: ‘It is impossible for the same thing to belong and not to 
belong at the same time to the same thing and in the same respect’ (τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ ἅμα ὑπάρχειν τε καὶ μὴ 
ὑπάρχειν ἀδύνατον τῷ αὐτῷ καὶ κατὰ τὸ αὐτό, Metaphysics IV 1005b19–20). Plato however charges 
contradiction with further ethical implications, insofar as it underpins a state of psychological disharmony 
involving not only opinions, but also desires, impulses, pleasures and pains (Soph. 228b). 
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universal knowledge. Refutation is a formal procedure directed at highlighting 
contradiction, and therefore can be applied to all arguments regardless of knowledge on 
their contents. He vividly exaggerates this definition, by comparing it to a pictorial art 
that (re)produces everything that exists, including living beings, geographical features, 
the heavens and the gods (233d9-234a5)—in other words, the whole universe (another 
possible translation of πάντων). In this sense, the Stranger compares sophistry to 
imitative arts: 
And is there any more artful or pleasant form of game than the imitative kind? 
παιδιᾶς δὲ ἔχεις ἤ τι τεχνικώτερον ἢ καὶ χαριέστερον εἶδος ἢ τὸ μιμητικόν; 
(234b1-2, tr. Burnet, adapted). 
Again, the Stranger insists on describing sophistry as a playful activity. Moreover, he 
establishes a focus on a specific kind of playfulness, namely imitative arts and, thus, the 
creation of images or representations. The polyvalence of this kind of paidia is 
highlighted by Theaetetus, who at first supposes that the Stranger jokes (παιδιὰν λέγεις 
τινά, 234a6), and then observes that the imitative form of game is ‘very encompassing 
and, as it were, many-coloured’ (πάμπολυ […] καὶ σχεδὸν ποικιλώτατον, 234b4). 
Notice that the Stranger’s notion of paidia is in no way dismissive: this form of 
playfulness is expert and artful, employing technical expertise towards specific results, 
such as (in this case) pleasant and beautiful representations. The Stranger illustrates this 
technical capacity through a comparison with illusionistic painting: 
And so we recognize that he who professes to be able by virtue of a single art 
to make all things will be able by virtue of the painter's art, to make imitations 
which have the same names as the real things, and by showing the pictures at a 
distance will be able to bewitch those, among young children, who lack 
intellect into the belief that he is perfectly capable to accomplish in fact 
anything he wishes to perform. 
οὐκοῦν τόν γ᾽ ὑπισχνούμενον δυνατὸν εἶναι μιᾷ τέχνῃ πάντα ποιεῖν 
γιγνώσκομέν που τοῦτο, ὅτι μιμήματα καὶ ὁμώνυμα τῶν ὄντων ἀπεργαζόμενος 
τῇ γραφικῇ τέχνῃ δυνατὸς ἔσται τοὺς ἀνοήτους τῶν νέων παίδων, πόρρωθεν τὰ 
γεγραμμένα ἐπιδεικνύς, λανθάνειν ὡς ὅτιπερ ἂν βουληθῇ δρᾶν, τοῦτο 
ἱκανώτατος ὢν ἀποτελεῖν ἔργῳ (234b5-10, tr. Burnet, adapted). 
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This passage describes the trick of simulating universal knowledge as a way of showing 
representations from a distance (πόρρωθεν), in order to make them appear identical to 
the real things. It is, in fact, an art of conflation of representation and reality, whereby 
they become ‘namesakes’ (ὁμώνυμα) and cannot be intellectually distinguished. It is 
thus a way of tricking ‘those, among young children, who lack intellect (τοὺς ἀνοήτους 
τῶν νέων παίδων)’ into believing in the reality of mere appearances. It creates the 
appearance that the trickster is perfectly capable or, better, perfectly adequate 
(ἱκανώτατος) to the task of representing precisely every reality. Notice that the Stranger 
does not claim that all children are subject to potential deception, but only those that fail 
to pay attention to the cognitive conditions that allow deception, so that there is no 
inherent and necessary bond between childhood (or childishness) and playfulness, but 
only a contingent one based on an intellectual lack. 
The Stranger does not explain, directly, how this conflation is produced in 
discourses. Instead, he illustrates it through the model138 of a perceptual phenomenon, 
whereby the proportions of objects vary according to their proximity and distance from 
the subject who perceives them. He claims that visual artists can replicate the 
proportions of their object faithfully, but not all of them do: 
Not those who produce some large work of sculpture or painting. For if they 
reproduced the true proportions of beautiful forms, the upper parts, you know, 
would seem smaller and the lower parts larger than they ought, because we see 
the former from a distance, the latter from near at hand. 
οὔκουν ὅσοι γε τῶν μεγάλων πού τι πλάττουσιν ἔργων ἢ γράφουσιν. εἰ γὰρ 
ἀποδιδοῖεν τὴν τῶν καλῶν ἀληθινὴν συμμετρίαν, οἶσθ᾽ ὅτι σμικρότερα μὲν τοῦ 
δέοντος τὰ ἄνω, μείζω δὲ τὰ κάτω φαίνοιτ᾽ ἂν διὰ τὸ τὰ μὲν πόρρωθεν, τὰ δ᾽ 
ἐγγύθεν ὑφ᾽ ἡμῶν ὁρᾶσθαι’ (235e5-236a2, tr. Burnet, adapted). 
Here the Stranger appeals to a notion of right measure (which he will further articulate 
in the Statesman), by exemplifying it as a visual feature: what is appropriate (τοῦ 
δέοντος) to a beautiful proportion (συμμετρίαν) needs to be distorted in certain 
representations, if these works are sufficiently large (μεγάλων).139 Sophistic playfulness 
is presented as a distorted image, an imitation that lacks the right measure and does not 
                                                             
138 ‘Let us then take a clearer model about this’ (Λάβωμεν τοίνυν σαφέστερόν τι παράδειγμα περὶ τούτων, 
233d3-4). 
139 The association of metaphors of distance-proximity and greatness-smallness with right measure is not 
typical of Plato alone. Cf. for instance Euripides’s Ion (585-647). 
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represent its object adequately. As Napolitano Valditara (2007) has recently observed, 
this distortion responds to aesthetic criteria that were well known in Classical Athens: 
visual artefacts like statues for high colonnades, pediments, and theatre backcloths 
require proportions to be adapted to the point of view of the observer, as they were to be 
observed from afar and from below.140 Napolitano Valditara refers in particular to the 
Byzantine Tzetzes’s account regarding Phidias’s statue of Athena (Chil. VIII 53). 
According to this late source, Phidias and a rival sculptor entered a contest for the 
creation of the most beautiful statue of the goddess Athena, which was to be placed in 
the Parthenon. Phidias’s statue, compared to his rival’s, appeared unpleasing, because 
its head was disproportionally big in respect to the body. But this statue was designed 
for a high colonnade: once observed from afar and from below, it appeared 
proportionate and more beautiful than Phidias’s rival’s. In the end, Phidias’s Athena 
gained more appreciation from the Athenians, precisely because of an optical illusion of 
the kind that the Stranger describes.141 Plato is thus relying on conceptions of artistic 
illusions, in order to illustrate his conception of linguistic ones: as long as it is possible 
not only to represent, in discourses, all realities, but also to distort them, by relying on 
inherent cognitive limits of the recipients, imitation can turn into deception. The 
Stranger, accordingly, considers those who produce similar effects as ‘illusionists’ or, 
more literally ‘wonder-workers’ (θαυματοποιῶν, 235b5), insofar as their conflation of 
opposite impressions puzzles the intellect. Therefore, representation can be realised 
either respecting the proportions of its model, regardless of how they may appear to a 
distant observer, or disregarding them, in order to produce a pleasant but false 
subjective impression. In the former case, the Stranger names it iconic (εἰκαστικήν, 
236c7) representation, insofar as it produces faithful images (εἰκόνα, 236c3); in the 
latter, he names it fantastic (φανταστικήν, 236c7), because it realises a delusionary 
apparition (φάντασμα, 236c3).142 
                                                             
140 Napolitano Valditara, 2007, pp.13-14. Napolitano’s study of the aesthetics of visual illusion in Ancient 
Greece provides further evidence for the Greeks’ ‘geometrically well-founded’ awareness of visual 
distortion and projection of shapes, in pre-Classical and Classical times (pp.12-13, tr. mine). Cf. Thales, 
DK11A1 = Plinius, Natural History XXXV 1,82 = D.L. I 27; Aristophanes, Ecclesiazusae, v.652. See 
also: Schuhl 1933, pp.77-78. 
141 The Byzantinian source dates to the XII Century C.E., and cannot be considered direct historical 
evidence. The convergence of the two aesthetical phenomena described by Tzetzes and Plato, however, is 
undeniable. Even if the anecdote about Phidias cannot be taken as documenting a historical fact, it 
provides accessory evidence of technical reflections on the aesthetics of vision in Classical Greece. 
142 Cf. Notomi, 2011. 
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 The fundamental idea expressed by this model is that sophistic illusions produce 
a conflation of opposite determinations. The Stranger indeed focuses on a series of 
polarities on which the art of illusion relies:  
Position of the illusionistic work Up-down (ἄνω-κάτω) 
Dimensions of the work Smaller-larger (σμικρότερα-μείζω) 
Position of the observer Distance-closeness (πόρρωθεν-ἐγγύθεν) 
Illusion Imitations-realities (μιμήματα-ὄντων) 
 
He chooses the example of optical illusions, of the kind attributed to Phidias, in order to 
furnish a perceptual analogy for the conceptual and discursive conflation of polar 
opposites. The apparent dimensions of larger and smaller objects can shift and be 
inverted, based on their position of height-lowness or distance-closeness, relative to the 
observer. The perspectival deceit produced by visual illusions underscores, to the 
Stranger, the fundamental cognitive limit of a purely subjective position, whereby the 
subjects content themselves with the contingent appearance of beautiful proportions. In 
order for an illusionistic form to remain proportionate, it is necessary that the observers 
be bound to a specific point of view, far from and below the image they observe. Only 
such a distance, combined with an inherent cognitive limit of the human perception, 
allows the illusionist to conflate greatness and smallness. An analogous phenomenon, 
the Stranger holds, affects the human intellect, when the discourses it receives or has 
recourse to do not allow it to distinguish between contradictory ideas.143 In this sense, 
the sophistic expertise in controversy and debate can be bent to a pure trick that, far 
from exposing contradictions, conflates them and exploits a natural difficulty in 
distinguishing them. 
The Stranger’s educational concern with the experience of a deceived mind is 
seemingly the reason why he only provides an illustrative model, and not further 
concrete accounts. He is not concerned with explaining which specific discourses 
conflate ideas or what features they possess. His prime aim, rather, is to invite his 
interlocutor to maintain a critical attitude towards discourses in general, and to allow for 
the possibility that any discourse might, upon closer scrutiny, create opposite opinions: 
                                                             
143 On the art of controversy as game, cf. Phaedr. 261c4-262c2. Socrates here defines this art as the 
ability to deceive the hearers by exploiting similarities between different and even opposite ideas, in order 
to make them appear the same and produce a cognitive ‘experience’ or ‘condition’ (πάθος 262b3) of 
delusion. At 262d2 he describes it as a kind of wordplay (προσπαίζων ἐν λόγοις). 
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Many among the hearers, Theaetetus, when they have lived longer and grown 
older, will by necessity come closer to realities and will be forced by 
experience openly to lay hold on realities; they will have to overturn the 
opinions which they had at first accepted, so that what was great will appear 
small and what was easy, difficult, and all the apparent truths in arguments will 
be turned upside-down by the facts that have come upon them in practical 
actions. Is not this true? 
τοὺς πολλοὺς οὖν, ὦ Θεαίτητε, τῶν τότε ἀκουόντων ἆρ᾽ οὐκ ἀνάγκη χρόνου τε 
ἐπελθόντος αὐτοῖς ἱκανοῦ καὶ προϊούσης ἡλικίας τοῖς τε οὖσι προσπίπτοντας 
ἐγγύθεν καὶ διὰ παθημάτων ἀναγκαζομένους ἐναργῶς ἐφάπτεσθαι τῶν ὄντων, 
μεταβάλλειν τὰς τότε γενομένας δόξας, ὥστε σμικρὰ μὲν φαίνεσθαι τὰ μεγάλα, 
χαλεπὰ δὲ τὰ ῥᾴδια, καὶ πάντα πάντῃ ἀνατετράφθαι τὰ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις 
φαντάσματα ὑπὸ τῶν ἐν ταῖς πράξεσιν ἔργων παραγενομένων; (Soph. 234d2-
e2, tr. Burnet, adapted). 
Like in the Statesman (277d7), the Stranger’s philosophical focus is on cognitive 
‘experiences’ or ‘conditions’ (παθημάτων). He is not interested in defining how the 
conflation of divergent opinions is produced by sophistry. He provides, instead, an 
experiential criterion for recognising when this conflation has been produced: the 
passing of time and a closer (ἐγγύθεν) scrutiny of reality can in fact overturn 
(μεταβάλλειν) former opinions, thus revealing them for what they are—illusions. The 
Stranger argues that, in a sense, aging brings about a level of disillusionment, as 
accumulation of conflicting opinions without necessary resolution. Notice that this 
experience is not one of direct acquisition of knowledge, but a troubling one, which 
radically subverts appearances by its compelling force (ἀνάγκη). There is no implication 
that aging, as such, leads to more knowledge: the lived experience is simply said to 
overturn the opinions (δόξας) and verbal apparitions (ἐν τοῖς λόγοις φαντάσματα) that 
the subject formerly held true. They do not cease to be opinions and images, as the 
perceived proportion of a work of art, even when seen closely, does not cease to be 
perceptual impressions. The delusion produced by the trick of conflation, then, is not 
revealed through a direct reference to the represented object itself, namely by showing 
the original and pointing out that its image is different from it. It is rather demystified 
through a cognitive experience of disorientation and subversion of opinions, originated 
by close scrutiny. The revelatory mark of delusionary tricks is not their inadequacy to 
the represented object, but the confusing distortion of opinions they produce, by 
102 
 
exploiting inherent cognitive limits of the human mind. In this sense, the Stranger 
actually addresses intellectual limits that are not peculiar to youth alone. Proper of 
(some) youths is only a lack of critical attitude towards general limitations both of 
discourses and of the subjective mind. Instead, the cognitive state of confusion that 
ensues from increased experience pertains to a more general majority (τοὺς πολλοὺς), 
which is equally untrained in judging what is true and is lost between conflicting 
impressions. 
 Napolitano Valditara (2007) has observed that the Stranger’s criticism of 
sophistry is parallel to Socrates’s criticism of poetry in the Republic, and teases out the 
same cognitive problem: the difficulty for the human intellect to measure correctly 
contradictory appearences.144 At X.602c-603b, Socrates argues that the rational faculty 
of the human mind has inherent cognitive limits, and exemplifies it through visual 
models. He points out that the same magnitude can appear greater or smaller based on 
the observer’s distance, that the same object can appear either curved or straight when it 
is observed either in the water or out, and that other optical illusions can make it appear 
concave or convex (602c-d). This distortion, he highlights, exists only in the mind, and 
it can be counteracted by measuring the object (602d-e). However, and here is the crux 
of the argument: 
Even when this [rational faculty] has measured and indicates that some things 
are bigger or smaller than the others, or equal, often opposite appearances are 
presented at the same time about the same things. 
τούτῳ δὲ πολλάκις μετρήσαντι καὶ σημαίνοντι μείζω ἄττα εἶναι ἢ ἐλάττω ἕτερα 
ἑτέρων ἢ ἴσα τἀναντία φαίνεται ἅμα περὶ ταὐτά. 
(602e4-6, tr. Burnet, adapted) 
Even rational measurement is not sufficient to dispel the natural appearance of opposite 
determinations regarding the same object. Socrates’s visual example, like the 
Stranger’s, is meant to address the intrinsic cognitive limitation that allows certain 
speakers (sophists or poets) to persuade through deceitful accounts. The intellect does 
never fully dispel illusions and contradictory impressions, and this is an inherent trait of 
the human mind. Just like human sight is open to perspectival illusions, so the mind is 
prone to being confused by implicitly contradictory discourses even when the intellect 
                                                             
144 Notomi (2011) also draws a parallelism between Resp. X and Soph., but he limits his observations to 
the distinction between iconic and fantastic images. 
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has measured them. Compatibly with the Stranger’s account, it seems legitimate to 
credit Plato with the persuasion that the human intellect is limited not only in the sense 
that it does not possess a complete, totalising or ‘divine’ knowledge of reality, but in the 
more radical sense that it remains constantly open to the possibility of deceit dictated by 
the difficulty to judge correctly contradictory ideas. The remedy against this condition, 
explicitly pointed out by the Stranger, is not just seeking an objective correspondence 
between image and reality, but rather preserving a watchful, critical attitude and being 
aware that the need to measure the images that affect our minds never subsides. 
The context of the Stranger’s account is, again, educational, insofar as he is 
concerned with practices of cognitive disillusionment. In the former definition of 
sophistry, the exhibition of implicit contradictions performed an educational role, 
insofar as it exposed the inconsistent adherence to divergent ideas. Conversely, here, the 
same cognitive experience prevents the trick of deceitful sophistry from being effective, 
by exposing it as an illusion. In both cases, however, the experience does not lead to 
stable knowledge of the truth, but it reveals the subversive relativity of partial points of 
view. Like the subjective perception of proportion or disproportion, exemplified by 
great sculptures and paintings, the experience of conflicting opinions simply marks a 
shifting point of view, and does not provide a definitive criterion of judgment. 
Accordingly, the Stranger’s educational purpose is to lead the young Theaetetus ‘as 
close as possible (ὡς ἐγγύτατα, 234e6) to a sound judgment, even ‘without those 
experiences’ (ἄνευ τῶν παθημάτων, ibid.) that would trouble him if happened upon ‘in 
practical actions’ (ἐν ταῖς πράξεσιν, 234e2). Like in the Statesman, his purpose is to put 
a young mind to the test, by exploring in dialogue (and not in praxis) the consistency 
and stability of its opinions. The Stranger’s description of paidia, ultimately, is an 
invitation to attain a more critical awareness concerning ‘great’ and complex objects of 
discourse and to pay close attention to implicit contradictions. 
In the Sophist, then, paidia appears in a strongly negative role, as a trick played 
on inexperienced minds, unaware of their own cognitive limits. It is a bewitching act 
addressed in particular to children and youths, because their lack of experience can lead 
them to disregard the implicit conflict of divergent ideas as well as the inherent 
relativity of their own perspective. It is an image that lacks the right measure, because 
its proportions are distorted in order to disguise implicit contradictions. However, this 
does not mean that it is described as childish, in a pejorative sense. In fact, first, it 
requires skilful ability, in order to produce a technical conflation of opposite ideas, like 
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‘great and small’, ‘difficult and easy’ and, ultimately, ‘image and reality’. Second, it 
does not rely on the recipients’ young age per se, but rather on a lack of critical 
awareness and close scrutiny, which depends on inexperience but which can also be 
counteracted by philosophical education. This counteracting, I wish to highlight, does 
not consist in a definitive possession of truth, but rather in the awareness of one’s own 
cognitive limitations and of the need for critical judgment. Paidia is therefore a practice 
that a philosopher needs to take very seriously, because it has the potential of deceiving 
the uncritical mind and hindering its judgment. Formally, its deceptive potential 
depends on two conditions: 
(a) the artful conflation of opposite ideas, on the deceiver’s part; 
(b) the lack of a critical intellect and of close scrutiny on the recipient’s part. 
The kind of philosophical awareness required by the Stranger is, above all, a recognition 
of the inherent limits of the intellect. Such as perception is naturally perspectival and 
subject to distortions, so the mind is naturally prone to confusion between inherently 
relative determinations. Attention to paidia, then, is not only recommended to immature 
subjects as such, but to all philosophers who concern themselves with vast and complex 
ideas. 
 
3.3. Educational Paidia: Clash of Opposites as Cognitive Stimulus 
Despite the Stranger’s negative judgment of paidia in the Sophist, he chooses to include 
it among valid philosophical methods in the Statesman. Different scholars have 
highlighted the problematic nature of this choice. Brisson, Lane, and Morgan, for 
instance, have remarked that the myth’s narrative form is inadequate to the demands of 
clear-cut distinctions of dialectic and to the acquisition of demonstrable definitions.145 
The problem, however, runs deeper: not only its narrative form, but also its playful 
status call its contribution to dialectic into doubt. It is true that a narrative does not 
organise ideas in a logical and universally necessary manner, but presents them as 
temporal events that unfold contingently, based on their relevance in the story. It is also 
true, as we have seen (Sections 1.2. and 2.2), that the myth contributes to the inquiry as 
an inadequate paradeigma of statecraft, by showing the contextual excess of the model 
of the herdsman. Thus, all the details of the story that transcend this limited role also 
seem to transcend philosophical relevance in this dialogue. However, the Stranger’s 
                                                             
145 Brisson, 2004, p.26; Morgan, 2000, pp.258-260; Lane, 1998, pp.99-101 and 123-124. 
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conception of paidia, as exhibited in the Sophist, illumines a more fundamental issue: 
the presence of implicit contrasts between divergent ideas, which can be used to exploit 
intellectual limits to hinder the mind from critical judgment. The fact that the Stranger 
decides to employ a form of paidia, thus, underscores a more fundamental and textually 
sound contrast than the one between myth and argument. It reveals the difference 
between deceptive and educational usages of playful discourses. The purpose of this 
section is to demonstrate in what sense the Stranger can consider paidia an educational 
instrument, despite and even thanks to its troubling effect on the inquiring mind. 
 
 3.3.1. Forms of Paidia throughout the Statesman 
In the Statesman, the Stranger does not define his own paidia in any explicit way. He 
does, however, provide different significant acceptations of this multifaceted term, in 
various contexts throughout the dialogue. I will explore here the four aspects of paidia 
that appear in the Statesman as related, respectively, to emotional impact, artistic 
pleasure, conflict of ideas, and philosophical testing. None of these instances refer, at 
least explicitly, to the usage of language, but they nonetheless show that the Stranger 
credits the usage of playfulness with a fundamental educational role. 
At 268b1-5, he describes the emotional influence that music can exert on tame 
animals as a form of paidia. To some extent, he claims, animals ‘partake by nature in 
play and music’ (παιδιᾶς καὶ μουσικῆς (…) φύσει μετείληφεν). Based on this 
assumption, he argues that an expert herdsman can avail himself of their playful 
disposition in order to direct their emotional states, ‘encouraging and soothing them 
with his incantations’ (παραμυθεῖσθαι καὶ κηλῶν πραΰνειν). In this sense, paidia is 
related not simply to artistic activities that can procure delectation (to animals as much 
as to humans); but in particular to an emotional sensitivity to non rational influences, 
which can be used to communicate the opposite emotions of courage or calm. Both 
these aspects parallel, in relation to music, one of the main purposes of playful activities 
throughout Plato’s corpus. On the one hand, encouraging or comforting 
(παραμυθεῖσθαι) is a form of emotional guidance that triggers a reaction against 
difficulties and fears; on the other hand, soothing (πραΰνειν) guides emotions in the 
opposite direction, attenuating impulsive reactions of anger and aggressiveness. For 
instance, as Morgan notices, in the Republic Socrates ‘speaks of “encouraging” 
(παραμυθουμένη, [IV] 442a2) the spirited part of the human soul with music and 
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gymnastics’.146 Similarly, Socrates also observes that anger can sometimes be retained 
and soothed (πραϋνθῇ, 440d3) by reason, just like a herdsman retains his dogs.147 The 
Stranger maintains the same language of opposite emotional influences, but (crucially) 
without any direct overlap of political and emotional guidance. In fact, he is concerned 
with distinguishing the political art from pastoral guidance, because herdsmen act on 
their subjects from a position of intellectual superiority which is not possible (at least, 
not directly) in human communities. Only at the end of the Statesman will he identify 
statecraft as the art of combining the citizens’ courageous and moderate dispositions 
(310e7-311a2); and even then, only at the level of social interactions, not within the 
individual subject. The very art of ‘persuading the multitudes and crowds through the 
telling of myths’ (τὸ πειστικὸν […] πλήθους τε καὶ ὄχλου διὰ μυθολογίας 304c-d), the 
Stranger holds, is to be entrusted to rhetoricians, whom statecraft merely directs without 
sharing in their expertise directly. There is no suggestion, in the Statesman, that paidia 
is appropriate to human communities as a direct non rational influence, in a way 
comparable to the guidance of animals. Unlike the Republic, the political argument of 
the Statesman is focused on the guidance of communities towards a virtuous 
arrangement of life, not on the guidance of individuals towards personal virtue. 
Consistently, paidia as enchantment does not appear as a valid political model of 
rational control of emotions, but only as an activity that cannot be imitated, without 
specification, by the statesman. 
 The crucial specificity of human communities and human playfulness is 
confirmed later, when the Stranger offers a definition of paidia in terms of artistic 
ornament and pleasure. Among the crafts necessary for the existence of a polis he 
includes ‘play’ (παίγνιον, 288c6) in the sense of artistic activity: 
the sort of craft pertaining to ornament, painting, and those imitations that are 
completed by the use of this, and of music, which have been brought to 
perfection only for our pleasures. 
τὸ περὶ τὸν κόσμον καὶ γραφικὴν θεῖναι καὶ ὅσα ταύτῃ προσχρώμενα καὶ 
μουσικῇ μιμήματα τελεῖται, πρὸς τὰς ἡδονὰς μόνον ἡμῶν ἀπειργασμένα 
(288c1-4, tr. Rowe, adapted). 
                                                             
146 Morgan, 2000, pp.165-166. Cf. also Resp. IV.476e1 (dialectic as a gentle exhortation to distinguish 
opinion and belief) and 499e1-2 (the encouragement of multitudes to embrace philosophical rule). 
147 Cf. also Resp. IV.572a, and Leg. V.731d1 (restraint of anger); and Resp. VI.501c (persuasion that 
calms popular indignation at the idea of philosophical rule). 
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Pleasures and arts are, to the Stranger, an essential part of human life—a judgment that 
Plato expresses in various occasions through different characters.148 The notion of a 
political and formative role of arts is, indeed, typical of the Classical age, when poets 
and artists were conceived as public educators, visual representations manifested 
ethical, religious and social ideals, and music and dance were formative exercises for 
noble and fine men.149 Significantly, however, artistic pleasures constitute here a social 
good in themselves, and not just a means to an end. According to the literal Greek, it is 
‘towards’ (πρὸς) pleasure that arts have been ‘perfected’ (τελεῖται). Arts are a valuable 
part of social life ‘not for the sake of serious commitment, but for the sake of 
playfulness’ (οὐ γὰρ σπουδῆς οὐδὲν […] χάριν, ἀλλὰ παιδιᾶς ἕνεκα, 288c9-10). 
Doubtless, in other dialogues Plato’s characters evaluate the arts also for their formative 
effect, but in this context they are considered exclusively as an innocent form of 
playfulness, and accepted without further considerations. More precisely, the distinction 
of playfulness and seriousness in the realm of art is the first condition of its full 
appreciation. It is remarkable that Plato here seems to anticipate the modern conception 
of ‘art for art’s sake’; but this fact does not imply a form of hedonism in contrast with 
his pervasive educational concerns. On the contrary, it underpins the difference between 
educational methods appropriate to an animal community and those adequate to 
humans. Certain artistic pleasures and leisurely imitations of reality exist to make 
human life pleasant, and are not used in a purely instrumental sense, unlike music as 
used by the herdsman. This aspect of paidia therefore stands in stern contrast to the 
former one, unless we recognise the change of perspective from all-encompassing to 
cooperative rule. If the usage of paidia were exerted from a position of superior 
understanding, it could include the direction of emotions; from a strict position of 
equality, instead, it exists for the sake of a pleasant life. 
 Notice however that visual arts can have a limited educational purpose, 
according to the Stranger. At 277c3-6, he argues for the superiority of discourse over 
painting and other kinds of handicrafts in illustrating philosophical ideas, but only ‘for 
those who are able to follow’ (τοῖς δυναμένοις ἕπεσθαι); for anyone else, instead, 
‘handicrafts’ (χειρουργιῶν) of that sort are valuable non-verbal forms of expression. 
Consistently, at 306c10-d4 he considers painting and music as expressing, ‘in images’ 
(ἐν εἰδώλοις), quickness and speed of bodies, which generically entice praise. Images 
can represent ‘all those aspects we call beautiful’ (ὅσα καλὰ […] λέγομεν, 306c7) in a 
                                                             
148 E.g. Phil. 50e-53c; Leg. 635e4-636e3 and 795d6-817e4. Cf. also Criti. 116b2-5. 
149 Cf. Havelock, C. M. 1978, pp.102-103; Detienne, 2006. 
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human body, expressing qualities that lead people to praise them (ἐπαινοῦντος, 
306d4).150  The Stranger thus considers them an adequate, if limited, example of what 
people appreciate as part of a virtuous and noble disposition. In this sense, the arts can 
instruct non-philosophers, displaying certain ethical behaviours and influencing ethical 
judgments. They can therefore be elevated, in the appropriate context, to educational 
instruments. This fact, though, does not alter his former definition of arts as playful 
activities, because they are considered a form of paidia for the pleasure they produce, 
and for it alone, not for their instructive potential. Conversely, it is not their playfulness 
that gives them educational value, but their illustrative and expressive potential (not 
dissimilar, in this respect, to that of graphic signs in general, including letters, but 
enhanced by the emotional impact of their expressivity). 
 The Stranger’s focus on human communities, then, would seem to relegate 
paidia outside of philosophy, at least in the strict sense of intellectually demanding 
inquiry. But in fact he also embraces a notion of game that relates to the theoretical 
field. At 307d6, he uses the term paidia to describe the cognitively troubling conflict 
between courage and moderation. Claiming that two virtues can conflict, to him, is 
indeed a ‘puzzling account’ (θαυμαστόν […] λόγον, 306b6), a discourse that triggers a 
level of confusion or puzzlement.  Both courage and moderation, the Stranger claims, 
are generally considered and praised as parts of virtue (μέρος ἓν ἀρετῆς, 306b1); but 
they describe radically opposite (ὑπεναντίοις, 306e3) ways of life, in reference either to 
‘speed and vigour and quickness of thought and body’ (τάχος καὶ σφοδρότητα καὶ 
ὀξύτητα διανοήσεώς τε καὶ σώματος 306e4-5) or to ‘actions that are slow and gentle’ 
(πράξεις αὖ βραδέα καὶ μαλακά, 307a9). The identical denomination, and equal praise, 
of two opposite kinds of behaviours, the Stranger remarks, is in fact easy for disputers 
(ἀμφισβητητικοῖς, 306a9) to criticize because it seems contradictory, and thus requires 
further justification. Notice that his mention of disputers is parallel to his description of 
sophistry as an art of contradiction and dispute (ἀμφισβήτησιν) in the Sophist (232e4): it 
reflects the same ethical preoccupation with the exploitation of contradictions in an 
antagonistic spirit. Thus, the Stranger’s concern is at once theoretical and practical. The 
puzzling identification of courage and moderation as virtues is a twofold linguistic 
practice, both descriptive and prescriptive, since it involves both the problematic equal 
                                                             
150 See Schuhl 1933, pp.81-82 on artistic expressionism of psychological states (Xen., Mem. 3.10). See 
Havelock, C. M. 1978, pp.99-103 for lifelike visual arts and their ethical impact. Cf. Section 2.2. 
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denomination151 of opposite sets of behaviour and the mutual praise or blame of 
opposite social groups.152 Their potential contrast, in parallel, hinders both a correct 
denomination, based on the recognition of what the two virtues have in common, and a 
peaceful coexistence of people with opposite dispositions: 
For I think because of their affinity to either set of qualities, they praise some 
things as belonging to their own kin, and censure those of their opponents as 
alien, and engage in a great deal of hostility towards each other, and about a 
many great things. 
κατὰ γὰρ οἶμαι τὴν αὑτῶν ἑκατέροις συγγένειαν τὰ μὲν ἐπαινοῦντες ὡς οἰκεῖα 
σφέτερα, τὰ δὲ τῶν διαφόρων ψέγοντες ὡς ἀλλότρια, πολλὴν εἰς ἔχθραν 
ἀλλήλοις καὶ πολλῶν πέρι καθίστανται (307d1, tr. Rowe, adapted). 
Linguistic divergence about virtues, to the Stranger, also entails a concrete hostility 
(ἔχθραν) between different ways of life, because it is not a merely descriptive act, but 
also a performative one which evaluates a certain set of behaviours over another. 
His response to the contrast, accordingly, is both theoretical and ethical. On the 
one hand, he appeals to the notion of right measure or timely opportunity. Either 
disposition should not be followed when it is ‘more untimely’ (ἀκαιρότερον, 307e7) or 
exceeds ‘what is appropriate’ (τοῦ δέοντος, 308a6) in a given circumstance, lest the 
community face impotent submission or dangerous rivalry with other communities. 
Rather, people of opposite inclinations should stand in mutual connection, holding the 
shared opinion that they are in need of each other for the benefit of their community 
(310e7-311a2). The prime objective of a statesman, accordingly, is to produce this 
univocal ethical persuasion in his subjects, not by altering their dispositions, but by 
directing them towards a shared endpoint: the happiness (eudaimonia) of the whole 
polis.153 On the other hand, and before arguing for a correct political guidance, the 
Stranger also introduces a fundamental ethical distinction between hostility and paidia: 
Well, this divergence between these two forms [of life] is a game; but in 
relation to the greatest concerns it happens to become a malady which is the 
most hateful of all for cities. 
                                                             
151 E.g. ‘saying’ (λέγοντες, 307a4); ‘we say’ (φαμεν, 307a7); ‘imparting names’ (ἀπονέμοντες τοῖς 
ὀνόμασιν, 307b7). 
152 E.g. ‘we praise’ (ἐπαινοῦμεν, 306e11); ‘exhalting’ (ἀγασθέντες, 307a8); ‘we blame’ (ψέγομεν, 307b6); 
‘they praise’ (ἐπαινοῦντες, 307d2); ‘blaming’ (ψέγοντες, 307d3). 
153 Pol. 272c5, 301d5, 311c8. See Section 5.3.1. 
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παιδιὰ τοίνυν αὕτη γέ τις ἡ διαφορὰ τούτων ἐστὶ τῶν εἰδῶν· περὶ δὲ τὰ μέγιστα 
νόσος συμβαίνει πασῶν ἐχθίστη γίγνεσθαι ταῖς πόλεσιν (307d6-8, tr. Rowe, 
adapted). 
Paidia stands here in opposition to hostility, conceived as a political malady ‘in relation 
to the organisation of life as a whole’ (περὶ ὅλην […] τὴν τοῦ ζῆν παρασκευήν, 307e1). 
In this passage, the Stranger makes the remarkable claim that the opposition of ethical 
dispositions, as such, is not necessarily equal to hostility or to a detrimental condition. 
The possibility of a non-hostile and non-detrimental opposition is crucial to the ethical 
message of the Statesman and it constitutes a recurring concern in this dialogue. 
Contradictory denominations of virtue, opposite views and behaviours, to the Stranger, 
are not inherently disruptive or detrimental, but they can become so if they are not 
correctly enacted, named and understood. What is detrimental about opposite virtues is 
their tendency to lack of measure, to appear as absolutes that are always valid in any 
circumstance, rather than as parts of a more complex and encompassing virtue, which 
presents itself in opposite ways under different circumstances. Playfulness thus 
possesses a fundamental political value, insofar as it construes opposition as something 
peaceful and devoid of danger. Certainly, the Stranger’s evaluation of this form of 
paidia is very cautious, because he is wary of its possible degeneration into conflict and 
he calls for its accurate management by a good leader. Nonetheless, paidia remains a 
positive (if fragile) practice, in the right circumstances, insofar as it constitutes a form of 
peaceful and less-than-serious contrast that eschews conflict.154 
 Finally, the Stranger credits paidia with a fundamental educational role in the 
construction of a just city. He claims that statecraft needs to discern the individuals’ 
ethical dispositions, distinguishing the ‘honest’ (χρηστῶν, 308d2) from the ‘base’ 
(κακῶν, ibid.) excluding (or even purging) from the city all those that are irrevocably 
drawn towards godlessness,155 overbearing violence, and injustice, and only combining 
                                                             
154 Cf. Leg. 803a on the absence of both game (paidia) and education (paideia) in war; and 803c-e on the 
foundational role of life’s ‘finest games’ (καλλίστας παιδιὰς) over conflict. The leading character argues 
here that only leisurely excercises and games allow to develop, safely and without danger, the citizens’ 
virtues and skills—including the very military skills and courage that are necessary in a war. 
155 Plato’s violent rejection of atheism/godlessness (ἀθεότητα) as unredeemable vice seems to impose a 
strong limit to the value he attributes to dialogue. The same judgment is the object of the entire book X of 
the Laws, and possibly reflects Plato’s own religious inclinations (cf. Phaed. 99c1-6; Resp. II.378e4-
383c7; Soph. 266b2-4). This matter is too complex to be explored here, but it must be noticed that, while 
morality and religiosity are deeply entwined in Plato’s philosophy, his conception of the divine generally 
coincides with a principle of measure and harmony at the individual, social, and cosmic levels. It does not 
constitute a preference for religious belief as such, but an evaluation of harmony as ‘divine’ reality. Cf. 
Leg. IV.716c4-5: ‘For us god will be the measure of all things [or: of the universe] in the highest degree’ 
(ὁ δὴ θεὸς ἡμῖν πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον ἂν εἴη μάλιστα). The notion of the divinity as a principle of 
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those that display dispositions towards virtue (308d1-309a2). This practical distinction 
does not coincide with the combining art of statecraft, but is preliminary to it because it 
serves to exclude from the just city every individual whose dispositions are inherently 
lacking of measure. It is thus a fundamental test to discern the individuals’ inner 
openness to right measure and education through game: 
[Good statecraft] will first put them to the test in play, and after the test it will 
in turn hand them over to those with the capacity to educate them and serve it 
towards this particular end, itself laying down prescriptions for the educators 
and directing them 
παιδιᾷ πρῶτον βασανιεῖ, μετὰ δὲ τὴν βάσανον αὖ τοῖς δυναμένοις παιδεύειν 
καὶ ὑπηρετεῖν πρὸς τοῦτ᾽ αὐτὸ παραδώσει, προστάττουσα καὶ ἐπιστατοῦσα 
αὐτή (308d3-6, tr. Rowe, adapted). 
Paidia performs here a propaedeutic role: it does not coincide directly with education or 
with political activity, but it grounds them both. The Stranger does not clarify what sort 
of practices he has in mind, but it is evident that he considers paidia a valid form of test 
(βάσανον). The Greek term basanos literally means ‘touchstone’, a tool for the 
identification of gold: rubbed against the touchstone, gold will impress a yellow streak 
and therefore reveal itself as authentic. Plato elsewhere identifies this process as a 
troublesome one: in the Gorgias (486d2-7), for instance, Socrates considers 
disagreement and debate, even when harsh, as a touchstone for his own convictions, 
insofar as an honest opposition can put him to the test. Testing, in this sense, is an 
activity that involves a certain level of contrast, like in the rubbing together of stone and 
metal, or in the conflict of opinions. But while the attitude towards conflict can be harsh 
and adversarial, it can also be accepted peacefully and playfully, in the conviction that 
opposition is not a serious matter or an end in itself, but a preliminary step towards 
more valuable cognitive and emotional outcomes. The acceptation of paidia as basanos 
is therefore consistent with the Stranger’s former remark that opposition is a kind of 
game, when performed in a friendly spirit and not for the sake of hostility. Like in the 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
measure justifies the juxtaposition, in the Statesman, of godlessness to violence (ὕβριν) and injustice 
(ἀδικίαν): godlessness is not mere lack of belief in the divine order of things, but coextensive to a lack of 
measure within one’s inner order and dispositions towards others. Plato’s concern with ethical harmony, I 
argue, has priority over his concern with unqualified religious belief and disbelief as such. We can 
perhaps distinguish, to some extent, ‘atheism’ as a set of positive opinions regarding the gods, and 
‘godlessness’ as an absence of divine/harmonious order. A modern, albeit certainly more flexible, version 
of this principle has been expressed by Gandhi: ‘God is ethics and morality […] God is conscience. He is 
even the atheism of the atheist’ (Y7, 5-3-25. 81; Bose, 1948). For the possibility of a dialogue between 
theism and atheism in Plato: Hobbs, 2017. On measure and divinity: Bontempi, 2009, pp.306-310. 
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former case, moreover, it reflects the Stranger’s general attitude throughout the 
dialogue, whereby he is testing Young Socrates’s philosophical inclinations. The 
Stranger coherently insists that a good philosophical interlocutor needs to resist the 
haste to reach a conclusion, as well as the difficulties of round-about discourses, never 
losing the sense of right measure, of their contextual opportunity and appropriateness to 
positive outcomes (286d4-287a6). Certain forms of discursive paidia constitute a 
benevolent challenge to the interlocutors. 
Ultimately, to the Stranger paidia is always a tool of educational guidance and 
evaluation, at least in the political field. It can be used to guide emotions, provide 
valuable pleasure, furnish a way to indulge in oppositions without hostility (albeit a 
fragile one), and serve as a test of psychological dispositions. In the next section, I will 
show how this is true also of paidia as a philosophical instrument. 
 
3.3.2. Paidia as Cognitive Stimulus: The Clash of Opposites 
Throughout the Statesman, the Stranger exhibits different aspects of the multifaceted 
practice of paidia; but do they illuminate his otherwise unqualified usage of myth as a 
game? I argue that it is possible to understand the mythical paidia as including all these 
aspects, as part of a cognitive instrument. Emotional impact, artistic creation, playful 
opposition, and testing function are all present, and they all cooperate to produce a 
questioning critical attitude. 
In the first place, we need to notice that the Stranger embeds three traditional 
stories in his elaborate narrative, with a single philosophical concern in mind: 
a) the miraculous inversion of the stars’ movements; 
b) the rule of gods over all animals, including humans; 
c) the birth of all animals from the earth. 
The Stranger’s narrative procedure draws upon and expands three traditional motifs: the 
story of Atreus and Thyestes, according to which the two brothers quarrelled for the 
kingship over Mycenae and Zeus inverted the course of the sun and the Pleiades as a 
sign of his favour for the former; the tradition of the ancient kingship of Cronus over 
humans; and the myth of an original birth of human beings from the earth, which 
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traditionally served to ground claims to political autochthony.156 These are not the only 
components of the myth, which includes complex imagery from a variety of poetical 
and philosophical sources, but they are the ones that the Strangers highlights explicitly. 
He unifies these three traditions in a single narration in order to locate them within a 
cohesive but ambivalent account: the universe periodically moves in opposite directions 
(ἐκ τοῦ ἐναντίου, 269a4),157 either on its own or under divine guidance; consequently, 
the gods periodically govern the mortals and periodically abandon them to a harsh 
environment; and at different times the mortals either age backwards, being reborn out 
of the earth and growing younger, or they grow and die in the customary way. The unity 
of the narration reflects the Stranger’s focus on a single cosmic ‘event’, ‘experience’, or 
‘condition’ (πάθους, 269b5; πάθος, 269c1): the periodic reversal of cosmic movement, 
which brings along the reversal of the aging process of all animals. 
The three elements of his myth, we can notice, also reflect a threefold 
philosophical and ethical concern with: 
a) the divinities’ actions and nature; 
b) the relation between divinities and humans; 
c) the human condition within the cosmos. 
All these concerns have been explored by Plato throughout most, if not all, of his works. 
Each involves extreme intellectual complexities in itself, and their combination in the 
Statesman exponentially increases the difficulty, insofar as they are presented as part of 
a single ethical problem. The originality of this myth, indeed, consists in their 
unification in a single picture: here reality is like a pendulum of opposite conditions that 
succeed one another in eternal ambivalence. 
Presenting this ambivalence as a pendular oscillation, the Stranger subsumes in 
his narration the traditional ambiguity of primordial human ages. As Erwin Panofsky 
(1955) observed: 
                                                             
156 Cf. Menex. 237b2ff.; Isocrates, Panegyric 24; Lane, 1998, pp.105-106. 
157 The notion of opposite movements or conditions recurs at: 249d, e; 270a, b, d, e; 271b; 273a, d, e; 
274e; it returns in the account of right measure (283c, 284e) and in the description of opposite 
dispositions towards courage and moderation (306b, c, e; 307a, b; 309c; 310a). In particular, at 273d2 
‘opposite’ (ἐναντίων) are the positive state of cosmic order and the detrimental condition of disharmony. 
It must be noticed, however, that the opposites described in the myth are not only good-bad or order-
disorder, but they include the impulse of divine guidance (which providentially establishes the cosmic 
order) and the cosmic drive toward autonomy (which by necessity tends to increasing disorder). Cf. 
Stefanini, 1949, pp.223-224. 
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there had been, from the beginning of classical speculation, two contrasting 
opinions about the natural [i.e. pre-political] state of man […] One view, 
termed “soft” primitivism […] conceives of primitive life as a golden age of 
plenty, innocence and happiness—in other words, as civilized life purged of its 
vices. The other, “hard” form of primitivism conceives of primitive life as an 
almost sub-human existence full of terrible hardships and devoid of all 
comforts—in other words, as civilised life stripped of its virtues (p.297). 
Vidal-Naquet (1983) has similarly noticed that the assimilation of primitive humans to 
animals, typical of the myth of Cronus and of the Golden Age, could be interpreted 
either as joyous simplicity or as bestial savagery, thus entailing an ambiguity between 
nostalgic and subversive political interpretations of this image (cf. Lane 1998, pp.111-
113). More recently, El Murr (2010) has also interpreted the spontaneous life of the Age 
of Cronus in the Statesman as inherently ambivalent, because devoid of toils and 
conflicts but also of autonomous human rationality, at least in political matters (pp.293-
294). It is not my purpose, here, to address directly the contents of this myth in relation 
to pre-Platonic literature, either seeking for recurrent cultural structures or for poetical 
affinities among various texts. My point is exclusively formal and regards the nature of 
paidia as an ambivalent discursive game. Whether we read this myth through the lenses 
of structuralism or we seek exclusively to interpret Plato’s particular philosophical 
stance, one datum is evident: this mythical account relies on deeply ambivalent images 
and indeed stresses them, by representing an eternally oscillating cosmic order and an 
equally oscillating human condition. I therefore hold that this ambivalence is the 
consistent trait of the imagery chosen by the Stranger, and that its availability to 
opposite evaluations of both the cosmic order and human life is his underlying reason 
for employing it. 
The ambiguity of the Age of Cronus thus turns, in the Stranger’s hands, into an 
oscillating ambivalence that affects every level of his narration. Concerning the divinity 
(a), the benevolent intervention and withdrawal of the cosmic god is also the cause of 
terrible catastrophes. When the god assumes control of the heavens, ‘great destructions’ 
(φθοραὶ […] μέγισται, 270c11) ensue on earth; and when he withdraws, the cosmos 
undergoes ‘confusions and tumult and tremors’ (θορύβων τε καὶ ταραχῆς […] καὶ τῶν 
σεισμῶν, 273a5-6). Divine governance is thus presented as problematic, insofar as it 
brings about destructive consequences whenever the god assumes control or abandons 
his power. Cosmic autonomy is equally ambivalent, because the Stranger credits the 
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cosmos with wise intelligence (φρόνησιν, 269d1) but also with an ‘innate desire’ 
(σύμφυτος ἐπιθυμία, 272e6) and a level of inherent disorder (ἀταξίας, 273b5) that 
slowly push it towards complete disarray (ἀνομοιότητος, 273d6).158 Concerning the 
relationship of humans and gods (b), divine governance allows a peaceful and toil-less 
life but completely overrules political self-determination,159 while human beings on 
their own are fragile160 and depend on the acquisition of technical abilities to survive the 
harshness of nature. Concerning the human condition itself (c), the mythical 
autochthony appears here as a literal resurrection of human beings, whereby birth does 
not require unsettling sexual needs and life flows in a spontaneous way. Yet it is also 
subverted into an image of individuals that age backwards, in a process of physical and 
mental regression towards infancy: mortals ‘went back to the form of new-born 
children, becoming like them both in soul and in body’ (πάλιν εἰς τὴν τοῦ νεογενοῦς 
παιδὸς φύσιν ἀπῄει, κατά τε τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ κατὰ τὸ σῶμα ἀφομοιούμενα, 270d-e). The 
opposite condition is equally problematic, because conflict for political rule is presented 
as inherent to human attempts at self-regulation: since no divine governor exists, 
‘everyone now disputes this function [of kingship] with the person we are looking for’ 
(πάντες αὐτῆς ἀμφισβητοῦσι τῷ ζητουμένῳ τὰ νῦν, 275b2-3). Current scholarship, 
accordingly, is still divided between contrasting interpretations. While some scholars, 
such as Rowe and Brisson, see the god as ultimately providential, others, such as Lane 
and Kahn, evaluate human and cosmic independence from divine direction as a positive 
(if traumatic) condition.161 Similarly, the Age of Cronus has been interpreted either as 
an idealised, utopian figure of blissfulness or as an ironical, dystopian account of human 
immaturity.162 Ultimately, it is still perplexingly unclear whether the Stranger is 
presenting divine governance as a desirable state to be sought for, or as an impossible 
condition to be warded off for the sake of human autonomy. 
Such a perplexing lack of clarity is not a coincidence to be explained away by 
choosing one or the other interpretation. In fact, I argue that it constitutes an irreducible 
and original aspect of this myth, which any reduction to non-Platonic imagery or to 
other Platonic accounts risks to obscure. The Stranger’s ambivalent narration can in fact 
                                                             
158 Literally ‘dissimilarity’, in the sense of a lack of balanced equality of forces within its own body, 
which threatens to tear it apart (see Chapter 4). 
159 ‘There were no political constitutions’ (πολιτεῖαί τε οὐκ ἦσαν, 272a). 
160 ‘Humans [were] weak and defenceless’ (ἀσθενεῖς ἄνθρωποι καὶ ἀφύλακτοι, 274b7-8). 
161 Providential divine rule: Carone, 2005; Brisson, 1995; and Rowe, 1995. Positive cosmic 
independence: Kahn, 2009; Morgan 2000; Lane 1998. 
162 Idealistic or utopian readings: Kahn 2009; Morgan 2000; Migliori 1996. Ironical or dystopian 
readings: El Murr 2010; Rowe 2010; Lane 1998.  
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be easily construed as similar both to utopian stories and dystopian ones, to the point 
that highlighting one or the other kind of parallelism does not really solve the quandary. 
Causing perplexity is indeed the Stranger’s explicit intention for using a discursive 
paidia. In psychological terms, indeed, he presents the events he narrates as perplexing 
or, better, puzzling (θαυμαστότερα, 269b6; θαυμαστῶν, 270b4; θαυμαστά, 270d2), as 
he does regarding his myth as a whole: (θαυμαστόν, 277b4). This qualification cannot 
be taken as a mere appeal to a generic sense of marvel triggered by a fantastic narration. 
In fact, the adjective thaumaston and the verb thaumazein refer to a troubling 
intellectual condition of puzzlement or questioning wonder causes by contradictory 
ideas. These terms appear repeatedly in the Statesman, always in association with 
moments of confusion that could hinder the inquiry.163 In particular, ‘thaumaston’ refers 
to moments of inquiry when two opposite ways of thinking about the same subject 
appear at the same time. As we have seen, the Stranger presents the contrast between 
courage and moderation as a ‘puzzling account’ (θαυμαστόν […] λόγον, 306b6) 
because it construes two opposite sets of behaviours as equally virtuous, and can be bent 
to the sophistic disputation and contradiction. Similarly, at 265a8, he calls Young 
Socrates a ‘wonderful man’ (θαυμαστέ), for his apparent suggestion to follow at the 
same time two opposite paths for the theoretical division of human nature, one shorter 
and swifter to cover (θάττω, 265a3), and one longer (μακροτέραν, 265a5). The sense of 
puzzled wonder that the Stranger describes is therefore one caused by ambivalence, 
whereby the mind is caught between two opposite determinations that are difficult or 
even impossible to disentangle.164 It is the same cognitive condition described in the 
Sophist as the consequence of the deceitful paidia produced by sophistic ‘wonder-
workers’ (θαυματοποιῶν, 235b5), who conflate opposite ideas in a single account and 
can exploit contradiction in an antagonistic spirit. The puzzlement created by the 
ambivalence of virtues, however, is resolved as a matter of contextual opportunity, since 
the Stranger argues that citizens of each disposition are only virtuous in the appropriate 
circumstances, and should cooperate with their opposite. Similarly, the longer and 
shorter ways of defining humanity are tackled separately, one at a time, and thus leave 
no ground for confusion. In these cases, the ambivalence is resolved by distinguishing 
each horn of the contrast and evaluating it separately, in different moments. By contrast, 
the myth is not an instrument of analytical division, but a narrative construction that 
                                                             
163 278c8; 278d7; 283b6; 283b8; 301e6; 302a2. In all these cases puzzlement is associated to intellectual 
or political disorientation, directly counteracted by the Stranger’s dialectical clarity. 
164 Lane names it ‘estrangement’ (1998, p.114), thus recalling the second property of paradeigmata as 
estranging movement between two different perspectives. Cf. Morgan, 2000, p.259. 
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demands further analysis but does not, per se, present clear-cut distinctions. It thus 
enhances, rather than dissolving, the impression of intellectual puzzlement that 
originates from ambivalent accounts. 
The mythological paidia creates a productive intellectual strain, a stimulus to 
closer philosophical inquiry. Both Plato and Aristotle famously credited the origin of 
philosophy precisely to puzzled wonder.165 In the Theaetetus, the eponymous character 
confesses his confusion and puzzlement in the face of contradictions, and Socrates 
states that ‘wondering: this condition is typical of the philosopher; for there is no other 
origin of philosophy but this (μάλα γὰρ φιλοσόφου τοῦτο τὸ πάθος, τὸ θαυμάζειν: οὐ 
γὰρ ἄλλη ἀρχὴ φιλοσοφίας ἢ αὕτη, 155d). Aristotle expanded this claim in his 
Metaphysics, and construed puzzled wonder as the historical cause of the birth of 
philosophy. He argued that ‘through wondering men both in our times begin and in the 
origin began to philosophize’ (διὰ γὰρ τὸ θαυμάζειν οἱ ἄνθρωποι καὶ νῦν καὶ τὸ πρῶτον 
ἤρξαντο φιλοσοφεῖν; A.982b), stimulated by the perception of their own ignorance in 
relation to ‘oddities’ or ‘objects of perplexity’ (ἀτόπων), such as the rising and setting 
of the stars or the origin of the universe. Significantly, Aristotle himself assimilated the 
lover of wisdom (philosophos) to the lover of myths (philomuthos), insofar as both 
attractions are grounded on puzzlement: ‘so even the philomuthos is in a certain respect 
a philosopher, for myth is composed of wonders’ (διὸ καὶ ὁ φιλόμυθος φιλόσοφός πώς 
ἐστιν: ὁ γὰρ μῦθος σύγκειται ἐκ θαυμασίων; ibid.). Notice that similar cosmological 
concerns are central to the myth of the Statesman, grounded as it is on the puzzling 
notion of a reversal of cosmic motions. Aristotle’s reception of Plato’s notion of wonder 
reflects not only the latter’s understanding of philosophical inquiry but also his 
appreciation of cosmological puzzles as necessary stimuli to inquiry.  It must be 
highlighted, however, that Plato presented puzzled wonder not as the start of a historical 
process but only as a subjective experience, which repeats itself whenever an intellect 
faces unsolved contradictions. 
Accordingly, Napolitano Valditara (2014) observes that, in the Theaetetus, 
Socrates credits this psychological condition to the presence of ideas that ‘fight with one 
another in our souls’ (μάχεται αὐτὰ αὑτοῖς ἐν τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ ψυχῇ, 155b4-5), namely lead 
to contradictory ideas that require further distinctions. In this context, Socrates claims 
that unsolved contradictions can appear ‘puzzling and ridiculous’ (θαυμαστά τε καὶ 
                                                             
165 Napolitano Valditara 2014; Berti 2008. 
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γελοῖα, 154b6),166 and offers a ‘small model’ (σμικρὸν […] παράδειγμα, 154c1) to 
clarify his claim. He imagines to compare six dice to four, and then to twelve: in the 
former case, the six dice are rightly said to be ‘more [πλείους]’ (than the four), in the 
latter they are rightly said to be ‘less [ἐλάττους]’ (than the twelve). But these claims 
seem to contradict a different claim on which the characters also agree, namely that 
nothing can ‘become greater or more in any other way than by being increased’ (μεῖζον 
ἢ πλέον γίγνεται ἄλλως ἢ αὐξηθέν, 154c8-9). This contradiction could be phrased as a 
question that would sound either as a naïve doubt or as a good puzzle: ‘How can six 
dice become more without increasing in number?’ The puzzling and laughable 
contradiction, here, is patently based on the sophistic167 trick of taking the same 
acceptation of ‘becoming greater or more’ in two opposite senses at once: in the former 
case as becoming greater than something else, in the second as becoming greater than 
oneself.168 Thus Socrates’ trick serves to reveal that the linguistic expression ‘becoming 
greater’ can be understood under two opposite respects, and that it is necessary to be 
aware of them in order to avoid a genuine contradiction of ideas (as opposed to a mere 
contradiction in words, due to the relative inadequacy of language). The kind of 
measurement in which philosophical judgment is involved is not just a determination of 
relative greatness and smallness, but the complex (and always context-dependent) 
understanding of in what senses or under what respects one and the same thing can be 
said to be great or small (or any other couple of relative opposites). 
Therefore, the playful practice of inducing puzzlement and perplexity is 
philosophically fundamental, insofar as it fosters in the interlocutor the necessity of a 
self-aware usage of language, an attention to the implicit contradictions to which 
unreflective discourses might lead. As Napolitano Valditara (2014) comments: 
                                                             
166 Notice how the reference to ridiculousness strengthens the association between play and wonder, 
insofar as puzzling claims may also appear as a joke. Heath (forthcoming) observes that Plato describes as 
laughable (γελοῖον) and ridiculous (καταγέλαστον) behaviours that include incompetence (Gorg. 473e6-
4a2), unwarranted claims to knowledge (Prot. 323a7-b1), specialised knowledge that others do not 
recognise (Euthphr. 3b9-c2) and, most significantly in our context, contradicting oneself or being lured 
into paradoxes (e.g. Parm. 138c7-2; Phil. 14d8-e4). Morgan (2000) remarks that Socratic irony itself 
(namely, the practice of feigning ignorance in order to lead interlocutors into contradictions or paradoxes 
and thus perplex them) is associated with playfulness at Symp. 216e4 (Socrates as ‘being ironical and 
playing [or: joking]’ [εἰρωνευόμενος δὲ καὶ παίζων] throughout his entire life). Morgan thus considers 
irony as ‘analogous to philosophical myth’ (p.169), precisely insofar as both display a perplexing 
convergence of playfulness and seriousness. 
167 Socrates immediately refers to sophistry as an antagonistic usage of similar tricks (154e1-2). 
168 A comparable ‘sophistic’ contradiction is suggested by Socrates in the Phaedo (102c-d), where he 
observes that the Pythagorean Simmias can be said to be at once great and small, when he stands between 
Socrates and Phaedo, because he is taller than the former and shorter than the latter. 
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‘this state can be translated as “perplexity” […] as long as we acknowledge its 
fundamentally aporetic character, namely the emergence of this condition, 
which Plato names pathos, in the face of hypotheses that come to “fight with 
one another in our soul”, as Socrates claims in the Theatetus, to the point […] 
making one grope in the dark” (p.141, tr. mine). 
Napolitano Valditara examines this psychological effect in particular with regard to 
logical quandaries, whereby accepted premises lead to contradictory conclusions. 
However, just like Aristotle will claim that objects of wonder are present as much in 
myths as in philosophical inquiries, so Plato explicitly includes them in the myth of the 
Statesman, even if he avoids explicit philosophical argumentation about their 
contradictory status. The character of the Stranger, rather than leading his interlocutor 
into contradiction (a typically Socratic practice), avails himself of an ambivalent 
account of divine actions, cosmic states, and human conditions that still possess the 
power of causing perplexity in those who scrutinize it closely. Like a sophistic trick, the 
Stranger’s myth is a playful account that triggers puzzlement in its more watchful 
receivers. I therefore suggest that the myth of the Statesman is a form of paidia 
precisely insofar as it is designed to trigger this very psychological condition, this 
particular cognitive-emotional state, through an accurate employment of narrative 
ambivalence. It cannot be reduced to a game of imagination, an emotionally persuasive 
device, or a simple hypothetical account that ‘imitates’ reality as closely as possible. 
Rather, it performs a properly philosophical function as a psychological drive towards 
further critical awareness, precisely because it creates a tension between opposite 
accounts without directly resolving it. It is, in a sense, a model of correct political 
leadership, but a problematic and perplexing one. 
The great divide between opposite contemporary interpretations of the myth, 
idealised/utopian or ironical/dystopian, constitutes an effect inherent to paidia and it is 
intentionally designed by the Stranger. He narrates his myth in order to create a strong 
ambivalence within the three ethical concerns mentioned above: 
a) controlled cosmic order against autonomous tendency to disharmony; 
b) direct divine governance against human autonomy; 
c) peaceful human regression to infancy against conflictive human 
development. 
120 
 
The myth does neither promote divine governance and perfect peace nor praise the 
cosmic and human tendency towards disharmony and conflict. It rather puzzles its 
interpreters because it expresses, at once, conflicting ideas. Unlike paradeigmata and 
conceptual divisions, it does not provide any clear-cut way to judge between opposite 
and clashing alternatives. It simply unifies them within a single narration and offers no 
straightforward solution. 
 This fact justifies the Stranger’s claim that the myth is incomplete and his 
refusal to judge its ethical meaning. As artful creation, compared to sculptures and 
paintings,169 the myth is judged by the Stranger as unfinished, insofar as it does not fully 
clarify its subject matter: ‘We have in every way failed to apply an end to our myth 
(πάντως τῷ μύθῳ τέλος οὐκ ἐπέθεμεν, 277b7). Precisely due to its ambivalence, it 
leaves the condition of the universe and of life within it unclarified, at least in terms of 
its ethical significance. While works of art are forms of paidia for the pleasure they 
provide when they are brought to completion (τελεῖται, 288c2), this myth has not 
reached its endpoint (τέλος) because it does not illustrate its object clearly enough. 
Accordingly, the Stranger raises the ethical question about human happiness under 
Cronus and Zeus, but leaves it unanswered (272b-d). The myth does not contain any 
explicit term of evaluation, and the Stranger invites Young Socrates to suspend the 
judgment until the appearance of an elusive ‘witness’ (μηνυτής, 272d3) of the human 
condition under Cronus. Therefore this myth is extremely differentm for instance, from 
the cosmological account of the Timaeus, which the leading character brings to an 
end,170 by presenting a harmonious and beautiful image of the whole universe.171 
Instead, the myth of the Statesman describes a cosmos caught in a pendulum between 
dangerous autonomy and direct divine control, whereby judging which kind of life is 
happier (εὐδαιμονέστερον, 272b3) becomes extremely problematic with regard to either 
age. This myth is characterised by a fundamental incompleteness because it raises 
ethical questions and demands evaluation of conflicting alternatives which remain 
unsolved. 
 For these reasons, the widespread interpretation of this myth as an excessive 
image and an insufficient narrative, namely an account that lacks of measure and fails to 
contribute to the political inquiry, must be corrected. In particular, Lane (1998) and 
                                                             
169 277a3-c3. 
170 Tim. 92c4: ‘and now we may say that our account concerning the universe has reached its end-point 
(καὶ δὴ καὶ τέλος περὶ τοῦ παντὸς νῦν ἤδη τὸν λόγον ἡμῖν φῶμεν ἔχειν). 
171 Tim. 92c7-8: ‘greatest, most noble and beautiful, and most perfect’ (μέγιστος καὶ ἄριστος κάλλιστός τε 
καὶ τελεώτατος). 
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Morgan (2000) focus on the fact that the Stranger introduces his story as a great myth 
(268d-e) and concludes by criticising it as an excessively great model (277a-c). Lane 
identifies its positive role, beyond mere correction of dialectical errors, as a 
methodological contribution to the inquiry: by presenting this grand image of divine 
government, the Stranger can introduce the notions of models and right measure that 
will become fundamental for the rest of the dialogue (p.101). More radically, Morgan 
concludes that the grandeur of this mythological narration is not suited to exact 
definition, and therefore inadequate and even misleading (p.261). It is certainly true 
that, among other things, the myth serves to present the model of herding as beyond 
human reach and thus inappropriate to a political perspective. Yet the cognitive role of 
this myth transcends methodological concerns with exactness, correct division, and 
even the role of models. Its purpose is precisely to trigger perplexity,172 and its relation 
to right measure is not just one of excess. Rather, it consists in the fact that such a 
perplexity, like the one triggered by the idea of dice that ‘become more’ without 
‘increasing’, calls into question the interpreter’s very ability to measure and judge 
correctly. Just like a sophistic account, its manipulation of contradictions makes it 
difficult to evaluate opposites; but unlike it, its purpose is not to confuse or attack, but 
rather to trigger further philosophical awareness. The puzzled wonder fostered by 
opposite ideas entertained at once is precisely the (always recurrent) beginning of a 
philosophical attitude, a habit to question critically the implicit problems of accepted 
accounts. Nor is this just a matter of cognitive abilities in general, inherently irrelevant 
to the political argument. In fact, what the myth questions is a crucial political issue: 
whether a rational and benevolent leader’s control is preferable to human autonomy. 
The Stranger’s paidia is thus neither an exercise in excess and narrative magnificence, 
nor a leisurely theoretical puzzle, but a very precise philosophical instrument designed 
to tease out the ambivalence of political rule. 
The fundamental feature of the myth is the presence of unsolved oppositions, 
which playfully test Young Socrates’s (and the readers’) judgment about political 
matters. Divine governance, the human condition, and their mutual relation are 
construed as ambivalent, as they involve a contrast between peaceful but submissive 
dependence on wise authority and a self-determined but conflictive independence. This 
ambivalence is both intellectually demanding and politically serious, but the game does 
not suggest any explicit solution. The playful frame indeed allows the Stranger to 
                                                             
172 Lane (1998) acknowledges the perplexing status of the myth, but reduces it to the fact that it is ‘ill-
timed [and] badly-finished’ (pp.99-110). 
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present such a contrast in a measured, moderate way, eschewing serious diatribes about 
political preferences, while at the same time reinforcing the need for pondered 
evaluation. It does so not only through an appeal to emotions and to expectations of 
artistic completeness, but in particular through the vivid inclusion of unsolved 
quandaries. In this sense, the use of myth as paidia coincides more strictly with the 
philosophical and educational acceptations of the term. Its inner oppositions are parallel 
to the contrast between courage and moderation, playful insofar as it does not entail 
partisan divisions. Its cognitive and emotional effect of puzzlement, and the open-ended 
demand for ethical judgment, are parallel to the idea of a playful test. 
The notion that the Stranger intentionally presents clashing ideas faces a 
significant objection: a clash of opposite ideas is the exact opposite of his rigorous 
practice of diairesis. In fact, the Stranger’s methodological insistence on the value of 
diairesis is directed at warding off the risk of conflating opposite ideas, as well as of 
incorrectly distinguishing them. People who are not accustomed at dividing concepts in 
this way, he argues: 
both throw these things together straight away, despite the degree of difference 
between them, thinking them alike, and correspondingly they do the opposite 
of this by dividing other things not according to [their proper] parts. 
τοσοῦτον διαφέροντα συμβάλλουσιν εὐθὺς εἰς ταὐτὸν ὅμοια νομίσαντες, καὶ 
τοὐναντίον αὖ τούτου δρῶσιν ἕτερα οὐ κατὰ μέρη διαιροῦντες (285a5-7, tr. 
Rowe, adapted). 
We have seen in Chapter 1 that the Stranger recommends distinguishing concepts that 
are qualitatively opposite, such as odd and even numbers or the masculine and feminine 
sexes. In this way, to him, it is possible to eschew the risk of opposing categories based 
on arbitrary oppositions, such as between Greeks and Barbarians. The opposite error is 
also possible: conflating ideas despite their divergence, as sophistry does. The Stranger 
describes this error metaphorically, as a ‘throwing together’ (συμβάλλουσιν) of 
different determinations. The unreflective conjunction, in language and thought, of 
qualitatively divergent ideas is aptly assimilated to a literal clash, as an instantaneous 
and disruptive event that brings together incompatible objects ‘straight away’ (εὐθὺς). 
Therefore, it seems difficult to presume that he might employ a similar practice, when 
he explicitly recommends avoiding it through methodological accuracy (in the 
Statesman) and critical awareness (in the Sophist). Nonetheless, he can conceive of the 
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myth itself as an appropriate method, precisely insofar as it is a distinct philosophical 
path, whose cognitive function is different from that of diairesis. The Stranger can thus 
present, in a different form and for different reasons, the same kind of clash that he 
criticises as inappropriate to divisions. In fact, he vividly reveals that a conceptual clash 
is present in his narrative: 
as [the cosmos] turned upside-down and clashed, urged on by the contrary 
impulse both of the beginning and of the end, it produced a great tremor in 
itself, which in turn brought about another destruction of all sorts of animals. 
ὁ δὲ μεταστρεφόμενος καὶ συμβάλλων, ἀρχῆς τε καὶ τελευτῆς ἐναντίαν ὁρμὴν 
ὁρμηθείς, σεισμὸν πολὺν ἐν ἑαυτῷ ποιῶν ἄλλην αὖ φθορὰν ζῴων παντοίων 
ἀπηργάσατο (273a1, tr. Rowe, adapted). 
I will return on this passage below (Section 4.1). I present it here to point out that the 
clashing (συμβάλλων) of the cosmos is described in the same physical terms that the 
Stranger uses to describe clashing ideas. The clash is a physical event that can 
adequately describe a linguistic and cognitive experience of unsolved ambivalence. In 
the myth, accordingly, the clash is presented as a concrete event that arises when 
opposite cosmic conditions suddenly converge. Indeed, the cosmos clashes when 
opposite impulses converge within its body: on the one hand, the former impulse of a 
guiding god, and on the other its own ‘drive’ or ‘desire’ (ἐπιθυμία, 272e6) to move 
autonomously. By using the vivid image of a cosmic clash, the Stranger alerts us that a 
convergence of opposite ideas is under way: on the one hand, an orderly impulse of 
control, and on the other a disruptive impulse of autonomy. The Stranger is thus very 
transparent in his usage of clashing ideas. He is not trying, by way of sophistry, to 
prevent accurate divisions. On the contrary, he is vividly drawing attention to the clash 
as disruptive and problematic. He explicitly abandons the rigidity of divisions for the 
unity of a playful narrative, in order to emphasise the moment of perplexing 
convergence of opposites. Therefore, I am not claiming that the interpreter can be 
satisfied with ambiguity, and not try to attain a definitive meaning of the myth. Rather, I 
argue that its inherent clash must be accepted as fundamental for its cognitive efficacy, 
precisely insofar as it stimulates further intellectual efforts. Most importantly, it triggers 
the necessity to understand ideas under different respects (just like Socrates’s example 
of dice ‘becoming greater’), and not just to differentiate ideas themselves. It 
foreshadows the need for a more complex and important cognitive skill than diairesis, 
namely for the art of right measure as ability of critical judgment. 
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The myth thus reflects all the different acceptations of paidia employed by the 
Stranger throughout the Statesman, but in a distinctively cognitive sense. First, it is 
emotionally impactful, because it touches themes of human happiness, conflict and 
autonomy and questions the human condition in the cosmos. Yet it does not produce 
any clear-cut emotional response like courage or moderation (unlike pastoral guidance), 
but a state of puzzled wonder, parallel to that produced in those who are watchful 
enough by sophistic delusions. Second, it can be evaluated as a representative work, i.e. 
an image, because it represents, narratively, the condition (πάθος) of the cosmos and of 
its parts. And yet it is incomplete as such, because it does not provide a conclusive and 
perfect representation of its object, but it provokes puzzled wonder and demands the 
recipients’ judgment. Third, it is a playful way of dealing with serious contrasts, such as 
control and autonomy. It does not solve the contrast, but merely makes it part of a single 
narrative. Finally, it is also a playful intellectual test, by which the interpreters’ 
understanding of the cosmic order and of the human condition is called into question, 
without explicit resolution but also without detrimental antagonism. The fundamental 
result of the myth, as paidia, is to emphasise the intellectual limitations of its receivers, 
thereby provoking pondered critical reflection about the quandaries of political rule. 
Paidia thus becomes a tool of philosophical and political education, the measured 
mixture of seriousness and playfulness. 
 
Conclusion 
The Statesman shows that discursive paidia is a valid cognitive tool for a philosophical 
inquiry, provided that it is used correctly. While Plato mentions other forms of paidia in 
the sense of playful or childlike activities, I have focused here on such practices in the 
field of discourses. Plato indeed distinguishes incorrect and correct uses of discursive 
games, based on their formal features and on the purpose for which they are employed. 
On the one hand, an incorrect usage of paidia coincides with a delusionary practice, 
which exploits the interlocutors’ intellectual limitations. In this sense, paidia is 
addressed to children, actual or metaphorical, as subjects who lack philosophical 
understanding to various degrees, in order to preserve their condition of intellectual 
inferiority. Plato thus condemns similar forms of discursive game as educationally 
detrimental. On the other hand, a correct usage of paidia constitutes to him a valid 
educational practice, which aims to challenge the interlocutors’ intellectual limitations. 
It does not provide analytical or illustrative tools like diairesis and paradeigmata, but a 
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way of enticing puzzlement and a critical attitude. Educational paidia, then, is addressed 
to interlocutors who lack philosophical understanding of a certain subject, but it works 
as the opposite of a deceitful trick. 
Deceitful and educational usages of paidia are characterised by perfectly 
specular determinations: 
Formal 
determinations 
Deceitful paidia Educational paidia 
Internal articulation Conflation of opposite ideas Clash of opposite ideas 
Cognitive effect Cognitive hindrance Cognitive stimulus 
 
Deceitful paidia is obscure in both its determinations: it is a practice of hiding 
contradictions and an effort of obscuring an interlocutor’s intellect. On the contrary, 
educational paidia aims at revealing its inherent limits and the contrasts it includes, 
albeit not at resolving them. The case of the Statesman is exemplary in this regard: the 
myth presents an explicit clash of opposite ideas, in order to trigger a response of 
puzzled wonder. While different scholars have remarked the fundamental 
incompleteness and estranging features of this myth, the prevalent judgment is that they 
subtract from its philosophical validity and political relevance alike. But the notion of 
paidia as a two-faced device, capable of either hindering or challenging the intellect, 
restores its full philosophical value: a fundamental stimulus to a critical attitude. 
In this chapter, I have studied the formal determinations of paidia as an 
ambivalent image, in order to attain hermeneutic instruments for interpreting how Plato 
concretely relies on imagery and to what ends. For the sake of clarity, I have also 
outlined the general contrasts within the contents of this myth: providential cosmic 
order against chaotic events; control against autonomy; and regression against 
development. Their clash is the most apparent feature of the myth, and I have argued 
that it performs a distinct educational role. Nonetheless, in order to demonstrate how its 
cognitive effect works it is necessary to analyse these contents in concrete detail. In the 
next chapter, therefore, I will show the internal articulation of the figure of cosmic 
movement, represented through the clashing images of centred balance and peripheral 
steering. I will thus demonstrate that the myth’s ambivalence works as an effective 
instrument to stimulate the intellect toward autonomous conceptual gains. 
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Chapter 4 – Mightier than Atlas: Images of Control and Autonomy 
They think they can find a new Atlas more powerful and 
more immortal than this, and in truth they do not think 
that what is good and right [to agathon kai deon] binds 
and holds together all things (Phaed. 99c). 
Introduction 
This chapter will provide a study of the cosmic imagery used by Plato in the myth of the 
Statesman. I will analyse the two-sided figure (schema) of the circular movement of the 
universe, as due either to a perfectly centred balance or to the steering action of a 
cosmic god. This figure is part of an intricate interweaving of cosmological and 
anthropological images, representing how different cosmic revolutions originate 
different human ages, a mythical past governed by the gods and a present deprived of 
divine guidance. According to the most widespread interpretation of the function of this 
myth, it serves merely to correct, imaginatively and playfully, a dialectical error: the 
excessive identification of the good statesman with a herdsman of human herds, an ideal 
ruler who does not exist in the actual world.173 In particular, Lane (1998) considers it a 
‘grand, childish, and inconclusive paradeigma’ (p.101) of statecraft, and claims that its 
corrective role consists precisely in portraying the herding of human beings as an 
excessively elaborate story about political matters. She thus claims that its imaginative 
narrative ‘develops a momentum and complexity of its own, unrelated to any 
articulation which its putative target [statecraft] might possess’ (p.120),174 and makes 
cosmic imagery, in particular, appear puzzlingly out of place (p.122).175 Lane’s position, 
albeit more radical than other interpretations of the myth, displays the limits of 
considering it merely a corrective accumulation of images that offer no positive 
contribution to the inquiry about statecraft. In fact, if we do not identify any 
correspondence between the complexity of images and the articulation of their object, 
accordingly we must deny or severely limit their cognitive value in illuminating the 
latter. By contrast, I will show that the carefully constructed combination of images 
serves to represent, from two opposite angles, a notion of measured, wise guidance, and 
thus to provide a positive cognitive gain. 
                                                             
173 Kahn (2009): ‘locating the ideal ruler in a mythical age of Cronus’ (p.161); Morgan (2000): ‘the myth 
has revealed that the former divisions were idealistic’ (p.255): Lane (1998): ‘the temporal and cosmic 
gulf between our own world and the possible world of Kronos’, p.115. 
174 Cf. Morgan (2000): ‘There is, however, a misfit between those [theoretical/methodological] ends and 
its narrative form’ (p.253). 
175 Lane’s analysis is ambiguous on this point, insofar as she also argues that the Stranger has ‘carefully 
constructed this artful narrative’ (p.113), but she suggests no positive correspondance of such a careful 
articulation with the object of inquiry. Instead, she argues that they are designed to alienate contemporary 
readers from traditional myths (p.114). 
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Methodologically, this approach is grounded on a specific premise: imagery can 
be analysed as such, and it needs to if we aim to clarify the whole set of meanings that 
Plato embeds in his dialogue, through forms of writing that are not limited to the logical 
procedures of diairesis and argumentation. Mythical imagery is not a preliminary 
account of a more rational truth located somewhere else, e.g. in other dialogues, literal 
accounts, or unwritten doctrines, but it can be shown to possess its own internal and 
contextual reasons, not directly dependent on an external logos.176 As Napolitano 
Valditara (2007) has observed, ‘context, [textually reconstructed] purpose, and internal 
coherence’ constitute the ‘“reasons” of the image’, which determine the linguistic and 
cultural materials to trace and select in order to understand its general history and 
illuminate its specific meaning (pp.X-XI). In our case, the Stranger presents his myth, 
certainly, as a corrective instrument (274e-275c), but also as a figure of the cosmic 
order available to human imitation (274d-e) and thus ethically significant in itself.177 
Regarding its internal structure, the Stranger explicitly highlights its composite nature, 
made of ‘disseminated’ (διεσπαρμένα, 269b7)178 fragments and traditional stories that, 
taken together, illustrate an event or condition (πάθος, 269c1) that ‘will be fitting to the 
demonstration of the king’ (εἰς γὰρ τὴν τοῦ βασιλέως ἀπόδειξιν πρέψει, 269c2). The 
Stranger’s composition of mythical imagery, therefore, certainly has a positive function, 
because it provides an ethical model and it illuminates the nature of statecraft by virtue 
of its ‘fitting’ (prepon), and thus ‘measured’ (metrion), correspondence to it. Mythical 
imagery thus needs to be evaluated rigorously in its own cultural contours and internal 
articulation, in order to show its positive significance. 
 My evaluation will proceed in three steps. First, I will show how the cosmic 
imagery is construed in the myth of the Statesman, identifying its specific features 
within the narrative context of the myth and broader cultural context. Second, I will 
demonstrate that the different images of cosmic balance and divine steering diverge and 
clash, again with reference to their cultural contours. Third, I will argue that its 
cognitive role derives precisely from the interweaving of two clashing, opposite images 
of one and the same figure, which provides a broader understanding of correct guidance 
and autonomous self-control. 
                                                             
176 Contra: Brisson 1998, p.111; Migliori 1996, pp.217-222. 
177 Cf. Lane, 1998, pp.109-110. Carone (2005) also highlight the ethical dimensions of the cosmological 
order, but not in terms of imagery. 
178 Lane (1998) observes that models serve to unify and compare ‘scattered’ (διεσπασμένῳ, 278c5) 
elements, but she wrongly claims that ‘no such careful juxtaposition is made in the construction of the 
story’ (pp.119-120). In truth, the construction of models and of the myth is methodologically the same in 
the Statesman. 
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4.1. Opposite Cosmic Images: Balance and Steering 
As I have anticipated, the myth of the Statesman presents an exceptionally composite 
imagery. Not only does it describe an intricately layered story, where animal and human 
lives are bound to cosmic movements; not only does it merge different kinds of stories 
in a mosaic of human origins, divine actions, and utopian ages; but it also complicates 
the description of such stories with a set of different, and often divergent, metaphors 
and analogies. Kahn (2009) and Pender (2000) have remarked, respectively, that various 
images of cosmic movements and primordial ages, and different images of divine 
actions, converge and often overlap. Pender (2000), in particular, has argued that the 
‘interweaving’ of ‘different metaphors’ within a single myth allows Plato to expand his 
theoretical accounts of divine activity in a nuanced, many-sided way, irreducible to any 
single image (p.118). In order to clarify this intricate combination of images, therefore, I 
will first offer a brief summary of the myth, which will allow us to locate the imagery 
object of this study (balance and steering) in its precise narrative context. 
 The Eleatic Stranger narrates that, in a remote past and in the future, 
extraordinary events happened and will always179 happen to the cosmic order: drawing 
from a traditional story, he claims that the movement of the sun and stars once changed, 
and will always change again, its direction; in the mythical period or counter-
movement, the gods rule over the human race, and people are born out of the earth, as if 
from their graves, grow younger, and then disappear altogether. Differently from the 
traditional myth, the Stranger claims, the apparently extraordinary change of direction 
of stars and planets does not depend on the occasional whim of a god, but on the nature 
of the universe itself: since it is bodily, he argues, it is unable to preserve its own 
movement forever and would eventually stop, if it were not for an external divine cause 
that periodically restores it to life, guiding it in the opposite direction and then letting it 
go again (269d-270a). Similarly, the birth from the earth is not a specific, unnatural 
event that happens in a localised time and space, but it is the universal effect of this 
change in cosmic motion; the age of all living beings visibly180 stops increasing, as they 
grow ‘as it were younger, more tender’ (270d-e). This extraordinary period of cosmic 
                                                             
179 Pol. 273c: ‘always at the time closest to its release (τὸν ἐγγύτατα χρόνον ἀεὶ τῆς ἀφέσεως)’ does the 
cosmos produce many good realities, while as time goes by its internal disharmony increases. Equally, 
animal lives follow and imitate the universe ‘for the eternity of time (τὸν ἀεὶ χρόνον)’ (274d). This is the 
clearest indication that the cosmic cycle recurs eternally, with no teleological optimism in the sense of a 
permanent return of the providential god (contra Brisson, 1995). 
180 Pol. 270d-e. While Plato uses here a language of appearance (idein, 270d), the animals in the Age of 
Cronus nonetheless grow younger both in body and in soul (270e). Their reversed aging is an appearance, 
surely, but coextensive to their psychological state; thus, it is not a mere illusion (contra Rowe, 1995, 
p.190). 
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events is separated from the present one by a series of dramatic catastrophes, an earthly 
correlate of the change of heavenly movement, which erased most memories of the past 
by killing off most of the living beings, and left the present humans only with mythical 
fragments of what originally happened (270c-271c). Finally, in the age of counter-
movement, the gods are in charge of all realities: a sovereign god governs the cosmic 
motion in order to save it from dissolution, while minor gods acts as shepherds of all 
creatures (271d-271e). In this age, everything is therefore more orderly and 
‘benevolent’ than in the present, since nature is bountiful and mild, and all the creatures 
are peaceful and tame (272e-272b). All the opposite features are true in the current 
period: the gods are absent, aging runs from youth to old age, birth does not happen 
spontaneously but through sexual intercourse, nature is harsh, and creatures do not live 
in peaceful terms (274b-c). 
It must be noted that all these extraordinary events are justified in a 
philosophical way, as descending ‘from the same condition’ (ἐκ ταὐτοῦ πάθους, 269b), 
the perennial oscillation of the cosmos. The tremendous reversal of the heavens is 
‘responsible (αἴτιον)’ for changes and destructions (270b); the birth from the earth and 
perplexing reversal of aging in the opposite direction happen ‘following along with 
(συνεπόμενον)’ with such change (270d); the gods’ governance of the particular parts of 
the world is ‘the same (ταὐτὸν)’ as the sovereign god’s rule and care of the cosmos as a 
whole (271d); finally, the autonomy of humans and animals proceeds ‘under the same 
direction (ὑπὸ τῆς ὁμοίας ἀγωγῆς)’ as the cosmic autonomous motion (274a). The 
philosophical bond of all these perplexing events is not simply one of direct causality, 
but one of coherent resemblance: just as the universe turned backwards, so did the ages 
of animals;181 just as the cosmic change of movement is greatest and perplexing, so are 
the changes that happen on earth; just as a god directed the cosmic motion, so did the 
minor gods rule over particular cosmic regions; just as the universe started taking care 
of itself after the change, so did animals and humans. Human lives, like any other event 
in the universe, proceed ‘imitating and following [the cosmos] for all time 
(συμμιμούμενοι καὶ συνεπόμενοι τὸν ἀεὶ χρόνον)’ (274d). The mosaic of different 
themes and images of this myth is therefore constructed by the Stranger through 
                                                             
181 This is the most fundamental reason against Brisson’s, Rowe’s, and Carone’s suggestion of a three-
stage cycle with a final return of the divinity. Animal life imitates the cosmic movement; but if we 
postulate three heavenly movements (backwards/forwards/backwards), and only two kinds of animal life 
(reverse aging/normal aging), the resemblance is necessarily broken. The three-stage interpretation thus 
sacrifices the principle of universal harmony to the ideal of divine governance, in a way that is completely 
alien to Plato’s style and philosophy alike. 
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repeated appeals to a principle of universal similarity.182  What differentiates his myth 
from the traditional stories is a profound unity whereby no event, however perplexing, 
appears as an independent and arbitrary ‘miracle’, but rather as a single thread of a 
carefully intertwined texture of correlate changes, of which it is possible to provide 
coherent and correlate reasons. 
By constructing his narrative texture this way, the Stranger follows a 
fundamental Platonic concern with similarities and differences, entangled at different 
levels. It is impossible simply to isolate a single mythical theme or image, without 
thereby touching the entire texture, and it is therefore necessary to keep an eye on this 
intertwined structure when dealing with any single element. The images of this study 
rest at the broader level of such correlations: the balanced turning and divine steering of 
the universe are depicted as the first and foremost events that determine all the other 
changes in the story. I will then focus my study on them, with attention to this principle 
of profound unity. 
 As I have anticipated, there are two main sets of images that the Stranger 
employs to describe the cosmic movement, and they correspond very strictly to different 
moments of his narration. When he first starts providing reasons for the changes in 
heavenly motions, he relies consistently on images of reversal, circular movement, 
balance, and even motions akin to walking. This set of images is introduced with the 
traditional story of Atreus and Thyestes, whose quarrel was judged by Zeus in favour of 
the former through a miracle: 
The reversal of the setting and rising of the sun and other stars, as they began 
setting in the region from which they now rise, and rising from the opposite 
region; and after having given witness in favour of Atreus the god reversed it to 
its present figure 
                                                             
182 Friedländer (1969b) draws attention to the fact that ‘the myth links the order in the state and in the true 
statesman with the order in the universe’ and he recognises in this link the seriousness of this 
mythological game (p.285); Stefanini (1949) remarks that a strong bond of ‘homology’ unifies cosmos, 
state, and laws (pp.215-220; tr. mine). I argue that this bond is not only a metaphysical principle, but the 
very formal principle that structures Plato’s narration and distinguishes it from the poetical fragments he 
weaves together: there is no arbitrary event, but a chain of correlated events, unified by their similarity. 
This philosophical principle holds even if the events it correlates are completely mythical and hardly 
believable in rationalistic terms. Contra Lane (1998), who emphasises human independence over its ties 
to a given cosmic order (p.110). It is true that independence is the main ethical content of the myth, but 
Lane overlooks the fact that human autonomy is also an imitation of cosmic self-regulation and, qua 
imitation, it always depends on it. 
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τὸ περὶ τῆς μεταβολῆς δύσεώς τε καὶ ἀνατολῆς ἡλίου καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἄστρων, 
ὡς ἄρα ὅθεν μὲν ἀνατέλλει νῦν εἰς τοῦτον τότε τὸν τόπον ἐδύετο, ἀνέτελλε δ᾽ 
ἐκ τοῦ ἐναντίου, τότε δὲ δὴ μαρτυρήσας ἄρα ὁ θεὸς Ἀτρεῖ μετέβαλεν αὐτὸ ἐπὶ 
τὸ νῦν σχῆμα)’ (269a, tr. Rowe, adapted). 
This mythological fragment is chosen by the Stranger specifically for its depiction of a 
polar reversal (metabolē). The terms metabolē and metaballein can be used to express a 
simple change, but they more often denote, in Plato, a radical overturning of an existing 
order into its polar opposite. Plato uses this acceptation very frequently in crucial 
passages of his dialogues. In the Philebus (43b), for instance, Socrates calls the bodily 
movements of fillings and depletions, which cause us pleasures and pains, ‘upwards and 
downwards reversals (μεταβολαὶ κάτω τε καὶ ἄνω)’, hence our term ‘metabolism’. In 
the Gorgias (481d7-e1), again, Socrates describes Callicles as ever ‘reversing up and 
down (ἄνω καὶ κάτω μεταβαλλομένου)’ his speeches, in a continuous overturning of his 
publicly displayed opinions to please the Athenian people. Similarly, in the Parmenides 
(162c), the metaphysical hypothesis of the One undergoes a ‘reversal from being to not-
being (μεταβολὴν ἐκ τοῦ εἶναι ἐπὶ τὸ μὴ εἶναι)’; one final example is found in the 
Republic (563e-564a): Socrates claims that, since ‘anything that is done in excess tends 
to bring about, in turn, a great change in the opposite direction (τῷ ὄντι τὸ ἄγαν τι ποιεῖν 
μεγάλην φιλεῖ εἰς τοὐναντίον μεταβολὴν ἀνταποδιδόναι)’, then likely ‘excessive 
freedom is overturned into excessive servitude (ἄγαν ἐλευθερία ἔοικεν οὐκ εἰς ἄλλο τι ἢ 
εἰς ἄγαν δουλείαν μεταβάλλειν); and he argues (565d) that this is entailed by the 
‘turning of a protector [of freedom] into a tyrant (μεταβολῆς ἐκ προστάτου ἐπὶ 
τύραννον)’. In these contexts, a radical change from pleasure to pain, from up to down, 
from existence to inexistence, from freedom to servitude, and from protection to 
tyranny, qualifies metabolē as a movement (physical or metaphorical) between polar 
opposites, more than as a simple change among nuanced possibilities. In the Statesman, 
the Stranger’s choice of a myth of polar exchange (between rising and setting) 
constitutes a vivid image of such overturning. A fragment of traditional mythology, in 
his hands, becomes an independent figure of radical reversal. 
 His appropriation of this fragment, though, is not limited to the establishment of 
a polar contrast, but is widened to a broader figure of circular motions: 
Listen then. This universe the god himself sometimes accompanies, leading it 
on its march and moving together with it in a circle, while at other times he lets 
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it go, when its circuits have completed the measure of the time allotted to it, 
and of its own accord it turns backwards, in the opposite direction. 
ἀκούοις ἄν. τὸ γὰρ πᾶν τόδε τοτὲ μὲν αὐτὸς ὁ θεὸς συμποδηγεῖ πορευόμενον 
καὶ συγκυκλεῖ, τοτὲ δὲ ἀνῆκεν, ὅταν αἱ περίοδοι τοῦ προσήκοντος αὐτῷ 
μέτρον εἰλήφωσιν ἤδη χρόνου, τὸ δὲ πάλιν αὐτόματον εἰς τἀναντία περιάγεται 
(269c, tr. Rowe, adapted). 
‘Listen, then’, the Stranger begins: with this formulaic appeal to an audience, he 
remarks that he is now building his own story, expanding the image of cosmic 
overturning. His wider image is first of all one of two opposed circular movements: the 
unnamed sovereign god, who takes the place of Zeus in the story of Atreus, periodically 
‘moves together [with the universe] in a circle (συγκυκλεῖ)’, while in other ‘rotations 
(περίοδοι)’ the universe ‘turns (περιάγεται)’ on its own.183 The polarity of rising-setting 
of the stars, here, is expanded into an opposition of two circles, which move ‘in the 
opposite direction (εἰς τἀναντία)’ and ‘backwards (πάλιν) in relation to one another. The 
Stranger thus creates a very complex image where the circularity of heavenly motions is 
not only a temporal cycle in its own right (a ‘period’, peri-hodos, literally a round-about 
path), but is also part of a polar cycle of two opposite, yet otherwise indistinguishable, 
rotations. The association of the metabolē of the original myth with the mutual turning 
backwards of two circles is not banal: what in the story of Atreus was just an 
(occasional) opposition is here subsumed within one and the same figure, the circle. The 
Stranger had implicitly anticipated such an image when he said: ‘after having given 
witness in favour of Atreus the god reversed it [the course of stars and sun] to its present 
figure (σχῆμα)’ (269a); here he tells us what this figure is, enabling us to see (if we had 
not already imagined it) the common element behind an apparent contrast. 
 We can also notice that the movement of turning (periagein) backwards in the 
opposite direction is one of Plato’s most significant images, not only in the 
cosmological context but also in relation to the activity of knowledge. At Leg. 898d the 
Athenian Stranger claims that a single ‘soul carries around everything (‘ψυχὴ περιάγει 
                                                             
183 The Stranger later (269e-270c) insists on this image, speaking again of ‘reversal (μεταβολῆς)’ but also 
of ‘recurrence (ἀνακύκλησιν)’ and ‘alternation (παράλλαξιν)’, describing the cosmos as it ‘revolves 
(κυκλεῖται)’, and using astronomical language associated with circularity such as, again, ‘rotations 
(περιόδων)’, ‘opposite [heavenly] motion (τἀναντία φορὰν)’ and ‘turnings (τροπῶν; τροπήν)’. Even the 
more neutral term phora (motion, impulse, etymologically associated with the act of bearing, pherein) 
refers, in Plato’s corpus, eminently to stars and planets being ‘carried around’ by the heavens or by the 
cosmic soul (e.g. Crat. 421b; Gorg. 451c; Symp. 188b; Resp. 617b; Tim. 39b; Leg. 897c); in particular, it 
is distinguished from generic motion, kinesis, at Crat. 434c and Theaet. 152d, and used for the ‘spinnings 
of a turned globe (σφαίρας ἐντόρνου […] φοραῖς)’, image of the intellect, at Leg.898b. 
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πάντα’)’ in the heavens, with the very same movement Timaeus attributes to it at Tim. 
34a and 36c (‘περιαγαγὼν’, ‘περιαγομένῃ’). At Phaedr. 247c1, ‘the revolution [of the 
heavens] carries around (περιάγει ἡ περιφορά)’ those philosophical souls that reached 
the top of the universe and managed to behold the Forms outside of it. Finally, in the 
image of the cave, Socrates famously describes a prisoner being ‘freed from his chains 
and forced to suddenly stand up and turn his neck around (περιάγειν τὸν αὐχένα) and 
walk and look up towards the light’ (Resp. 515c), while other prisoners are ‘prevented 
by the chains from turning their heads around in circle (κύκλῳ δὲ τὰς κεφαλὰς ὑπὸ τοῦ 
δεσμοῦ ἀδυνάτους περιάγειν)’ (514c) and can only stare at shadows. In the Timaeus and 
the Laws, the movement of circular periagein belongs to intellect in its utmost 
perfection, the very principle that animates the whole universe at all its levels (but most 
effectively in the heavens); in the Phaedrus, the cosmic movement also allows inferior 
souls to partake of it, and rely on it in order to contemplate the ideal Forms of all reality; 
differently, in the Republic the image is purely human, as the turning of the neck, head, 
and eyes away from the darkness of delusion to the light of truer knowledge. Periagein 
can thus have two divergent implications: a circular perfection of an unchanging 
movement, or the radical polarity of a movement that turns from one condition to its 
opposite. Uniquely, the myth of the Statesman combines both elements: on the one 
hand, the perfection of the heavenly movement, and on the other the potential 
opposition of ‘turning around’ from divine guidance to self-directed motion. Just like in 
the Timaeus and the Laws, the universe is ‘a living creature (ζῷον) […] having had 
wisdom (φρόνησιν) assigned to it by the one who fitted it together in the beginning’ 
(269c-d), a life and intellect of its own, which allow it to preserve its own circular 
movement; but differently from those dialogues, here it is also subject to the most 
radical of all possible changes. The Statesman is therefore a unique case in Plato’s 
images of cosmic movements,184 because it deploys the ambivalent figure of circular 
motion in order to express both divine order and radical overturning. 
The ambivalence of this image has led some scholars to imagine a radical 
opposition between two forms of cosmic life, either as a positive feature or as a negative 
one to be explained away. So Lane (1998) reads the opposition between the two cycles 
as a ‘temporal and cosmic gulf’ between ‘possible and actual’ worlds (pp.115-16), 
between the apolitical Utopia of Cronus and our political present; she thus evaluates the 
                                                             
184 E.g. Phil. 28c-31b; Tim. 48a; Leg. 966d-967e (cf. Carone 2005, p.240, n.4). 
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element of opposition as a positive ‘turn’ towards full autonomy in the universe.185 
Differently, Brisson (1995), Rowe (1995), and Carone (2005) read it as an erroneous, 
non-Platonic opposition between the benevolent will of god and the potential chaos of a 
life not directed by the divine principle;186 hence their suggestion of a more correct 
three-stage interpretation, according to which the cosmic god ultimately regains 
definitive control. But there is no need to alter the textual reading because of this 
opposition, as if it entailed a radical separation between two completely opposite 
alternatives; rather, an attentive textual analysis of imagery shows that the element of 
opposition is intentionally subsumed by the Stranger under the single figure (schema) of 
circularity, with its twofold symbolism of unchanging perfection and most radical 
change. As the Stranger himself says, this image of an opposition between two equal 
movements represents at the same time ‘the smallest possible variation of [the cosmic] 
movement’ (269e), because the overall figure does not change, and ‘the greatest and the 
most perfect turning of all’ (270b-c), because the opposition of direction is the most 
radical that is possible to imagine. The text itself points out an ambivalence of 
perspective within one and the same figure. Ambivalence is built into this image, 
because it is possible to consider it from two alternative points of view. In order to see 
the complete figure (schema), then, it is necessary not to discard either of them, but to 
see them both in their profound unity: the identical structure and opposite enactment of 
divine guidance and cosmic autonomy. 
A third set of images expresses the unity of the two movements in a single 
schema: the cosmic movement as a kind of ‘travelling’ made possible by its perfect 
balance. The Stranger’s universe is alive, and its movement is consistently represented 
not as a mere mechanical event, but also as a kind of intentional or conscious action: 
at times it is helped by the guidance of another, divine, cause, acquiring life 
once more and receiving a restored immortality from its craftsman, while at 
other times, when it is let go, it proceeds on its own along itself,  187  having 
                                                             
185 A similarly Utopian reading is maintained, albeit with some minor differences, by Kahn (2009) and 
Morgan (2000), p.255. 
186 Carone, 2005, p.126; Brisson, 1995, pp.349-352; Rowe, 1995, pp.11-13. These scholars read the 
withdrawal of the god and the opposite directions of divine and cosmic circular movements as 
representing the absence of rational providence. I argue, instead, that they represent two opposite modes 
of enacting one and the same figure of rationality enacted in two different and opposite ways. 
187 The Greek ‘δι᾽ ἑαυτοῦ αὐτὸν ἰέναι’ is translated by Rowe as ‘it goes on its own way under its own 
power’. Like in Rowe’s translation ‘δι᾽ ἑαυτοῦ (on its own way), expresses the idea of moving ‘through’ 
a space or ‘along’ a direction; I choose the translation ‘along itself’ better to express the idea that, once 
left free, the universe follows a path determined by its own spherical body. ‘Through itself’ would have 
been, perhaps, a translation of greater philosophical (and scientific) significance, since it expresses the 
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been let loose at such a right moment, as to travel backwards for many myriads 
of revolutions because, greatest and most perfectly balanced as it is, it proceeds 
walking on the smallest foot. 
τοτὲ μὲν ὑπ᾽ ἄλλης συμποδηγεῖσθαι θείας αἰτίας, τὸ ζῆν πάλιν ἐπικτώμενον καὶ 
λαμβάνοντα ἀθανασίαν ἐπισκευαστὴν παρὰ τοῦ δημιουργοῦ, τοτὲ δ᾽ ὅταν 
ἀνεθῇ, δι᾽ ἑαυτοῦ αὐτὸν ἰέναι, κατὰ καιρὸν ἀφεθέντα τοιοῦτον, ὥστε ἀνάπαλιν 
πορεύεσθαι πολλὰς περιόδων μυριάδας διὰ δὴ τὸ μέγιστον ὂν καὶ 
ἰσορροπώτατον ἐπὶ μικροτάτου βαῖνον ποδὸς ἰέναι (270a, tr. Rowe, adapted). 
Consistently with the former passage, here the Stranger describes a cosmos imbued with 
life (ζῆν) and even immortality (ἀθανασίαν), and narrates its movement accordingly: the 
universe is accompanied in its walk (συμποδηγεῖσθαι)188 by a god, just as earlier the god 
was shown ‘leading [the universe] as it travels (συμποδηγεῖ πορευόμενον)’ (269c). The 
god thus behaves like a shepherd, who is guiding along a very particular animal. We can 
thus see a similarity between (on the one hand) god and cosmos, and (on the other) 
shepherd and herd; indeed, the former representation of the statesman as a shepherd was 
ridiculed by the Stranger, for the absurdity of a tame animal pretending to guide similar 
animals, with similar words: 
the king looks even more ridiculous, when he runs along with his herd and walks 
together with the man who, for his part, is best trained for the easy-going life. 
ἔτι γελοιότερος ὁ βασιλεὺς φαίνεται μετὰ τῆς ἀγέλης συνδιαθέων καὶ σύνδρομα 
πεπορευμένος τῷ τῶν ἀνδρῶν αὖ πρὸς τὸν εὐχερῆ βίον ἄριστα γεγυμνασμένῳ 
(266c, tr. Rowe, adapted). 
The shepherd, or the shepherd-like king, walks alongside his animals just like the god in 
the myth accompanies the universe in its walk. Both the shepherd and the god are 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
puzzling idea that the whole universe, outside of which nothing physical exists, materially moves through 
its own space and coincides perfectly with it; but perhaps it would credit this myth with a theoretical 
complexity that we only find, fully developed, in the Timaeus (31a-b) and in Aristotle’s Physics Δ and θ. 
Based on my research, the earliest instance of this notion appears in Heraclitus, fr.41 = D.L.9.1: ‘One 
thing is wisdom, to understand intelligence, by which all things are steered through [or: along] all things 
(ἓν τὸ σοφόν, ἐπίστασθαι γνώμην, ὁτέη ἐκυβέρνησε πάντα διὰ πάντων)’. 
188 The term sumpodegeisthai is rare; my research identified only one other occurrence in Sophocles, 
Ichneutae, fr.314 v.169: ‘Father, walk beside me, so you’ll know whether I’m really a coward (πάτερ, 
παρὼν αὐτός με συμποδηγέτε[ι, ἵν᾽ εὖ κατείδῃς εἴ τίς ἐστι δειλία)’. This is the cry of a chorus of satyrs, 
scared by the unfamiliar sound of the newly invented lyre, appealing for the god Silenus to guide them. 
The god then offers to ‘approach (προσβιβῶ)’ the sound and ‘walk (βάσιν)’ with them. Given the pastoral 
setting (a hunt for Hermes who stole Apollo’s cattle) whereby the satyrs are treated like Silenus’s hounds, 
the term describes the behaviour of a shepherd or a hunter walking alongside his animals. Notice also the 
association with the idea that being guided by a wiser leader is beneficial in the face of distressing 
changes in the subject’s familiar experience of the world. 
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described through verbs of physical living movements (diathein, dromein, podegein), 
and as sharing them (sun-) with the creatures they take care of; in this way, in the myth, 
the Stranger reinforces the idea of a shared figure (schema) of movement for guide and 
guided. There is no insistence on other possible traits of a shepherd or an animal, in the 
description of the god and the cosmos: the focus is exclusively on motion, but as a 
living one. 
 It does not come as a surprise, then, that when the universe ‘is let go (ἀνεθῇ)’ 
and ‘let loose (ἀφεθέντα)’ it moves like a living being: it ‘travels backwards (ἀνάπαλιν 
πορεύεσθαι)’ with its own, particular movement of ‘rotations (περιόδων)’, ‘walking on 
the smallest foot (ἐπὶ μικροτάτου βαῖνον ποδὸς)’. The whole scene of cosmic 
movement, either guided or autonomous, is described through terms of animal-like 
motion, to the extent that the universe has a very small ‘foot’. While it might be 
possible to take all of these terms figuratively, as simply pointing to mechanical motion 
around a geometrical basis,189 the context of living activity is clear and should not be 
obscured; in this image, the universe walks in a circular motion for a time, guided and 
accompanied by a shepherd-like god, and when the time is opportune (kata kairon) it 
manages to move itself on its own accord, standing autonomously on its own foot.190 
This is a curious but consistent image of a cosmic ‘foot’, on which the universe travels 
(poreuesthai), when the god stops sumpodegein, walking along it as if on feet. Only on 
its foot does the universe find, as a condition of its very movement and life, its own 
perfect balance, in a strong contrast between its huge size and the minuscule point of 
balance itself. 
This first narration of the cosmic movement requires a strong effort of 
imagination, due to the multifaceted nature of the images employed: first of all, a polar 
contrast of rising and setting of stars and planets; then, two contrasting ways for the 
universe to move along one identical pattern; finally, the image of a living cosmos 
accompanied by a god or walking on its own, in an effort to find autonomous living 
                                                             
189 Notice that Plato could have expressed the geometrical notion of ‘basis’ without resorting to more 
metaphorical terms: at Tim. 55b, he describes the icosahedron as ‘having twenty equilateral triangular 
bases (εἴκοσι βάσεις ἔχον ἰσοπλεύρους τριγώνους γέγονεν)’. When it refers to a part of a physical body, 
the term basis generically denotes a stable (bebaios) position on which the body stands or steps, with 
more focus on stability and fixedness than on movement (cf. Crat. 437a; but the meaning is more nuanced 
at Resp. 399e and Leg. 670d). 
190 The terminology of a foot belonging to the cosmic ‘animal’ is also consistent with the puzzling 
categorization, in the former divisions, of human beings based on the number of their feet (266b-e): here, 
the dialogue is also prompting us to imagine the physical constitution of living beings as a possible way 
to understand what they are. The identification of humanity in respect to other forms of life is reached 
through a process of comparison, first with the animal realm, then with the living cosmos. 
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balance on its own foot. All these images share a physical language, thereby framing the 
description as a quasi-scientific account of purely physical movements that succeed one 
another, based on physical reasons. However, the language of ‘walking’ also introduces 
an aspect of organic life, picturing the physical movements of the universe and of the 
directing divinity as some sort of conscious and intentional action. We cannot obliterate 
this difference: the physical, bodily movement is also a living, organic one, and not 
merely that of a cosmic machinery, periodically ‘recharged’ by an external agent. 
Nonetheless, the mechanistic and organic images are consistent in focusing on the 
purely physical reasons of the movements; there is no mention, yet, of the guiding god 
as a providential and benevolent agent, whose action saves the universe from losing its 
life by losing the regularity of its movement. At this stage of the narration, rather, the 
Stranger simply offers to Young Socrates a physical description of the cosmic changes, 
as the reason behind the myth of Atreus and Thyestes; the whole process of cosmic 
turning and counter-turning is fully described, but the narration is by no means 
complete. 
 After this physical description, the Stranger abandons for a while the great 
cosmic narration, and focuses on the earthly (physical and political) events that the 
change entails. He describes the two dramatic events caused by the reversal of circular 
motion: the destruction of many animals, including most of humankind (270c-d), and 
the reversal of their ageing. This time is also, the Stranger further claims, the mythical 
Age of Cronus, when divine beings directed all life and movement, no political 
constitutions existed, and life was easy and peaceful (271e-272a). The Stranger, in 
addition, asks Young Socrates for a judgment on the happiness of the two ways of life 
under Cronus and in the present, and argues that happiness depends on the practice of 
philosophical dialogue, not on the inherent physical conditions just described (272b-d). 
Here the focus, then, is earthly life, and human/political life in particular. This focus is 
indeed crucial for the political dialogue, but the Stranger dismisses the question of 
happiness in political or apolitical contexts as impossible for him to answer, and moves 
back to the cosmic imagery. 
 The shift of perspective is explicit and abrupt: 
We must now state the point of our rousing our myth into action, in order to 
move forward and bring what follows to its end. When the time of all these 
things had been completed and the hour for change had come, and in particular 
all the earth-born race had been used up, each soul having rendered its sum of 
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births, falling to the earth as seed as many times as had been laid down for 
each, at that point the pilot of the universe, after letting go, as it were, of the 
bar of the helm, retired to his observation-post, and as for the cosmos, its 
allotted and innate desire turned it back again in the opposite direction. 
οὗ δ᾽ ἕνεκα τὸν μῦθον ἠγείραμεν, τοῦτο λεκτέον, ἵνα τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο εἰς τὸ 
πρόσθεν περαίνωμεν. ἐπειδὴ γὰρ πάντων τούτων χρόνος ἐτελεώθη καὶ 
μεταβολὴν ἔδει γίγνεσθαι καὶ δὴ καὶ τὸ γήινον ἤδη πᾶν ἀνήλωτο γένος, πάσας 
ἑκάστης τῆς ψυχῆς τὰς γενέσεις ἀποδεδωκυίας, ὅσα ἦν ἑκάστῃ προσταχθὲν 
τοσαῦτα εἰς γῆν σπέρματα πεσούσης, τότε δὴ τοῦ παντὸς ὁ μὲν κυβερνήτης, 
οἷον πηδαλίων οἴακος ἀφέμενος, εἰς τὴν αὑτοῦ περιωπὴν ἀπέστη, τὸν δὲ δὴ 
κόσμον πάλιν ἀνέστρεφεν εἱμαρμένη τε καὶ σύμφυτος ἐπιθυμία (272d-e, tr. 
Rowe, adapted). 
In the former narrative shift, the perspective moved from the heavenly changes to the 
earthly effects of which they were the cause; now it moves back to the counter-
movement of the universe, when the time of earthly events is mature. Once again, 
heavenly and earthly events are represented in mutual correlation: broader cosmic 
reversals cause dramatic effects on earth, and the completion of the earthly cycle of 
counter-aging is the necessary condition for the beginning of a new cosmic cycle. The 
story of the Stranger is not linear, but moves according to different shifts of focus, 
between the macro-cosmos and earth, moving away from the broader perspective only 
to return again to it. 
In this second account of universal circular motion, we find a sudden 
introduction of unexpected nautical imagery. This is surprising, because the pastoral 
myth of Cronus was initially introduced to correct the model of the shepherd, by 
showing in which ways it is inadequate to political activity; but the myth exceeds this 
narrow limit when it is used to locate human life within a broader cosmic context. Yet 
the Stranger considers this context, too, as a reason for ‘rousing our myth into action’, 
i.e. an element that is significant for the overall meaning of the myth. Paying attention 
to the shift in imagery, then, means evaluating the whole set of meanings at work in the 
story. Here, the cosmic god, formerly described as a craftsman who walked together 
with the living cosmos, is imagined as a ship’s pilot (kubernētēs) who at the right time 
lets go of the bar of the cosmic helm, thus leaving the cosmos free to turn back, 
following its own innate and destined desire (epithumia). 
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Once again, the image is composite: despite being portrayed as guided in a 
mechanical way, just like a helm, the universe is nonetheless alive, and it is desire that 
moves it once it is let go, not just a physical tension. We find at the same time (a) a 
traditional representation of cosmic guidance as the action of a divine pilot, and (b) a 
convergence of terms about emotional states with mechanical images of steering. As 
Pender (2000, p.98) observes, ‘in the early Greek literary tradition Zeus is represented 
as a helmsman’: for instance, Pindar describes Zeus as steering the fate of his dear ones 
(Pythian 5, vv.122-3), and an unnamed god as the desirable helmsman who could direct 
political leaders (Pythian 4, v.274). But only in Pre-Socratic philosophy the divine 
direction of events becomes a matter of universal order: Heraclitus (frs.41 and 64), 
Parmenides (fr.12), and Diogenes of Apollonia (fr.5) all use the image of the helmsman 
for the divine direction of everything (pan). To Heraclitus, intelligence ‘steers all things 
(ἐκυβέρνησε πάντα)’ in the universe, and so does the divine thunderbolt (‘τὰ δὲ πάντα 
οἰακίζει κεραθνός’); to Parmenides, it is a goddess who steers everything (‘δαίμον ἣ 
πάντα κυβερνᾶι’); and so does, to Diogenes, the intelligent principle of air (‘καὶ μοι 
δοκει [...] ὁ άήρ [...] ὑπο τούτου πάντας καὶ κυβερνᾶσθαι καὶ πάντων κρατεῖν’).191 
While this image (a) is generally used to emphasize the supreme governance of 
‘individuals in a position of sole direction’ (Brock 2013, p.55), and thus fits perfectly 
the idea of a sovereign cosmic god, it becomes more nuanced when it is related to the 
emotional states of human individuals. The convergence of psychological terms and 
nautical imagery (b) was also very frequent in Greek poetry and myth, but not 
associated as such to the universe: as Pender (2000, pp.98-99) observes, in Sophocles’s 
Ajax Odysseus professes to Athena: ‘sometimes I am struck out of my senses 
[ἐκπέπληγμαι] […] But you arrive right in time [καιρὸν δ᾽ ἐφήκεις], for in all matters, 
both past and future ones, I am steered by your hand [σῇ κυβερνῶμαι χερί]’ (vv.33-35). 
Odysseus thus opposes his own condition of confusion to the divine direction of a 
goddess, who knows when it is opportune to intervene and guide him. In the same vein, 
in Aeschylus’s Agamemnon, the chorus describes the eponymous, unwise king as ‘not 
rightly guiding the helm of [his] mind [οὐδ᾽ εὖ πραπίδων οἴακα νέμων]’ (v.802). Here 
the nautical image of the helm consists of the same association of a mechanical act to a 
psychological state, but it is used to symbolise (absent) self-control, not the external 
control of a god. Euripides also uses the image of the helm in a dialogue between the 
frenzied king Orestes and his closest friend Pylades: ‘I will take care of you [κηδεύσω 
                                                             
191 Pender, 2000, pp.98-100. 
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σ᾽ ἐγώ]’, Pylades promises when Orestes laments his own ‘frantic rage [οἴστρῳ]’, so the 
king finally accepts his support and calls him ‘helm of my course [οἴαξ ποδός μοι]’ 
(Orestes, vv.790-795). The nautical image is, again, one of external, more lucid 
direction of a frenzied mind. Plato himself, in the Critias,192 represents the gods as 
directing, with benevolence, the minds of ancient humans: 
[The gods] would not make physical violence to the bodies, just as shepherds 
who lead their herds with blows, but they rather steered the course of the 
animal from the stern, where it is best turned-about, and they laid hold of its 
soul by persuasion according to their own thought, thus piloting every mortal 
creature. 
οὐ σώμασι σώματα βιαζόμενοι, καθάπερ ποιμένες κτήνη πληγῇ νέμοντες, ἀλλ᾽ 
ᾗ μάλιστα εὔστροφον ζῷον, ἐκ πρύμνης ἀπευθύνοντες, οἷον οἴακι πειθοῖ ψυχῆς 
ἐφαπτόμενοι κατὰ τὴν αὐτῶν διάνοιαν, οὕτως ἄγοντες τὸ θνητὸν πᾶν 
ἐκυβέρνων (109b-c, tr. Rowe, adapted). 
In all these examples, the act of divine or human guidance of a soul is represented as a 
benevolent, and better advised, steering of a helm to the best advantage of the guided 
subjects. Brock points out that ‘although the basic notion of the helmsman would seem 
to be one of control, […] this is usually linked to notions of superior skill or wisdom’ 
(2013, p.56); we can observe, similarly, that in these examples it is the possession of a 
mind unhindered by confusion or irrational drives that makes the guidance of the ‘pilot 
of the soul’ valuable to, and desired by, the guided person. But there is more: as Plato 
explicitly argues, this direction is not only one of skill, but also one of benevolence; 
Athena with her protégé Odysseus, Pylades with his best friend Orestes, and the gods 
with a race of mortals that deserve the privilege of persuasion (peithō) instead of brute 
force (bia), represent cases in which the image of the helm is one of smooth, 
unhindered, and not forceful guidance. The helm does not resist the hand of the skilled 
pilot, just as the acceptance of a benevolent persuasion does not hinder the act of 
guidance, and the benevolent act itself restrains from harsh measures. When associated 
with emotional states, the image of a smooth, skilful, and benevolent guidance stands in 
opposition to the harshness of both irrational psychological states and violent 
behaviours. 
                                                             
192 Cf. Pender 2000, p.121. 
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 The combination of nautical images and emotional states in the Statesman, then, 
is not surprising. The original element is the attribution of emotional states to the 
universe itself, so that divine guidance cannot be taken for granted (as in the Pre-
Socratics). The opposition of the two circular movements of the universe is represented 
as a contrast between the skilful art of a pilot and the autonomous drives of a living 
being, in perfect continuity with poetical images of human beings. The sudden lack of 
an external direction, and the contrast with an opposite one, indeed trigger at first harsh 
consequences:  
as it turned upside-down and clashed with itself, urged on by the contrary 
impulse both of the beginning and of the end, it produced a great tremor in 
itself, which in turn brought about another destruction of all sorts of animals. 
ὁ δὲ μεταστρεφόμενος καὶ συμβάλλων, ἀρχῆς τε καὶ τελευτῆς ἐναντίαν ὁρμὴν 
ὁρμηθείς, σεισμὸν πολὺν ἐν ἑαυτῷ ποιῶν ἄλλην αὖ φθορὰν ζῴων παντοίων 
ἀπηργάσατο (273a, tr. Rowe, adapted). 
The former anastrephein, turning backwards, of the universe, here becomes a dramatic 
metastrephein, a turning upside-down which ensues terrible quakes and deaths; and the 
metaballein, reversing, of the myth of Atreus now becomes a sumballein, a clashing 
together of opposite physical impulses. Control leaves way to violence. Only after the 
shock for the sudden lack of guidance, and for the impulses that clash in opposite 
directions, does the universe find rest again, as when it was piloted by the god: 
After this, when an adequate time had elapsed, it began to cease from tumults 
and confusion and attained calm from its tremors, and set itself in order, into 
the accustomed course that belongs to it, itself taking charge and control of the 
things within it and itself, because it remembered so far as it could the teaching 
of its craftsman and father. 
μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα προελθόντος ἱκανοῦ χρόνου, θορύβων τε καὶ ταραχῆς ἤδη 
παυόμενος καὶ τῶν σεισμῶν γαλήνης ἐπιλαβόμενος εἴς τε τὸν εἰωθότα δρόμον 
τὸν ἑαυτοῦ κατακοσμούμενος ᾔει, ἐπιμέλειαν καὶ κράτος ἔχων αὐτὸς τῶν ἐν 
αὑτῷ τε καὶ ἑαυτοῦ, τὴν τοῦ δημιουργοῦ καὶ πατρὸς ἀπομνημονεύων διδαχὴν 
εἰς δύναμιν (273a-b, tr. Rowe, adapted). 
It takes time, the Stranger narrates, for the universe to resume the same orderly course 
(dromon) as when it was piloted by the god; but it is nonetheless possible: tremendous 
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disorders do ensue from the contrast of directed and autonomous guidance, but they are 
not permanent. Just as the god had let go of the universe at the right moment (kairos), 
now the universe can find the accustomed course after an adequate time (hikanos 
chronos), remembering as best as it can what it was like. Again, the nautical imagery 
overlaps with anthropomorphic terms, since the universe is a living creature endowed 
with impulses (hormeis), and capable of responsible care (epimeleia), control (kratos), 
and memory (mnēmē). When the time is mature, the harsh effects brought about by the 
cosmic desire fade away, and a new smooth order takes place, not through the external 
command of the pilot, but through the ability of the universe to take charge and control 
over itself, and to remember its former condition. The opposition of rational control and 
violent impulses, traditionally expressed through the opposition of nautical direction 
and frenzied confusion, finds here a middle ground in self-control through adequate 
remembering. 
 The nautical imagery becomes prominent again when the Stranger goes back to 
the god’s benevolent intervention to safeguard the life of the cosmos. In the absence of 
the helmsman, cosmic forgetfulness (lēthē) increases, and disharmony (anarmostias) 
gains control again, verging on utmost destruction (273c). It is in this context that 
nautical images resurface: 
It is for this reason that now the god who ordered it, seeing it at loss in dire 
straits, and concerned that it should not, storm-tossed as it is, be broken apart in 
confusion and sink into the boundless sea of dissimilarity, takes his position 
again at its steering-oars, and having turned around what had become diseased 
and been broken apart in the previous rotation, when it was left to itself, orders 
it and by setting it straight renders it immortal and ageless. 
διὸ δὴ καὶ τότ᾽ ἤδη θεὸς ὁ κοσμήσας αὐτόν, καθορῶν ἐν ἀπορίαις ὄντα, 
κηδόμενος ἵνα μὴ χειμασθεὶς ὑπὸ ταραχῆς διαλυθεὶς εἰς τὸν τῆς ἀνομοιότητος 
ἄπειρον ὄντα πόντον δύῃ, πάλιν ἔφεδρος αὐτοῦ τῶν πηδαλίων γιγνόμενος, τὰ 
νοσήσαντα καὶ λυθέντα ἐν τῇ καθ᾽ ἑαυτὸν προτέρᾳ περιόδῳ στρέψας, κοσμεῖ 
τε καὶ ἐπανορθῶν ἀθάνατον αὐτὸν καὶ ἀγήρων ἀπεργάζεται (273c-e, tr. Rowe, 
adapted). 
The cosmic god is here pictured again as steering the cosmic helm, and the possible 
destruction of the whole universe appears in the guise of an unbounded sea, in which 
the storm-tossed cosmos can get lost. The divine intervention, then, aims to restore its 
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round-about path (periodos), as the god turns the universe itself like a helm, and 
prevents it from getting lost in dire straits (en aporiais),193 i.e. in the absence of any 
possible direction of travel (poreia), ultimately sinking and being destroyed. The focus 
is here not on the conditions of possibility of the cosmic movement, but on those of its 
impossibility: forgetfulness of what the original motion was like would not only restore 
the former confused condition, but also dramatically destroy any homogeneity in the 
cosmic movement itself. The real danger is not a clash between two opposite directions, 
but an utmost lack of direction, aptly imagined as a sea with no limits. The purpose of 
the nautical imagery, then, is threefold: 
(a) expressing the presence of a skilful and benevolent controller; 
(b) recalling the cosmic circularity akin to the turning of a helm; 
(c) visualizing an absolute lack of direction (aporia). 
In the sea-storm and unbound maritime expanse we do not see, simply, the opposition 
between a wise and good direction and contrasting, confused impulses, as in traditional 
poetry; we see the more troubling image of impulses which go in no direction, which 
are unable to maintain a consistent course, and are at loss within a wholly confusing 
space with no way out. The divine, benevolent, providential intervention is not 
represented as an antidote to simple confusion, but to outright loss and destruction. 
 Here, then, the focus of the narration shifts, as the Stranger radically changes the 
imagery chosen to represent cosmic movement. While, through the image of circularity, 
we saw an opposition of motions subsumed under a single figure (schema), in the 
nautical imagery we see both the contrast of a benevolent direction to autonomous 
impulses, and the dramatic possibility of utmost loss of direction. The images of 
circularity, although anthropomorphised, were physical, and made no reference to the 
dangers of the loss of such motion, or to the providential nature of the external divine 
guidance. Their focus was the unity of two opposed movements, together with the 
condition of possibility of autonomous cosmic rotation (balance). The nautical images, 
instead, are used to describe the role of the divine guide, in contrast with the desire for 
autonomous motion, and the dangerous events that would ensue from such autonomy, 
                                                             
193 I diverge here in particular from Rowe’s (1995a) translation (‘in difficulties’), insofar as the clear 
representation of a ship-like universe lost at sea demands a consistent translation of the term aporia. A-
poria is not simply a generic condition of difficulty, but a real lack of possible ways of travelling 
(poreiai) or passages (poroi); it is the specific kind of difficulty a traveller would face when movement in 
any direction is impossible, like a physical ‘strait’; it is what periodically hinders the cosmos from being 
independent master (autokratora) of its own course (tēs hautou poreias, 274a). Cf. Theaet. 174c; 
Xenophon, Anabasis, 5.6.10. 
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were it not for the benevolent return of the guide. Here, the presence of a divine guide is 
not justified simply by the argued impossibility for a material object to move itself 
forever; it is justified also as an action of intentional care towards a living being in 
danger. Only when the universe is in danger does the helmsman intervene; otherwise he 
lets it go at the right moment. Even the single shared feature of the two images, the life 
of the universe, diverges: first, it depicts the god as walking side by side to the cosmos, 
and then as physically controlling it. Overall, the two images have two divergent 
reasons within a single narration: on the one hand, to represent the conditions under 
which the universe is able to preserve the same figure of motion; on the other hand, to 
represent the benevolent intervention of an external guiding force, which grants the 
conservation of such motion. 
 In this section, I have simply described the two images in their own right; but 
their divergence demands explanation. The myth, as such, does not provide explicit 
reasons for it, even if it makes clear that the two images belong to somewhat different 
sub-narratives. The explanation is made all the more necessary because the myth itself 
sets the universal motion as a model for human imitation (‘[humans] had to live their 
lives through their own resources and take care for themselves, just like the cosmos as a 
whole, which we imitate and follow for all time’, 274d), and as a tool to understand 
statecraft itself. In the next two sections, therefore, I will analyse the relation between 
the two divergent images of balanced circular movement and nautical guidance, 
showing what their presence in a unified narration means for the philosophical stance of 
the Statesman. 
 
4.2. Clashing Cosmic Images: the Tension of Autonomy and Control 
In this section, I will focus on the crucial elements within the divergent images of 
cosmic motion in the myth of the Statesman: centred balance and peripheral steering. I 
will show that these elements underscore the fundamental reasons for the divergence in 
imagery, and relate to each other in a visual way, as alternative perspectives on the 
perfect circularity of cosmic movement. While, as we have seen, the figure of cosmic 
movement is one and the same, i.e. a circle, the Statesman also dramatizes a unique 
contrast between two opposing directions of circularity; it originally depicts one 
temporal cycle of two spatial circles. In the image of centred balance the focus on 
autonomous cosmic movement prevails, while the nautical image of steering focuses 
more on the motion directed from outside. In other words, the ability of the universe to 
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find balance is the condition of possibility of its autonomous preservation of the circular 
figure (schema), while the benevolent intervention of an external helmsman is a reaction 
to the impossibility of such preservation when certain factors (lack of memory, increase 
of disorder, inability to replicate a similarity) do not allow it. I will show that both 
images express a concern with the preservation of right measure, but in radically 
opposite ways that express the paradoxical, inherently ambivalent, status of 
philosophical autonomy and wisdom (phronēsis). 
 Cosmic-centred balance has influential antecedents in both mythology and 
philosophy. Even before the universe started being conceived as a series of concentric 
spheres, the idea of the central space of the cosmos as locus of stability and a means to 
directions, was deeply rooted in Greek culture. In a series of essays on the ancient 
Greek organisation of space, Vernant (1985, pp.152-260) devotes extensive study to the 
cosmic image of the centre; he observes that the traditional Hesiodic image of the 
universe is one of vertical tri-partition, with the earth marking the middle-point between 
heavens and underworld. In Hesiod’s description, the deepest region of the underworld, 
Tartarus, is located 
as far beneath the earth as heaven is above earth […] For a brazen anvil falling 
down from heaven nine nights and days would reach the earth upon the tenth: 
and again, a brazen anvil falling from earth nine nights and days would reach 
Tartarus upon the tenth. 
τόσσον ἔνερθ᾽ ὑπὸ γῆς, ὅσον οὐρανός ἐστ᾽ ἀπὸ γαίης […] ἐννέα γὰρ νύκτας τε 
καὶ ἤματα χάλκεος ἄκμων οὐρανόθεν κατιὼν δεκάτῃ κ᾽ ἐς γαῖαν ἵκοιτο· ἐννέα 
δ᾽ αὖ νύκτας τε καὶ ἤματα χάλκεος ἄκμων ἐκ γαίης κατιὼν δεκάτῃ κ᾽ ἐς 
Τάρταρον ἵκοι (Theogony, vv.720-725, tr. Evelyn-White). 
Earth is thus located in the precise position of mathematical equidistance between the 
superior and inferior limits of the universe, measured with the correspondence of times 
and (significantly) weights; moreover, earth (the divine Gaia) is also described as ‘the 
ever-sure seat of all [πάντων ἕδος ἀσφαλὲς αἰεὶ]’ (v.117, tr. Evelyn-White, adapted)194. 
The Hesiodic image of the earth is one of fundamental, original stability, in the middle 
of the universe, bringing forth and sustaining all life, and separating the blissful abodes 
                                                             
194 The Hesiodic passage on Gaia as ever-sure seat of the cosmos was demonstrably known to Plato, who 
quotes it at Symp. 178b. The alternative reading ‘seat of all the immortals (πάντων ἕδος ἀσφαλὲς αἰεὶ 
ἀθανάτων, vv.117-118), not documented in Plato, is probably a late interpolation. Rather, Gaia is depicted 
as the first goddess which brings forth and supports all life and natural objects (vv.126-139). In any case, 
the earth occupies a central position in the universe also as the origin of all primordial life. 
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of the immortals from the dark underworld where Titans and unforgivable sinners are 
imprisoned. It is part of a polar image of the universe, where the opposite directions of 
up and down, separated by the unshaken middle-ground, are constitutive aspects of the 
cosmic order.195 
This image will change in the philosophical accounts of Anaximander and 
Parmenides, who conceived the universe as a spherical body, but the cosmic centre 
remains for them a locus of stability and power. Vernant (1985, pp.218-227) has 
observed that Anaximander, as reported by Hippolytus, presented a cosmology in which 
‘the earth is aloft, not dominated by anything; it remains in place because of the similar 
distance from all points [of the celestial circumference]’ (τὴν δὲ γῆν εἶναι μετέωρον ὑπὸ 
μηδενός κρατουμένην, μένουσαν δὲ διὰ τὴν ὁμοίαν πάντων ἀπόστασιν)’.196 Although 
the language of this description could be a late interpolation,197 it is faithful to 
Anaximander’s clear conception and image: the earth is not ‘dominated’ by any other 
body, but maintains its own position only through its own power, determined by its 
equidistance from rest of the universe. While Thales before him had (seemingly) argued 
that the earth is sustained by water,198 Anaximander locates the earth alone in the 
middle of everything (panta), and claims that its position is, in itself, sufficient to make 
it stand stable. Earth requires no physical substrate or substance to preserve its place and 
power; instead, it is purely dependent on geometrical199 conditions that are inherent to 
its very position: its autonomous force simply depends on the right place. A position of 
power within the whole universe, originating from its centre, is also credited by 
Parmenides to his steering goddess: ‘in the middle of those [celestial circles] the 
goddess who steers all things governs all works of wretched childbirth and mixture’ (ἐν 
δὲ μέσωι τούτων δαίμων ἣ πάντα κυβερνᾶι πάντ’ἔργα στυγεροῖο τόκου καὶ μίξιος 
ἄρχει).200 In this passage, Parmenides associates cosmic centrality,201 steering, and 
                                                             
195 Vernant, 1985, p.206: ‘L’espace d’en haut est complètement différent de celui du milieu et de celui 
d’en bas.’ 
196 Diels & Krantz 12A11 = Hippol. Haer. I 6, 3-5. Kahn, 1960, p.76.  
197 Vernant (1985) supports the historical reliability of this language, observing that it agrees with a pre-
Socratic conception of the universe as a dynamic relation of different forces (kratoi) e.g. at Od. XXIII, 46; 
XI, 597 (pp.221-222). 
198 Kirk, Raven and Schofield 84-85. Historical development of pre-Socratic cosmologies: Kahn (1960). 
199 Kahn (1960) distinguishes Anaximander’s geometrical rationalism from the later Ionians’ empiricism 
and assimilates it to Pythagoreanism. 
200 DK 22B12.3-4 (tr. adapted). 
201 The interpretation of ‘in the centre’ as referring to the centre of the whole universe was established by 
Diels, 1897, p.107, based on the testimony of Simplicius (Phys. 144.25), who probably had access to the 
whole context (cf. Phys. 144.25 = DK 28A21). Simplicius explains that Parmenides’s goddess is the 
universal cause of generation and has her abode in the middle of everything (en mesōi pantōn 
hidrumenēn). 
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governance over generation, making the central point of the cosmic sphere a locus of 
divine power. Moreover, he represents Being itself, beyond the delusionary appearances 
of a moving cosmos, as a perfect sphere, ‘evenly balanced in all directions starting from 
its centre’ (μεσσόθεν ἰσοπαλὲς πάντηι).202 The centre, to Parmenides, is a locus of 
pervasive power and equality that characterises the whole reality, both as it appears to 
the senses and as it is in itself. The stable balance of reality and the generative 
movement of the cosmos both depend on the central point of a cosmic/metaphysical 
sphere. 
While in Anaximander the locus is explicitly occupied by the earth, 
Parmenides’s conception only refers to it as the origin of divine governance and 
universal balance. In both authors, however, it is associated with power (kratos, archē), 
and with equality (homoiotēs, isotēs) of distances and forces. Unlike in the Hesiodic 
myth, this centre is not part of a vertical and polar figure, but of a circular one; the 
centre is not such in comparison to upwards and downwards directions, but to the all-
encompassing points of a sphere; its position is one of equidistance from the whole 
frame of reality, conceived as a uniform totality, and not from two opposite spaces with 
uneven characters. The middle point is not located between up and down, but within a 
spherical frame. 
The image of cosmic balance has strong ethical and political connotations. 
Vlastos and Vernant203 have shown that the structure of the polis and the democratic 
language between the sixth and fifth century were characterised by the centre (meson) 
as a space of equality and shared power under a common law: both to Anaximander and 
Parmenides, the cosmic sphere is ‘a whole whose parts are all equal among themselves, 
so that none can dominate any other’, and ‘absolute homogeneity means an internally 
secure equilibrium’ (Vlastos 1947, p.162); equally, ‘what indeed characterises the space 
of the city is that it appears organised  around a centre’, i.e. ‘the domain of the common, 
the public, the ξυνόν [what is shared]’ (Vernant 1985, pp.216-217; tr. mine). The shift 
from a vertical, hierarchic image of the universe, to a circular, centred one, whereby 
power depends on equality of forces in the cosmic body, is stunningly parallel to the 
                                                             
202 DK 28B8.44 (quoted by Plato at Soph. 244e). It is unclear whether Parmenides is speaking, in 
materialistic terms, of the physical universe as it really is, beyond all impressions of the senses, or of a 
metaphysical intellectual reality that only appears as a physical cosmos. Nonetheless, the image of a 
spherical Being and the description of a spherical universe converge, since Parmenides’s theory of real 
being and apparent nature are explained in dependence on the same epistemological principles. 
203 Vlastos, 1947, pp.161-162; Vernant, 1985 pp.207-212. Cf. Lévêcque and Vidal-Naquet (1964) on 
political reforms and cosmology from Cleisthenes to Plato. 
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democratic developments of the Greek polis. These associations, however significant 
and corroborated by contextual evidence, remain nonetheless implicit in pre-Socratic 
poets and philosophers alike. What Hesiod, Anaximander, and Parmenides present is a 
developing theory of the cosmos, which is related to the development of political 
thought and practices though consistent imagery; but they offer, as far as we know, no 
explicit reflection on the convergence of cosmic and political images. The common 
image of the cosmic and political space has thus been explained in anthropological 
terms, as a change in mentality whereby categories of equality similarly influenced both 
cosmology and politics. Plato, by contrast, deploys these spatial notions as images and 
credits them with explicit ethical and political meanings; only in Plato’s dialogues, that 
is to say, we find not a mere convergence of world-views, but a self-aware usage of 
imagery to complement philosophical investigations. 
As remarked by Vernant (1985, pp.236-237) and Pender (2013, p.50), we find a 
crucial image of balance (isorropia), with ethical implications, in Plato’s Phaedo. Here, 
as part of an eschatological myth of the post-mortem destinations of the souls, Socrates 
describes to Simmias what the ‘form’ (ἰδέαν, 108d) of the earth is according to his 
belief: 
I am persuaded, then – he said – that firstly, if the earth is in the centre of the 
heavens and rounded, it needs neither the air nor any other constraint such as 
this in order not to fall, but that to hold it in place the equality of the heavens to 
themselves on all sides and its own balance are sufficient; indeed, a balanced 
object placed in the centre of something which is equal cannot incline either 
more or less in any direction, but it will remain equally unswerving. 
πέπεισμαι τοίνυν, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς, ἐγὼ ὡς πρῶτον μέν, εἰ ἔστιν ἐν μέσῳ τῷ οὐρανῷ 
περιφερὴς οὖσα, μηδὲν αὐτῇ δεῖν μήτε ἀέρος πρὸς τὸ μὴ πεσεῖν μήτε ἄλλης 
ἀνάγκης μηδεμιᾶς τοιαύτης, ἀλλὰ ἱκανὴν εἶναι αὐτὴν ἴσχειν τὴν ὁμοιότητα τοῦ 
οὐρανοῦ αὐτοῦ ἑαυτῷ πάντῃ καὶ τῆς γῆς αὐτῆς τὴν ἰσορροπίαν· ἰσόρροπον γὰρ 
πρᾶγμα ὁμοίου τινὸς ἐν μέσῳ τεθὲν οὐχ ἕξει μᾶλλον οὐδ᾽ ἧττον οὐδαμόσε 
κλιθῆναι, ὁμοίως δ᾽ ἔχον ἀκλινὲς μενεῖ (Phaed. 108e-109a, tr. based on Reale). 
Socrates’s image of the earth within the universe is one of self-sufficiency based on 
equality: the earth, evenly ‘rounded (περιφερὴς)’,204 is located ‘in the centre (ἐν μέσῳ)’ 
                                                             
204 The term peripherēs, in this context, could also mean ‘evenly surrounded’. Socrates is describing not 
only the form of the earth, but its position in relation to the heavens. I choose the translation ‘rounded’ 
because Socrates has just said he was going to tell Simmias what the earth itself is like, and because its 
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of the heavens, in a position of equidistance that grants it ‘balance (ἰσορροπίαν)’, 
equipoise, literally the equality (isotēs) of inclinations (rhopai). The heavens themselves 
are equal in all parts, i.e. homogenous, and are part of the complex cosmic equality that 
grants earth its own stability. Socrates also polemically contrasts his image with those 
pre-Socratic theories, like Anaximenes’s and Anaxagoras’s, which posited a physical 
substrate to support the earth.205 He rather claims that no constraining physical necessity 
(ananke) is required to hold fast (ischein) and keep it in its place; it does not require 
(dein) a material element such as air or water, but the sufficient, adequate (ikanēn) 
condition of its stability is its homogeneous position (and shape). 
As Socrates had said earlier in this dialogue, he is not satisfied with 
Anaxagoras’s materialistic philosophy, since it does not teach ‘the cause and the 
necessity (τὴν αἰτίαν καὶ τὴν ἀνάγκην)’ of the earth’s position, nor, ‘if he said the earth 
was in the centre (ἐν μέσῳ)’, why it is ‘best (ἄμεινον) for it to be in the centre (ἐν 
μέσῳ)’ (97e-98a).206 Socrates here criticises a certain kind of materialistic philosophy, 
because it does not include an ethical concern for the best, i.e. a non-physical principle 
for the position of material bodies. This concern is also dramatically existential for him, 
since he compares this explanation to his own position in a cell, condemned to death for 
impiety: describing nerves and bones as they sit on the cell’s bed, air and hearing as 
they are the material conditions of a philosophical conversation, is not enough to 
explain why Socrates has been condemned and has accepted this outcome (98c-99a); 
similarly, he requires a teleological explanation concerning the reasons why the 
universe is ordered in the way it is. But philosophers like Anaxagoras 
do not search for the power which causes things to be now placed as it is best 
for them to be placed, nor do they think it has any divine power, but they think 
they can find a new Atlas more powerful and more immortal than this, and 
more capable to hold everything together, and in truth they do not think that 
what is good and right binds and holds together all things. 
τὴν δὲ τοῦ ὡς οἷόν τε βέλτιστα αὐτὰ τεθῆναι δύναμιν οὕτω νῦν κεῖσθαι, ταύτην 
οὔτε ζητοῦσιν οὔτε τινὰ οἴονται δαιμονίαν ἰσχὺν ἔχειν, ἀλλὰ ἡγοῦνται τούτου 
Ἄτλαντα ἄν ποτε ἰσχυρότερον καὶ ἀθανατώτερον καὶ μᾶλλον ἅπαντα 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
position is already sufficiently described by the words ‘in the middle of the heavens’, so that ‘surrounded’ 
would be pleonastic. 
205 Socrates makes explicit mention of Anaxagoras at 97b-c. At 99b-c he alludes to the cosmologies of 
Empedocles, Anaximenes, Anaxagoras, and Democritus, all of which ground the earth on some material 
element (cf. Aristotle, De Caelo, II 13, 294b-295a). 
206 Reale (2000) identifies this passage as an allusion to Anaximander’s cosmology (p.128, n.104). 
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συνέχοντα ἐξευρεῖν, καὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ δέον συνδεῖν καὶ συνέχειν 
οὐδὲν οἴονται (Phaed. 99c, tr. based on Reale). 
We find here the reasons of Socrates’s cosmic image: he wants to describe a cosmic 
power (ischun) that is capable to hold fast (ischein) with sufficient strength the cosmic 
order, not just in a mutual relation of forces where one binds the other, but in a 
harmonious totality whereby things are held and bound together.207 To agathon kai 
deon, the good and right, or the good and needful, is the power that Socrates describes 
as binding together (sun-dein) the order of things.208 If the earth is stable and has self-
control, it is because it occupies the right position; there is no need for a stronger power 
to hold it, or the heavens, like the Titan Atlas did in traditional mythology. The earth, 
within a cosmic homogeneous order, is self-sustained; its power depends not on another 
substance, but simply on the correct, adequate location within a frame of cosmic 
equality. In Socrates’s myth, then, equality of forces is genuinely mightier than Atlas, 
because it is not an external constraint, but an inherent capacity of self-sustenance and 
self-grounding, which requires only a correct position. Vernant is right in observing 
that the earth is self-sustaining because, balanced at equal distance from everything, it 
does not need any material constraint (pp.213-214); but we must notice that only in 
Plato’s dramatic representation the right position becomes an ethical model.209 The 
cosmic image becomes in Plato a model for the search of a precise position that allows 
stability, conceived as an ethical good. His preference for an image similar to 
Anaximander’s or Parmenides’s is justified by a concern for a cosmic explanation that 
can also, under different conditions, serve as an ethical model for existential choices. 
Such as the earth’s position ‘in the centre’, Socrates’s position in a cell, waiting to die, 
is the material outcome of an immaterial principle with ethical significance, a 
philosophical autonomy which holds fast to an ethical position (‘Because, by the dog, I 
think these bones and sinews of mine would have been in Megara or Boeotia a long 
time ago, carried (φερόμενα) by an opinion of what was best (βελτίστου), if I had not 
judged that it was more just and beautiful (δικαιότερον […] καὶ κάλλιον), rather than to 
                                                             
207 Pender (2013) observes that the imagery of balance extends homogeneously from the cosmic order to 
afterlife punishments themselves, since the terrific flowing and counter-flowing of infernal rivers ‘are set 
in reciprocal balance’ and ‘rhythmic regularity’,  following ‘the same order and balance’ and ‘the same 
principles of order as the earth as a whole’ (p.50 = Phaed. 111d-113c).  
208 Cf. Pender 2013, pp.56-58 on intertextuality with Resp. 616b1-c5 (cosmic axis as bond of heaven) and 
Phaed. 112b3 and Tim. 40b8-c1 (rotation of the earth around its axis, previously studied by Burnet). 
209 While Plato is the first explicitly to turn cosmological accounts into ethical images, pre-Socratic 
theories conceived the cosmos also as an ethical order, based on a universal law of Justice (Dikē) holding 
things in their rightful place (Vlastos, 1947; cf. Napolitano Valditara, 2009, p.5; Long, 2009, p.109). The 
difference between Plato and earlier cosmologists consists in his explicit indications that he is crafting 
myths and images, thus inviting self-aware philosophical reflection on their validity as expressive tools. 
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escape and run away, to sustain (ὑπέχειν) any penalty inflicted by the city’, 99a). The 
image of cosmic balance, then, in Plato assumes explicit ethical tones of self-regulation, 
unwavering stability, and just ethical positions, exemplified both by the earth standing 
stable in the centre of the heavens, and by Socrates sitting calmly in his cell. 
  Plato uses the same image, for similar purposes, in the Statesman, but expands it 
to the whole universe. Here it is the cosmos that, let loose ‘at the right moment (κατὰ 
καιρὸν)’, is able to proceed on its own for thousands of thousands of years, thanks to its 
most balanced (ἰσορροπώτατον) movement. It is this ability that allows it ‘to be 
independent master of its own course (αὐτοκράτορα εἶναι τῆς αὑτοῦ πορείας)’ (274a) 
and for the creatures that are part of it ‘to take care of themselves by themselves, just 
like the cosmos as a whole (τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν αὐτοὺς αὑτῶν ἔχειν καθάπερ ὅλος ὁ 
κόσμος)’ (274d). The focus is, once again, on self-regulation and autonomy: just like 
the earth in the Phaedo had no Atlas to rely upon nor external constraints to hold it fast, 
but depended on its own right position, so the cosmos in the Statesman, periodically 
deprived of its divine controller, depends on its own balance to keep moving and living. 
Even more explicitly than in the Phaedo, the insistence on the prefix/pronoun auto 
makes the image of cosmic balance an explicit instance of autonomy, independent self-
regulation, and care over oneself. The myth of the Statesman, in a sense, seems to 
dramatize the absence of ‘a mightier Atlas’ who supports the heavens, making it the 
periodical absence of the universe’s cosmic guide. Without an external, more powerful 
force to move it, the universe needs to find balance on the right point, the ‘smallest foot 
(μικροτάτου […] ποδὸς)’ that can support its whole ‘greatest (μέγιστον)’ mass (270a). 
The cosmos needs to find the force to support itself by itself, and can do so only through 
a correct, harmonious position. 
The Stranger does not describe the spatial location of this small point of balance, 
but it seems reasonable to locate it in the very middle point of the heavenly spheres. We 
have seen that, in Greek philosophical thought, the notion of cosmic balance is 
explicitly linked to the existence of a middle point; and the Phaedo explicitly portrays 
the mutual position of the earth in the centre and of the heavens that surround it. The 
myth of the Statesman requires, perhaps intentionally on Plato’s part, a hermeneutic 
effort to imagine where the point of perfect balance is; but it is beyond doubt that, in 
Plato’s various descriptions (like in Parmenides’s), circular and spherical bodies find 
their equipoise in their centre. We can find different examples of centred equipoise: at 
Resp. 436d-e, Plato represents spinning-tops as standing still on one point, revolving 
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around their own axis: they can be said to be at the same time still and moving, because 
they are fixed under the respect of the ‘straight line (εὐθὺ)’ of their axis, without 
inclination, but they rotate under the respect of their ‘circumference (περιφερὲς)’. A 
spinning top keeps moving in circles in the same place, because it maintains its balance 
at the straight line that passes through its centre (i.e. its axis). At Leg. 893c, Plato 
describes, in similar terms, circular bodies as apt images for the soul, and in particular 
the cosmic one (principle of its movement): 
those things that possess the power of standing in the centre move in one 
location, as when the circumference of circles, which are said to stand still, 
revolves. 
τὰ τὴν τῶν ἑστώτων ἐν μέσῳ λαμβάνοντα δύναμιν […] ἐν ἑνὶ κινεῖσθαι, 
καθάπερ ἡ τῶν ἑστάναι λεγομένων κύκλων στρέφεται περιφορά (tr. Burnet, 
adapted). 
It is clear that, when Plato imagines bodies characterised by circular movement, the 
standing point of their stability is inevitably in their centre; so when we are to 
understand where the pivot of the universe is, it is inevitable to imagine it as its very 
centre. As the circumference revolves, the central point, through which its axis passes, 
remains still; analogously, as the greatest cosmic sphere revolves, its centre remains 
unchanged, thus granting the continuity of movement. The self-moving cosmos does not 
stand upon any external surface (it is, in fact, everything there is, without any other 
external body), but it stands upon the very core of its all-encompassing body. Delicate 
as it is, the balancing of a macroscopic spherical body on its microscopic centre 
constitutes a perfect visual example of the measured and precise accuracy, holding 
together opposite qualities, which Plato names metrion.210 
                                                             
210 I am grateful to Dr Jamie Dow for an enlightening conversation about the phenomenon of balance in 
revolving bodies. In the Republic (436d-e), the balance of a spinning-top is used by Socrates to indicate 
the inseparable coexistence of two opposite conditions in one and the same object and at the same time, in 
analogy with the experience of psychological conflict. In the Laws (X.893c-d), the balanced rotation of 
circular bodies is used by the Athenian Stranger in the same way, but with further emphasis on the fact 
that larger and smaller circumferences within the same object possess proportionally different velocities, 
despite the fact that only a single impulse of motion has been communicated to all of them. This 
phenomenon is thus an eminent example among those that trigger the philosophical thaumazein, because 
the same event can and in fact needs to be described, even geometrically, in opposite ways at the same 
time (cf. Chapter 3). As Dr Dow remarked, the puzzlement is enhanced by the fact that, unlike in the case 
of bodies that stand still while only some of their parts move, in a spinning body the regular movement of 
the whole is necessary for the stability of the axis and vice-versa. Here opposites are not only predicated 
of the same thing but physically imply each other; the coexistence of two opposite descriptions is thus not 
a mere sophistic trick but a very cogent necessity of geometrical formalisation. 
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 This imagery of balance is not limited to spatial considerations of stable 
movements, but also extends to temporal concerns of timing, thus marking a crucial 
difference from the myth of the Phaedo. While in the Phaedo the earth is represented as 
balanced as such, inherently without need for an external constraining power, the 
universe in the Statesman is not. The introduction, unique to this myth, of a periodical 
dependence on an external divinity draws attention to a temporal aspect. There is not 
only a right position for the universe to preserve its movement, but also a right time 
when it can be left alone. The letting loose of the universe is a passive condition on 
which it has no direct control, since it depends on the external divinity, but it is not 
arbitrary: it happens kata kairon (270a), according to the moment when it is opportune 
to let it go. The Stranger takes up this idea again at 272d-e: when the time (chronos) of 
all the mutations brought about the divine intervention is complete (eteleōthe), i.e when 
the conditions inside the universe are mature (each earthly soul having repeatedly 
reincarnated), the divine steersman retires to his observation post and let the universe 
unfold on its own. After a moment of confusion and catastrophes, the universe is able to 
maintain a regular movement when the time is adequate (ikanou chronou; 273a); and 
exactly when the time of its autonomy is complete (teleutōntos […] tou chronou; 273d), 
when it risks to bring about definitive destruction, the steersman resumes his position 
and saves it from sinking into a sea of confusion. The universe is then portrayed as not 
fully autonomous, or rather not autonomous as such, but in dependence of external 
guidance, because its movement varies in different moments. The cosmic autonomy is, 
we may say, temporally conditional. 
The narrative focus on this temporal element marks the shift of imagery from 
balance to steering: it is the description of a steering god that coincides with the 
Stranger’s narration of different times of divine intervention and cosmic autonomy. 
While the image of balance only included a cursory, obscure remark on the god letting 
the universe go at the right moment, the image of the steersman is part of a narration 
that describes explicitly the different times when the god intervenes or withdraws. First, 
he withdraws when a temporal cycle of incarnations is mature; then, the universe needs 
to reach the adequate time for a movement devoid of catastrophes; and finally, its 
movement risks to go out of control and it is opportune for the steersman to come back 
again. This association of right moments of intervention with nautical imagery is not 
casual, but it is based on a cultural association of the skilful art of a pilot and the ability 
to discern the precise moments for a successful voyage. We have seen that, in 
154 
 
Sophocles, the metaphor of Athena guiding the mind of Odysseus depended on her skill 
to know exactly the right time when her intervention was needed: ‘But you arrive right 
in time (καιρὸν δ᾽ ἐφήκεις), for in all matters, both past and future ones, I am steered by 
your hand (σῇ κυβερνῶμαι χερί)’ (vv.34-35). This association seems to originate from 
the difficulty of maritime voyages, which are dependent on the external conditions of 
the sea and of the climate, in turn depending on the particular time of the year when the 
pilot decides to set sail. We find an explicit advice about this difficulty, which requires 
the knowledge of kairos, in Hesiod’s Works and Days: 
You yourself wait until the season for sailing is come, and then haul your swift 
ship down to the sea […] But you, Perses, remember all works in their season 
but sailing especially […] I will show you the measures of the loud-roaring sea 
[…] I will tell you the mind of Zeus who holds the aegis; for the Muses have 
taught me to sing in marvellous song. Fifty days after the solstice, when the 
season of wearisome heat is come to an end, is the right time for mortals to go 
sailing. Then you will not wreck your ship, nor will the sea destroy the sailors. 
αὐτὸς δ᾽ ὡραῖον μίμνειν πλόον, εἰσόκεν ἔλθῃ· καὶ τότε νῆα θοὴν ἅλαδ᾽ 
ἑλκέμεν […] τύνη δ᾽, ὦ Πέρση, ἔργων μεμνημένος εἶναι ὡραίων πάντων, περὶ 
ναυτιλίης δὲ μάλιστα […] δείξω δή τοι μέτρα πολυφλοίσβοιο θαλάσσης […] 
ὣς ἐρέω Ζηνὸς νόον αἰγιόχοιο· Μοῦσαι γάρ μ᾽ ἐδίδαξαν ἀθέσφατον ὕμνον 
ἀείδειν. ἤματα πεντήκοντα μετὰ τροπὰς ἠελίοιο, ἐς τέλος ἐλθόντος θέρεος 
καματώδεος ὥρης, ὡραῖος πέλεται θνητοῖς πλόος· οὔτε κε νῆα καυάξαις οὔτ᾽ 
ἄνδρας ἀποφθείσειε θάλασσα (vv.630-666, tr. Evelyn-White, adapted). 
Hesiod’s advice to his brother Perses is clear: the sea is dangerous to mortals, but 
shipwrecks can be avoided through attention and memory of the right seasons (horai), 
the opportune (horaios) time for sailing, which depends on basic astronomical and 
geographical knowledge, here expressed as the measures (metra) of the sea and as the 
mind (noos) of the sky god Zeus.211 The poet is here using the sea as an example for a 
general attention to due measure and right timing. Indeed, this advice on nautical skill, 
about which the poet admits his inexperience, ultimately leads to a universal maxim on 
kairos which became traditional in Greek culture: 
                                                             
211 In this poem, the problem of dealing with shifting circumstances is ultimately framed as the problem 
of understanding the divine will of Zeus, which is an instance of cosmic justice (the ‘true judgements 
which are of Zeus and are the noblest [δίκῃς, αἵ τ᾽ ἐκ Διός εἰσιν ἄρισται]’, v.36, tr. Evelyn-White, 
adapted). 
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Observe due measures: and the right time is most noble in all things 
μέτρα φυλάσσεσθαι· καιρὸς δ᾽ ἐπὶ πᾶσιν ἄριστος (v.694, t. Evelyn-White, 
adapted). 
Hesiod uses the image of nautical skill to represent a universal criterion of action: 
metron and kairos, which should direct to success all actions (ergon panton; pasin). His 
poem indeed also includes examples from farming, which depends on the correct 
seasons (vv.381-640), and religious piety, which depends on traditional days of 
celebration (vv.765-828). Works and Days, above all, is a set of didactic examples used 
to show (deiknunai) that there are specific moments (days or seasons) for all human 
works (like farming, sailing, or venerating the gods); it is an exhortation to the art of 
kairos. The nautical image provides a perfectly vivid example of such art, which not 
only achieves success but also avoids deathly dangers. 
 Employing a nautical image for the conditions of cosmic movement, Plato relies 
heavily on this cultural background. The action of the divine steersman, like the 
Sophoclean Athena’s and the Hesiodic sailor’s, is first of all a kairotic action, a skill of 
identifying the opportune conditions and moments that can direct a voyage (real or 
metaphorical) to success, and avoid confusion and destruction. The act of steering 
(strephein) is chosen by Plato not only because it reflects the circular movement of the 
heavens, but also because it represents, in the figure of a steersman, the ability to 
understand right measure and act accordingly. It is not, however, a permanent feature of 
the universe, like Parmenides’s steering goddess who sits at the centre of all things; but 
it is an external power that intervenes only periodically and from outside. 
External divine intervention strongly diverges from the image of a divinity that 
always moves in circles, since it portrays the god as capable of abandoning and coming 
back to the universe. Here, the analogy between a steersman and a power moving purely 
in circles breaks down, because the steersman can always step back from the helm or 
return to it, when the kairos requires it. Similarly, the image of an all-encompassing 
cosmos is at odds with the representation of an external space in which it may founder 
and lose its internal movement (i.e. its life). The two moments of the myth, despite their 
narrative unity, stand in a relation of disanalogy, insofar as they represent incompatible 
images of the cosmos and of its guiding principle.  
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4.3. Cognitive Cosmic Images: a Delicate Philosophical Freedom 
The clash of imagery is necessary for the cognitive efficacy of the mythical account. 
The power of strephein, precisely because it is one that mainly observes the conditions 
of the universe from outside, and intervenes only when time is mature, is radically 
peripheral and circumstantial. It is neither an immanent power of the universe, 
focalised in its centre, nor a force that constantly acts on the universe from within. 
Rather, it is a transcendent force, acting on its circumference like a steersman would act 
on a helm, and only when it is opportune to do so. Similarly, the introduction of a 
possible deathly danger at sea, with the risk that the universe be storm-tossed like a 
ship, forever losing its course (poreias) and sinking, diverges from the visual image of 
the cosmos as a circular body, which could eventually lose its balanced movement, but 
certainly not sink in an external space. In order to introduce the theme of kairos, the 
Stranger must imagine that the unchanging perfection of a self-identical movement can 
change and let go, and that the all-encompassing universe lies within an external space, 
which threatens its autonomy and makes it conditional. 
 Ultimately, the two images that Plato chooses for the single figure (schema) of 
celestial movement are radically opposite, both visually and conceptually. Visually, we 
are first presented with an image of balance, whereby the ultimate condition of circular 
movement is a stability around a central pivot or axis; but afterwards, we are presented 
with a divine force which turns around the universe from outside, like a helm. 
Conceptually, we are first led to think of the conditions that allow a self-moving 
spherical body to maintain its motion; these are a matter of equipoise on a cosmic 
centre; but later, we are led to think of the timely action of a steersman, who always acts 
only in dependence of a criterion of correct timing. The two images, in this sense, 
represent different enactments of the right measure (fitting, opportune, and appropriate) 
defined in the middle of the Statesman (284a-285c). However, they do so in radically 
opposite ways. First of all, one image is spatial, while the other introduces a concern for 
temporal action. Moreover, in terms of visualisation, the second image introduces the 
features, incompatible with the first, of a sea external to the universe and of a divine 
movement that steps back from its circular guidance. Finally, the combination of these 
images entails a shift of attention from the centre to the periphery, from a movement 
that only requires a stable central point, to one that depends on the peripheral action of 
an external power. 
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In agreement with these incompatible shifts of focus, the conceptual 
implications of the two images are radically opposite. On the one hand, we have the 
condition of a self-directed right measure, a dominion of the living universe over itself 
through its stability on an internal point of itself. The universe, when it moves on its 
own, requires a status of internal perfect equipoise between its whole macroscopic body 
and the microscopic foot/pivot on which it can stand. Its movement is fully a matter of 
internal harmony. On the other hand, we have the possibility of radical destruction, 
which calls for an external measured direction, not concerned at all with the point of 
balance itself, but with preserving the orderly movement of the cosmic body as a whole, 
which could get lost in an external unlimited space. This order is not grounded on the 
internal harmony between big and small, but on the external imposition of a figure of 
movement. 
The two images of right measure, overall, are not only divergent but clashing, as 
they portray irreducible and incompatible events or features: 
(a) movements in one direction and in the opposite; 
(b) spatial right position and temporal right moment; 
(c) eternally identical divine movement and withdrawal from the helm; 
(d) internal movement and external forces. 
Since the two images are part of a narration, where they succeed one another in time, 
their different features do not seem to clash strongly; the myth does not employ two 
radically opposite images to describe one and the same object, as if the universe were at 
the same time self-moving and controlled. The two opposite movements (a) and the 
right measure in space or time (b) are in fact simply distinguished. They only clash 
physically, as the Stranger represents the universe clashing (sumballōn, 273a) with itself 
when the controlled movement is overturned. The opposition of controlled and 
autonomous movements is so radical that it directly destabilises the cosmic order, 
causing various catastrophes. But the properly metaphorical clash is a convergence of 
the disanalogous features (c) and (d): the disanalogy between a spinning, all-
compassing body, and a ship-like object that can founder in an external sea cannot be 
reconciled; nor can the perfectly circular movement of the god, and its kairotic moving 
back and forth, abandoning or returning to the cosmic helm.212 This clash produces a 
                                                             
212 This movement back and forth could itself be pictured as circular, insofar as it is cyclical. Even so, it 
could not be equal to an unchanging sunkuklein, revolving together alongside the cosmos, but should 
include a moment of rupture; and it could not explain the physical taking hold or letting go of the bodily 
cosmos, either. The two depictions of the god inevitably clash, thus originating a metaphorical meaning. 
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conceptual space where two opposite instances converge, i.e. where the independence of 
the cosmic movement can be shown as dependent on an external power. The universe at 
the same time needs to find its own inner right measure to be autonomous, and can find 
it through an external, timely action, which is incompatibly directive. Conceptually, the 
clash of imagery is one between: 
(e) freedom (as autonomy) and control (as guidance). 
Between these two incompatible images, we find a conceptual space where the cosmos, 
in its independence, replicates the figure of its former dependence. Through its 
‘memory’, i.e. through its ability to preserve and re-enact the past, it can move in 
perfect circularity without either relying on a god, or dispersing its motion in an 
unlimited space. 
Schuhl (1968) has correctly identified the ongoing cosmic dependence within its 
balance, envisaging the universe as a kind of spherical spindle suspended to a string. 
This mechanism, available in Plato’s time, might have influenced many of his cosmic 
representations, but the one in the Statesman in particular: 
the machine revolves, the string to which it is suspended is twisted; when the 
artisan [who was spinning it] steps aside, the string, quite naturally, tends to 
untwist; at first, the movement continues without interruption, and then, after a 
moment of turmoil, when the two impulses oppose each other (272e-273a), ‘its 
allotted and innate desire turned it back again in the opposite direction’ (p.84, 
tr. mine). 
As an external hand spins this mechanism in one direction, the string keeps twisting 
until, once the controlling hand stops moving it, it finally untwists in the opposite 
direction, and lets the mechanism turn on its own thanks to the accumulated tension on 
its axis. Since untwisting cannot exist without previous twisting, the autonomous 
movement of this mechanism would not be possible without the external, opposite 
impulse. This image is in fact a perfect analogy for the idea of a cosmic ‘memory’, 
which can incorporate and preserve the impulse of the god. The scholar justifies his 
appeal to this physical model, noticing that the Stranger explicitly appeals to images in 
order to visualise abstract, invisible realities (285e-286a); he compares this mechanism 
to the universe in the Republic, represented as a spherical spindle used by the Fates to 
weave mortal destinies (616c); and he also observes that the torsion (strephein)213 of the 
                                                             
213 Cf. 272e, 273a, 273e. 
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cosmos is physically the same as the wool-strings’ torsion later described in this 
dialogue (streptikon, 282d). 
To some extent these justifications are textually weak, since they rely on 
elements that, in this dialogue, are not described or even alluded to. In a way, Schuhl 
forces the textual evidence, imagining a mechanical model that Plato might have had in 
mind, and bracketing the description of the living cosmos. Nonetheless, it is true that the 
Stranger is also representing the universe as an artefact, periodically subject to an 
external force in a mechanical way, and periodically reacting thanks to its own inner 
drive. While there is no textual evidence for the twisted string, such an image provides a 
valid mechanical analogy for the dynamic of action-reaction here described. Migliori, 
who criticises the excessive one-sidedness of Schuhl’s reading, nonetheless admits that 
it is very likely that Plato had in mind a machine or a sort of spinning-top in picturing 
the universe in this way.214 Indeed, the Stranger combines images of conscious life and 
artificial dynamism. We can therefore reconnect Schuhl’s mechanical image, 
undoubtedly too limited, to the dynamic of living freedom and mechanical control 
expressed by the two clashing images of balance and steering. If, under the power of an 
external steering hand, the universe is passively twisted, it is the ‘tension’ accumulated 
in its centre (Schuhl’s string) that allows it to replicate on its own the very same figure 
of motion. Cosmic balance is actually a tension of two opposite drives. 
This dynamic is cognitively productive, because it establishes a clash or a 
tension between opposite, incompatible ideas. It does not merely illustrate a set of 
similarities, but it demands that the recipients autonomously recognise its philosophical 
implications: autonomous movement is the result of a process, temporally and spatially 
conditioned. Independence is not independent. As a physical and living body, the 
universe opposes to the directing god its own fated tension and innate desire (epithumia, 
272e). The circular motion imposed from outside does act on the cosmic body as on a 
mechanism, but it clashes with the universe’s living impulse, creating a tension which is 
resolved, at the right time, when the universe is let go. To correct Schuhl’s one-sided 
image, what we see in the myth is not a mechanism attached to a string; it is rather a 
clash of peripheral and central forces, one directing the universe from outside and 
communicating to it, mechanically, a circular figure of motion, and the other unfolding 
                                                             
214 Migliori (1996): ‘The fact that Plato, anyway, might have written [this passage] having a machine, or a 
sort of spinning-top, in his mind is even likely’ (p.322 n.31, tr. mine). Cf. Brisson, 1995, pp.356-357. 
While Migliori judges this comparison irrelevant to any demonstration, the mechanical dynamics studies 
by Schuhl highlight a crucial educational process: the correct transference (at the right time) and 
acquisition (through tense axial balance) of a wise intellectual movement. 
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in the contrary direction, but replicating perfectly the same figure because it equilibrates 
the forces of its macroscopic revolving mass in its stable microscopic centre. The 
universe thus incorporates the external control, and makes it its own. What we see, in a 
sense, is a transfer of force from the circumference to the centre, and a transfer of power 
and authority from the controller to his subject. This transfer of power is visualised both 
as a mechanical process and as a living exchange of authority and control. The divine 
control is not control for its own sake, but it is directed to the autonomous movement of 
the universe; on its part, the universe needs to preserve that motion, i.e. to preserve the 
tension between the received impulse and its own contrasting drive. As the tension 
physically declines, ‘forgetfulness’ increases because the replication of movement 
becomes impossible, and the god needs to intervene again. The movement through 
tension is therefore also dangerous, because the tension can fade away and, in absence 
of all strings and constraints, it needs to be restored from outside to prevent its utmost 
loss. 
 Only if we recognise this clash or tension, visually expressed as a dynamic of 
peripheral steering and central balance, the full meaning of this imagery emerges. The 
possibility of maintaining the right movement, of autonomously enacting right measure, 
is conditional; it depends on the ability to maintain two opposite drives at the same 
time. Hegel, as an insightful if not always impartial Platonic interpreter, correctly 
commented that to Plato rationality is essentially characterised by the ability to ‘sustain 
within itself the Contradiction [or: the Opposite] (den Gegensatz in sich ertragen)’, i.e. 
to accept that contradiction is constitutive of itself.215 Rational freedom from constraints 
depends on its own constraining conditions. Correct external control is directed only at 
internal self-control. Accordingly, the Stranger does not portray either balance or 
guidance as an immediate, natural given, and does not underplay the clash between 
them. Rather, he shows that the cosmic right movement does not depend exclusively on 
an objective criterion, on a correct figure of movement that is always available and can 
be imposed by all means. He shows, instead, that there is a problematic and even 
dangerous possibility for the cosmos to find its own right position. The cosmic 
movement is an action that requires attentive care (epimeleia) and practical wisdom 
                                                             
215 G. W. F. Hegel, GPh XIV. Plato, p.240 (211); quoted in Cicero (1998), pp.216-217, n.47 (translation 
mine). Notice that Hegel is referring here to the role of contradiction in Plato’s Philebus, but his comment 
is meant as a general interpretation of Plato’s philosophy. Hegel’s idealistic reading, nonetheless, must be 
moderated in one respect: the measured convergence of contradictory impulses is not, in Plato, 
exclusively an immanent property of reality but it also depends on the actions of an external divinity. The 
cosmos cannot find its own right measure simply thanks to its own internal dynamics, but it needs to 
imitate or be directed by an external divine principle. 
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(phronesis), and an autonomy that depends on an inherent tension. Cosmic freedom is 
not a given to be taken for granted; rather, it is part of a cycle of emerging and subsiding 
right conditions, fleeting right moments. The preservation of the circular motion is thus 
a conditional possibility, not an unchanging rule. This is the original philosophical 
message of this myth: even within the figure of circular motion, the most perfect rule of 
eternal self-equality, there is an element of opposition, which is the necessary condition 
for fully autonomous self-equality and self-regulation. Originally elaborating existing 
imagery of cosmic balance and guidance, Plato creates a wholly-new model for the 
paradoxical concept of an acquired autonomy, a difficult self-regulation that can be 
communicated from outside and needs attentive wisdom to be maintained. His usage of 
imagery communicates, with cognitive efficacy, the delicate status of philosophical 
freedom. 
 
Conclusion 
This analysis of the Stranger’s usage of cosmic imagery in the Statesman demonstrates 
that it produces a clash of apparently mutually exclusive ideas, whose cognitive value 
lies in the triggering of autonomous intellectual responses in the recipients. The 
Stranger resorts to two images, balanced circularity and steering, to represent a single 
circular figure (σχῆμα) of cosmic movement. Both images are associated with right 
measure, either as spatial equipoise or timely intervention; but they also communicate 
radically opposed and incompatible ideas. On the one hand, then, the mythical figure 
displays a conceptual unity, as it represents one and the same cosmic condition (πάθος), 
dependent on right measure. But on the other hand this condition is radically 
problematized by a set of conceptual contrasts inherent to the notion of right measure, 
and represented through opposite images. This contrast makes the myth puzzling, in 
accordance with its function as paidia, thus demanding the interpreter’s cognitive 
engagement. 
 I have shown that the Stranger avails himself of images of balanced circularity 
and steering, in two different moments of his narration. Balanced circularity constitutes 
for him a way to subsume the image of polar reversals, such as the inversion of 
heavenly motions, under a univocal image of orderly movement. Cosmic steering, 
differently, represents circular motion as a matter of external direction. With reference 
to pre-Socratic philosophy and poetry, I have shown that the conceptual and ethical 
implications of these two images are opposite. In the former case, we find an image of 
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stable and powerful self-control, grounded on pre-Socratic notions of the organisation 
of cosmic space around a steady centre. In the latter, we find an image of expert and 
benevolent external control, grounded on pre-Socratic notions of timely response to 
danger and confusion. Based on these opposite implications, I have argued that the myth 
communicates a set of clashing notions: (a) divergent movements that come to a 
physical clash; (b) spatial against temporal instantiations of right measure; (c) eternally 
identical divine movement against periodical divine withdrawal; and (d) internal cosmic 
movement against external forces acting upon it. The fundamental common trait of all 
these clashes is a contrast between (e) freedom (as autonomous independence) and 
control (as heteronomous dependence). 
 The mythical paidia, thus, embeds a conceptual clash within a unified narration. 
In this way, it produces a novel and puzzling philosophical notion: independence is 
dependent on conditions of measured control. Self-regulation, by definition, is at the 
same time an act of submission to and of control oneself. It is not an immediate given, 
but the result of a process of inner harmonisation of divergent drives. As the cosmos, in 
its independence, replicates the figure of its former dependence, so autonomy needs to 
be acquired. Wisdom (φρόνησις) and care (ἐπιμέλεια) of oneself consist in the 
preservation of such a delicate tension. In his composition, Plato does not resort to 
explicit arguments, precisely in order to preserve the puzzling ambivalence of this 
notion. Instead of presenting a definitive ethical criterion, or a set of formal 
determinations, he produces the conditions whereby the recipients of his myth are 
demanded, even forced, to discover and recognise the point of balance on their own. He 
has thus ensured that the interpreters’ mind needs to find a way to orientate itself amidst 
divergent ideas or be irrevocably at a loss. The cognitive value of his playful and 
puzzling myth ultimately consists precisely in triggering an autonomous and self-
orienting intellectual response to the delicate ambivalence of self-direction. 
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Chapter 5 – Models of Leadership of Minds: Leading to Balance 
Do you believe that the constitutions of cities are born 
out of an oak or a rock, rather than from the citizens’ 
dispositions [ēthōn], which, so to speak, tip the scales 
[rhepsanta] and drag the rest after them? (Resp. 544d7-
e2). 
 
Introduction 
This chapter examines the Statesman in order to illuminate the notion of leadership of 
minds. My interpretation of this dialogue takes into account its scene as much as its 
contents, in the persuasion that the dialogue form further illuminates the arguments. I 
will argue that this dialogue presents a guidance of human minds directed at enabling 
autonomous psychological (cognitive and emotional) balance in the guided subjects. I 
will observe that Plato presents the same form of guidance as beneficial to both 
individual minds and political communities. To support this claim, I will outline the 
common trait that Plato identifies between individual education and political leadership: 
the production of a balanced combination of different perspectives. Since in both cases 
leadership of minds aims to enable a form of well-composed equilibrium, it is in effect a 
way of generating right measure in the souls of the guided subjects. Thus, this chapter 
further articulates the notion of right measure by teasing out its concrete instantiations at 
the individual and political level, as Plato represents them in the Statesman. 
The correct leadership of minds is Plato’s major educational concern in the 
Statesman as much as in his other political dialogues. As I have observed in my General 
Introduction, three recent studies of the Statesman have examined the notion of 
psychological leadership. Two studies have presented it as a matter of methodological 
and doctrinal instruction (Lane 1998, Bobonich 1995), thereby emphasising its 
cognitive aspects and presenting emotions in particular as subordinate or distorting 
factors. One study has presented leadership as production of social harmony and as 
attentive to the constructive role of emotional influences (Bontempi 2009). None has 
highlighted the common traits between individual and political education. Lodge’s 
(1947) more dated study has shown that Plato’s other political dialogues, the Republic 
and the Laws, are concerned with ‘the life of the self’, namely with the interaction and 
development of different psychological subjects within a complex ‘social tissue of civic 
life’, influenced by biological, social and other nonlogical factors (p.232). Lodge has 
demonstrated that, to Plato, the first and foremost political concern is educational: 
educating professional members of society (pp.41-59), educating good citizens (pp.60-
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87), educating philosophers and leaders (pp.88-113), in each case availing not only of 
technical and notional instruction but also of imagination (pp.114-137), artistic 
techniques (pp.150-183), and above all pedagogical and psychological care (pp.184-
233). All these educational concerns, culminating in the leadership of minds, aim to 
enable a good life for individuals and communities alike. I will show that the same 
educational and psychological concern shapes the dialogue scene and political account 
of the Statesman. 
This overlapping of education and politics may be unfamiliar to modern 
readers.216 Careful semantic distinctions are therefore necessary to preserve this 
connection while avoiding confusion. Certainly, it is possible to think of politics and 
education as belonging to distinct fields of expertise and performing separate functions. 
Political leadership and subjection to given political institutions are matters of collective 
and institutional order, and the idea of educational development does not immediately 
coincide with this framework.217 Education, in fact, aims to instruct and shape 
individuals, through the communication of technical or intellectual notions and the 
development of vocational, cognitive or emotional skills. Various fields of political 
action are not related, without mediation, to educational concerns: for instance, social 
conflict, economic processes, legislation and criminality, or the modalities of 
participation to power. However, this divide is not present in the ultimate political 
account of the Stateman. Here education constitutes, as I will show, a bridge-concept 
that conjoins individual and political guidance. In particular, to Plato psychological 
factors (cognition, opinions, and emotions) orientate and influence political choices, 
societal dynamics, and resulting institutions. Thus, Plato’s major political concern is the 
education of the mind. In order to avoid confusion, then, I will adhere to the following 
terminological distinction. I will use the term ‘education’ for the individual practice and 
‘educational leadership’ for the restructured and expanded figure of political leadership 
that Plato represents. While I draw important parallels between the two, I also 
                                                             
216 Lodge (1947) similarly comments that speaking of ‘education for citizenship’ may seem unclear to 
modern readers, because to us every individual always already is a citizen, namely a democratic subject 
(p.60). 
217 I cannot tackle here the problem, largely ideological, of the compatibility between a modern liberal 
democratic framework and an educational understanding of politics. This problem, famously raised by 
Popper (1945), has been recently revived by Lane (1998, pp.5-6). Charging political authorities with a 
role of evaluation and guidance of the citizens can be seen, by modern readers, as paternalistic and 
oppressive of individual liberties. The theoretical root of this problem is a constrast between the notions 
of negative freedom (freedom from the constraints of authority and their potential abuse) and positive 
freedom (freedom to live and flourish in a community as well-organised as possible). Plato’s political 
thought belongs firmly to the latter framework, and any modern evaluation of his doctrines must take into 
account its historical distance from current notions of liberty (cf. Lodge 1947, pp.224-225; 234-259). 
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acknowledge that there are differences, most notably in that political leadership 
addresses a community and involves further functions beyond education.  Therefore the 
distinction that my terminology draws is the one between our familiar idea of education 
and Plato's original view of political rule as educational leadership. 
My aim is to identify the common traits between education of the mind and 
political leadership. The parallel between the order (or confusion) of the mind and of the 
city is a central tenet of Plato’s political philosophy, and it is explicitly theorised in the 
Republic. Here, the character of Socrates describes the constitution of a city as model 
(παράδειγμα, 9.592b) of the individual mind, insofar as they both encompass a plexus of 
factors, parts, or aspects that determine their inner order or confusion (cf. Resp. 367e-
369a). The constitutive complexity of both city and psyche, to Plato, requires both 
leaders and educators to eschew exclusive reliance on doctrinal or dogmatic contents, 
and to seek for adequate means of education such as music, narrations, images and 
artistic composition to bring both society and mind to harmony.218 While in the 
Statesman the Stranger does not envisage any explicit analogy of this sort, it can be 
shown that he nonetheless describes the conditions of both fields in the same terms, 
thereby presenting their inherent difficulties and potentials as comparable. I therefore 
hold that identifying their comparable traits is necessary to illuminate how Plato 
configures, in this dialogue, a practice of leadership that directs and improves both 
individual and social psychology. 
I will articulate this comparison in four sections. First, I will foreground the 
overarching connection between dialogue scene and political contents through a critical 
engagement with recent scholarship on the Statesman (5.1.). Second, I will study the 
education of the individual mind as represented in this dialogue (5.2.). This section will 
address both the dialogue scene as a model of education (5.2.1.) and the image of the 
inquiring mind as representing its optimal cognitive condition (5.2.2.). Third, I will 
study the educational leadership of the political community (5.3.). This section will 
consist of four steps: isolating the notion of educational leadership (5.3.1); assessing its 
political significance (5.3.2.); examining the concept of political balance (5.3.3.); and 
addressing the problem of the methods of educational leadership (5.3.4). Finally, I will 
identify the common traits that emerge from the above accounts (5.4.). My comparison 
of education and leadership is thus indirect. It does not consist in establishing a point-
by-point assimilation of the two fields, thus overshadowing their differences. It is rather 
                                                             
218 Cf. Lodge (1947), pp.150-183. 
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a hermeneutical effort of reconstruction, demanded by Plato’s dialogical writing. It first 
examines how individual education and political leadership are independently 
configured in the Statesman, and only as a last step it teases out their fundamental 
common trait. 
 The purpose of this novel comparison is twofold. On the one hand, it will 
reinforce my thesis that images and models are cognitively fundamental to understand 
Plato’s philosophical position in the Statesman. We cannot fully appreciate the notion of 
educational leadership of minds without looking at how Plato represents, in this 
paradigmatic dialogue as much as in his images, the dynamic processes of mind and 
society. My study will thus show that Plato’s creativity and appeal to imagination is 
fundamental in the construction of a complete figure of leadership. On the other hand, 
this comparison further illuminates the concrete and dynamic aspects of right measure. 
It shows that individual education and political leadership equally aim to combine 
different perspectives in a correctly balanced fashion. The educational efforts that Plato 
represents in the Statesman are ultimately grounded on the notion of right measure as 
equilibrium, which eschews detrimental confusion and conflict, and allows a 
harmonious self-regulation. 
 
5.1. Preliminary Remarks: A Two-Sided Educational Process 
The purpose of this chapter is to show that the Statesman presents a two-sided 
educational process between guides and guided subjects. My reading of this dialogue 
contradicts the scholars’ widespread one-sided attention to the formal features of 
philosophical and political guidance alone, without sufficient study of their concrete 
relation with the guided individuals or groups. Rather than identifying formal 
methodologies or doctrinal contents,219 my novel study aims to tease out the 
characteristics of dialectical and political praxes. It focuses on the concrete and dynamic 
aspects of education and educational leadership, which (at least in the context of the 
Statesman) are irreducible to rigid formal accounts and have been thus represented by 
Plato in their living movement. 
                                                             
219 Weiss (1995) argues for the assimilation of the statesman to a Socratic ‘physician of the soul’ (p.213), 
thereby implicitly accepting the parallelism of social and individual education (conceived as healing, 
corrective act). However, she makes no attempt to ground this parallelism on textual evidence, and thus 
fails to grasp the multifaceted dynamics described by the Stranger, which are not exclusively curative. 
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This living movement has been widely overlooked by current research on the 
Statesman. For instance, Sayre (2006) and Lane (1998) have devoted their studies to 
methodology and theoretical knowledge as the central elements of the dialogue. Sayre 
reads the political dialogue from the exclusive angle of methodology, dialectics and 
metaphysics, to which he devotes all his attention to the detriment of their bond with 
political contents (p.6). Lane identifies the similarities between dialectical methodology 
(‘exemplifying and dividing, and […] finding the mean’) and political knowledge 
whereby, she concludes, ‘method and politics […] become one’ (p.202).220 Similarly, 
Weiss (1995) focuses exclusively on the definition of the statesman as ἐπιστημῶν, 
possessor of technical knowledge, analysing his understanding of ‘the just, beautiful, 
and holy’ as ethical principles that guide his actions (p.222). A particular case is 
represented by Bobonich’s (1995) interpretation, which does in fact focus on ‘the 
education of non-philosophers’ (p.328), but construes it as a methodical indoctrination 
whereby opinions are ‘implanted’ or ‘inculcate[d]’ in ignorant multitudes (p.321). In all 
such cases, we observe a lack of attention, if not towards the subjects themselves, at 
least towards their independent standpoint in relation to the statesman. To overlook this 
object of study, however, means to miss the properly practical nature of leadership, 
which is by necessity addressed to living subjects and shaped by their autonomous 
conditions. Methodology and formal knowledge are not one with concrete leadership, 
unless one artificially abstracts from the concrete application of the latter and reduces it 
to pure formal categories. 
The same lack of attention to praxes affects, to various degrees, the few 
available studies of the dialogical scene of the Statesman. These studies generally focus 
on the Stranger’s doctrines and the formal means of their communication to Young 
Socrates. For instance, Rowe (2000) holds that the Statesman was composed by Plato 
‘to propound already fixed positions’ (p.175), whereby it ‘doesn’t quite come off as a 
dialogue’ (p.176) and constitutes a thinly ‘disguised pedagogy’ that hardly requires a 
dialogical form (p.178). Rowe’s judgment is particularly puzzling insofar as the 
Statesman is, in fact, explicitly set out as a pedagogical or educational dialogue (e.g. 
257c7-258a6; 285c8-d7). It is difficult to imagine why Rowe claims that this process be 
in any way disguised. Rowe rightly observes that this dialogue does not portray an 
                                                             
220 Lane (1998) acknowledges the independent role of the citizens in relation to the statesman (pp.178-
180). However, she construes the former’s role merely as ‘the murkier stuff of beliefs and backgrounds’ 
to which a rigidly objective norm must be dictated (p.186), and the latter’s as the communication of a 
methodologically, if less theoretically sound, understanding of the kairos (‘facilitating the perception of 
the timely good’, p.202). 
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interaction among different arguments, defended by different characters, thus losing the 
‘sheer excitement’ of debate that is more typical of Plato’s writing (p.171). The lack of 
debate or excitement, however, does not mean that the presence of different characters 
can be disregarded and the dialogue reduced to a camouflaged treatise. Two recent 
studies of this dialogue scene, in fact, defend its relative significance. Santa Cruz 
acknowledges that the Stranger, in his educational role, must rely ‘on his interlocutor’s 
agreement, without which it is impossible to proceed’ (p.193, tr. mine). Like Rowe, 
nonetheless, she holds that the form of the Statesman ‘is not the one of a living 
dialogue’ and that ‘the absence of conflict in it is remarkable’ (p.190, tr. mine), because 
its purpose is to present mere ‘considerations on explicatory methods’ (p.199, tr. mine) 
rather than an exchange of opinions. Gill offers a more nuanced interpretation (1995), 
supporting a reading of this dialogue as a genuine, albeit not very dramatic, ‘dialectical 
interchange’ (p.292). He observes, correctly, that the dialogue includes a moment of 
mediation between the Stranger’s support for unregulated authority and Young 
Socrates’s resistance to it (Pol. 291-303). Since the Stranger, in response to his 
interlocutor’s doubts, needs to moderate his position and allow for the value of 
constitutional legislation, Gill reads this dialogue as a dynamic process of 
‘defamiliariazation and theorised reconstitution’ (p.304) whereby given opinions are 
progressively reframed and corrected in view of a mediation of different standpoints.221 
Nonetheless, Gill (2000) also admits that this process of ‘mediation’ of intellectual 
positions is not necessarily ‘expressed through the dramatized interchange between 
personae’ in Plato’s dialogues (p.292). There is in fact no inherent reason to rely on a 
dramatic discussion in order to present a mediation of ideas. The genuinely dramatic 
aspect, which none of the interpreters here listed has sufficiently considered, is Young 
Socrates’s own disposition or philosophical progress as Plato represents it. These 
interpreters, instead, consider formal methodology and theoretical clarification as the 
fundamental payoffs of the Statesman. 
What similar approaches fail to acknowledge, or acknowledge only as 
secondary, is the independent position of the subjects of philosophical or political 
guidance. They focus, instead, either on figures that Plato presents as possessors of 
knowledge, or on the formal, methodological features of their expertise. To my 
knowledge, only Stefanini (1949) has argued against the central role of methodology or 
didactic formalism in this dialogue, arguing that Plato has represented a difficult 
                                                             
221 Cf. Gill (2000) for a development of this interpretation as valid for the other non-Socratic dialogues as 
well. 
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progress of reflective ‘awareness’222 acquired through speculation (p.217), as opposed 
to a mere refinement of methods and doctrines. He holds that Plato has portrayed ‘the 
anxiousness and almost the suffering of thinking’ dictated by constant inquiry and 
doubts, and analogous to the difficult problem of finding, concretely, an ideal statesman 
(p.441). Albeit limiting his observations to general remarks and not exhibiting complete 
textual evidence for his reading, Stefanini correctly emphasises the concrete 
experiential aspects that, to Plato, determine the cognitive and political value of the art 
of dialectic. His attention to the presence of cognitive experiences (‘awareness’) and 
emotional states (‘suffering’) in Plato’s writing is not a naïve appreciation of superficial 
elements, with no bearing on theoretical issues. Rather, it has a solid theoretical 
foundation, namely the conviction that, in every dialogue, Plato represents philosophy 
as a process of ‘skepsis’ (p.441), a troubling but constructive examination and re-
examination of opinions, grounded at once on the possibility to attain some truth and on 
the necessity to question established positions, constantly, from multiple standpoints. To 
Stefanini, skepsis is thus a dynamic process that stands in between rigid dogmatism and 
absolute scepticism and requires both moments.223 In agreement with this theoretical 
standpoint, I will demonstrate that, in the Statesman, Plato explicitly portrays a process 
of dialogue that involves toilsome effort, and that he assimilates the intellectual and 
political experiences of the search for a correct combination of perspectives. 
 
5.2. The Statesman as a Model of Dialectics 
In composing the political inquiry of the Statesman as a dialogue, Plato has eschewed 
linearity of argument and chosen to represent, instead, an educational scene 
characterised by errors, philosophical digressions, and complex shifts of angles. In this 
                                                             
222 All citations from Stefanini are given in my translation. The Italian ‘coscienza’ could also be translated 
as ‘consciousness’. The notion of consciousness or self-awareness in ancient Greece is extremely 
complex and it cannot be easily reduced to contemporary notions of psychology or philosophy of mind. 
Foucault (2003) has suggested that the principle ‘know thyself’, reportedly expressed by the Delphic 
oracle, grounds Classical culture not so much in terms of theoretical understanding as in terms of 
pragmatical care (epimeleia) of oneself: self-awareness emerges, to him, in the context of the ethical 
management of one’s life, material goods, and inner dispositions (p.47). The full scope of this concept 
cannot be tackled adequately here, but it can be observed that the processes of ethical psychology 
represented in the Statesman fit perfectly within this frame. Cf. Napolitano Valditara, 2010, pp.19-21. 
223 See Stefanini (1991), pp.XXVIII-XXXIII. Cf. Capizzi (1995) and Lodge (1947). Capizzi sees Plato’s 
philosophy as a mediation between dogmatism and scepticism (pp.404-6). Lodge argues for a reading of 
Plato’s dialogues as sceptically detached from the theoretical positions they propose, even as they defend 
idealistic positions, because their educational purpose is to promote critical judgment (pp.6-8). Stefanini’s 
position is preferable, however, insofar as it does not detach dogmatism or idealism from scepticism, but 
rather shows that both moments (the positing of abstract truths and their constant questioning) are 
inseparable parts of the same theoretical process. 
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dialogue, indeed, the Eleatic Stranger guides Young Socrates through a multifaceted 
‘experience about knowledge’ (περὶ τῆς ἐπιστήμης πάθος, 277d7) on political matters, 
starting with an error of perspective (the statesman as herdsman, 258a7-277a2) and 
slowly correcting it through a set of organised disruptions and combinations of images. 
I argue that Plato’s compositional choice prevents the readers from interpreting this 
dialogue merely as an exposition of methodological, metaphysical, or political 
doctrines. Rather, it is productive to read it as a particular image of dialectics, namely of 
the activity of inquiring minds in general. The Stranger himself invites such a reading 
by assimilating his and Young Socrates’s inquiry to a model: 
E.S.: If someone were to ask us about the session of pupils learning about 
letters – when one of them is asked what letters make up some word or other, 
are we to say that for him on that occasion the inquiry takes place more for the 
sake of the question that has been set before him, and that alone, or for the sake 
of his becoming more able to answer all questions relating to letters? / Y.S. 
Clearly for the sake of his being able to answer everything. / E.S. What then 
about our inquiry now about the statesman? Has it been set before us more for 
the sake of that very thing, or for the sake of our becoming more able 
dialecticians in relation to all subjects? / Y.S. That’s clear too – for the sake 
of our being more able in relation to all. 
ΞΕ. Εἴ τις ἀνέροιτο ἡμᾶς τὴν περὶ γράμματα συνουσίαν τῶν μανθανόντων, 
ὁπόταν τις ὁτιοῦν ὄνομα ἐρωτηθῇ τίνων ἐστὶ γραμμάτων, πότερον αὐτῷ τότε 
φῶμεν γίγνεσθαι τὴν ζήτησιν ἑνὸς ἕνεκα μᾶλλον τοῦ προβληθέντος ἢ τοῦ περὶ 
πάντα τὰ προβαλλόμενα γραμματικωτέρῳ γίγνεσθαι; / ΝΕ. Δῆλον ὅτι τοῦ περὶ 
ἅπαντα. / ΞΕ. Τί δ᾽ αὖ νῦν ἡμῖν ἡ περὶ τοῦ πολιτικοῦ ζήτησις; ἕνεκα αὐτοῦ 
τούτου προβέβληται μᾶλλον ἢ τοῦ περὶ πάντα διαλεκτικωτέροις γίγνεσθαι; 
/ ΝΕ. Καὶ τοῦτο δῆλον ὅτι τοῦ περὶ πάντα (285c8-d7, tr. Rowe, adapted). 
The significance of this passage extends the Stranger’s account of models (see Chapter 
2) to the dialogue as a whole: the political inquiry at hand is not an end in itself, but it 
can provide a paradigmatic model, set before the minds of the interlocutors as much as 
of the readers, of dialectic itself in all circumstances (περὶ πάντα). As images and 
models allow the mind to explore a complex topic from (ideally) all its different angles, 
so in relation to the Statesman it is possible to shift the interpretive angle from political 
concerns to a reflection on the activity of dialectic as such. 
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In this passage, Plato explicitly draws the readers’ attention to the dialogue as a 
whole, highlighting its paradigmatic value. Notice however that the character of the 
Stranger does not argue for the absolute validity of this interpretation, but rather asks 
for Young Socrates’s judgment. Young Socrates is the one who accepts to consider this 
political inquiry from a reflective angle about dialectic alone. It is not necessary, thus, to 
take this passage as an invitation for the readers to focus exclusively on exercises of 
dialectic, compared to which political concerns are of minor importance or even 
indifferent. In fact, the Stranger, in an interrogative fashion, simply points out that two 
possible interpretations of this political inquiry are possible: one focused on the problem 
of statecraft, the other on the dialectical activity it entails. We need not sever the two 
aspects if we observe that it is the very topic of statecraft, qua multifaceted and 
susceptible of inquiry from different angles, that demands an equally complex 
movement of inquiry. By inviting Young Socrates to consider the inquiry as an image of 
dialectic, the Stranger certainly stresses the importance of dialectic, but he does not 
imply that political inquiry is an indifferent pretext for practicing the art of dialogue. 
Rather, he invites the youth (and the readers) to pay attention to what happens at the 
level of the dialogue itself, in order to reflect critically on the very process of dialectic 
triggered by the problem of statecraft. 
 
5.2.1. A Shared Exercise of Cognitive Stability 
In the Statesman, Plato represented a dialectical exercise undergone by Young Socrates, 
which demands strong stability of mind. The other characters of this dialogue are the 
same that appear in the Theaetetus and the Sophist, which narratively precede it: the 
older Socrates, who introduces the characters’ discussion but then remains silent, the 
old mathematician Theodorus of Cyrene, and his younger ‘colleague’ and Young 
Socrates’s companion Theaetetus.224 Plato’s narrative scene connects the three 
dialogues: Theaetetus had dialogued with Socrates about knowledge the former day, 
during the discussion in the Theaetetus, and about sophistry with the Stranger this very 
day, during the discussion in the Sophist. Now the characters of the older Socrates and 
Theodorus are discussing with the Stranger about choosing another interlocutor to 
replace Theaetetus: 
                                                             
224 Historical studies of character: Skemp, 1952, pp.22-26; Migliori 1996, pp.33-36; Reale, 2000, p.193 
and p.263. Plato’s choice to represent young mathematicians as in need of philosophical training is 
theoretically significant, because it reflects the subordination of mathematical (hypothetical) knowledge 
to philosophical thought, which aims to give account (logon didonai) of its very hypothetical premises 
(Resp. VI.510c-511e). Cf. Napolitano Valditara (2011). 
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E.S.: Should we give him a rest and substitute for him [the younger] Socrates 
here, who trains with him? Or what’s your advice? / Theodorus: As you say, 
make a substitution; since they are young, they’ll put up with any sort of 
toilsome effort more easily if they take a rest. 
ΞΕ. διαναπαύσωμεν αὐτὸν μεταλαβόντες αὐτοῦ τὸν συγγυμναστὴν τόνδε 
Σωκράτη; ἢ πῶς συμβουλεύεις; / Θεόδωρος. καθάπερ εἶπες, μεταλάμβανε· νέω 
γὰρ ὄντε ῥᾷον οἴσετον πάντα πόνον ἀναπαυομένω (Pol. 257c7-10, tr. Rowe, 
adapted). 
Immediately, the characters describe philosophical discussions as a hard training, 
characterised by a level of toilsome effort (πόνον).225 This aspect follows consistently 
the scene of the Sophist. At Soph. 218a6-b4, the Stranger had warned Theaetetus that 
the length (μήκει) of discourses was likely to cause him pains (πονῶν), and the youth 
had accepted by suggesting that, should he be unable to carry on, the burden of the 
discussion could pass to Young Socrates, a ‘companion in training’ (συγγυμναστήν) 
whose custom is ‘to share toilsome efforts’ (συνδιαπονεῖν) with him. The Statesman 
thus represents a kind of effortful dialectical exercise meant to develop Young 
Socrates’s philosophical skills. The older Socrates supports and expands this frame, by 
suggesting that the discussion will constitute a test of the youth’s abilities: 
Yesterday I myself commingled in discourses with Theaetetus, and I have just 
now heard him answering questions, but in Socrates’s case I did neither; we 
need to examine him too. He’ll answer to me on another occasion; for now let 
him answer you. 
Θεαιτήτῳ μὲν οὖν αὐτός τε συνέμειξα χθὲς διὰ λόγων καὶ νῦν ἀκήκοα 
ἀποκρινομένου, Σωκράτους δὲ οὐδέτερα· δεῖ δὲ σκέψασθαι καὶ τοῦτον. ἐμοὶ 
μὲν οὖν εἰς αὖθις, σοὶ δὲ νῦν ἀποκρινέσθω (258a3-6, tr. Rowe, adapted). 
This exercise, the older Socrates jokes, will serve to reveal whether his younger 
namesake shares a genuine ‘kinship’ (συγγένειαν, 257d2) with him, as their homonymy 
                                                             
225 I am grateful to Francesco Benoni for his constructive indications about πόνος in the Sophist and, more 
generally, about Plato’s understanding of suffering as integral to the philosophical quest for knowledge. 
For a study of the various meanings of ponos, ranging from the toil of daily human labours to military and 
heroic ordeals, see Loraux (1982). This term is associated to philosophical characters and their theoretical 
efforts in Xenophon, Apol. 17; Plato, Symp. 219e8; and Aristotle, Et. Nic. I, 12, 1102a5 and X, 6, 
1177a33. 
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seems to suggest.226 The entire discussion on politics is set from the start not merely as 
an exercise of correct definition, but as a very personal examination of a young mind. 
The Stranger’s central focus, indeed, rests on the psychological conditions of those who 
undergo effortful philosophical inquiries. 
As we have seen in Chapter 2, his account of intellectual confusion as akin to a 
pupil’s misunderstanding of complex syllables serves to highlight what would happen 
‘if our souls by their nature experienced this same thing in relation to the letters [scil.: 
elements] of everything’ (εἰ ταὐτὸν τοῦτο ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχὴ φύσει περὶ τὰ τῶν πάντων 
στοιχεῖα πεπονθυῖα). The same psychological concern refers as much to diairesis as to 
other expressive forms: at 258c the Stranger argues that ‘our soul’ (τὴν ψυχὴν ἡμῶν, 
258c7) must strive to think in terms of two opposite Forms in order to find the path 
towards statecraft, and at 286a he claims that visual images lack the power to ‘satisfy’ 
(ἀποπληρῶσαι, literally ‘fill up’) ‘the soul of the inquirer’ (τὴν τοῦ πυνθανομένου 
ψυχὴν, 286a2).227 The Stranger’s concern with methods of dialogue and, more 
generally, expressive forms is always justified by their psychological (either cognitive 
or emotional) impact. They are educationally opportune only if they produce a correct 
inner order of the soul, counteracting or preventing negative conditions such as 
confusion, disorientation or insufficient clarity. All the aspects of philosophical 
communication examined in the former chapters fit within this psychological frame: 
disruptions interrupt the linearity of inquiry (Ch.1), images provide different angles 
through which an inquiring mind needs to move (Ch.2), and playful imagery provokes 
the inquiring intellect with clashing ideas (Ch.3 and 4). 
The Stranger, accordingly, pays attention not only to intellectual procedures, but 
also to the emotional efforts faced by Young Socrates. He praises his tentative 
distinction of human beings from other animals as ‘very eager and courageous’ 
(προθυμότατα καὶ ἀνδρειότατα, 262a5), even if he considers it too superficial to 
distinguish a statesman from a herdsman. He observes that ‘revulsion’ (δυσχερείας, 
286b7) can ensue from apparently excessively convoluted discourses, and he worries 
that the youth feels revulsion (δυσχεραίνεις, 294a2) against the apparently excessive 
idea of unregulated political expertise. Finally, he insists repeatedly on the puzzling 
nature of his myth (θαυμαστόν, 277b4; cf. 269b6; 270b4; 270d2), as well as of other 
                                                             
226 On word-play on the characters’ names as a trigger of philosophical discussion, cf. Crat. 383b2-384c5; 
Symp. 185c4-d3. Socrates’s joke here seems to forshadow the Stranger’s later concern with the 
recognition and evaluation of similarities, thus adding further significance to the dialogical frame. 
227 Cf. 306d1: pictures of human bodies can nonetheless express bodily and psychological qualities such 
as quickness ‘in body, soul and voice’ (εἴτε κατὰ σώματα εἴτ᾽ ἐν ψυχαῖς εἴτε κατὰ φωνῆς). 
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discourses such as the one about the contrast of courage and moderation (θαυμαστόν 
[…] λόγον, 306b6). The Stranger, therefore, is fully aware that his method of lengthy 
argumentation is connected to his interlocutor’s inclinations, doubts and perplexities, 
since it either triggers various emotional reactions or responds to them. The presence of 
such reactions is not a mere side-effect of an intellectual endeavour, but it is integral to 
the inquiry to the point of determining the argumentative directions taken by the 
Stranger. The educational scene of the dialogue thus serves to emphasise the 
psychological effects entailed by an intellectual and emotional ‘gymnastic’ such as the 
inquiry on statecraft requires, and justifies its puzzling lack of linearity. 
The Stranger explicitly invites Young Socrates to reflect on these dialectical 
efforts and accept them as an integral part of complex inquiries. At 286a4-5 he claims 
that philosophy consists in ‘exercising at being able to give and receive an account of 
each thing’ (μελετᾶν λόγον ἑκάστου δυνατὸν εἶναι δοῦναι καὶ δέξασθαι), namely in a 
practical effort of communication both for the speaker and for the listener, who must be 
able to follow attentively the various nuances of the dialogue. Shortly afterwards, the 
Stranger insists that lengthy discussions and digressions should be ‘accepted’ 
(ἀποδεχόμενον, 286e5) for their educational value, as they can make the hearer better at 
discovering new notions and ways of communicating them. Thus, the Stranger displays 
an educational concern with the development of autonomous philosophical skills in his 
interlocutor, to be acquired by following attentively the disruptive path of inquiry on 
political complexities. Notice that ‘knowing how to give and receive account’ 
(ἐπίστασθαι λόγον τε δοῦναι καὶ δέξασθαι) about every subject is also described by 
Alcibiades as Socrates’s unchallenged expertise in the Protagoras (336c1).228 Plato has 
thus represented the younger Socrates as training in his older namesake’s expertise: the 
art of dialectic itself. Yet his concern is not just with dialectic as a technical tool, but 
also with the psychological conditions it entails. Indeed, the Stranger had previously 
exhibited this concern in his theory of models, when he claimed that images can help 
the mind to ‘compose itself’ (συνίσταται, 278d2) among various shifts of perspective 
rather than being ‘carried around everything’ (περὶ ἅπαντα […] φέρεται, 278d2) in 
outright disorientation. Therefore, Young Socrates’ efforts are aimed at developing 
                                                             
228 Plato’s insistence on the universality of such expertise does not coincide with a hubristic claim that 
dialectic consists in universal knowledge (a deceitful sophistic claim according to Resp. X.596c-598d and 
Soph. 231d-236d). Rather, insofar as dialectic is open both to giving and receiving accounts of everything, 
it constitutes an art of inter-subjective communication, critically open as much to the reception of others’ 
ideas as to the expression and examination of one’s own. 
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dialectical skills as much as cognitive stability in facing digressive, multifaceted 
discussions. 
Finally, the Stranger construes his and Young Socrates’s inquiry as a shared 
process aimed at reciprocal agreement. He first remarks that ‘the two of us together 
must search for the statesman’ (δεῖ πολιτικὸν τὸν ἄνδρα διαζητεῖν νῷν, 258b3), thus 
immediately setting out the research as a common effort. Subsequently, he claims that 
‘if people are doing something in common, concord is desirable’ (ἀλλὰ μὴν τοῖς γε 
κοινῇ τι πράττουσιν ἀγαπητὸν ὁμονοεῖν; 260b7-8), thus establishing mutual agreement 
(literally, developing alike [ὁμοῖοῖ] minds [νοοῖ]) as the foundation of any shared 
(κοινῆ) activity. He further insists on the common nature of the task that ‘we are 
sharing’ (αὐτοὶ κοινωνῶμεν, 260b10), and later prevents Young Socrates from 
concluding the inquiry by claiming that ‘I need to share my opinion in common with 
you, as well’ (δεῖ […] κἀμοὶ μετὰ σοῦ κοινῇ συνδοκεῖν, 277a3-4).229 The guiding 
principle of his discussion with Young Socrates is mutual understanding. Such a 
principle is necessarily two-sided. At 277a3-4, the Stranger refuses to agree with the 
youth that a definition of statecraft qua responsible care of a community is sufficient to 
capture its nature. At 293e8-294a4, instead, he welcomes his interlocutor’s doubts about 
the opportunity of unregulated authority, a position that Young Socrates considers 
unmeasured,230 and tackles them directly. The multifaceted structure of the Statesman, 
thus, owes as much to the Stranger’s insistence on dialectical precision as to Young 
Socrates’s hesitations and doubts. Concord is not represented here as a mere uniformity 
of minds, but as the result of a difficult process in which two individuals acknowledge 
each other’s positions and strive to mediate them. In agreement with Gill (1995 and 
2000), we can notice that the Statesman portrays a dynamic of genuine interaction 
between two subjective standpoints, as opposed to rigid dogmatism or didactic 
formalism. Even if the Stranger undoubtedly preserves a leading role, and Young 
Socrates never proposes positive arguments, the educational dynamic represented by 
Plato is significant. It serves to portray philosophical education not just as the 
communication of established notions, but as an attentive relationship of teacher and 
pupil, necessarily influenced by the latter’s own dispositions, both cognitive and 
emotional. 
                                                             
229 Santa Cruz (1995) also lists: 257c8-d2; 261a8; 264d5; 277e2; 280b6-8; 287a6-b1; 293e2-294a2; 
294b6-7 (p.192). 
230 Cf. Chapter 1, Section 1.3. 
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Plato represents Young Socrates as benefitting from this attention and slowly 
becoming more sensitive to the nuances of the Stranger’s exposition. At first, the 
Stranger in fact leads the discussion with a strong hand. When he begins his second 
diairesis of animal species, he anticipates the youth’s possible questions with the words: 
‘so that you don’t precede me’ (ἵνα μή με φθῇς, 266d11); and as we have seen he 
prevents him from concluding the political discussion too early (277a3-4). However, 
Young Socrates soon starts to anticipate the Stranger’s implicit aims. At 277c7-8, the 
youth asks: ‘Show me how you say we have not yet given an adequate account [of 
statecraft]’ (ὅπῃ δὲ ἡμῖν οὔπω φῂς ἱκανῶς εἰρῆσθαι δήλωσον), thus exhibiting reflective 
awareness about the current status of inquiry. More strongly, at 293e6-7 he phrases his 
doubts against unregulated authority in terms of right measure, claiming that the 
Stranger’s position has not been said ‘in due measure’ (μετρίωs). In both cases, Socrates 
correctly perceives implicit problems or imprecisions, which require the Stranger to 
address overlooked arguments and integrate them in his account of statecraft. At 275e, 
the generic definition of statecraft as ‘art of taking charge’ (ἐπιμελητικὴν, 275e5) of a 
community had to be integrated with a long and laborious examination of all the social 
aspects to which it relates, namely professional arts and the citizens’ dispositions 
(287b4-311c8). At 293e, the superficial notion of effective and benevolent authority 
‘without laws’ (ἄνευ νόμων, 293e7) had to be integrated with an examination of the 
independent value of legislation (293e6-300c4). Young Socrates thus gradually learns to 
exhibit his own educational needs and even to challenge his interlocutor’s opinions, 
always with attention to implicit problems that would make a particular political 
position too partial to be judged adequate and measured. The Stranger indeed welcomes 
the youth’s final objection with the words: ‘You preceded me just a little with your 
question, Socrates’ (μικρόν γε ἔφθης με ἐρόμενος, ὦ Σώκρατες; 293e8)’, thereby 
approving his perception of the implicit limits of what has been said and accepting his 
novel position ahead of his teacher.231 In the end, it is Young Socrates who puts the 
final seal on the political discussion, approving the Stranger’s discourse as beautiful and 
well-composed:232 
                                                             
231 In the Sophist he displays a comparable educational concern, blaming pre-Socratic philosophers, 
despite their venerable wisdom, for writing in such a style as to disregard whether ‘we follow them up 
close’ (ἐπακολουθοῦμεν, Soph. 243a7) or ‘they leave us behind’ (ἀπολειπόμεθα, 243b1). 
232 Contra Rowe, 1995, p.245. Rowe argues that these last words are pronounced by the older Socrates. I 
hold that the simple disappearance of the main interlocutor at the very end of the inquiry does not match 
the educational scene represented by Plato, and the abrupt reappearance of Socrates seems somewhat 
unjustified. Notice that the educational scene of the Sophist also ends with the young interlocutor’s 
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In the most beautiful way, Stranger, you have completed for us the kingly man 
and the statesman. 
κάλλιστα αὖ τὸν βασιλικὸν ἀπετέλεσας ἄνδρα ἡμῖν, ὦ ξένε, καὶ τὸν πολιτικόν 
(311c7, tr. Rowe, adapted). 
 
Thus, the role of Young Socrates as trainee in philosophical dialogue is much 
more than a silent receiver of established doctrines. In fact, he serves to represent a 
subject that, while strictly guided, faces countless philosophical difficulties and 
patiently learns to evaluate them autonomously. Skemp (1952) has observed that Young 
Socrates is not a colourless listener but has a specific character: he is ‘over-eager to 
complete the definition of the Statesman […] He finds it hard saying that the truly wise 
statesman is able to rule without laws, but he is quick to admit to rarity of good draught 
players […] He is commended for restating the important contention that a skilled 
adviser of a ruler is as much a statesman as if he ruled himself, and has no doubts of the 
effect of tying up everything by legal regulations. He sees nothing wrong in the practice 
of marrying for money’ (p.26). Skemp considers these as little dramatic touches, but I 
have shown that at least some of them have a specific philosophical significance: his 
intellectual eagerness and courage, as well as his revulsion against rule without laws, 
constitute moments in which the right measure of statecraft is called into doubt and 
must be found through different paths of discussion. Young Socrates’s last words fit 
within this dramatic scene and indicate that his efforts have been successful. He can 
now see clearly the well-composed figure he’s been striving to find. 
 This dialogue scene is thus significant for a correct interpretation of the 
Statesman as an image of dialectical inquiry. It establishes inquiry as a toilsome effort 
from which, nonetheless, an interlocutor can benefit both in proficiency in 
communication and lucid stability of mind. It represents the frequent irruption of 
emotional aspects and intellectual difficulties that complicate the examination of a 
multifaceted issue. It also establishes dialectic, even when strictly educational, as a 
process of mutual acknowledgement and progressive convergence of opinions. Finally, 
it portrays education itself as an art of communication, which takes into account the 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
agreement (Soph. 268d5). It seems indeed more coherent with the Stranger’s educational praxis that the 
conclusion of both dialogues demand the youths’ agreement. 
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dispositions and doubts of the interlocutors, in order to communicate autonomous 
insights on philosophical problems. 
 
5.2.2. The Inquiring Mind and its Circular Motion 
Having established how Plato represents the dialogical scene of the Statesman, it is now 
possible to examine how the Stranger describes the intellectual movement he and 
Young Socrates undergo together. I will show here how he repeatedly displays his 
awareness that the political inquiry at hand is a dynamic and non-linear process, because 
it involves various dialectical movements among different problems and a subjective 
ability to follow them in an organised, stable fashion akin to the circular motion of the 
cosmos. 
 In Chapter 1, we have seen that the discussion of the Statesman is apparently 
disorganised, frequently interrupted by digressions and changes of discursive paths. 
Similarly, in Chapter 2 we have seen that this dialogue requires the readers to follow a 
set of different images of politics, shifting their attention from one conceptual angle to 
another. Not only do collateral problems disrupt the linearity of this political inquiry, 
but the multifaceted nature of politics itself demands that it be considered, wittingly, 
from distinct perspectives. The non-linear and many-sided structure of the Statesman 
responds to a philosophical demand for a flexible but stable intellectual movement, 
which eschews both naïve reductions to univocal notions and confused dispersion of 
ideas. The Stranger highlights this dialectical dynamism not only through the language 
of divergent ‘paths’ or ‘routes’,233 but also by metaphorically describing it as a form of 
motion. He introduces his theoretical digression on the experience about knowledge as a 
process that Young Socrates’s doubts have ‘very strangely set in motion’ (μάλ᾽ ἀτόπως 
[…] κινήσας, 277d6). Similarly, later he claims that the youth’s questioning attitude 
has, again, ‘set in motion’ (κινήσας, 297c7) an ‘account’ (λόγον, 297c8) of the status of 
legislation. In both cases, he insists that these collateral movements should not be set 
aside, once a problem has triggered them, until the issue has been satisfactorily clarified. 
As always, his metaphorical language is not casual. In the literal sense, the language of 
motion (κίνησις) can describe, for instance, the precise movement of the revolving 
cosmos234 as well as the rhythmic movements of dance.235 Describing moments of 
                                                             
233 E.g. 266e1; 268d5; 273e7. 
234 269e3: ‘κινεῖται’; 269e4: ‘κινήσεως’; 269e6: ‘κινουμένων’. 
235 307a10: ‘ῥυθμικὴν κίνησιν’. 
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inquiry as motions means assimilating them to physical changes of position that can be 
harmoniously controlled, and it allows the interlocutors to think about the overall 
structure of their dialectical discussion. The image of motion, thus, serves to describe 
dialectic as dynamic process whereby the inquiring mind is ‘carried’ (φέρεται, 278d3) 
along various lines of inquiry but needs to ‘compose itself’ (συνίσταται, 278d2) 
throughout this movement. 
 At 286e3-287a3, after the digression on knowledge but before the one on 
legislation, the Stranger further specifies this image of generic intellectual motion as 
specifically circular. A preliminary remark on the context of his image is necessary. At 
this point, the Stranger is addressing the problem of right measure (metrion) in 
discourses. As we have seen in Chapter 1, he claims that philosophical discourses 
should not be judged as excessive or inadequate just because of their length or brevity, 
namely out of quantitative criteria. Rather, to him the quantitative notion of measure 
should be bent, as it were by ‘forcing’ it (προσαναγκαστέον, 284b10), to qualitative236 
determinations of appropriateness or adequacy. As long as it is appropriate to tackle, 
with lengthy discourses or even myths, unexpectedly complex problems, discourses can 
be said to possess the opportune measure. As long as a path of inquiry or an expressive 
form of language is adequate to elucidate a collateral problem or an implicit difficulty, it 
can be named measured. This claim holds, to him, as much for the lengthy divisions on 
the art of weaving as for the laborious myth of cosmic reversals (and also for the 
digression in the Sophist237 about the notion of non-being). Thus the notion of right 
measure is very general and applies to any form of discourse that might appear 
excessive or inappropriate to a topic, like punctilious distinctions about carding and 
fulling or grand narratives about the cosmic order might seem irrelevant to the 
definition of statecraft. It is in relation to measured discourses that the Stranger 
introduces the image of circular motion: 
                                                             
236 I agree with Sayre (2006) that right measure is a qualitative property (e.g. the distinction found ‘in the 
middle’ between opposites, such as even and odds numbers, as identification of both sets based on an 
inherent quality or lack thereof, such as divisibility by two; cf. pp.230-232). Notice however that speaking 
of quality might be misleading, if we take this term in a purely objective sense. Insofar as we speak of an 
object as measured in the sense of ‘fitting’, ‘adequate’, ‘suitable’, ‘sufficient’ or ‘appropriate’, like a dress 
that fits a person or enough water to fill up a jar (cf. Gorg. 493a-d), right measure can be defined as 
relational. The property at issue may depend on a measurable quantity (the dress is long enough; the 
water in the jar is in the right amount), but the quality of adequacy depends on the relation between two 
objects and is therefore two-sided and contextual (one may also say that a person is too tall for the dress 
she wishes to wear, or that a jar is too small for the water it is meant to contain). This intrinsic relational 
aspect necessarily demands the subject’s judgment and is, in this sense, always ethical (is the person 
inadequate to an objectively good dress, and therefore misguided in her efforts to fit in it, or is the dress 
inadequate to the person, and therefore badly produced?). 
237 Soph. 236d-242b. 
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If in relation to such discussions someone finds fault with the length of what is 
said and will not put up with going round in circles, we must not let such a 
person go straight away […] but we should think it right that he should also 
show, in addition, that if it had been shorter it would make the partners in the 
discussion better dialecticians and better at finding how to display realities in 
their words. 
ἔτι δ᾽ αὖ πρὸς τούτοις τὸν περὶ τὰς τοιάσδε συνουσίας ψέγοντα λόγων μήκη 
καὶ τὰς ἐν κύκλῳ περιόδους οὐκ ἀποδεχόμενον, ὅτι χρὴ τὸν τοιοῦτον μὴ πάνυ 
ταχὺ μηδ᾽ εὐθὺς οὕτω μεθιέναι […] ἀλλὰ καὶ προσαποφαίνειν οἴεσθαι δεῖν ὡς 
βραχύτερα ἂν γενόμενα τοὺς συνόντας ἀπηργάζετο διαλεκτικωτέρους καὶ τῆς 
τῶν ὄντων λόγῳ δηλώσεως εὑρετικωτέρους (286e3-287a3). 
This image defines the Stranger’s educational purpose: to him, the troubling movement 
of digressive discourses is something to be endured for the sake of acquiring abilities of 
dialogue and communication. We need to remember that the inquiry on statecraft, as a 
whole, was introduced as a sort of toilsome dialectical gymnastics; similarly, now the 
Stranger insists that all similar discussions, however troubling, are valuable insofar as 
they benefit those who undergo them. The measuring standard of the value of 
philosophical discourses, thus, is not their objective length, quantitatively determinable, 
but the effect they have on the interlocutors’ dialectical abilities and cognitive 
condition. 
Why, then, does undergoing such disorienting discussions correspond to a 
round-about motion? Certainly, this image cannot be explained away as implying the 
vanity of such efforts, as a process that merely ends up where it started or as circular 
reasoning, because the Stranger rather considers them valuable and productive. As 
Pender (1999) has shown, Plato’s images of circular motion, when attributed to the 
progress of argument and thought, can assume two opposite meanings. On the one hand, 
they can denote ‘some sort of confusion or ignorance’ whereby the speakers are stuck in 
an aimless reasoning (p.105).238 On the other, they can represent ‘the kind of stability 
held up as an ideal’ in Plato’s cosmological accounts,  the stability of cosmic bodies that 
                                                             
238 Charm. 174b: ‘all this time you’ve been dragging me around in a circle’ (πάλαι με περιέλκεις κύκλῳ)’; 
Gorg. 517b: ‘All the time we discuss we never stop coming round always to the same place, with each not 
knowing what the other is saying (ἐν παντὶ γὰρ τῷ χρόνῳ ὃν διαλεγόμεθα οὐδὲν παυόμεθα εἰς τὸ αὐτὸ ἀεὶ 
περιφερόμενοι καὶ ἀγνοοῦντες ἀλλήλων ὅτι λέγομεν)’. 
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keep moving while maintaining a constant position (p.107)—namely their balance.239 
Plato can thus describe a reasoning as circular either because it is aimless and 
inconclusive or because it stands in balance on its own position albeit moving through 
various moments of discussion. Given that the Stranger recommends to sustain circular 
arguments as a valuable educational practice, I argue that his image of circularity 
belongs to the second kind identified by Pender. Indeed, in the myth of the Statesman 
the image of circular revolutions (περιόδων, 270a7)240 represents the rational and wise 
cosmic motion, at times strictly led by a sovereign deity, and at times enacted 
autonomously by the cosmos itself, in delicate balance. In the myth the figure of 
circularity expressed both the idea of strict control, imposed by a helmsman-like leader, 
and the notion of self-controlled inner balance. Equally, this image serves here to 
represent a troubling succession of discourses that needs to be patiently sustained, for 
the sake of internalising dialectical abilities (technical as well as psychological). 
The organisation of the Statesman, accordingly, can create the impression that 
the Stranger is leading Young Socrates in an exercise of confusing, and even pedantic, 
circularity of argument. The interlocutors start with a definition of statecraft as (a1) all-
encompassing expertise in governing a community (258a7-267c4), only to question it 
because of (b1) the myriads of arts that could overlap with it (267c5-268d1) and correct 
it through the myth of an age devoid of arts and politics (268d2-277a3). After a central 
reflection on the former error (277a3-287b3), the characters start again by 
distinguishing (b2) all the arts that contribute to political organisation (287b4-305e7), 
and only at the end they reach a definition of (a2) political expertise as guidance of 
opinions and emotional disposition in the community, for the sake of the citizens’ 
harmonious coexistence (305e8-311c8). The discussion of the Statesman is indeed a 
circular process, whereby given opinions are turned around back-to-front as the inquiry 
moves from problem (a) to problem (b), only to start back from (b) moving towards (a). 
Yet this process is not aimless. Through it, rather, the interlocutors’ initial, univocal 
notion of political expertise as the all-encompassing control of a community is refined 
and reconfigured as, above all, an art of leadership of opinions and inter-subjective 
dispositions. The interlocutors conclude where they started, but with a novel perspective 
on politics: the initial great image of the statesman as ‘shepherd of the people’ has given 
                                                             
239 Cf. Leg. 893c (see Section 4.2). Skemp (1942) shows that Plato presents circular motion as divine and 
superior to linear motions in Pol., Tim. and Leg. Sedley (1997) shows that to Plato circular motion is 
‘appropriate to rational thought’ (p.329) insofar as it is eternal, just like reason has eternal truths as its 
ideal objects. 
240 Also 273e2: ‘περιόδῳ’. 
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way to the very small image of a weaver of bonds among the citizens, turning greatness 
into smallness, excessive perspectives into measured ones. Circularity of discourses 
might thus appear as a confusing ‘overturning’ (μεταβολή)241 of speeches, a vain or 
confusing back-and-forth among opinions. Nonetheless, it constitutes a valuable 
educational exercise insofar as it provides an experience of how excessive perspectives 
can be corrected and given opinions revolutionised. Starting from an error of 
perspective, and correcting it through its back-to-front re-examination, the Statesman 
does more than represent methodological exercises or providing political doctrines; it 
represents the movement of a mind capable of reversing existing opinions and 
examining them from novel angles without becoming disoriented and unstable. 
The image of the circular movement of the intellect is indeed typical of Plato’s 
educational concerns with the inner order of the soul. As we have seen above (4.1), the 
Statesman shares with the Laws and the Timaeus the image242 of a cosmic mind that 
moves the universe according to circular patterns. In the Statesman, the living (ζῷον, 
296d1) cosmos is endowed with wisdom (φρόνησιν, ibid.) insofar as it can move 
through myriads of revolutions on its own accord. Similarly, the eponymous character 
of the Timaeus posits the circular movement243 of the cosmos as typical of ‘intellect and 
wisdom’ (νοῦν καὶ φρόνησιν, 34a2), and the protagonist of the Laws speaks of ‘the 
motion and revolution and calculations of intellect’ (νοῦ κινήσει καὶ περιφορᾷ καὶ 
λογισμοῖς, X.897c5-6) and of ‘the revolution of intellect’ (τῇ τοῦ νοῦ περιόδῳ, 
X.898a5) that govern the life of the universe. In addition, the Statesman shares with the 
Phaedo the image of a spherical cosmos, whose perfect shape and motion grants is 
‘balance’ (ἰσορροπίαν, 109a4) on its centre and furnishes a model of ethical, rational 
order embedded in the material cosmos. The ostensible reason for this image, thus, is 
that it represents a stable homogeneity of shape and movement: a circumference is 
equally distant from the centre in all its parts, and a circular motion always starts back 
from where it started, endlessly replicating exactly the same path as long as it remains 
balanced on its axis. Circular motion is the image of a reality that never changes, never 
ceases to move itself by itself, and preserves itself identical to itself, with geometrical 
                                                             
241 Cf. Gorg.  481d7-e1; Parm. 162c5-6; Soph. 234d6. 
242 Pol. ‘figure’ (σχῆμα, 269a5); Laws ‘image’ (εἰκόνα, X.897e1); Tim. ‘figure’ (σχῆμα, 33b1). 
243 Tim. 34a1: ‘κίνησιν’; 34a4 ‘κύκλῳ κινεῖσθαι’. 
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precision.244 It is an image of a never-ending life that depends on a perfectly rational 
structure.245 
This figure of perfect, geometrical homogeneity also provides an image for 
human rationality, but with nuances due to the influence of non rational factors on the 
human mind. For instance, Timaeus describes the human soul as divinely designed to 
replicate the cosmic revolutions (περιόδους, Tim. 44d3), and like the cosmic soul placed 
within a spherical body (the head) to direct the rest of the body. However, he also grants 
that it is subject to irrational influxes from bodily affections,246 which drag it ‘forwards 
and backwards, and again to the right and to the left, and downwards and upwards’ (εἴς 
τε γὰρ τὸ πρόσθε καὶ ὄπισθεν καὶ πάλιν εἰς δεξιὰ καὶ ἀριστερὰ κάτω τε καὶ ἄνω, 43b3) 
and leave it disoriented. Unlike cosmic wisdom, human rationality needs to respond 
adequately to all sorts of impulses that threaten its inner order. Similarly, in the 
Phaedrus Socrates describes the heavenly revolution as carrying around (περιάγει, 
247c1) disembodied and perfectly rational souls together with the gods. Such souls, 
Socrates narrates, are therefore able to contemplate, from the very top of the cosmos, 
the ideal Forms outside of it (247d ff.). But this process is not devoid of difficulties:247 
while divine souls are structured ‘in a balanced fashion’ (ἰσορρόπως, 247b2) and easy to 
govern because devoid of non rational appetites, human souls are constantly drawn 
downwards towards earthly goods and are more difficult to keep in the same divine 
position.248 To Plato, emotional aspects variously influence the stable and lucid activity 
of human intellect, and one of the many images he chooses to represent this dynamic is 
a circular motion that must be maintained, with effort, in equilibrium. This image 
represents a stable and regular position of the intellect that, in its optimal condition, is 
not disrupted and unbalanced by irrational impulses, but preserves a rational structure. 
                                                             
244 Timaeus famously calls it ‘a certain moving image of eternity’ (εἰκὼ […] κινητόν τινα αἰῶνος), 
namely the dynamic imitation of a reality that never changes. 
245 Cf. Skemp, 1952, pp.85-91. In particular, Skemp notices that the essential reason for the image of 
circularity (and the anthropomorphic account of the universe as endowed with consciousness) is the 
establishment of the ‘analogy of microcosm and microcosm’ (p.90). See also: Guthrie (1962) on 
circularity as cosmic perfection (pp.351-7); Sedley (1997) on circularity as rationality. 
246 Such as the need for nutrition or confused empirical perceptions (43b5-c5). In addition, Timaeus later 
lists the emotional impulses of pleasure and pain, audacity and fear, spiritedness and hope, irrational 
sensations and erotic drives (69c3-d5), but without mention of either circular or linear motions of the 
soul. 
247 ‘For there extreme toil and challenges are set before the soul’. (ἔνθα δὴ πόνος τε καὶ ἀγὼν ἔσχατος 
ψυχῇ πρόκειται). Cf. Pol. 257c7-10 and285c8-d7 (Sections 5.2 and 5.2.1). 
248 The fundamental difference between Timaeus’s and Socrates’s accounts is that, in the former case, 
irrational impulses derive from the body, while in the latter they pertain to the soul as such. It is 
impossible to address here the controversial problem of Plato’s consistency in his psychological accounts; 
suffice it to identify his constant focus on psychological activity as a dynamic process, either regular and 
balanced or carried around in confusing directions. 
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However, Plato uses the image of circularity also to promote intellectual 
dynamism over excessive immobility. In the image of the cave in the Republic, in 
particular, Socrates describes the conditions of prisoners forced by chains to stare at 
delusionary shadows, as the impossibility of ‘turning their heads around in circle’ 
(κύκλῳ δὲ τὰς κεφαλὰς […] περιάγειν, 514b1) towards the source of light that casts 
those shadows.249 The freed prisoner imagined by Socrates, by contrast, will be able to 
engage in an ascendant path towards the hidden sources of light (a fire in the cave, and 
the heavenly bodies outside), thus perceiving the real objects past the former delusions, 
and then come back to the other prisoners with accounts of what he has seen. In this 
context, the circular motion available to the human head (identical to the one in the 
Timaeus), does not represent a stable movement, but a free one: the ability to observe 
reality from perspectives otherwise unavailable and to gain a sounder knowledge of 
reality. The human ability to revolve their heads, the seat of intellect and sight in the 
Timaeus, constitutes here an image for the possibility to gain a synoptic view of reality, 
provided that the mind is not constrained by cognitive limits and delusions. The stable 
revolution of the intellect, directly coincident with the movement of the head (when 
helped by an unchained body),250 is thus here an act of con-version, of re-orientation 
from limited images towards truer realities. Therefore, to Plato circularity of intellectual 
movement does not represent only the fixedness upon a stable point, but also the motion 
of a synoptic, ‘all-round’ understanding of reality.251 
In accordance with my study of cosmic imagery in Chapter 4, we can thus 
observe that the figure of circularity constitutes at once an image of stable and 
                                                             
249 It may be argued that a fully circular motion of the human head goes against human physiology, and 
that once again Plato is creating a metaphor that exceeds the limits of realism. However, at 514a Plato 
clearly describes the prisoners’ necks and legs as chained, so that the prisoners’ liberation entails a 
possibility to revolve their whole body and, by extension, physically revolve their heads in a circle. This 
fact obviously hinders us from taking the head as a fully independent seat of rationality (cf. Tim. 44d-
45a), but it does not diminish the metaphorical force of envisaging the head, spherical seat of intellect and 
vision, as a microcosmic image of the whole universe and capable, under the right circumstances, of the 
same activity. 
250 See fn.249 above. 
251 Napolitano Valditara (2007) observes that the idea of a synoptic vision, obtained by rotating a mirror 
in a full circle, appears at Resp. X.596d-e (‘if you are willing to take a mirror and turn it around in every 
direction [εἰ 'θέλεις λαβὼν κάτοπτρον περιφέρειν πανταχῇ] … you will quickly produce the sun and 
everything in the sky, and the earth and yourself and the other animals and equipments and plants and all 
the objects about which we just now discussed’). In this context the synoptic vision is in fact a sophistic 
illusion, an image of the universe that pretends to be real. It it the most complete and thus worst kind of 
deceit or self-delusion. Napolitano Valditara insists on the ‘delusionary and deceitful role’ of the mirror 
for its power to replicate ‘the whole world’ (p.235, tr. mine). Nonethless, this power depends not on the 
mirror as such, but on the utmost completeness and perfection of the illusion, which is only achieved 
through a rotation akin to the cosmic motions (peripherein). The image of circular motion thus remains 
fundamental for Plato to express the idea of complete vision and perfect knowledge (even when 
delusionary). 
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homogeneous rationality, and of a freely moving intellect capable of synoptic views. 
The obstacles to this intellectual movement, to Plato, can be either irrational impulses 
pushing it in confusing and unbalancing directions, or an excessive fixity that constrains 
a comprehensive intellectual exploration. Just like in the Statesman, both the excessive 
focus on limited perspectives and the disoriented dispersion of mind along different 
lines can be detrimental for human cognition and psychological stability. Following 
another Socratic image of circularity, we may say that to Plato the human mind is like a 
precariously placed spinning-top,252 which must eschew at once destabilizing thrusts 
and paralysing constraints in order to maintain its regular activity. 
The kind of intellectual movement through which the Stranger leads Young 
Socrates combines both the aspects of stability and movement. While I accept Pender’s 
(1999) interpretation of circular motion as stable intellectual dynamism, I stress the fact 
that this ambivalent condition is ultimately dependent on a form of balance. Moving 
through a variety of perspectives on the same issue, facing emotional impulses and 
cognitive disruptions, while aiming with unwavering determination at a synoptic and 
satisfactory representation of the topic at hand, the inquiry of the Statesman constitutes 
a demanding exercise in cognitive balance. Just like, in the Stranger’s myth, a divine 
helmsman firmly imposes a circular motion to the universe, so that it might in due time 
replicate it autonomously, so the Stranger leads his pupil through a circular recurrence 
of arguments on statecraft, constantly re-examining them from different angles until the 
circle is closed in mutual concord, for the sake of the youth’s own development. 
The dialogue scene of the Statesman is therefore justified by this educational 
process, more than by mere methodological or doctrinal concerns. The focus of scholars 
such as Rowe (2000), Santa Cruz (1995) and to some extent Gill (1995) on 
methodological or theoretical stances, in fact, risks to obscure the full educational 
purpose of the Stranger. While he leads the youth with uncontested authority and does 
care about methodology and theories, his role does not consist in communicating mere 
doctrines. Rather, he constructs his own lengthy discourses, only to demolish them and 
build them up again from a novel angle.253 While he does ask for Young Socrates’s 
judgment and consent, often allowing him to determine shifts in his own exposition, he 
never asks for the youth’s argued opinions. Certainly he is not a Socratic questioner, 
who invites his interlocutors to present their own opinions and submits them to scrutiny 
                                                             
252 Resp. IV.436d4-e6. Cf. Section 4.2. 
253 Cf.  Stefanini, 1949, pp.441-442. 
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though short questions and answers.254 Yet his educational aim is not to communicate 
formal notions or methodologies to a passive learner, but rather to communicate to him 
a specific form of intellectual movement. For him and Young Socrates ‘to reach 
concord’ (ὁμονοεῖν, 260b8) means precisely to develop a similar (ὁμοῖος) condition of 
the intellect (νοῦς), which needs to revolve stably amidst the different facets of a 
complex inquiry. Even the readers find themselves involved in the same process, as they 
face the apparently disjointed structure and bedazzling variation of perspectives in the 
Statesman. Through the Stranger’s disruptive, multifaceted, and puzzling argumentative 
style, Plato thus forces those who follow his arguments to develop a philosophical 
disposition: the inquisitive form of mind of the philosopher who never rests within 
partial perspectives but constantly strives to examine them, as lucidly as possible, from 
every side. 
 
5.3. Educational Leadership and Political Balance 
In this section my focus shifts from philosophical education to political leadership, in 
order to show in what sense this latter expertise is educational. I will thus examine the 
educational relationship that the ideal statesman establishes with his community. First 
(5.3.1.), I will show that statecraft consists in a form of educational guidance of 
psychological dispositions, akin but irreducible to other more traditional forms of 
leadership such as generalship and rhetoric. To define its irreducible status, I will 
introduce the notion of meta-leadership. Second (5.3.2.), I will examine Plato’s radical 
distinction between leadership of minds and traditional political control, suggesting that 
it is possible to speak of a revolutionary political account. Third (5.3.3.), I will argue 
that the Statesman represents the educational leadership of minds as a balancing act. 
Finally (5.3.4.), I will raise the problem of the concrete methods of this leadership, 
showing that the Statesman leaves it necessarily open as a matter of practical action 
rather than pure definition. 
 
                                                             
254 Cf. Soph. 217c1-d2. Here the Stranger explicitly contraposes the Socratic method of dialogue through 
brief questions and answers to his own method of lengthy expositions, more akin to a dialogue with 
himself and a display of eloquence than to a discussion with an interlocutor. He justifies his choice as 
fitting to the complexity of the topics at hand (sophistry, politics and philosophy). 
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5.3.1. Leadership of Minds as Meta-leadership 
The process of inquiry in the Statesman leads the interlocutors to a conclusive account 
on the function of statecraft: the leadership of the citizens’ psychological ‘dispositions 
towards courage or moderation’  (τὸ τῶν ἀνδρείων καὶ σωφρόνων […] ἦθος, 311b8-9), 
enacted by someone who knows what is best for the city and its members, namely an 
ideal of inner harmony and autonomous stability, and what is opportune for the sake of 
its attainment, namely the creation of intersubjective bonds of mutual concord (310e7-
311a2). As several scholars have remarked,255 the major political concern of this 
dialogue is psychological, because the prime objects of political action are ‘those who 
possess them [i.e. inclinations for courage and moderation] in their souls’ (τοὺς ἐν ταῖς 
ψυχαῖς αὐτὰς ἴσχοντας, 307c6). The model of weaving finally serves to present 
statecraft as a production of intersubjective harmony. It must be emphasised, once 
again, that Plato never presents this notion as a linear definition, because statecraft 
encompasses a variety of angles (e.g. the limitations of absolute authority, its relation to 
written prescriptions, or the ethical responsibilities it entails) that cannot be reduced, 
without distortions, to a one-sided account. Even at the very end of the dialogue, the 
Stranger does not renounce to imagery and insists on the metaphor of a well-composed 
social fabric, a magnificent and noble robe that covers and protects the body politic as a 
whole (311b7-c6). Therefore, it is useful to bear in mind that every aspect of statecraft 
explored in this dialogue constitutes a particular perspective and cannot exhaust its 
multifaceted nature. Nonetheless, it is true that the Stranger identifies an eminent role of 
statecraft, which does not exclude its other aspects, but constitutes its most proper 
function. This role is the communication of a ‘true opinion’ (ἀληθῆ δόξαν, 309c6), a 
foundational and correct belief whereby the courageous and moderate citizens’ can 
eschew mutual ‘hostility’ (ἔχθραν, 307d4) and strive to preserve ‘concord and 
friendship’ (ὁμονοίᾳ καὶ φιλίᾳ, 311b9), in order to communicate some level of 
autonomous authority to them (‘to entrust offices in cities to them forever in common 
[τὰς ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ἀρχὰς ἀεὶ κοινῇ τούτοις ἐπιτρέπειν]’ 310e-311a). Statecraft is thus 
a process of mediation between opposite groups of citizens and of creation of shared 
values which enable a stable and autonomous government—a form of constructive and 
empowering leadership of minds. Its role is therefore not purely psychological but 
properly educational, qua concerned with the correct development of autonomous social 
dynamics. 
                                                             
255 Bontempi, 2009, pp.143-147; Lane, 1995; Bobonich, 1995. 
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This particular role distinguishes statecraft from all other modes of individual or 
social guidance, training and instruction. Moreover, it makes statecraft eminent among 
them, because the management of social dynamics as a whole is foundational to any 
other particular and partial instance of social interaction. As we have seen in Chapter 
1, the positive definition of statecraft is preceded by a negative moment, where all 
productive and servile arts are distinguished from statecraft (287b4-290e9) together 
with traditional constitutions (government of one individual, of elites, and of multitudes: 
291a1-293e5; 300c5-303d3) and different arts of leadership (303d4-305e7). Finally, the 
Stranger introduces statecraft itself as eminent among all forms of leadership, by 
comparing it to the purity of gold once purified from less precious materials: 
Well, it seems that in the same way [as goldsmiths] we have now separated off 
those things that are different from political knowledge, and everything that is 
alien and not akin to it, and that there remain those that are precious and related 
to it. Among these, I think, are generalship, jurisdiction, and that part of 
rhetoric which in common with statecraft persuades people of what is just and 
so steers, together with it, the affairs of cities. 
κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τοίνυν λόγον ἔοικε καὶ νῦν ἡμῖν τὰ μὲν ἕτερα καὶ ὁπόσα 
ἀλλότρια καὶ τὰ μὴ φίλα πολιτικῆς ἐπιστήμης ἀποκεχωρίσθαι, λείπεσθαι δὲ τὰ 
τίμια καὶ συγγενῆ. τούτων δ᾽ ἐστί που στρατηγία καὶ δικαστικὴ καὶ ὅση 
βασιλικῇ κοινωνοῦσα ῥητορεία πείθουσα τὸ δίκαιον συνδιακυβερνᾷ τὰς ἐν 
ταῖς πόλεσι πράξεις (303e7-304a2, tr. Rowe, adapted). 
Here, the Stranger uses the image of gold to remark the value and rarity of genuine 
political leadership, while at the same time assimilating it to other distinct but similarly 
valuable directive arts. He thus introduces one last negative account in which he defines 
as quasi-political all the arts that provide some form of direction of the citizens. His 
whole account includes not only military leadership, jurisdiction, and persuasive 
rhetoric, but also individual education, the art ‘that is the object of learning and teaches’ 
(μανθανομένης καὶ διδασκούσης, 304c4-5). All these arts, he claims, need to be 
subordinated to the one that coordinates them all, determining whether their action (or 
inaction) is useful for the good of different citizens and for the city as a whole. 
Therefore, statecraft is a very demanding art of meta-leadership. It can be named ‘meta-
leadership’ because it requires various competences that encompass all other forms of 
socio-political leadership but cannot be reduced to them: assessing the opportunity for 
military action or peacefulness; devising a correct legislation; determining the necessity 
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for popular persuasion; and assessing the citizens’ intellectual capacities and 
educational needs. Thus it overlaps, to some extent, with all other directive arts, but it is 
also distinct from them. It does not need to include the specific competences of 
generals, judges, rhetoricians, and teachers, or to exert direct influence on their 
activities.256 Rather, it needs to assess the value of their arts and guide their actions in 
view of what benefits the organisation of the whole city and, by consequence, the 
happiness (eudaimonia) of the citizens within it.257 Even though it is a form of 
leadership comparable to any other, its directive position and political value transcend 
them all. 
‘Meta-leadership’ is a negative and abstract notion: it tells us what statecraft is 
not and only abstractly defines its purpose as the happiness of the whole city. With this 
negative account, however, the Stranger paves the way to the final, positive and 
concrete determination of statecraft as psychological leadership directed at producing 
social concord. 
 
5.3.2. A Revolutionary Political Account 
Insofar as the political model of the Stranger is defined in opposition to every other 
form of expertise, constitution, and leadership, it might be said that his account is 
revolutionary. Ultimately, the Stranger does not suggest any possible reformation and 
improvement of existing political orders, but he radically separates genuine political 
leadership from all of them. Moreover, he strongly asserts the fundamental role of the 
dispositions of the multitudes in the emergence of a good political order. To him, 
statecraft is not a mere technique of control or a familiar form of leadership, but an 
educational art that must empower the citizens themselves (or at least some of them, 
those who can display courage and moderation) by granting them autonomous self-
control and the ability to rule in mutual cooperation. Rather than consisting in complete 
control from a superior position like the traditional ‘shepherd of the people’ (ποιμένα 
λαῶν),258 genuine statecraft aims to create a disposition for concord and friendship 
                                                             
256 Cf. Lane (1998), pp.142-145. 
257 The object of statecraft is for the community to be ‘happy’ (εὐδαίμονι, 311c8; cf. 272c5, 301d5), in the 
typical Platonic sense of a psychological and social condition in which different drives, opinions, and 
functions, directed by knowledge, avoid conflicting with each other and find harmonious coexistence (cf. 
Hobbs, 2000, pp.50-59; Russell, 2005, p.238; Kamtekar, 2001, p.190). 
258 Brock (2013) remarks that this epic formula constitutes a clichéd image, mostly applied to military 
leadership but also to ideas of benevolent care and divine protection. The formula occurs 65 times at the 
end of a line in early hexameter poetry and the image is frequent in Near Eastern texts, including 
obviously the Bible. Brock also stresses the fact that, in the Statesman, ‘the use which Plato makes of this 
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among the citizens themselves. Its efficacy and value therefore inherently depend, in the 
Statesman, on the conditions of its subjects. The Statesman ultimately charges statecraft 
with a responsibility in leading the citizens’ minds towards an intersubjective harmony 
of opinions and emotional drives. Since this role is irreducible to any other professional 
or political function in the city, the very act of positing it as the sole genuine political art 
challenges all established political orders. 
This challenge depends on the notion that psychological dispositions have 
fundamental political repercussions and should thus be the first and foremost object of 
political action. This notion is not idiosyncratic of the character of the Stranger, but it is 
typical of Plato’s political doctrines. It recurs at Resp. VIII.544c1-e2 and Leg. I.644b9-
645b7. In the Republic, Socrates argues that the origins of constitutions must be traced 
back to the emotional dispositions and desires of their members, and he proceeds to 
derive timocracy, oligarchy, democracy, and tyranny respectively from desires for 
military honours, wealth, freedom, and unrestrained power. Socrates describes the 
citizen’s ‘dispositions’ (ἠθῶν, VIII.544e1) as they metaphorically ‘drag’ (ἐφελκύσηται, 
VIII.544e2) the political order towards different possible organisations. Similarly, in the 
Laws the Athenian Stranger argues that political norms derive from the control or lack 
of control over pleasure/joy and pain/affliction (ἡδονὴν καὶ λύπην, I.644c7) in the 
citizens, when their behaviours and habits become norms for the entire city. In both 
cases, the characters analyse the origins of constitutions from the bottom up, as they 
supposedly derive from complex networks of psycho-physical dispositions, habits and 
beliefs that can influence societal dynamics and solidify into political institutions 
(which in turn will influence the citizens’ dispositions, and so on).259 Thus, the 
Statesman addresses a typical Platonic concern with the foundational role of emotions 
and moral psychology in the political field. Differently from the other political 
dialogues, however, it focuses exclusively on aggressiveness and mildness of 
temperaments, insofar as they determine opposite modes of life marked by courage and 
moderation. The highest and most proper political concern, to the Eleatic Stranger, 
should be the education of the courageous and moderate citizens’ intersubjective 
attitudes. A genuine statesman should enable the citizens to evaluate their own 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
figure is idiosyncratic and ultimately abortive’ because, while he does not dismiss it completely, he 
subordinates it to the image of weaving (p.46). 
259 Lodge (1947) argues that Plato’s theory of mind ‘is identical with the life of the self: or rather, of 
selves interacting and developing themselves in a social tissue of civic life’; to Lodge, thus, the life of the 
self influences and is influenced by language, arts, science, philosophy, and culture in general (p.232). 
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standpoints in relation to the opposite ones and consider both equally valuable for the 
happiness of the city. 
To Plato the educational objective of genuine politics, I propose, is the main 
reason for him to distinguish it from existing political orders and forms of expertise. In 
all his major political dialogues, Plato separates, to some extent, the ideal constitutions 
he presents from existing ones: Resp. presents the political order of its ideal city as a 
model laid up in heaven, irreducible to existing constitutions and perhaps even 
impossible to realise;260 Leg. presents its legislation as a project for an imaginary colony 
inspired by Athenian, Spartan and Cretan constitutions;261 and Pol., as we have seen, 
explicitly theorises a separation of true political expertise from all other forms of 
constitution and leadership. This separation, I hold, is largely independent from the 
vexata quaestio of Plato’s intellectual utopianism or pragmatic realism.262 The presence 
of idealistic descriptions of the best possible political order does not prevent Plato from 
exploring a variety of concrete political problems in detail and accepting the validity of 
second-best solutions.263 Thus the distinction between a utopian project and political 
reality is inadequate to capture the complexity of Plato’s political accounts. In fact, 
Plato posits a distinction between a form of politics focused on the education of the 
mind (i.e. cognition and emotion) and instrumental political fields such as control, 
professionalization, legislation, and forms of power over the citizens’ minds. Lodge 
(1947) has shown that this is the case in Resp. and Leg., arguing that here Plato ‘does 
not philosophize for the sake of philosophizing’, but that he ‘endeavours to give to the 
city-state an ideal formulation, to construct a pattern’ for political rule because ‘his 
educational theories have always the practical aim of training for citizenship, or it may 
be for leadership’ (p.14). His construction of ideal patterns, Lodge argues, is chiefly 
directed at practical educational concerns (p.15). I hold that the Statesman not only 
supports Lodge’s intepretation, but explicitly theorises it. This dialogue theorises, at 
once, the abstract separation of genuine politics from inadequate political practices, and 
its inherent bond, qua educational activity, to the dispositions of its subjects. It thus 
                                                             
260 Resp. IX.592b: ‘But maybe there is a model of it laid up in heaven for those who want to look it and 
by looking to settle there. But it makes no difference whether it exists now or will ever exist (ἀλλ᾽ … ἐν 
οὐρανῷ ἴσως παράδειγμα ἀνάκειται τῷ βουλομένῳ ὁρᾶν καὶ ὁρῶντι ἑαυτὸν κατοικίζειν. διαφέρει δὲ 
οὐδὲν εἴτε που ἔστιν εἴτε ἔσται)’. 
261 Leg. III.702c-d: ‘let us choose from what we have said, and organise a city with our words, as it were 
by erecting it from the foundation (ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων ἐκλέξαντες, τῷ λόγῳ συστησώμεθα πόλιν, οἷον ἐξ 
ἀρχῆς κατοικίζοντες)’. 
262 This problem has been recently revived by Kahn (2009), who sees in Pol. and Leg. more pragmatic 
takes on the utopian ideal of philosophical rule in Resp. (pp.163-164). 
263 E.g. the ‘second navigation’ of constitutional legislation addressed at Pol. 293e ff. On the value of 
second-best constitutions in the Statesman, see Lane 1998, pp.155-163. 
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teases out the revolutionary potential of conceiving the education of the citizens’ minds 
as the truest political concern and the eminent political practice. 
 The Stranger’s account, therefore, is not revolutionary in the sense of 
overturning authorities in favour of democratic politics, the pure self-determination of 
the multitudes in the city. In fact, his stance remains based on a conception of public life 
determined by ethical limits and measuring standards, which endow the statesman with 
the authority to discern and select who has the right to partake to this life and, in fact, to 
life tout court.264 The Stranger and Young Socrates espouse various political positions 
that ancients and moderns alike would identify as anti-democratic or difficult to 
integrate within democratic institutions. They accept that no multitude (πλῆθός) can 
attain any form of knowledge (ἐπιστήμην), including statecraft, thus arguing in favour 
of the government of enlightened oligarchies, diarchies or monarchies (292e1-293a4). 
On the same note, they also accept that genuinely beneficial and expert legislative 
decisions may be taken regardless of popular consent, as long as they benefit and 
improve the citizens (296a7-297b4); and they grant that the statesman might resort to 
violent measures, exile, reduction to servitude or deprivation of privileges to exclude 
from the city individuals of inherently intemperate dispositions (308e8-309a7). In 
addition, they identify democracy as a fragmented and weak constitution, incapable of 
achieving either great goods or great evils; thus, they limit its political value to 
situations in which there is no stable legislation, and social diversity of opinions is less 
detrimental than the arbitrary decisions of oligarchs or tyrants (303a4-b4). Moreover, by 
contrast with typically modern liberal ideals, they accept the institution of slavery or 
servitude, as a constitutive part or the city’s professional organisation (289c4-d1). The 
Stranger’s argument for social cohesion and collective rule, in fact, is limited to specific 
groups of citizens whose dispositions tend towards courage and moderation, while all 
                                                             
264 Cf. Brock (2013): ‘One rarely encounters the “shepherd of the people” these days, at least in the 
western world: the image is hardly at home in an era in which almost all regimes profess to be 
democracies’ (p.43). Plato’s idiosyncratic dismissal or radical reconfiguration of this image in favour of 
models of social balance (p.46) might legitimately be read as in tune with contemporary democratic 
preferences, and it certainly constitutes an attempt to moderate excessive and potentially tyrannical claims 
to authority. However, Plato never fully abandoned the idea of a superior expertise endowed with 
complete power over human life, including the right to purge unsuitable individuals (p.48; cf. Leg. 735b-
736c). Bontempi (2009, p.323) and Foucault (1983, pp.261-262), accordingly, remark that Plato’s 
position remains mingled with concerns typical of ancient ethics, whereby strict limits and conditions can 
preclude political participation to those who are seen as ‘others’ in relation to the accepted ethical 
framework, in a way that to us moderns is unacceptable. The overlap of ethics and politics, of judgment 
about the quality of individual lives and about their right to partake to politics, is irreducibly incompatible 
with any democratic framework. Nonetheless, precisely Plato’s emphasis on education as foundational of 
correct politics grounds both his rejection of more authoritarian political models and the possibility of a 
cautious modern appreciation of his ethical stance. 
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the others citizens (free or enslaved) are merely envisaged as held fast within this 
political organisation (311c3), without further ideals of democratic participation or 
universal freedom. The Stranger is unclear whether courage and moderation can in fact 
be universal or they are possessed by a more limited class of human beings. Most 
importantly, he never suggests that the best political organisation can emerge 
spontaneously, finding its own equilibrium due to the internal dynamics of the 
community alone, but he constantly posits the reference to an external principle of 
harmony as necessary for the social good.265 Therefore, the political account of the 
Statesman cannot be taken as a fully-fledged endorsement of democratic ideals, either in 
an ancient or in a close-to-modern sense.266 
Nevertheless, we may speak of the Statesman as presenting a revolutionary 
political model insofar as it radically privileges educational concerns over any other 
political interest, function, and constitution. This dialogue does not condemn democracy 
as such; it rather separates genuine statecraft from all forms of political order. Thus it 
contains the roots of a conception of politics as responsible above all for the citizens’ 
education and even autonomy. The very authority of educational leadership is 
dependent on the effective improvement of the citizens’ coexistence. Thus, this account 
is more radically revolutionary than the assertion of the rights to self-determination of 
political multitudes over limited authorities. It theorises the substitution not of one 
model of authority over another, but rather of a model of intersubjective harmony based 
on psychological dispositions to models of pure control, technical expertise, normativity 
or power over the minds of political subjects. It is the radical affirmation of the 
principle of right measure over limited and partisan political concerns. 
 
5.3.3. Leading to Balance: A Tension of Control and Autonomy 
The political figure presented in the Statesman combines aspects of heteronomous 
command, based on the knowledge of right measure, and autonomous (albeit not 
spontaneous) organisation of the citizens, who enact a measured and harmonious 
coexistence. This figure entails an inescapable tension of control and autonomy: 
statecraft consists here, puzzlingly, in the art of controlling a community for the sake of 
                                                             
265 Just as, in the myth, the cosmos does neither find nor maintain its own balance without the external 
intervention of a god (cf. Chapter 4). 
266 Skemp (1952) nonetheless outlines the Stranger’s discussion of the ‘relative merits’ of democracy, 
which make it relatively close to modern democratic ideals: its capacity to resist ‘tyrannical self-
assertion’ through the diversity of opinions and ‘the admission that laws represent the fruit of experience’ 
(pp.65-66). 
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their own autonomy. Accordingly, the interlocutors’ exploration of statecraft, once it 
has abandoned the model of the herdsman, follows two paths, outlining both a political 
function of rigid control and one of educational leadership. 
In the first place, the Stranger portrays statecraft as a controlling authority that 
regulates all the professional activities in the city and can disregard, in its legislative 
role, both written norms and popular consensus, insofar as it can effectively benefit the 
city. Modelling the statesman upon a weaver, he envisages the statesman as the 
legitimate director of co-operative (συνεργῶν, 280b2) arts, due to his technical 
knowledge of the final product. Modelling him upon a physician, the Stranger grants 
him the authority to impose even through force or constriction a healthy regimen (i.e. a 
good legislation) to the political community, ‘without persuading’ (μὴ πείθων, 296b1; 
296b5) his subjects of the validity of his treatments. Within this frame, neither the 
Stranger nor Young Socrates display any concern with the citizens’ own opinions about 
political principles, but they are content with asserting the authority of expert 
knowledge, provided that (like medicine) it also entails full responsibility for the 
conditions its enforceable regimen will produce in its subjects. Therefore, statecraft 
needs to exert indirect authority over every other activity in the polis: it determines, 
with expert skill, the opportunity of every form of expertise, from the production of 
tools to creative arts and nurture (287b4-290e9); it constitutes the ideal to which 
constitutions must conform themselves if they aim to avoid social strife and tyranny, 
should a good statesman be absent (300e11-301c4); and it directs professional forms of 
leadership such as teaching, rhetoric, military guidance, and jurisdiction by determining 
the contextual opportunity of their activities (303d4-305e7). Statecraft appears first, in 
every respect, as a ‘ruling’ or ‘controlling’ (ἄρχουσαν, 305e2) enlightened authority. 
Therefore, when it comes to professional activities, including legislative decisions, the 
Statesman displays a strong preference for centralised, enlightened control over 
unregulated social dynamics.267 
 By contrast with the Stranger’s account of professional activities, his 
introduction of moral psychology as politically foundational entails a direct concern 
with the freedom and autonomy of the citizens, as the very endpoint of educational 
leadership. This account positively describes the ‘undefiled gold’ that had been 
                                                             
267 It must be noticed, however, that the Stranger’s preference for centralised, enlightened control is 
moderated by the concession that, should this be factually impossible, the autonomous legislative activity 
of an assembly provides a viable, albeit more difficult, second-best solution (300d9-e3). The specific 
dynamics of this activity, impossible to explore here, have been studied by Skemp (1952, pp.48-49), Gill 
(1995) and Lane (1998, pp.146-163). 
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previously distinguished from other valuable forms of leadership. The Stranger will 
indeed describe, radically, the role of statecraft in relation to moral psychology as the 
sole aspect that is proper to it: 
For this is the single and whole task of kingly weaving-together: never to 
allow moderate dispositions to stand away from the courageous, but by 
working them closely into each other as if with a shuttle, through unanimity, 
honours, dishonours, opinions, and the giving of pledges to one another, 
drawing together a smooth and fine-woven fabric out of them, as the saying 
goes, to entrust offices in cities to them forever in common. 
τοῦτο γὰρ ἓν καὶ ὅλον ἐστὶ βασιλικῆς συνυφάνσεως ἔργον, μηδέποτε ἐᾶν 
ἀφίστασθαι σώφρονα ἀπὸ τῶν ἀνδρείων ἤθη, συγκερκίζοντα δὲ ὁμοδοξίαις καὶ 
τιμαῖς καὶ ἀτιμίαις καὶ δόξαις καὶ ὁμηρειῶν ἐκδόσεσιν εἰς ἀλλήλους, λεῖον καὶ 
τὸ λεγόμενον εὐήτριον ὕφασμα συνάγοντα ἐξ αὐτῶν, τὰς ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν 
ἀρχὰς ἀεὶ κοινῇ τούτοις ἐπιτρέπειν (310e7-311a2, tr. Rowe, adapted). 
The core elements of statecraft established in this dense passage are three: (1) the 
reference to the model of weaving, here envisaged as a ‘drawing together’ (συνάγοντα) 
of citizens of opposite dispositions; (2) the reliance on a complex network of (loosely 
defined) discursive practices that need to be communicated to the social groups in the 
city; and (3) the political end-point as a communication of authority to the citizens, so 
that they may enact it permanently (ἀεὶ). It is under this respect that statecraft consists in 
a communicative process, whereby discursive practices are managed in order to increase 
the citizens’ closeness and in view of their permanent autonomy. This communicative 
process appears nonetheless ambiguous. Various scholars have argued that the Stranger 
envisages a certain kind of social uniformity or orthodoxy as political objective,268 but 
his account is more nuanced.  In order to clarify it, we need to look at how he describes 
the problems and potentials of communication in the city. 
At first, the Stranger argues that, in order to remain ‘free’ (ἐλευθέρων, 308a1) 
from foreign powers, it is necessary for the citizens correctly to evaluate the opportunity 
of both aggressive and mild policies. Unilateral and untempered preferences for 
militarism or pacifism, he claims, would equally drive a city into servitude or 
                                                             
268 E.g. Skemp (1942) interprets statecraft as the imposition of a quasi-religious ‘orthodoxy’ (p.42), and 
Bobonich (1995) as ‘the implanting of true opinion’ in the citizens’ minds (p.324). Lane (1998), despite 
granting a level of autonomy to the citizens, nonetheless concludes that statecraft ‘dictates what is 
properly to be done’ as an objective norm that only ‘obliquely’ interacts with the citizens’ dispositions 
(p.186). 
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destruction sooner or later, either by provoking fierce reactions against the city-state or 
by facilitating its conquest (307e1-308a8). He thus envisages a situation in which one-
sided dispositions for aggression or mildness are always (ἀεὶ, 307e9 and 308a5) 
followed without change, and thus become equally detrimental. However, his 
fundamental concern is not restricted to foreign policies, which serve only as particular 
example of the dangerous excesses entailed by unilaterality of opinions.269 Rather, his 
objective is the citizens’ ability to guide themselves permanently (i.e. in all kinds of 
political decisions), relying on the right mingling of aggressive and mild dispositions. 
An ideal statesman must not only ensure that submission to foreign powers be avoided, 
an end which could be also achieved, at least theoretically, by an expert authority; but 
he must also find a way to allow the citizens to evaluate each other’s opinions, diverse 
and emotionally-influenced, in the most constructive way possible.  
To the Stranger, the city is a disrupted social field that needs improvement, and 
thus some level of control, so that its inherent potential for conflict may be bent towards 
constructive relationships. The ‘puzzling’ (θαυμαστόν, 306b6) problem of potentially 
conflicting, albeit equally valuable, sets of behaviours constitutes to him a notion that is 
easy for ‘disputers’ (ἀμφισβητητικοῖς, 306a9) to exploit antagonistically. On the same 
note, he argues that the impact of temperamental ‘affinity’ or ‘kinship’ (συγγένειαν, 
307d2) frequently leads the citizens to praising familiar behaviours and decisions and 
blaming alien ones, thus constituting the root of social hostility (ἔχθραν, 306b10).270 His 
concern is therefore more fundamental than the mere opportunity of divergent foreign 
policies, but rests on the possibility of emotionally-driven conflict. This view is similar 
to his previous evaluation of professional experts as potential ‘competitors’ 
(ἀμφισβητούντων, 268c3) for political authority, qua providers of necessary material 
goods for the community and thus partakers in its maintenance. But the educational role 
of statecraft is more nuanced than strict regulation, because it addresses social 
interactions dictated not by mere professional roles, but by deeply ingrained 
psychological factors. 
                                                             
269 Contra Lane (1998), who argues that the statesman must communicate an ability to assess the 
timeliness of political choices (pp.170-180). Her interpretation is unsatisfactory, insofar as the Stranger 
does not press the problem of timeliness, but rather moves on immediately to social cohesion, where the 
problematic element is not just a difference in timely opportunity of choices but the very divergence 
between groups of citizens. Evidently this problem is more fundamental, because it would be impossible 
for the citizens correctly to assess the opportunity of each other’s dispositions and to achieve agreements 
without, first and foremost, a correct (non-hostile) practice of dialogue.  
270 Restated at 307d3, 308a7, 308b4. 
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Therefore, the Stranger’s view does not entail a judgment in favour of the 
citizens’ absolute subordination to the ruler’s expertise, let alone against any diversity 
of dispositions and correlative opinions. In fact the Stranger, while claiming that the 
hostility fuelled by temperamental differences is a social ‘malady’ (νόσος, 307d7) that 
can dissolve and weaken a city and needs a ‘remedy’ (φάρμακον, 310a3), also considers 
those very differences as necessary for its healthy organisation. If aggressive or mild 
decisions are influenced by the corresponding emotional dispositions, and since both of 
them can be beneficial to a city, precisely their being ‘carried in opposite directions’ 
(ἐπὶ τὰ ἐναντία φερομένων, 310a5) constitutes the condition of political freedom and 
social cohesion. Like in the case of a city which can expertly attack and retreat or seek 
peace at the right moment, independence from foreign powers depends on the 
cooperative assessment of the opportunity of one or the other disposition. And like in 
the image (εἰκόνα, 309b5) of rigid warp and soft woof, the very integrity of the social 
fabric depends on the tension that emerges when divergent preferences for 
aggressiveness and mildness are made to interact. The different citizens must at the 
same time be drawn together (συνάγοντα) by the statesman and maintain their inherent 
tendency to be carried (φερομένων) in opposite directions. The condition to which the 
statesman must provide a remedy is, rather than the simple divergence of opinions, their 
emotionally-influenced unilaterality. His relation with his subjects, albeit tense because 
in contrast with their inner drives, nonetheless relies on them to achieve the right level 
of social cohesion. 
To represent this process, Plato resorts not only to the image of threads drawn 
together and carried apart, as it were by external pulls, but also to the image of divergent 
inclinations, internally driving the very psychological movement of the citizens. This 
psychological metaphor recurs only once in the Statesman, in noticeable contrast with 
the predominant image of the social fabric. The Stranger criticises both the one-sided 
‘love’ (ἔρωτα, 307e6) for moderation as ‘less opportune than it should be’ (ἀκαιρότερον 
[…] ἢ χρή, 307e7) and the one-sided inclination for courage as a ‘desire stronger than it 
ought to be’ (σφοδροτέραν τοῦ δέοντος ἐπιθυμίαν, 308a6-7). In the latter case, he 
speaks of ‘those who incline more towards courage’ (οἱ πρὸς τὴν ἀνδρείαν μᾶλλον 
ῥέποντες, 308a4), thereby framing the political problem as a matter of dynamic 
psychological processes that impact on the political order. The presence of this 
metaphor, however limited, is crucial. The image of interwoven warp and woof is 
suitable to represent the bond of courage and moderation, but it does not capture the 
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autonomous and potentially unbalanced psychological movement of the citizens. The 
concept of psychological inclination, instead, is at least implicitly associated with the 
criterion of balance. 
This concept is central to the political accounts of the Republic and the Laws, 
and in the former the association to the criterion of balance is explicit. At Resp. 
VIII.544d7-e2, Socrates rhetorically contraposes the idea that constitutions, like men in 
traditional myths, are ‘born out of an oak or a rock’ (ἐκ δρυός ποθεν ἢ ἐκ πέτρας […] 
γίγνεσθαι)271 to his conviction that they originate ‘out of the citizens’ dispositions, 
which, so to speak, tip the scales and drag the rest after them’ (ἐκ τῶν ἠθῶν τῶν ἐν ταῖς 
πόλεσιν, ἃ ἂν ὥσπερ ῥέψαντα τἆλλα ἐφελκύσηται). Socrates’s account is the story of a 
decline from the ideal constitution ruled by philosophers, the lovers of wisdom, toward 
tyranny due to the destabilising progressive accumulation of different inclinations in the 
citizens. The various desires for honours, wealth, freedom and power that proliferate in 
real constitutions then drag them slowly towards tyranny, the polar opposite of the best 
government. This process is as much psychological as it is political: at VI.485d Socrates 
had posited that ‘when in someone the desires incline strongly to any one thing, they are 
weakened for other things’ (εἰς ἕν τι αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι σφόδρα ῥέπουσιν […] εἰς τἆλλα τούτῳ 
ἀσθενέστεραι), so that only one desire can preponderate in a single person from time to 
time. The same dynamic influences, according to Socrates, the political field. At 
VIII.550e8 he claims that the desire for wealth, typical of oligarchies, causes people to 
hold wealth in more honour than virtue. He thus suggests that ‘the divergence of wealth 
and virtue be conceived as if each lay in the scale of a balance inclining opposite ways’ 
(οὕτω πλούτου ἀρετὴ διέστηκεν, ὥσπερ ἐν πλάστιγγι ζυγοῦ κειμένου ἑκατέρου, ἀεὶ 
τοὐναντίον ῥέποντε). In Socrates’s account, the desire for wisdom and virtue thus 
constitutes a counterbalance to other inclinations that, if preponderant, can alter both the 
psychological constitution of individuals and the political constitution of cities. The 
Laws (VII.802e) also include an account of ethical psychology in terms of inclinations, 
but complicate it with a further exploration of gender dynamics, whereby masculinity 
inclines (ῥέπον) to courage and femininity inclines as it were downwards (ἀποκλῖνον) to 
temperance—and both are equally necessary in a well-composed city. At IX.862c9, 
moreover, education, constriction and punishment are said to incline (ῥέπειν) 
disharmonious souls and anti-social forms of life towards correction, albeit with 
                                                             
271 The reference is to Homer, Odyssey XIX, v.163. Cf. Iliad XXII, v.126. 
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different efficacies (whereby education remains the preferential corrective tool).272 In 
both Resp. and Leg., inclinations are drives that require an adequate counterbalancing 
movement, which can be provided either by superior wisdom (love of virtue, education, 
correction) or by the correct interrelation to their opposite.273 The same conceptual 
framework, I propose, is at work in the Statesman: the ideal leader of minds is the one 
who is able to communicate to the citizens a correct form of mutual counter-balancing. 
The fact that this dialogue strips down the infinite possible political complexities to the 
sole case of courage-moderation facilitates, didactically, our grasp of the very criterion 
of harmony as balance of opposites. 
If my reading is correct, then the mutual bond of the citizens is not a tie, a 
constraint, but rather a delicate tension whereby opposite drives are neither so close as 
to coincide nor so (disproportionally) distant from their middle-ground as to unbalance 
the whole political structure. The predominance of the image of social bonds can be 
explained by the Stranger’s emphasis on the need for closeness, rather than a generic 
mathematical equidistance from a steady centre. The right measure of the disrupted 
political community, to him, cannot be found but by counteracting unilateral pulls to 
separation and hostility. In any case, the political action here configured is not just 
productive of closeness and affinity for their own sake, but of right measure; it is a 
response against disharmony, not a rigid dogma. The image of inclinations is thus 
fundamental to grasp the non-dogmatic principle that guides the statesman. He must not 
impose a doctrinal orthodoxy that overrules the citizens’ own opinions, but he aims to 
establish the conditions that can counter the citizens’ unreflective and potentially 
conflictive unilaterality. 
                                                             
272 The only other occurrences of this verb are found at Tim. 79e5 (physiological movement of air that 
tends to exit the body), Phaedr. 247b4 (downwards inclination of disembodied souls from the heavens 
towards the earth, due to an inherent psychological asymmetry between kinds of emotional drives), and 
Phil. 46e4 (preponderance of pain or pleasure, which physiologically coexist and succeed one another). 
The noun ῥοπή (inclining impulse) appears at Resp. VIII.556e4 (external impulse to sickness in the body, 
as opposed to its inner health) and Leg. XI.920b2 (inclination that can ‘urge forward’ [προτρέπειν] to 
vice, as opposed to stability in virtue). The terminology of inclination is thus always associated with pairs 
of opposites (in and out, up and down, pleasure and pain, sickness and health, vice and virtue) in dynamic 
alternation. Notice that some of these alternations are physiological and inevitable (breathing, enjoying-
suffering; cf. movement-stasis or courage-moderation) while others are disruptive and susceptible to 
correction (health-sickness, virtue-vice; cf. balance-imbalance). All are open to education or self-
regulation. 
273 To Resp. and Leg. we may add Prot. 356b, where Socrates represents pleasures and pains as measured 
on a pair of scales, and their temporal proximity and distance as the beams. This account of right measure 
(355b-358c) is nonetheless more focused on subjective virtue (courage as ability to evaluate and face 
pains, 359d ff.) than on political harmony. 
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Thus, the widespread scholarly interpretation of this political figure as requiring 
some sort of orthodoxy or uniformity of minds is too partial. A one-sided focus on the 
role of expert authority, indeed, has frequently led interpreters to disregard of the 
internal dynamics of the community. Even Lane (1998), who construes statecraft as 
necessarily implicated with the citizens’ own activity, ultimately identifies these latter’s 
status as ‘the murkier stuff of beliefs and backgrounds’ to which a rigidly objective 
norm must be dictated and suitably adapted (p.186). By contrast, it must be emphasised 
that the Stranger envisages correct social dynamics as a process through which the 
citizens themselves, once they have rejected hostile unilaterality, improve each other’s 
judgments in mutual dialogue. The Stranger argues that those citizens of courageous 
disposition, if they possess the correct opinion and can appreciate the multilateral nature 
of political virtue, will incline to ‘enter in partnership with those who are just’ (τῶν 
δικαίων […] κοινωνεῖν, 309e1-2) and thus moderate their ‘feral’ (θηριώδη, 309e3) 
tendency to aggression in the wrong circumstances. In the same way, to him the 
moderate who hold the same opinion will become authentically ‘prudent and wise’ 
(σῶφρον καὶ φρόνιμον, 309e6) by eschewing the tendency to ‘simple-mindedness’ 
(εὐηθείας, 309e8) dictated by their unreflective mildness. This tendency is also, to the 
Stranger, the foundation of the citizens’ possibility to eschew their ‘revulsion’ 
(δυσχερείᾳ, 310c7) at the idea of mingling courageous and moderate families through 
marriages, thereby avoiding the generation and upbringing of individuals increasingly 
unrestrained in their unilateral dispositions and bringing about more measured 
individuals (310a7-e2).274 The process that the statesman must trigger, thus, consists in 
a development from mere aggressiveness and mildness, not necessarily valuable in 
themselves, towards genuinely courageous and moderate behaviours and even, to some 
extent, justice and wisdom, insofar as it prevents aggressive prevarications and 
unreflective passivity. Its ultimate end is for the citizens themselves to be able to be 
drawn towards one another, when it is opportune to temper their otherwise valuable 
divergent inclinations. 
Therefore, I argue, the statesman’s loosely defined network of ‘unanimity, 
honours, dishonours, opinions, and the exchange of pledges with one another’ 
                                                             
274 At 310a7-9, the Stranger insists that the fundamental factor of political order is the ‘divine’ (θείου) 
bond of social concord, and that the ‘human bonds’ (ἀνθρωπίνους δεσμούς) of marriage and parenthood 
depend on it as secondary instances. The cultural and educational element is thus predominant in his 
account. While he does grant that natural predispositions are a relevant factor, his focus always rests on 
the citizens’ opinions and beliefs. It seems incorrect to speak, with Lane (1998), of a ‘eugenically based’ 
marriage policy (p.182), but the issue of the relation between natural order and cultural devices in the 
Statesman is too complex to be exhausted here. 
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(ὁμοδοξίαις καὶ τιμαῖς καὶ ἀτιμίαις καὶ δόξαις καὶ ὁμηρειῶν ἐκδόσεσιν εἰς ἀλλήλους; 
310e10-11) depends in the last instance on the citizens’ own activities and discourses. 
The Stranger does favour a certain unanimity (ὁμοδοξίαις), in the sense of likeness 
(ὁμοιότης) of opinions (δοξαί), but it would be a stretch to construe it as a mere 
doctrinal orthodoxy imposed from above. In fact, he explicitly requires the citizens 
themselves to engage in common partnership and compare their own opinions for the 
sake of improving them. The loosely defined social practices he envisages, finding 
concord, granting or denying honour, exchanging opinions and pledges, cannot possibly 
depend on the statesman’s activity alone. They rather require – in order to enable a 
‘healthy’ process – that the citizens themselves willingly enact them. The political 
figure presented by the Stranger requires not only the statesman’s expert direction, but 
also the active self-regulation of his community. It requires not just the formation of a 
bond but the citizens’ constant activity of mutual self-balancing. 
The political figure of the Statesman is thus at odds with a notion of statecraft as 
mere authority. Here political rule, in its highest and most proper function, does not 
consist in arranging the citizens’ activities, or even in rigidly controlling their 
dispositions from above, but rather in guiding the citizens towards a convergent 
appreciation of divergent standpoints. It is a properly educational endeavour: like the 
teacher of his former example, who must make the pupils always (ἀεὶ, 278c1) able to 
avoid errors and to recognise the different letters in all syllables,275 so the statesman 
must make the citizens permanently (ἀεὶ, 311a2) capable of eschewing unilaterality and 
evaluating each other’s opinions in different situations. As educational activity, 
therefore, statecraft cannot simply disregard the citizens’ different opinions and 
dispositions by imposing authoritarian commands, because it needs to preserve, in its 
autonomy, the healthy tension between the citizens’ opposite modes of life. 
Notice that the Stranger grants that this balance of opposite dispositions may 
emerge even within a single mind, in which case statecraft may also confer authority to 
a single virtuous individual. However, he considers both individual and collective 
authority as equally viable and open to contextual evaluation: 
Whenever there happens to be a need for a single ruler, [the statesman will act] 
by choosing the person who has both qualities; and where there is a need for 
more than one, by mixing together a part of each of these groups. 
                                                             
275 Cf. Chapter 2. 
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οὗ μὲν ἂν ἑνὸς ἄρχοντος χρεία συμβαίνῃ, τὸν ταῦτα ἀμφότερα ἔχοντα 
αἱρούμενον ἐπιστάτην· οὗ δ᾽ ἂν πλειόνων, τούτων μέρος ἑκατέρων 
συμμειγνύντα (311a4-6, tr. Rowe, adapted). 
The Stranger’s ultimate position is neither monarchic, nor elitist, nor democratic, but 
rather allows for different modes of rule in different circumstances, albeit always 
depending on the preliminary selection and approval of the statesman. His concern with 
the moral psychology of the rulers simply transcends constitutional distinctions and is 
thus equally applicable to monarchy as to aristocracy and democracy. While he does not 
specify which situations might entail a need for either monarchic or more inclusive 
forms of power, he explicitly grants that multitudes can govern as legitimately as 
monarchs, provided that either form of sovereignty can order their emotional 
dispositions and thus regulate their impact on political opinions. The highest function of 
statecraft thus consists in communicating a truly beneficial order of dispositions to the 
city, in line with the image of a noble robe that the statesman confers to it (311b7-c6). 
 Therefore, we can notice an inherent tension in this model of political praxis, 
because the self-moving subjects who are conferred legitimate authority are at the same 
time the material on which the statesman must work. Their autonomous movement is as 
relevant as the direction communicated from above. Their freedom is certainly not 
described, in terms comparable to modern representative democracies or ancient 
Athenian direct participation, as a given condition always already present in the 
citizens’ lives. Rather, it is presented a mode of self-regulation, to be produced by a 
superior expertise concerning what favours or hinders social harmony. In the Statesman, 
we find no optimistic appreciation of the multitudes that need to coexist in a city. 
Rather, the ‘never simple’ (μηδέποτε ἁπλᾶ, 279c8) and potentially conflictive 
coexistence of different skills, constitutional preferences, and personal attitudes 
constitutes a problematic, albeit unavoidable, aspect of social life. Yet we do not find a 
pessimistic rejection of the value of communal life, either, as necessarily condemned to 
detrimental conflicts and distorted judgments to be dogmatically controlled. What we 
find, instead, is a demanding political ideal of possible regulation of social life, based on 
the communication of correct intersubjective attitudes, a disposition for friendly and 
constructive dialogue that must be followed ‘as far as possible’ (καθ᾽ ὅσον, 311c5) by 
the citizens themselves. This political figure thus involves at once an appreciation of 
internal social dynamics that can determine, from the bottom up, an autonomously well-
regulated community, and a rigid assertion of the necessity for an enlightened authority, 
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capable to direct such potentially disintegrating dynamics towards their best possible 
outcome. 
 The political contents of the Statesman reflect its thematic focus on figures of 
guidance and of autonomy in dynamic, tense interaction. In the Stranger’s myth the 
divine pilot of the cosmos periodically guides it with absolute control over its body and 
movements and periodically lets it go, in order for it to maintain itself balanced as long 
as it can (Ch.4). This cosmic image can indeed be considered, literally, paradigmatic of 
the kind of political activity promoted by the Stranger: guidance as education, 
leadership as transmission of self-directed power, control as aimed at autonomous 
balance. But the cosmic model is not the only way in which Plato has represented this 
process. Through the interlocutors’ discussion, similarly, the image of the herdsman, an 
absolute controller of his tame flock, is set aside because it can trigger disputations 
about his role; but images of expert control return in the shape of helmsmen and 
physicians who take full responsibility for their subject’s wellbeing, as well as of 
weavers who direct their co-workers (Ch.1 and 2). Finally, the very educational scene of 
the dialogue represents a strong leading figure, the Stranger, directing with 
unquestioned authority the inquiry on statecraft, while the subject of his guidance, 
Young Socrates, slowly learns to anticipate the problems that will arise and determines, 
with his hesitations and doubts, the different paths of inquiry taken by his educator. 
Therefore, by looking at the images and scene that Plato has chosen for his composition 
of the Statesman, we can notice that the problem of authoritative but beneficial control 
over various kinds of subjects is the recurrent theme of this dialogue. Plato’s central 
focus consists in the identification of genuinely educational and empowering forms of 
guidance, so that authority might be configured not as mere control but as authentic 
leadership. 
 
5.3.4. Which Methods for Leading Minds? 
The Statesman presents statecraft as a problematic, even puzzling form of empowering 
leadership, but it leaves open the problem of the concrete communicative methods that 
the statesman addresses to his community. Not only does the Stranger envisage the 
communication of a true opinion to the citizens, but he also speaks of it as helped by 
‘the Muse of the kingly art’ (τῇ τῆς βασιλικῆς μούσῃ, 309d2). He pictures statecraft as 
akin to other expressive arts, which were similarly said to be guided by their respective 
Muses. His ultimate political figure thus requires the statesman to act as a good 
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communicator for his community, capable of expressing effectively the need for 
constructive dialogue. The Stranger, nonetheless, does not attempt to define how this 
communicative aspect may work in practice. Rather, this figure of educational 
leadership constitutes a pure ideal of statecraft. It opens the issue of concrete 
educational practices, but without the purpose of defining them once and for all. I hold 
that this openness is inherent to the notion of educational leadership as a practical 
balancing act that must be enacted differently (but coherently) in different 
circumstances. 
The limitations of the Stranger’s political figure are due to his explicit 
distinction of statecraft from any other professional form of leadership, namely 
teaching, rhetoric, military strategy, and jurisdiction. The concrete activity of the 
statesman remains puzzlingly difficult to determine, insofar as statecraft lacks any 
positive correspondence with more familiar techniques of leadership.276 In fact, it has 
been suggested that the statesman envisaged by the Stranger might act like a benevolent 
rhetorician who attempts to re-direct emotional drives,277 or an educator who attempts 
didactically to transfer philosophical doctrines.278 There is some measure of truth in 
such readings. Insofar as statecraft consists in an act of instructive communication and 
leadership of minds, it seems reasonable to assimilate it tout court, for instance, to 
rhetoric, which in the Phaedrus (261a8) Socrates calls ‘a certain guidance of souls 
through discourses’ (ψυχαγωγία τις διὰ λόγων) and which he himself uses to praise the 
love of wisdom. Similarly, it could be assimilated to a kind of maieutic education 
addressed to the citizens to correct their misguided opinions and stimulate constructive 
dialogue, ‘stirring, persuading, and reproaching’ (ἐγείρων καὶ πείθων καὶ ὀνειδίζων), 
such as Socrates describes himself as doing for the benefit of Athens, like a nagging 
gadfly provoking a noble but lazy steed, in the Apology (30c2-31c3). Notice also that, in 
                                                             
276 Lane (1998) suggests that statecraft consists in dictating the correct modes and timings for these arts to 
be enacted. Her reading is correct but does not address the educational problem at its core: how does the 
statesman factually communicate his directions? How does he persuade the citizens of their opportunity? 
And how does he incline them towards healthy concord? These problems require us to pay attention not 
only to the political expertise in recognising opportune conditions and times of political action, but to the 
very acts of communication needed in order to communicate or maintain them. 
277 Tordesillas (1995) assimilates statecraft, qua production of collective right measure (metrion) and 
expert management of shifting political circumstances, with rhetoric, qua persuasion of the masses and 
expertise in the opportunity (kairos) of speeches. While these parallelisms are certainly valid, his one-
sided account does not capture the whole complexity of statecraft as the Stranger describes it. 
278 Bobonich (1995) argues that ‘the only method of improvement Plato suggests here [Pol. 296b5-c2] is 
education’ (p.321), but construes it as the implanting of ideas and inculcation of behaviours, to which the 
citizens’ own drives merely resist due to their inherent distortion (p.328). However, the Stranger does not 
construe the citizens’ role as either passive reception or rebellious resistance, but as a tension that is 
required for the city’s good order and happiness. 
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the Gorgias (521d6-8), Socrates claims that he is ‘one of the few Athenians, not to say 
the only one, who attempt to practise the true political art, and the only among those 
who live now to practise political matters’ (μετ᾽ ὀλίγων Ἀθηναίων, ἵνα μὴ εἴπω μόνος, 
ἐπιχειρεῖν τῇ ὡς ἀληθῶς πολιτικῇ τέχνῃ καὶ πράττειν τὰ πολιτικὰ μόνος τῶν νῦν). Thus 
it is tempting to see the statesman as a Socratic figure, whose role as guide of the 
citizens is the same as Socrates’s guidance of the Athenians, and whose expertise is 
equally encompassing. Similar assimilations, however, are ultimately unsatisfactory, 
because the Stranger explicitly ascribes the arts of education and persuasion to other 
professionals, and Socrates himself does not claim to actually possess true political 
expertise.279 No similar suggestion has been proposed for the identification of the 
statesman with a judge or a general, although we may legitimately observe that his role 
also requires him to formulate judgments concerning the conflicts among his subjects 
and to influence their aggressiveness or lack of spirit. In fact, the Stranger grants that 
such similarities are inherent to political leadership, but he is careful in distinguishing 
its unique field of action: neither the individual intellect of a student and the subjective 
position of the judged in a court, nor the emotions and opinions of armies and popular 
assemblies, but the whole field of social dynamics in the city. In the Stranger’s account, 
statecraft operates only ‘with regard to the constitution of the city’ (ὥς γε ἐν πολιτείᾳ, 
309e6-7) as a whole, and not through direct involvement with every single part of it. 
Thus, the specificity of the statesman’s role entails its utmost complexity. He needs to 
convince the citizens that an intricate social reality, composed of potentially conflictive 
professional claims, constitutional preferences and, above all, divergent modes of life, 
may actually attain the harmonious order it lacks and needs. His educational role 
therefore cannot be limited to a specific instructive, persuasive, or directive activity, but 
encompasses a very broad range of communicative competences. 
However, the Stranger makes no attempt to explore concrete methods to respond 
to social complexities, nor does Young Socrates demand it. In the Statesman, thus, we 
face a certain lack of concreteness, even when concreteness would be required to define 
how to realise its political figure. This problematic lack can be contrasted with the 
extensive attention dedicated, in the Republic and the Laws, to the manifold issues of 
political education, which the Stranger leaves mostly unexplored. In particular, he does 
not describe ways to tackle the variety of emotional factors elsewhere credited with 
                                                             
279 Notice how Socrates, in the Gorgias, distinguishes between the true art of statecraft, which he only 
attempts to practise (ἐπιχειρεῖν), and the political matters which he in fact practises (πράττειν). This 
distinction is compatible with the Stranger’s separation between, on the one hand, political arts that are 
akin to statecraft and, on the other, true statecraft itself. 
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political relevance, such as desire for wealth,280 drive for pleasure and aversion to 
pain,281 fear of death,282 or the moving power of poetry.283 In fact, unlike Socrates in the 
Republic, he explicitly considers the ‘pursuit of wealth and power’ (πλούτου καὶ 
δυνάμεων […] διώγματα, 310b7) as not ‘worthy of discourse’ (ἄξια λόγου, 310b8) or 
‘serious effort’ (σπουδάζοι, ibid.). Moreover, he does not address the possibility of 
persuasive introductions to legislative norms, apt to inform the citizens of their value,284 
or the role of mythology and poetry in educating the population about ethical 
principles.285 Even with regard to his specific focus, the dynamics of courage and 
moderation, he does not suggest any concrete form of verbal communication, like 
rhetorical speeches, myths, irony, or refutation, which may illuminate how his political 
model might be realised from case to case.286 By comparison with the complexity of 
emotional factors and educational techniques described in the Republic and the Laws, 
the Statesman might seem somewhat superficial in its political figure, focused as it is on 
the determination of a formal objective of political guidance in relation to courage and 
moderation alone. However, we must bear in mind that the interlocutors acknowledge 
as their sole purpose the attainment of a satisfactory figure of statecraft, addressing all 
the issues that might appear relevant to them and leaving behind problems that escape 
their own understanding287 or appear irrelevant. 
This lack is not the mark of theoretical incompleteness, but rather of practical 
openness. It indicates that Plato, in composing this dialogue, merely intended to furnish 
an ideal figure of statecraft as educational leadership, while leaving the problem of its 
practical realisation open to further exploration. The practical aspect is nonetheless 
inherent to the very political figure he presented, insofar as it cannot be conceived as 
normative or dogmatic control but rather as a model of a balancing act. This praxis is to 
be performed in different ways in different contexts, while maintaining the same 
fundamental objective of harmonious balance. 
                                                             
280 E.g. Resp. VIII.550d6-e8. 
281 E.g. Leg. I.644b9-645b7. 
282 E.g. Resp. III.387b8-c6. 
283 E.g. Resp. X.606a3-b8; Leg. II.656c1-657a1. 
284 E.g. Leg. IV.722a7-723d3. 
285 E.g. Resp. II.376c7-377a9. Mythology is nonetheless credited with educational efficacy at Pol. 304c-d, 
albeit attributed to rhetoric and not to statecraft itself. 
286 Notice that the Stranger, however, allows for non-verbal forms of expression. At 277c3-6 he grants 
that ‘handicrafts’ (χειρουργιῶν) like painting and sculpture can provide some education for those who 
cannot follow complex arguments, and at 306c10-d4 he claims that music and painting can represent 
beautiful and noble behaviours ‘in images’ (ἐν εἰδώλοις). Handicraft and music are nonetheless distinct 
from statecraft, and cannot solve, alone, the problem of its educational leadership. Cf. Section 3.3.1. 
287 Such as the problem of happiness in an apolitical golden age (272d2-4). 
207 
 
5.4. The Common Trait of Education and Leadership 
In this section I will compare the dialogue scene and the political contents of the 
Statesman in order to show their theoretical cohesiveness. In Sections 5.2. and 5.3. I 
have analysed the non-doctrinal and practical aspects of philosophical education and 
political leadership as Plato presented them in the Statesman. In both cases, I have 
observed that a criterion of autonomous balance grounds his writing and justifies his 
extensive reliance on the dialogue form and on images. I have argued that to Plato 
philosophical education is not just a communication of doctrines or formal methods, but 
rather of a well-balanced condition of mind. Similarly, I have argued that to him 
political leadership is not just a form of dogmatic control but rather the communication 
of autonomous intersubjective balance to the citizens. Here, I will argue that these two 
conceptions are comparable because they are both grounded on the same educational 
dynamic: the challenge of unilateral and potentially contrasting perspectives and the 
creation of their best possible integration within a cohesive whole. The dialogue scene 
and political contents are therefore cohesively grounded on Plato’s notion of education 
as production of well-combined balance. 
This educational framework conjoins the political argument to the very dialogue 
scene that frames it. Such a conjunction has not been hitherto studied, because the 
differences between argument and scene are more immediately evident. The argument is 
focused on concrete political complexities and forms of technical expertise, while the 
scene represents an effort of correct dialectical argumentation. The subject-matter of 
this dialogue is thus to some extent independent from the dialectical training it 
represents. There is no reason to think that the education of philosophical abilities and 
dispositions must be bound, by logical necessity, to a political argument. Accordingly, 
other Platonic dialogues also represent dialectical training while advancing diverse 
philosophical arguments. For instance, we find similar explorations of dialectic through 
the drama both in the Theaetetus and in the Sophist. In the Theaetetus, the older 
Socrates leads the eponymous young man through the various problems of defining 
knowledge, with its various potentials and limitations. Similarly, in the Sophist the 
Stranger is concerned with leading Theaetetus through many possible definitions of 
sophistry and offering reflections on the activity of the inquiring mind, with particular 
attention to the dangers of deceit and delusion.288 The Philebus and the Parmenides also 
portray characters that strive dialectically to define complex philosophical ideas (the 
                                                             
288 Cf. Section 3.2. 
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good individual life and Being itself). Gill (2000) observes that Plato’s ‘readiness […] 
to engage with other philosophical, or conventional, positions’ for the sake of attaining 
a ‘mediation’ of opinions in the Statesman is common to other dialogues frequently 
attributed to Plato’s old age, like the Philebus and the Parmenides (p.292). Therefore, 
we might conclude that the experience of philosophical inquiry portrayed in the 
Statesman is not inherently bound to its occasional subject-matter. Dialectical 
procedures are therefore not the common element between scene and argument. Instead, 
I propose, the conjunction consists in Plato’s concern with the education of the mind to 
balance. In the Statesman, Plato is determined to show that philosophical education and 
politics, as modes of communicating balance, are inherently entwined. 
In the scene of the Statesman, the Stranger focuses on the praxis of correct 
communication of political, as well as philosophical, opinions, for the sake of assessing 
the extent of their validity and reaching a satisfactory level of agreement with his 
interlocutor. As we have seen, he educates Young Socrates by: letting him follow 
inadequate political perspectives to the point where they become untenable (268b6-c4); 
disrupting the linearity of thought with pivotal moments of political and philosophical 
reflection (262a5-263e5; 272b3-d6; 277a3-287b3; 293e6-300c4; 308b10-308e3); 
provoking his interlocutor with puzzling images of interdependent control and 
autonomy (277b4); and requiring him to maintain his mind as well-composed as 
possible throughout a variety of political perspectives (278c8-d5). Mirroring the 
complexity of a political community, the intricate tangle of divergent opinions and 
potential disputations in need of harmonious combination, the Stranger complicates his 
dialogue with Young Socrates by demanding that political opinions be reflectively 
explored from all kinds of angles, and made to fit in a well-integrated, harmonious 
figure. 
The underlying common trait of this political inquiry and the political 
community it describes is the potential for disrupting, destabilizing differences of 
perspectives, which need to be evaluated in order to avoid complete confusion and to be 
integrated for the sake of social harmony. Thus, the scene of the Statesman itself further 
illuminates how Plato conceived the practical aspects of political education and correct 
dialogue, as methods of producing intersubjective concord. Again, the statesman 
remains certainly different from an educator, insofar as he does not address individuals 
or particular social groups but the whole political community, and thus needs to 
cooperate with other professional leaders and communicators. Nonetheless, the 
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fundamental problem of divergent perspectives is the same in both cases, and it is 
reasonable to assume that the instruments to tackle it be comparable as well. I argue, 
therefore, that Plato has represented the various methods of dialogue employed by the 
Stranger as a way to present valid models for the statesman’s own leadership of minds, 
or at least in view of analogous educational concerns. I have examined the Stranger’s 
different communicative methods throughout this dissertation. He allows (1) disruptions 
to interrupt the linearity of political discourses, either insisting on his disagreement with 
his interlocutor or welcoming his doubts. He insists on (2) the partiality of political 
models and images, which demand constant shifts of perspective, while never 
renouncing the possibility of their coherent integration or allowing absolute political 
relativism. Finally, he welcomes (3) playfulness and self-aware usage of mythology as 
cognitively productive forms of communication concerning political concepts such as 
control and autonomy. It is thus possible to identify a network of correlations between 
these techniques of dialogue and the educational concerns raised by the Stranger about 
political matters. 
We can find such correlations in the Stranger’s language about emotional states 
and cognitive experiences. We have seen that, to him, disruptive digressions can cause 
an individual mind to be carried around different angles of inquiry and feel a ‘revulsion’ 
(δυσχερείας, 286b7) caused by confusion, as when Young Socrates feels unease at the 
idea of unregulated authority. Similarly, the Stranger describes as ‘revulsed’ 
(δυσχερανάντων, 301c7) the people who do not trust in the possibility of enlightened 
monarchy, out of fear that it might degenerate into tyranny, and as ‘revulsion’ 
(δυσχερείᾳ, 310c7) the citizens’ aversion to creating familiar bonds between courageous 
and moderate social groups.289 This confusion of the mind, to him, is as much a 
‘malady’ (νόσημα, 283b7) as social conflict is (νόσος, 307d7). He thus presents both 
Young Socrates’s hesitations and the citizens’ possible resistances as detrimental lacks 
of inner order that must be laboriously sustained and responded to, for the sake of 
attaining political opinions (and attitudes) as constructive as possible. On the same line, 
as the Stranger considers the integration of political perspectives a precise ‘mixture’ 
(συγκράσεων, 278d3) of different elements on which ‘to concord’ (ὁμονοεῖν, 260b8) 
with Young Socrates, so he names ‘mixture’ (σύγκρασιν, 308e7) the courageous and 
moderate citizens’ constructive ‘concord’ (ὁμονοίᾳ, 311b9). To him, thus, the process 
whereby different opinions can be integrated through educational dialogue is akin to the 
                                                             
289 Cf. Lane, 1998, pp.161-163. 
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process of social agreement. Finally, as he presents the ‘puzzling’ (θαυμαστόν, 277b4) 
mythical image of clashing control and autonomy as a ‘game’ (παιδιὰν, 268d8), so he 
considers the contrast of courage and moderation as ‘puzzling’ (θαυμαστόν, 306b6) but 
also, when it does not entail hostility, as a playful activity (παιδιὰ, 307d6). Both in his 
usage of imagery and in his political language the Stranger allows for playful and 
valuable clashes of ideas, to be sustained together in a cohesive whole. Through the 
Stranger’s terminological consistency, therefore, Plato has construed the educational 
dynamics required by an individual and by a community as comparable, insofar as they 
entail analogous difficulties and potentials. Overall, the benevolent but tenacious 
insistence on the partiality of any political perspective, in need of balanced combination 
through dialogue, seems to constitute the foundation of both the Stranger’s educational 
praxis and the ideal statesman’s leadership. 
Ultimately, in the Statesman Plato has represented a paradigmatic educational 
praxis, not limited to a dogmatic communication of doctrines, but responsive to diverse 
cognitive and emotional factors that influence both subjective and intersubjective 
opinions. Both the Stranger’s and the ideal statesman’s efforts are directed at benefitting 
their subjects by making them autonomously capable to sustain the multifaceted 
complexity of political opinions, without being led astray by their partiality but seeking 
their best possible integration. Thus, it can be observed that the praxis of dialogue, to 
Plato, is central to both the philosophical and the political leadership of minds, not 
necessarily in relation to theoretical complexities, but in view of a correct management 
of disagreements and evaluation of partial perspectives. As Lodge (1947) argued, 
Plato’s educational conception of dialogue entails ‘the comparison of all sides and the 
one-sided victory of none’, because only through this process one can achieve ‘the 
reflective, balanced judgment which depends upon itself in matters of practice’, namely 
genuine autonomy of judgment (p.8).290 Lodge’s point is only partially correct, though, 
because it is limited to the Republic and the Laws. It must, in fact, be complemented by 
the insights on right measure provided by the Statesman. The educational process that 
Plato presents here does not rely merely on detached comparative procedures or 
acceptance of diverse perspectives, but it aims as far as possible at their cohesive 
integration, for the sake of a balanced inner constitution of mind and society. It is not an 
abstract stance in favour of detached critical thinking, a form of theoretical skepticism 
                                                             
290 The echoes of the Statesman’s figures of multifaceted judgment, self-sustained balance, and practical 
efforts directed at generating it are evident, but Lodge does not seem to be aware of them (he refers, 
rather, to: Lach. 188a ff., 200a ff.; Meno 84a ff.; Euthyd. 288c-291a; Resp. 590e ff., 540a-b; Phaedr. 276 
ff., 278a-b; Epist. VII 341-344c). 
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or political neutrality. Rather, it is a practical instrument aimed at achieving a 
harmonious interrelation of psychological (cognitive and emotional) conditions. It is the 
path to make right measure come into being both in the individual mind and in the city. 
With regard to the complexity of both philosophical inquiries and social life, 
Plato’s fundamental concern is the impact of emotional dispositions and unreflective 
partiality of opinions on the inner constitution of both individuals and communities. 
Both are equally improved by firmly sustaining destabilising and repulsive doubts, by 
embracing those opinions that display their own partiality and lack of definitive 
truthfulness, and by allowing different opinions to be integrated through the 
acknowledgment of their particular angles. Certainly, Plato insists on the necessity of 
finding an expert and well-disposed leader of minds, because to him unchecked 
differences of opinions are potentially detrimental. At the same time, nonetheless, he 
emphasises the value of a well-regulated autonomy in evaluating those differences and 
appreciating them for their partial validity, dependent on specific points of view. The 
Statesman thus constitutes a many-faced figure of educational guidance through correct, 
adaptive communication in political discussions of the sort that, ideally, statecraft itself 
should direct to and enable in the citizens. Plato’s fundamental concern, in this 
dialogue, is the dynamic movement of educational leadership as communication of 
balance. 
 
Conclusion  
In this chapter, I have examined the dialogue scene of the Statesman and its political 
contents. By contrast with mainstream interpretations of this dialogue as focused on 
theoretical and methodological issues, I have directed my attention to the practical 
aspect of the guidance of mind (5.1). I have shown that the dialogue scene represents an 
educational effort aimed to engender a well-balanced condition of mind (5.2). 
Subsequently, I have shown that the political contents configure a form of educational 
leadership aimed to realise a well-balanced political community (5.3). Finally, I have 
argued that the two educational processes are comparable because they rely on the 
same, fundamental common trait: the avoidance of detrimental excesses and the 
achievement of a balanced and cohesive integration of different perspectives (5.4). I 
conclude that, in the Statesman, Plato has addressed the education of the mind, both 
through the representation of a dialogical scene and through figures of political action. 
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By paying comparative attention to both aspects we can observe that, as the 
Stranger leads Young Socrates’s mind towards an integration of different political 
perspectives, so the ideal statesman leads the citizens towards the integration of 
divergent standpoints. The condition of the subjects of guidance is therefore inherent to 
the nature of correct education and leadership. In both cases, to Plato emotional 
influences play a central role, insofar as they determine, to some extent, opinions, 
judgments and doubts concerning the features of a good political organisation. Equally, 
both for individual minds and social interactions Plato promotes an ideal of dynamic 
and autonomous stability, which depends in the last instance on a capacity for non-
hostile dialogue, open to the constructive interaction of partial points of view. In both 
cases the guide needs to rely on the dispositions and judgments of the guided subjects, 
because his objective is their own self-regulation. 
The Statesman, albeit not radically open to every possible opinion and thus 
dependent on the presence of some enlightened authority, nonetheless grounds the value 
of a leader exclusively on the capacity to enlighten others to the widest possible extent, 
making them able to evaluate diversity of perspectives as an intellectual and political 
asset. In this dialogue, Plato has configured educational leadership as inherently 
dynamic, insofar as it depends on the unstable and varied conditions of its subjects, and 
as it is impossible to reduce it to a fixed set of norms. It is an act of right measure, both 
because it aims to enable a correct harmony or balance in its subjects and because it is 
in itself measured, attentively fitting to the conditions and responses of those subjects. 
Ultimately, I hold that Plato’s choice to avail, even for a technical work like the 
Statesman, of the dialogue form, is fully justified by its aptness to present not only 
methodological or doctrinal contents, but the open praxes of his educational ideal. 
 Two crucial results emerge from this reading of the Statesman. First, images are 
always central in Plato’s writing due both to their cognitive efficacy and to their 
political value. In order to communicate his notion of educational dynamism, Plato 
configures this political discussion as a model of philosophical dialectic and represents 
the psychological experience it entails through the image of circular movement among 
various angles of inquiry. Moreover, he never presents his political account as a linear 
definition. He rather insists up to the very conclusion on the image of the social fabric 
composed by elements inclining in opposite directions but also drawn together, thus 
never allowing for a definitive reduction of his ideal of leadership to fixed dogmatic 
positions. Even if it is possible to extract a non-metaphorical account of his position, 
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without which any interpretation would impossible and his writing ineffective, images 
are still inherent to the cognitive and discursive process of understanding and 
communicating ideas. To Plato, exploring different perspectives in a dynamic, non-
dogmatic fashion constitutes at once a fundamental cognitive experience and a 
beneficial political praxis. 
Accordingly, the second result of my reading consists in the identification of the 
common trait that, to Plato, underlies philosophical and political dialogue alike. In both 
cases, the inevitable presence of partial perspectives and emotional influences 
constitutes the ambivalent element that requires a correct guidance. Plato presents 
unreflective or emotionally-driven partiality of opinions as (1) potentially disruptive, a 
source of both intellectual confusion and social unrest—a troublesome condition and a 
malady that needs healing. However, he also presents it as potentially valuable, 
provided that partial standpoints are reflectively understood in their limitations and 
always bent towards (2) amicable tension or (3) concordant integration—not a 
disharmony to be corrected but an asset to be exercised, with tense effort, in the best 
possible way. In both the intellectual and the political field, thus, the ‘healthy’ praxis 
envisaged by Plato consists in a dialectical mediation of divergent opinions. I have 
shown that the Statesman does not fully exhaust the range of such praxes, but it 
demonstrates that Plato’s evaluation of them is central to his philosophical and political 
views and thus deserves more extensive exploration. 
My analysis of the Statesman, ultimately, demonstrates that Plato’s ideal of 
education through dialogue does not consist in the dogmatic communication of fixed 
notions but in ‘tipping the scales’ of interconnected opinions towards their constructive, 
dialectical equilibrium.  
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Conclusions – Multifaceted Balance: Combining Images and Leading 
Minds 
 
6.1. Scope of the Project: Right Measure as Principle of Balance 
In this dissertation, I have sought to illuminate two underexplored facets of Plato’s 
notion of right measure in the Statesman: the cognitive role of imagery and the correct 
leadership of minds both in individuals and in political communities. In my central 
chapters, I have shown that the cognitive function of images is grounded on their well-
articulated combination. In the first and last chapters, I have framed this study of 
imagery within the main subject of the dialogue, namely the correct guidance of human 
minds. Throughout this study, I have shown that, for the sake of fleshing out a notion as 
complex as right measure, it is necessary to examine its different practical instances in 
various contexts. 
It has thus become evident that right measure constitutes a dynamic point of 
balance between opposites (alternative paths of inquiry, ignorance and knowledge, 
seriousness and playfulness, control and autonomy, courage and moderation). However, 
this conclusion must not be radicalised in the direction of an excessive formalism, 
because right measure is also a (not always successful) criterion of judgment of 
conceptual and ethical ambivalences and a principle of harmonious combination of 
heterogeneous (not merely opposite) elements. Ultimately, this project illuminates an 
overlooked aspect of Plato’s philosophy: its multifaceted and dynamic attention to the 
guidance of human minds for the sake of psychological and political equilibrium. 
The conclusion of my research, accordingly, does not entail a reduction of the 
many facets of right measure to a single rigid pattern (opposite-balance-opposite or 
deficiency-measure-excess). This pattern will be theorised by Aristotle in defining the 
related ethical concept of the mean (mesotēs),291 but Plato’s representations of right 
measure in the Statesman escape any reductionism to abstract concepts. The figure of 
balance constitutes a useful heuristic outline to understand what right measure is 
without overshadowing its practical instances. If we imagine a pair of scales carried 
around on a ship amidst different climatic conditions, some calm and some turbulent, 
                                                             
291 Nichomachean Ethics 1104a-b. Notice however how Aristotle, exactly like Plato, forewarns his 
readers that ‘the whole account of moral actions is bound to be said as an outline, not with exact 
precision’ (πᾶς ὁ περὶ τῶν πρακτῶν λόγος τύπῳ καὶ οὐκ ἀκριβῶς ὀφείλει λέγεσθαι, 1104a). In a Platonic 
spirit, Aristotle remarks that the ethical mean (μεσότης) is imprecise in itself, and that morally wise 
actions are even more so because they, like medicine and navigation, always require contextual 
deliberation (Price, 2011, pp.200-201; 209; cf. Broadie, 1991, pp.17-19). 
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we will have a clearer picture of Plato’s right measure. The weights to be put on the 
scales, the length of its beams, and the position of the point of balance between them 
may be determined with mathematical exactness, but the correct adjusting of the scales 
to shifting and unstable circumstances will remain a contextual effort, not always 
precise. Analogously, the abstract criteria of right measure in its most stable state might 
be exactly determined through reason, but their practical instantiations under different 
conditions will vary, always requiring skillful and timely responses and never 
absolutely reducible to definitive norms. The outcome of my study thus consists in 
showing how, even within a clear pattern of right measure as balance, its each and every 
instance is irreducibly contextual and dependent on diverse specific practices. My study 
shows not just that to Plato this ethical model is good, but what makes it good in the 
circumstances examined. To Plato, the model of balance serves to orientate practices 
that are educationally productive, cognitively effective and ethically valuable, insofar as 
they counteract disharmony, confusion, and conflict and actively communicate 
autonomous harmony, lucidity and concord. 
This conclusion does not purport to be in any way exhaustive in scope, yet it 
illuminates Plato’s attention to practical efforts. The limitation of my research field to a 
single dialogue, however integrated by inter-textual comparisons, means that my results 
cannot be universalised without mediation. They do not express Plato’s definitive 
positions or identify hermeneutic principles valid, without change, in other contexts. 
Nonetheless, the advantage of my focalised study is twofold. First, it articulates the 
notion of right measure by relying on the only dialogue in which Plato has 
approximated its definition and insisted on representing its various facets. Second, it 
shows the inter-relation and central significance of two fields of Platonic research, 
imagery and ethical leadership, which are still too frequently considered as secondary to 
Plato’s theoretical concerns. Both fields are practical, not theoretical, because they are 
concerned with practices of correct and effective generation of right measure as 
balanced composition of diversities and contrasts. Even the theoretical effort of 
achieving knowledge ultimately depends on the exercise of right measure. My 
contribution is especially significant insofar as the Statesman itself has been read, 
almost universally, as hinging on theoretical concerns and formal methodology. My 
novel reading of this dialogue, by contrast, shows that the practical aspects of right 
measure are in fact preponderant. I have shown that Plato here conjoins some of his 
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highest theoretical efforts with a flexible and nuanced openness to the practical concerns 
of individual and collective guidance and self-guidance. 
Precise limits define the scope of this project and foreground further possible 
research. As I have observed, a broader reconstruction of right measure in Plato’s 
corpus, especially in relation to imagery, will require further study. Nonetheless, I have 
shown that the Statesman must be considered as paradigmatic of Plato’s cognitive usage 
of imagery as well as of his nuanced political stance. Verifying this claim will require to 
test its hold in different contexts. For instance, does the measured combination of 
images perform similar roles and produce a comparable psychological effect in other 
dialogues, especially when used by the exemplar philosopher Socrates, or is its usage 
idiosyncratic of the Stranger? Moreover, does the political model of educational 
leadership of minds apply to other dialogues? In particular, does it have any bearing on 
the notion of psychagogia (soul-guidance) credited to rhetoric (and thus to different 
kinds of rhetorical tools, not just imagery) in the Phaedrus? How does the foundational 
role of ethical psychology relate to Plato’s evaluation of constitutional forms and laws 
in other political dialogues? And what is the full scope of the relation between ethics 
and politics in Plato’s thought? Is the individual form of psychological guidance (and 
self-guidance) primary in his political evaluation, or is ethics itself contaminated by 
social and political dynamics? These implicit questions have haunted my research but I 
could not give them the space they deserve. 
Nonetheless, my evaluation of the Statesman as a paradigmatic model of 
educational leadership furnishes three fundamental methodological guidelines for 
further research. A) The cognitive and heuristic role of imagery emerges only in relation 
to its dialogical context, and in particular to the purposes for which images are used and 
to the psychological reactions they trigger. B) What Plato considers a positive effect of 
rhetorical techniques can be identified as dependent on its psychologically expert usage, 
namely on a counterbalancing management of detrimental lacks or excesses in cognition 
and emotion. C) The relation between ethical and political concerns can be clarified by 
paying attention to the mutual influence between individual practices or conditions and 
societal dynamics, always with regard to the balance of psychological and political 
constitutions. These guidelines allow us to test the hold of right measure as central 
principle of Plato’s compositional techniques, communication of ideas, ethical 
psychology and politics. The pattern of well-composed balance outlined in this thesis is, 
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I propose, fundamental for understanding Plato’s philosophy not just as theoretical 
exploration but also as a practical effort. 
Having so defined the scope, limitations, and contributions of my project, in the 
next sections I will outline in detail my contributions about cognitive images and 
leadership of minds. 
 
6.2. Cognitive Images: Combination and Clash of Perspectives 
In the central chapters of this dissertation, I have addressed the question whether Plato’s 
images perform a merely illustrative function or actively contribute to the acquisition of 
knowledge. This problem is crucial for a correct interpretation of the Statesman as 
configuring a dialogical experience about knowledge-acquisition, in agreement with the 
Stranger’s own remarks. Nonetheless, scholars so far have focused in particular on the 
illustrative function of paradeigmata. They have focused, without distinction, on the 
Stranger’s partial example of children that compare letters in simple and complex 
syllables, guided by the expertise of a teacher; they have considered this example as the 
central, if not unique, description of how the mind acquires knowledge through images; 
and have concluded that paradeigmata serve as easy-to-grasp terms of comparison that 
do not provide, on their own, access to new propositions or perspectives. Current 
scholars, therefore, unanimously hold that imagery, in the Statesman, contributes to 
inquiry only by providing stable and evident examples which, at best, establish a new 
structure for understanding complex ideas, but they offer no justifications for its validity 
nor grant novel insights. 
My study has demonstrated that this agreement needs to be challenged, for 
reasons of textual accuracy and conceptual completeness. First, the usage of 
paradeigmata needs to be located in the correct dialogical context, because the 
Stranger’s examples of knowledge acquisition describe the very process of inquiry that 
the Statesman represents. It cannot be understood, then, as a general epistemological or 
linguistic theory, without mediation. Second, the example of letters is too reductive in 
comparison to the process it illustrates, and needs to be combined with the other 
examples provided by the Stranger (visual arts and awakening). Third, the Stranger’s 
usage of imagery is not limited to instruments explicitly named paradeigmata (models), 
but it includes other images variously named as eikon, schema and paidia—or not 
named at all. This fact suggests that his primary concern is not the definition of a 
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specific rhetorical figure, but rather the similar impact of all images (analogies, 
comparisons, metaphors, etc...) on the inquiring mind. I have therefore organised my 
study of imagery according to three moments of inquiry. First, I have analysed the 
Stranger’s different examples of (1) visual arts, (2) awakening from dreams, and (3) 
juxtaposition of syllables as defining a theory of knowledge-acquisition as a process of 
(1) combination, (2) variation, and (3) recognition of different images, arguing that it is 
operative throughout the whole dialogue and never superseded by a definitive 
acquisition of truth (Chapter 2). Second, I have examined the Stranger’s notion of 
paidia, which he uses to denote illusory discourses in the Sophist and mythical imagery 
in the Statesman, as a process of either conflation or clash of opposite ideas (Chapter 3). 
Third, I have sought to unravel the complex workings of mythical imagery in this 
dialogue, focusing on the image of cosmic balance and analysing its inner articulation 
(Chapter 4). In this way, I have shown that images, in the Statesman, function as 
heuristic and cognitive instruments. 
 I have argued that images serve as heuristic instruments thanks to their 
interaction within a threefold process: (1) combination of different images in a cohesive 
whole (completion of a work of art); (2) disruptive variation of images and perspectives 
(awakening); and (3) comparative recognition of similarities (juxtaposition of syllables). 
The usage of imagery is thus part of an intellectual and dialectical dynamic whereby not 
only objective similarities are illustrated and transferred from a known object to one less 
known (3), but incompatible differences evaluated from the appropriate standpoint (2) 
and finally various perspectives integrated in an all-encompassing account (1). This 
process does not serve to attain a definition of its object: in the Statesman, the characters 
define statecraft, in reciprocal agreement and through diairesis of mutually exclusive 
alternatives, as a directive art for human communities. Images, thus, do not furnish 
answers to the Socratic question ‘what is this?’ (τί ἐστί;); they are not heuristic in 
relation to the essential nature of an object. Rather, we may say, they reply to the 
question ‘of what kind?’ (ὁ ποῖος;), they are heuristic in relation to the quality of their 
object in different contexts and under different respects. This is the theoretical reason 
why, in this dialogue, statecraft is always examined from distinct perspectives: as 
autonomous production of a good, in accordance with the image of a producer; as 
collective care of a living community, following the model of the herdsman; as 
cooperative construction of a cohesive social fabric, as per the model of the weaver; as 
necessarily imprecise in its legislative function, based on the analogy with a trainer of 
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gymnastics; and as provision of health and safety against detrimental inner conflicts and 
instabilities, following the images of the doctor and the helmsman. All these images do 
not serve to provide a conclusive demonstration or linear definition, but rather to 
achieve a more complex and encompassing conceptual figure of statecraft, without 
conflating it with any of its partial aspects but allowing for constant intellectual 
movement through different angles of inquiry. 
Images and models, overall, are crucial to knowledge-acquisition as depicted in 
the Statesman, for three reasons. First, it is necessary to recognise that each contextual 
description of statecraft works as an image, a term of comparison through which an 
object is seen as something fundamentally distinct, and which thus orientates the 
inquiring mind from a specific perspective. Second, it is necessary to eschew a twofold 
lack of measure, either identifying statecraft completely with one of its possible images, 
or radically falling into disrupting lacks of recognition, complete confusion and radical 
‘ignorance’ (ἀγνοεῖν, 277d4) whenever the perspective necessarily changes. Third, it is 
necessary to combine the various images into a unified figure, recognising their points 
of conjunction and variation, and judging them within the broader conceptual field they 
generate. It is necessary to preserve a balanced intellectual dynamism that eschews both 
reduction to one-sided accounts and dispersion among confusing differences. The 
Statesman thus shows that conceiving different opinions as images and through images 
allows the inquiring mind to orientate itself among the complexities of a multifaceted 
issue and reach a broader, more flexible point of view. Even if it is certainly possible to 
furnish a different, more literal account of what images represent, the very dynamic 
movement of intellect and dialectic through different angles, the capacity to ‘see as’, to 
conceive an object under different regards without losing track of their fundamental 
unity, constitutes the irreducible heuristic role of Plato’s imagery. 
 The mythical paidia similarly contributes to knowledge-acquisition, but in a 
more problematic way. It does not unfold similarities and differences in a discursive 
process, but rather condenses them within a narrative frame, whereby conceptual 
distinctions become less evident. Its immediate effect is therefore not one of increased 
lucidity, but one of puzzled wonder. As a consequence, the interaction of different 
images within a mythical narration produces a clash of contradictory ideas. 
Nonetheless, this clash (συμβάλλειν, 273a1 and 285a5), if recognised correctly, 
performs in the myth the same function that the combination (σύγκρασις, 278d3) of 
perspectives performs throughout a discursive inquiry, or at least a comparable one. It 
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must in fact be emphasised that the clash, a trigger of puzzled wonder rather than 
knowledge, remains more problematic because it is the mark of something that has not 
been sufficiently clarified, or better of the cognitive impossibility of measuring and 
judging correctly with definitive certainty. Its cognitive contribution remains a positive 
one, nonetheless, precisely insofar as it brings to light an irreducible ambivalence and it 
stimulates the cognitive ability to evaluate the same object from opposite angles. 
In Chapter 4, I have analysed the clash of the two images of cosmic movement 
envisaged in the Statesman: inner balance of the universe and external guidance of a 
divine helmsman. Both images represent one and the same figure (σχῆμα, 269a5) of 
movement, the circular motion of the heavens; and both are culturally associated to the 
notion of right measure, either as spatial equipoise or timely action; but they also 
vehicle radically opposed and incompatible ideas about expert guidance. The first image 
is spatial, focused on the centre of an all-encompassing spherical body, and expresses 
the notion of autonomous self-control. Differently, the second image is temporal, it 
shifts the attention on the periphery of the universe, including the image of an external 
space in which the cosmos can founder, and vehicles the idea of a guiding power that 
sustains the universe. The two images, albeit displaying one and the same figure of 
circularity, are explicitly represented as opposite, because they develop in two opposite 
directions (ἐκ τοῦ ἐναντίου, 269a4; cf. ‘ἐναντίαν ὁρμὴν’ 273a2). Plato even represents 
this opposition as a physical event, a collision that brings about a series of catastrophes 
on earth. Thus, he draws explicit attention to his carefully constructed clash of 
incompatible images. He represents the very image of cosmic autonomy not as a given 
state, but as the delicate and independent replication of a former guidance. 
The clash of incompatible ideas, ultimately, serves to produce the novel and 
puzzling notion that autonomy needs to be acquired, that independence is dependent on 
conditions of measured control, and that wisdom (φρόνησιν, 269d1) and care 
(ἐπιμέλειαν, 274d5) over oneself consist in the preservation of a delicate tension 
between opposite drives. This is the philosophical reason of the inherent ambivalence of 
cosmic imagery in the Statesman. On the one hand, the measured movement of wisdom 
is one and the same, regardless of whether it is imposed from outside or autonomously 
enacted; on the other, autonomous wisdom can be learned and right measure can be 
acquired, in a problematic shift that both preserves and opposes external guidance, 
because it maintains the external norm but does so in its own way. There is more in the 
image of cosmic revolutions than in the figure of divine guidance, precisely because the 
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cosmos, material and susceptible of instability, requires to exert a tense internal balance 
that, alone, allows it to replicate the perfect divine motion in complete autonomy. Once 
again, Plato is inviting his readers to look at the notion of directive control from two 
different perspectives, both of which are necessary for the completeness of its 
conceptual figure. 
Images thus perform a heuristic or cognitive function in their dynamic 
interaction, either as harmonious combination or puzzling clash. Working together, 
images construct novel conceptual spaces, where the notion of a measured and 
balancing leadership can be understood in further detail. By presenting images as 
susceptible of combination and clash, Plato displays his awareness that imagery has a 
strong cognitive power, which transcends the limit of didactic illustration. This does not 
mean, however, that images as such have a privileged cognitive power. They do not 
provide, as Pender remarks, any unique or direct access to philosophical knowledge 
(2000, pp.50-59). In fact, their outcomes, as defined here, could be achieved by a 
plethora of different linguistic tools: for instance, Plato uses the dialogue form as a way 
to represent the diversity of points of view and their successful or failed integration; he 
uses Socratic irony to point out when accepted opinions implicitly clash with each 
other; and he resorts to Socratic refutation in order to correct the conflict of opinions 
within the soul, in the same way as he does with images in the Statesman. Moreover, the 
Statesman shows that no single instrument of inquiry is sufficient, in itself, to attain 
philosophical knowledge; it rather represents a complex interplay of different methods, 
including diairesis, mythical narration, and imagery. Insofar as all linguistic expressions 
are irreducibly different from the realities they serve to represent, Plato often insists, 
they are akin to images.292 This general observation holds as much for diairesis, debate, 
irony, and refutation as it does for paradeigmata, eikones, and paidia. Such a generic 
claim does not coincide with a disqualification of any of those instruments; rather, it 
means that each of them needs to be understood in its specific potentials and limitations. 
It could be proven, arguably, that all of them contribute differently to the process of 
knowledge-acquisition, and function in specific contexts as heuristic tools. Nonetheless, 
in this occasion, Plato has chosen to achieve this outcome through imagery, as integral 
part of an educational effort that does not merely aim to instruct but to incite the 
inquiring mind to consider the same issue from different perspectives, striving to 
evaluate and combine them as correctly as possible. 
                                                             
292 Pol. 277a3-c6. Cf. Crat. 439a-b, Tim. 19b3-20a1, Criti. 106c-108a; Resp. X.595a1-608b9; Phaedr. 
275d4-e6; Epist. VII 342a1-344d2. 
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6.3. Leadership of Minds: Educating to Inner Balance 
In the first and last chapters of this thesis I have framed my study of imagery within the 
main subject of the dialogue, namely the correct guidance of human minds based on the 
principle of right measure. The topic of ethical psychology and of the criteria for its 
guidance in the Statesman has received scant scholarly attention, and its political 
account has never been connected to the process of education it represents. The 
presence of psychological elements in the dialogical scene itself, namely in Plato’s 
portrayal of an instance of philosophical guidance, has not hitherto been studied. This 
limitation, I have argued, is due to the persistent reading of the Statesman as a technical 
methodological dialogue, frequently combined with the opinion that Plato had lost his 
artistic touch by the time he composed this work. By contrast, I have shown that both 
Plato’s compositional skills and his attention to psychological nuances are crucial to a 
cohesive interpretation of this dialogue. By studying the structure of the dialogue 
(Chapter 1) and the consistency between the dialogical scene and its political doctrine 
(Chapter 5), I have shown that right measure is the underlying philosophical principle of 
the Statesman not only theoretically but also composition-wise. I have thus shown that 
this dialogue serves to represent, through its composition and dramatic scene, how right 
measure works as a criterion of cognitive and emotional orientation. 
In Chapter 1, I have studied the structure of the Statesman in relation to the 
principle of right measure. First of all, my purpose in this chapter has been to present a 
clear-cut point of reference for the following analyses, showing how the various images 
in the Statesman are clearly organised according to two opposite paths of inquiry, in 
agreement with the widely accepted overview established by Diés (1935). I have argued 
that an accurate understanding of this structure cannot be limited to a formal 
identification of sections, but needs to be expanded to its philosophical significance. 
Accordingly, I have demonstrated that the Statesman is not only divided, on the 
macroscopic level, between the inquiry into statecraft as akin to herding (258a7-277a2) 
and as modelled upon weaving (287b4-311c8) by a central reflection on ‘right measure’ 
in philosophical discourses (277a3-287b3), but also by a series of identically structured 
divisions at more detailed levels. As I have shown, diairesis (258a7-268d4) is 
methodologically distinct from myth (268d5-277a2), and separation of political arts 
(287b4-305e7) is distinct from the account of statecraft as unification of virtues in the 
citizens (305e8-311c8). Moreover, each of these moments is split in two by different 
critical reflections: on the criteria of correct diairesis (262a5-263e5); on the ethical 
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evaluation of apolitical and political lives (272b3-d6); on the relation between expert 
authority and laws (293e6-300c4); and finally on the criterion that should guide political 
leadership (308b10-308e3). In every case, we find the same structure of ‘organised 
disruptions’ (alternative A – critical reflection – alternative B) embedded in different 
‘units of meaning’, rather than a linear succession of arguments from premises to 
conclusions. In addition, Plato has represented this disrupting process as occasionally 
troublesome, the cause of possible revulsion (286b7; 294a2) against apparent 
digressions and perceived excesses, precisely because it forces the inquirers to 
constantly re-evaluate their opinions through various shifts of focus. Right measure acts 
as a practical criterion of evaluation and orientation of mind between contraposed 
alternatives. 
I have thus argued that this structure is philosophically significant because it 
embeds in the very dialogue the philosophical notion of ‘right measure’, the art of 
finding ‘the middle’ (τὸ μέσον, 284e7) between contrasting standpoints and formulating 
correct judgments, which Plato construes as fundamental both to philosophy and to 
politics. Plato’s choice to represent a dramatic dialogue as opposed to writing a 
methodological treatise is crucial, because it construes philosophical inquiry as a 
process that demands frequent disruptions, re-evaluations and corrections of established 
opinions. The Statesman artfully represents the education of Young Socrates’s inquiring 
mind in resisting the appeal of one-sided, straightforward opinions, and in striving (not 
always successfully: 272d2-4) to formulate a correct judgment (krisis)  every time a 
critical difficulty challenges former agreements. By structuring the Statesman in this 
way, Plato has combined his masterful compositional skills and his persistent interest in 
philosophical education as a dynamic effort of challenging, in a Socratic spirit, 
preconceived ideas while never renouncing to strive dialectically for the truth. 
I have tackled this educational dynamic in deeper detail in Chapter 5, by 
comparing the educational praxes that Plato has presented in relation to philosophy and 
politics. I have shown that Plato has represented the educational dialogue between the 
Stranger and Young Socrates as a toilsome effort (πόνον, 257c10) of mutual 
acknowledgment of standpoints, whereby the latter character acquires autonomous 
philosophical insights in the implicit difficulties of the former’s arguments. I have 
shown, in addition, that the Stranger represents the movement of intellect and discourse, 
through which he is leading Young Socrates, as circular and in need of stability: he 
envisages digressive discourses as dynamically ‘going round in circles’ (τὰς ἐν κύκλῳ 
224 
 
περιόδους, 286e5), and the inquiring mind (ψυχὴ, 278c8) either as capable of ‘standing 
composed’ (συνίσταται, 278d2) or as ‘carried around everything’ (περὶ ἅπαντα […] 
φέρεται, ibid.) that is said. Plato thus shows awareness that the Statesman represents a 
variety of disruptions and divergent perspectives, inherent to philosophical inquiries and 
psychologically problematic. In accordance with Plato’s recurring images of the 
revolving universe, and in particular with the image of a ‘perfectly balanced’ 
(ἰσορροπώτατον, 270a8) cosmos in the Statesman, the educational objective he 
promotes here is one of inner order of opinions and emotional dispositions, resisting 
both the dispersive cognitive and emotional thrusts that complicate the attainment of a 
clear, all-encompassing vision (doubts and perplexities as much as hastiness or 
revulsion), and the static fixity of one-sided opinions. 
Finally, I have argued that Plato envisages the same educational framework as 
operative in the statesman’s guidance of the citizens’ dispositions. I have observed that, 
like in the Republic and the Laws, he construes political constitutions as emerging from 
a complex network of psycho-physical dispositions, habits and beliefs that influence 
social dynamics and political institutions (and are influenced by them). In the 
Statesman, however, Plato’s focus rests exclusively on the two opposite forms of life 
determined by either aggressiveness and courage or mildness and moderation, as he 
brackets other factors such as desire for money or poetical fascination. Despite these 
differences in scope, Plato’s framework remains the same: dynamic social interactions 
are in need of balance (and thus of philosophical guidance) to eschew detrimental 
hostility (ἔχθραν, 307d4) and find a viable form of ‘concord and friendship’ (ὁμονοίᾳ 
καὶ φιλίᾳ, 311b9). I have observed that the image of unbalanced inclinations recurs in 
Plato’s major political dialogues, the Republic and the Laws, and argued that in the 
Statesman this model is limited to the mutual counterbalancing of courage and 
moderation. The Stranger only uses this image once, addressing the souls ‘inclining’ 
(ῥέποντες) towards courage, because his main concern consists in the corrective 
creation of social bonds among citizens. Nonetheless, the same psychological 
framework is at work in this dialogue. The Stranger radically separates ideal statecraft 
from more traditional conceptions of politics in terms of its role of educating the 
citizens’ minds.  
Overall, in the Statesman statecraft is a way of communicating autonomous 
balance to the citizens. This communication is based both on the statesman’s action of 
‘drawing together’ (συνάγοντα, 311a1) the subjects, and on the citizens’ inherent 
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tendency to be ‘carried in opposite directions’ (ἐπὶ τὰ ἐναντία φερομένων, 310a5) by 
their equally valuable drives. To the Stranger, the ideal political situation is for 
courageous and moderate citizens to acknowledge that both impulses are equally needed 
for the city’s autonomy and integrity. The Stranger envisages an ideal situation in which 
the statesman communicates a permanent (ἀεὶ, 311a2) mutual tension to the citizens, 
whereby they can learn to enter in constructive partnership (κοινῇ, ibid.; κοινωνεῖν, 
309e2) and autonomously act, as it were, as mutual counterweights to their potential 
excesses through a non-antagonistic ‘exchange of opinions’ (δόξαις […] ἐκδόσεσιν εἰς 
ἀλλήλους, 310e10-11). His political ideal, radical as it is, is not a naïve appreciation of 
strict orthodoxy or generic friendliness, but a reflective and well-structured evaluation 
of the advantages of convergent opinions combined with divergent but not hostile 
emotional dispositions that can benefit a city. It is an ideal figure of statecraft as 
practical communication of a well-balanced social cohesion. 
I have concluded that Plato has presented in the Statesman an ideal figure of 
statecraft as a constructive leadership of minds that is structurally akin to philosophical 
guidance. Both are forms of educational guidance that aim to: (1) cure or prevent the 
‘malady’ (νόσημα, 283b7; νόσος, 307d7) of detrimental confusion and contrast among 
opinions and emotional drives; (2) give value to the coexistence of contrasts not as 
hostile contradiction, but as a kind of ‘game’ (παιδιὰν, 268d8; παιδιὰ, 307d6) that 
encompasses their opposition; and (3) achieve their cohesive ‘mixture’ (συγκράσεων, 
278d3; σύγκρασιν, 308e7). To Plato, in the Statesman as much as in the other political 
dialogues, the inner order of both psychological (cognitive and emotional) and social 
conditions depends on an educational, but not dogmatic, guidance towards a 
constructive dialectical equilibrium. The right measure of the city ultimately consists in 
a form of balance to be exercised by the citizens themselves in mutual support. 
By contrast with widespread readings of this dialogue and of its political theory 
as strictly methodological and doctrinal, I submit a novel and more nuanced 
interpretation of the Statesman. Plato has represented here a process of educational 
communication of right measure. By employing sophisticated compositional techniques 
and imagery, he has effectively portrayed the dynamics of measured guidance and 
balanced self-regulation. Thus, he has sought to promote an ideal of genuinely 
educational praxes that can respond to cognitive and emotional factors, which may 
threaten as much as enable, if correctly exercised, the individual and social attainment 
of inner balance.  
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